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PREFACE 
For those unfamiliar with the geography of France, and 
to ass i st with the identification of a reas speclf, cally 
mentioned in the text7 named deipartements are accompanied by 
a number in brackets (f or example Aude (11) - These numbers 
correspond to those given on the map of de pa, rt ement s 
provided in Appendix One. 
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ABSTRACT 
19737 the F revic h government, 1 ri response to 
considerable pressure from- small retailer interest g 1,0 Lips, i nt rod Liced legislation ai med at restricting t he f ut Lire 
growth Of large area retail stores. The Lo i Royer" 
established a series of d6partemental planning COIYIIYlissi Otis 
composed of retailer, locally electeo, and consumer 
representatives. These commissions were given the power to 
authorise or reject planning applications for large retail 
units and extensions to existing stores, above certain size 
thresholds dependent upon the size of the commune in which 
development was to take place. The law allowed for an 
appeal proceedure in which the Minister of Commerce and 
Crafts, advised by a national commission of similar 
composition, was the final arbiter. 
This thesis examines the impact of the "Loi Royer", 
with particular reference to hypermarket development in 
France. The spatial and structural growth of large stores, 
and large retail organisations is assessed, with case 
studies undertaken on the application of the law in the 
Brittany region, and the growth of the Carrefour group. The 
role and form of public policy in the retail sector in 
general is also considered. 
The composition of the commissions and proceedures 
established by the legislation provided considerable 
potential for influencing the development of large stores in 
France. However, whilst the legislation has had some short 
term and localised. impact upon hypermarket development, in 
the long term, the restrictive effects of the law must be 
questioned. By exploiting various loopholes and failings in 
the legislation, hypermarket openings have continued, and 
the large retail groups have maintained their growth largely 
at the expense of the small retailer, whom the law was 
intended to protect. The legislation may also have 
indirectly encouraged numerous strategic adaptions, on the 
part of the larger retail organisations, which have served 
to further improve their position vis a vis smaller 
retailers, or introduced large retail groups into sectors 
traditionally dominated by independent traders. 
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CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION 
"Conceivably t own-p I ann ing and land use control may t urn out to be am o rig t he most powerful external 
variables that help shape our fo rt hcoty, 1 rig retail 
structures. " (Hollander 1973) 
most sectors of the economy are in f1 uenced by state 
intervention of some form. In December 1973, in response to 
various political and economic pressures, the French 
government introduced legislation based upon land use 
control in an attempt to influence the growth of large store 
retailing which was perceived as an increasing threat to the 
small independent retailer. The Loi Royer established a 
system of de"opartemeritaI commissions consisting of retailer, 
local authority and consumer representatives to consider 
applications for new store developments and extensions to 
existing retail units above certain size thresholds. An 
appeal proceedure allowed for recourse to the Minister of 
Commerce and Crafts who was the final arbiter of any 
proposal. This study analyses the effects of this 
legislation with particular reference to the development of 
hypermarkets, and, to both large, and small scale retail 
organisations. 
To interpret the impact of any public policy measure it 
is neccessary to develop some understanding of the event or 
innovation at which the legislation is aimed, and in 
particular of the forces underlying it. With this in nnind7 
Chapter Two provides a review of the traditional models of 
institutional change within the retail sect o r, which have 
been constructed in attempts to explain the appearance of an 
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innovation, it's development, and the responses of ot hers 
towards it. The role of the retail env i ronm6rit in 
generating such change and adaption is considered, and t fie 
major t rends in two influential features of this 
environment, the organisational and consumer components, are 
briefly discussed with regard to their role in the evolution 
of the hypermarket. 
A definition of the hypermarket., emphasising the unique 
features and operating characteristics which distinguish it 
as a new concept of retailing and a major institutional 
innovation, is provided in Chapter Three. This section also 
considers the impact, both socially and phys i ca 11 y of 
this new institution upon the existing retail system. The 
particular retail system in which the hypermarket appeared 
and evolved is the subject of Chapter Four, which 
illustrates the importance, relationships, and relative 
positions of power., of the different types of retail 
organisations and the existing retail institutions in 
France. 
Chapter Five examines the role of public policy in the 
retail sector, and contemplates the aims of such policy. T he 
approaches that may be taken towards perceived problems in 
the sector are considered, alongside the variety of 
instruments and measures at the disposal of the state to 
attempt to achieve these aims. The forces which encourage 
state interventioriv and determine the exact mix of policies 
chosen,, are noted, with particular emphasis placed upon the 
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role of pressure groups in this process. in view of t he 
apparent influence of these bodies in France,, the role of 
interests groups is examined, and consideration is given to 
their access to power through conventional and r1orl- 
conventional channels,, and with regard to various ryiodels of 
state/pressure group relationships. 
The specific development of retail legislation in 
France is discussed in Chapter Six. A change in government 
attitude towards large stores is noted, and the influence of 
particular retail pressure groups upon this change in policy 
is stressed. Finally, the text of the Loi Royer is 
examined., along with supporting government Circulars issued 
at later dates. 
The Royer legislation imposed potentially restrictive 
conditions upon proposals for large store development in 
France. In view of this, the trends in hypermarket 
development both before and - 
following government 
i-ntervention are noted in Chapter Seven. Numerical 
development, size and other characteristics, spatial 
patterns, and other features likely to be influenced by the 
legislation are examined, alongside trends in ownership by 
different types of retail organisations. Explanations for 
the observed trends7 and the consequences for various 
organisational sectors are suggested, and two noticable 
developments, the growth of acquisitions, and extensions to 
existing units, are attributed specifically to the Loi 
Royer. 
Chapters Eight and Nine provide an examination of t he 
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applications made for development based upon new large 
stores, and for extensions to existing units at both the 
local and national (following appeal) level. The vi um be r, 
type, and spatial features of applications and their success 
rates are noted for proposals based upon different types of 
development, and by different types of organ i sat ion. 
Detailed discussion of the applications based upon 
hypermarkets and supermarkets, and extensions to existing 
stores of this type is undertaken, and the impact of 
Ministerial decisions upon those applications taken to 
appeal is examined. On the basis of the trends n oted in 
these Chapters possible adaptions in the application policy 
of certain types of organisation are suggested. 
An evaluation of the changing application policies of 
developers is to be found in Chapter Ten. The real effect 
of the commissions as a block on retail development is 
questioned, as is the role and motivation of the centralised 
decisions made by the Minister. A further level of control 
not accounted for by the legislation, the judicial courts, 
is also discussed. Finally, the operational effects of the 
law, in relation to development costs, the various 
loopholes in the legislation that have been exploited by 
applicants, and the apparent changes in application and 
development strategies are examined. 
A case study of the Brittany region (Chapter Eleven) 
provides a specific example of the workings of the Loi Royer 
at the local level, and the issues raised by the preceeding 
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eval'uation of the legislation are examined in the Brittany 
context. As a postscript to this section, and in the light 
of the suggested failings of the legislation,, the debate 
concerning possible amendments to the Loi Royer is 
discussed. Attention is focused upon the composition of the 
commissions,? the decent ral isat ion of ministerial authority, 
and the size thresholds of applications required to be 
submitted to the commissions. 
Finally, in Chapter Twelve, more strategic implications 
which may be partly attributed to the legislation, but over 
which the legislation has little control, are discussed. 
These issues-, relating to the structural trends within the 
retail sector, such as increasing concentration, 
diversification'. development abroad, and other changes and 
adaptions in operating strategies, are suggested to be a 
more direct and long term threat to the position of the 
independent trader. These developments are placed in the 
context of an individual firm. in the case study of 
Carrefour, one of the-leading retail groups in France, in 
Chapter Thi rteen. 
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CHAPTER TWO : THE DEVELOPMENT OF RETAIL iNSTITUTIONS 
Any attempt to evaluate the legislative response of the 
state to an event or aevelopment which disrupts the status 
quo should consider the way in which such an event or 
development occurs, and the forces which give rise to this 
development. The appearance of new retail innovations or 
institutions is no exception to this rule. 
There are numerous theories attempting to explain 
institutional change in the retail sector, and M41rtenson 
(1981) has reviewed most of these. The scope of theoretical 
models available ranges from those which simply draw 
analogies with others developed for the sciences, to 
cyclical models which attempt to explain change over time, 
and to concepts that relate to the organisational reaction 
to change. 
Dreesmann (1968) drew attention to similarities between 
retailing and biological systems, and presented various 
analogies between innovation in retailing and mutation in 
biology., illustrating that during periods of mutation, as 
can be the case with retail innovation, developments may be 
fast, violent, unexpected and revolutionary. Other 
analogies suggested by Dreesmann are those of convergence 
towards a common form, as a retail innovation is adopted and 
accepted by others; hypertrophy, which allows certain 
species or innovations to outgrow their competitors owing to 
a temporary lack of competition; regression or backward 
evolution in the shadow of main (and often contrasting) 
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developments, which explains how the growth of large out-of- 
t own stores may provide opportunities for small local 
retailers; and finally assimilation,, as existing species or 
forms mutate or convert into new ones. Whilst there may be 
a certain charm to these ideas, the applicability of much of 
Dreesmann's theory is somewhat limited, as the author 
himself acknowledged... 
"The use of biological analogies can be promising in 
systematising the theory of evolution in retailing. 
The dangers avid limits of this methodological aid are 
also obvious, especially in the possible mixture of 
causal and finalistic descriptions of reality. " 
Dreesmann (1968) 
More recently, Etgar (1984) has developed a retail 
ecology model, in which he argues that the emergence and 
survival of a new retail institution? defined as an 
organisational form through which various resources (human, 
financial, physical, and social) are combined to achieve 
organisational goals, is controlled by a natural selection 
process. If the new institution passes through this process 
it is likely to survive. The natural selection process 
involves three stages and commences with the variation 
appearance phase in which the new retail institution or 
species first appears. The second stage of the model, that 
of selection, ensures the survival of those new institutions 
which provide the best "fit" to the environment. Etgar 
emphasises the role that luck and random factors may play 
during this stage. Finally, the retention phase is reached 
when the institution is preserved and duplicated by other 
organisations. 
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Numerous mech-anisms of change are identified in each of 
these stages. In the initial phase, change may be generated 
by factors relating to historical development, which may 
allow an old institution which is "dying" to find a new 
niche or role as the environment changes, or by horizontal 
competition between institutions for consumer patronage. 
Change may also occur during this variation appearance stage 
as a result of vertical conflict within the marketing 
channel (relating to Galbraith"s concept of countervailing 
power as one actor in the channel responds to an increase in 
the power possessed by another), or through both planned 
attempts by entrepreneurs to develop new institutions,, and 
random factors. 
In the selection stage, survival is ensured by the 
adoption of those retail strategies which provide advantages 
over competitors. Etgar suggests that this is achieved by 
either a reduction in transaction costs, whether financial 
or temporal, or by improving efficiency through horizontal 
or vertical economies of scale. Finally, retention occurs 
as a result of such mechanisms as the diffusion process, in 
which the institution is adopted in its original form; 
through a dialectic mechanism, which sees the new 
innovation adopted by existing institutions and modified to 
suit their needs; or by external expansion, when the 
innovating organisation expands of its own accord and 
replaces older institutions. 
By far the greatest discussion, however, has centered 
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upon cyclical theories of retail change, whicn attempt to 
explain t he growth and decline of specific retail 
inst it I-it i Otis. The Accordion theory noted by Hall, Knapp and 
Winsten (1961), and elaborated by Hollander (1966), suggests 
that the retail sector- experiences alternating market 
domination by stores with wide and narrow product 
assortments (figure 2.1). General, wide line stores create 
a vacuum for speciality stores within the sector, as they 
can not offer style and variety; whilst in turn, speciality 
stores in an attempt to improve sales tend to add other 
lines of merchandise. This model is useful in illustrating 
how the behaviour of one type of institution will create 
both the opportunity and need for complementary 
institutions. 
Hollander (1966) argues that despite an increasing 
trend towards scrambled merchandising throughout retailing, 
openings will always exist for narrow assortment specialist 
retailers for a variety of reasons. Many traders will wish 
to remain as specialists, viewing themselves more as 
craftsmen rather than businessmen. Restraints will prevent 
a complete conversion to scrambled merchandising, whether on 
a voluntary basis, as traders will not enter other retail 
sectors for fear of retaliation by established traders, or 
owing to legislative blocks which prevent entry into certain 
fields, as is the case with pharmacy and alcohol retailing. 
The capacity of different organisations, in particular 
with regards to their capital and other resources, may also 
prevent scrambling, and some diversifications may prove too 
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cost Iy for firms. Final ly, Hollander suggests that the 
complex pat te rn of consumer preferences and habits will 
maintain contraction (specialisation) and expansion 
(scrambling) of the retail accordion. As a result 
opportunities will always exist for the specialist retail 
institution 
... 
"the retai I population will continue to resemble the 
composition of a well-designed shopping centre. The developers of these centres have always recognised the 
way in which large, wide scale entreprises and small, 
specialised ones complement each other to provide the 
most attractive shopping combination. " (Hollander 1'966) 
The most established cyclical model of retail change is 
the "wheel of retailing", developed by McNair in 1958. This 
theory suggests that new retail institutions enter the 
sector as low status, low margin, and low price operations, 
and then gradually trade up as they acquire more elaborate 
establishments and facilities which demand greater financial 
investment and incur increased operating costs. 
Consequently, the institution matures into a high cost, high 
price type, which itself becomes vulnerable to new low 
margin, low price institutions, as the "wheel" turns a full 
cycle. 
Hollander (1960) suggests tentative explanations for 
the movement of the "wheel". New retail institutions are 
often pioneered by aggressive, cost-conscious entrepreneurs. 
Sol as these individuals age and become wealthier, their 
commitment may wane, and their successors may be less 
competent. Hence, an associated deterioration in management 
may cause the "wheel" to t urn. Alternat ively, management 
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may be misguided by suppliers who pp-rsuade them to adopt 
unnecessary modernisat ions and over-elaborate facilities. 
More plausable explanations for moveryient may be f0 und 
in the theories of imperfect competition. Retailers often 
avoid direct price competition, either because of controls 
relating to resale price maintenance., or for fear of 
immediate retaliation by competitors. As a result they turn 
instead to improvements in service which are less 
susceptible to direct retaliation. McNair himself explained 
movement of the "wheel" through the development of excess 
capacity in conditions of imperfect competition as more and 
more operators adopt the innovation. 
The adoption of certain innovations, such as scrambled 
merchandising techniques may also 
addition of higher margin lines. 
suggested that secular trends 
the standard of living rises, 
trading up as the institution 
wealthier consumer segments. 
may 
cause movement through the 
Finally, it has also been 
account for movement. As 
opportunities are provided 
seeks to take advantage of 
Meanwhile, because of 
or 
t he 
t he 
unequal distribution of standard of living increases, 
opportunities remain for the entry and development of low 
cost, low price institutions. 
Criticisms of the "wheel of retailing" focus primarily 
upon it's inability to explain all types of institutions or 
t0 be applicable in all environments. The model does not 
appear to explain retail development in developing 
ecorio. iyoies, i ri which the new institutionsi such as 
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supermarkets, enter as high margin, high cost operations. 
Simi larly, whi lst institutional developments in more 
deveýoped economies, such as the department store and 
supermarket, may conform to the model, other innovations 
such as automatic merchandising , and shopping centres 
certainly do not, as they enter as high cost/price 
institutions. Further problems of justifying the "wheel" 
theory arise from the limitations of existing retail 
typologies (Hollander 1981), and the availability of data 
concerned with retail margins - both of which hamper 
analysis. 
Goldman (1978) identifies four hypotheses within the 
McNair model. Firstly, that institutions enter the retail 
sector on the basis of price appeall secondly, that the low 
prices offered by new institutions result from reduced 
operating costs by virtue of fewer services and lower store 
quality; thi rd 1 y., that after establishing itself, the new 
innovation will trade up; and finally, t-hat trading up 
causes the appearance of new institutional innovations. 
However, according to Goldman, three of these hypotheses do 
not stand up to examination. 
Evidence does not seem to support the idea that new 
institutions develop on the basis of price appeal alone, for 
as has been noted above, many new innovations are based upon 
other factors such as service and convenience. Similarly, 
numerous other reasons (other than reduced service and 
store quality) may be found for the lower operating costs 
noted in many new institutions. Economies of scale, the 
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standard i sat i on/packag ing of goods, and other technological 
advances, may provide more plausible explanations. 
The fourth hypothesis, that trading up provides 
opportunities for the entry of low cost/price institutions 
assumes that either retailers that trade up provide services 
which consumers do not want, or that new low income 
consumers appear, and that established retailers do not 
fight back against new competition. Goldman argues that all 
of these assumptions are invalid as services are added 
because of consumer demand, new institutions take trade from 
existing consumers; and* established retailers certainly do 
respond to and resist new institutions. 
The only hypothesis supported by Goldman is that which 
states that trading up occurs, and he identifies three types 
of trading up; routine, which involves the addition of more 
of the existing services; non-routine, in which new services 
are added to existing ones; and innovaiive, whereby a new 
price-service combination is established, which differs from 
the established pattern. It is noted that innovative 
trading up will only be attempted if routine, and non- 
routine methods fail. 
One major criticism of the McNair model is that the 
11wheel" concept does not explain, nor consider the response 
of established institutions to new developments. Izraeli 
(197: 5) attempts to overcome this problem, and provide some 
explanation for the entry of high margin, high price/service 
institutions, in a theory which considers three wheels of 
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ret ai1 ing. I-Araeli suggests that three (not one) "wheels" 
exist, and his model comprises or a high cost/price 
institution and a low cost/price institution "wheel", either 
side of a larger " whee I rep resent i rig established 
institutions (figure 2.2). 
The entry of a new institution at either extreme 
provokes a reaction from the others, as the established 
institutions attempt to imitate the methods of the innovator 
to maintain or regain their market shares, and as innovating 
institutions are pressurised into becoming mo re 
conventional. Hence a low cost/price innovation (A) upgrades 
both its prices and services and moves along the margin/cost 
continuum, Whilst the conventional low priced outlets (C) 
downgrade to meet the competition provided by A. As- t he 
differences between the rival institutions diminish the 
cycle of the "wheels" slows down and stops, thus ... 
"the cycle, which began with conflict, ends with 
accommodat ion. (Izraeli 1973) 
The new innovations (A and B), bei: ome part of the 
establishment which takes up a greater share of the 
continuum. This situation represents stability in the 
sector, and provides the conditions for the arrival of a new 
innovating institutions, at either end of the continuuml, 
which in turn precipitates a new cycle of the three 
"wheels". 
A further type of cyclical model explaining now new 
retail institutions may behave is that put forward by 
Davidson, Bat es I and Bass (1976), who adapted the idea of 
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Figure 2.2 : The Three Wheels of Retailing. 
Of- 
rigure r: Emergence of low-end innovative institution 
A and high-end innovative institution B 
V., - rigure 3: Establishment expands through addition of 
former innovative institutions A and B 
Figure 2: Response of established institutions C and 
D, and "actions of innovati . ve j. nstitutions A and B 
V. - Frgure 4: The cyck starts again with entry of 
innovative institutions E and F 
Izraeli (1973) 
the product life cycle to fit retail institutions. As with 
the product life cycle, the institutional life cycle passes 
throl. Agh fou. r phases of development (figure 
early growth or 
-. 
Int he 
innovation phase, the new innovating 
inst itut ion appears. The institution contrasts Witn 
existing retailers and is unique either in terms of its cost 
structure or in some other feature (locationi product 
assortment, promotional practices). The new innovation 
attracts customers and sales rise. However, the concept is 
rather crude and needs to be redefined, as profits lag 
behind sales owing to probiems associatea with operating the 
new venture, high initial investment costs, or an inability 
to achieve economies of scale owing to size. 
Theý second phase, that of accelerated development, sees 
a rapid growth in both sales and profits, which encourages 
the institution to expand geographically, and encourages 
other retailers to adopt the innovation. Towards the end of 
this phase, the sales, market share and profitability of the 
institution reach a maximum level. 
During t tie thi rd phase of maturity, market share 
stagnates as operating problems begin to occur. 
Difficulties arise in controlling a large and com. plex 
o rganisat ion, and excess capacity develops, as the firm 
tends to expand too quickly and sales per square metre of 
sales space fall. In addition during this phase, 
competition occurs f rom operators who have adopted the 
retail i nnovat ion, and from new innovations. All these 
developments lead to a general decline in profitability. 
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Figure 2.3 : The Retail Life Cycle. 
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The final phase in the cycle, decline, is characterised 
by major losses in market share, marginal profitability and 
an inability to compete. To some extent decline may be 
avoided, or postponed by repositioning in which the 
institution modifies certain marketing concepts. Davidson 
Bates, and Bass (1976) conclude... 
Ila sophisticated management group can slow down the 
pace of its company"s evolution, and it can hold 
profitability at adequate levels for an extended period 
of time. However, a return to exceptional levels of 
profitability can be achieved only by converting to new 
forms of distribution or by entering new lines of 
trade. " 
Hence, through the use of this concept, Davidson and 
Johnson (1981) argue that as a mu It i -f o rmat retail 
organisation is made up of a series of life cycles with each 
element within the organisation moving along at its own 
pace, it is possible to maintain organisational growth by 
concentrating effort and resources upon those elements in 
the early growth phases of the cycle. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that, as in 
the case of the product life cycle, the institutional life 
cycle is shortening. The department store took eighty years 
to reach maturity; the variety store forty-five years; the 
supermarket thirty-five years; and some suggest that the 
hypermarket reaches maturity within a ten year period. 
Davidson (1970) argues that the life cycle will continue to 
shorten owing to the growing number of entrepreneurs and 
itanagers with inter-organisational administrative skills, 
and an increased willingness of financial institutions to 
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fund new concepts on a large scale. However, it should also 
be recognised that maturity may be reached geographically at 
different tiffies. 
These cyclical models attempt to explain the emergence 
of new retail institutions, and how such innovations may 
pass through different phases or stages of development. A 
further type of model which may be applied to retail 
instituti ons is that developed by Fink, Baek and Taddeo 
(1971). to explain how existing organisations might react to 
new innovations. Developed from a sociological theory 
constructed in 1967 by Fink for individual reactions to 
change, this model identifies four phases through which an 
organisation may pass when it experiences a "crisis" (figure 
2.4). 
For the purposes of the model, the authors define a 
crisis as ... 
"A human system (individual, group, organisation or 
other) is assumed to be in a state of crisis when its 
repertoire of coping responses is not adequate to bring 
about the resolution of a problem which poses a threat 
to the system. " (Fink, Baek and Taddeo 1971) 
This crisis will be precipitated by an event, within or 
outside the system, such as the development of a new retail 
innovation7 and the Fink, Baek and Taddeo model assumes 
that a dynamic human system will react to such a crisis and 
develop into something else other than what it was before 
these events. 
The initial shock phase begins with the arrival of a 
new institution which threatens any segment of the existing 
organisation which is critical to its functioning. The 
20 
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reaction of individuals to the shock is self-centered. They 
become solely concerned with survival, communication becomes 
f ragmented and attention is focussed upon the immediate 
threat. Instead of evaluating alternative solutions and 
planning for reaction, there is a refusal to accept change, 
and the first solution that springs to mind is adopted. 
Consequently, during the defensive retreat phase, the 
response is to reduce the threat posed by change, by 
maintaining the existing system at all costs. There is 
a rigid clinging to the past, and reality is ignored or 
denied, as long term goals are pushed aside. Individuals 
within the organisation turn to one another for loyalty, 
information and decision making becomes highly centralised, 
and tried and tested short term decisions are made. 
Generally, a call is made for legislative protection at this 
stage. 
Eventually, defensive retreat becomes self defeating as 
it does not allow for corporate growth, it only ensures 
survival. The organisation accepts that it can not fight 
the change and enters the acknowledgement phase. Self 
examination occurs as new interpretations and understandings 
are sought. The organisation begins to adapt to the new 
environment and begins to cautiously experi, ment with new 
alternatives, which may include imitating the new 
institution or innovation. 
Final ly, the firm enters the adaption and change, or 
g rowt h phase, as t he organisation becomes 'flexible and 
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accepts and adapts to the new environment. The growth 
process is renewed as organisations coordinate their 
operations and plan new objectives for future growth. 
2.1 THE ROLE OF THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Whi Ist these models provide some explanation of how 
conditions arise within the retail sector that present 
opportunities for the development of new retail 
institutions, and how these developments may behave and 
affect existing organisations, there is limited reference 
the external environmental factors that provide the stimulus 
for the innovation itself. Etgar (1984) criticizes the 
established models of institutional change, arguing that 
they are closed-system models, and as such ... 
"disregard the inherent dependency of any retailing 
system on its environment. Changes in retailing are 
expected to reappear an a predictable basis and are not 
linked to or explained by changes taking place outside 
the realm of the retailing institutions themselves. " 
Despite t he reference of Hensel (1973) tot he 
importance of recognising and interpreting broad 
environmental changes within life styles, value systems, and 
technology, it is only since the late 1970s that increasing 
emphasis has been placed upon the role of the external 
environment in institutional change in the retail sector. 
In 1979(a), Dawson, commenting specifically upon the 
catalyst event which provokes the Fink, Baek and Taddeo 
crisis-response model, referred to the effect of external 
st imul i and political or theoretically based power shifts 
Upon t ýie process of change. Innovation within the 
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inst it I-It i or-, I and societal change in general, are cited as 
two such stimuli, and Dawson comments... 
"There Would seem to be a tendency in the process of 
change in the marketing system for external stimuli to become increasingly important as the catalyt to 
change. " 
Similarly, McNair and May (1978), whilst attempting to 
predict "the next revolution of the retailing wheel", 
conclude that ... 
"retail institutional change shows a mixture of direct 
and i nd i rect responses to trends in the environment. 
Such trends are interwoven with economic I technological, demographic, attitudinal, and other 
shifts? with the threads of accelerated rates of change 
running through the whole fabric. " 
Most recently, Kaynak (1979) and Savitt (1984)v both 
commenting on McNair"s "wheel of retailing" theory,, have 
also pointed to the role of the, environment in retail 
change. Savitt (1984) urges the consideration of such 
factors as the diffusion of innovations and the product life 
cycle alongside external influences in the form of 
technological change, consumer trends, and supplier 
behaviour. Whilst Kaynak (1979), discusses the difficulties 
of applying the "wheel of retailing" to less developed 
economieS7 and argues that retailers and retai 1i rig 
instit-utions must adapt to the different environments found 
in these markets. Kaynak claims that the "wheel" will not 
revolve un 1 ess "the environment is favourable for the 
introduction of a new institution". and suggests that ... 
"retailing institutions, methods and techniques evolve 
with a changing social structure which in turn has 
evolving political, economic and business components. 
Certain combinations of these components produce 
specific social structures that create the need for 
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suitable retailing institutions and operating methods. 
in view of these comments, the retail system, seen as 
the mix of retail techniques or institutions that develop in 
an economy, could be regarded as being fundamentally derived 
from the interaction of organisational and consumer forces 
within the environment,, which themselves are influenced to 
varying degrees by other "external" factors, such as the 
physical and economic environments, and techological 
innovation amongst others. Various feedback mechanisms will 
exist between all the components that make up this retail 
environment. 
These components and the interactions which take place 
between them are all contained within a public policy 
framework established by the government or administration of 
the country. The influence of this public policy framework 
upon the components and mechanisms within the market will 
vary in intensity both spatially and temporally, as the OECD 
report on the distributive sector (1973) notes ... 
"attitudes of different countries reflect their 
general economic philosophy, they also respond to the 
economic and social problems raised by the 
distribution sector and its development. " 
The public policy framework may also have considerable 
influences upon the external forces which influence the 
retail sector. 
As any retail technique or innovation should be viewed 
as a product of the changes and trends at work within 
the 
retail env 1ro noyient, these features should 
be briefly 
reviewed to allow some understanding of 
the characteristics 
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and development of the institution concerned. Changes 
within both -the organisational and consumer segments will 
influence the adoption and development of an innovation. 
Furthermore, for public policy measures to succeed they Noust 
attempt to influence these factors which underly the 
development of an institution, rather than merely to tamper 
with the manifestation of these forces - namely the 
institution itself. Consequently, insight into these forces 
is important when attempting to analyse the impact of 
specific public policy measures introduced with the aim of 
either positively or negatively influencing the development 
of a certain institution. 
2.2 ORGANISATIONAL TRENDS 
There are numerous reviews available of the trends at 
work within the organisational component of the retail 
sector. The three most apparent and influential trends, 
noted by Dawson (1979b) (1982) and others, would appear to 
be the changing market shares held by different 
organisational types within the retail sector; the 
rationalisation, particularly through the process of 
vertical integration, of the operations undertaken by 
organisations; and the economies of scale pursued within 
organisations, which has resulted in both larger units and 
company organisations. 
2.2.1. Market Shares 
the share of the total retail market held by the major 
organisational types has changed considerably over the last 
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few decades (figure 2.5). This feature is important as it 
reveals which organisational categories are likely to adopt, 
or are more capable of adopting a new innovation or 
institution. The broad trends identified from total retail 
sales are even more pronounced in the retail grocery sector. 
Although international comparisons are difficult owing to 
different classification systems, throughout most of Europe 
the traditional independent retailers (defined generally as 
organisations with less than ten outlets) continue to hold 
the largest share of the retail market, but this share has 
been declining for a variety of reasons. Amongst these 
are the slowness and inability of this organisational sector 
to adapt to modern retail techniques, additional competition 
from new types of retailers, and changes in consumer habits 
and buying patterns. 
Generally, Consumer Cooperative groups (with certain 
exceptions), have also seen a decline in their share of 
t rade, largely as a result of institutional inertia, and 
have suffered from their traditional policy of returning 
profits to their consumer shareholders in the form of 
dividends, at the expense of investment in new retail 
techniques and methods. The general reaction to this 
decline has been the restructuring avid streamlining of the 
Consumer Cooperative Movements throughout Europe, largely 
involving the formation of larger Societies through mergers. 
The third maj or organisational category are the 
multiple retailers, who have experienced a growth in 
their 
stiare of trade in contrast to, and at tne expense of, their 
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ure5 MarKet Share of Total Retail Trace by iype of 
urganisation 
MarKet Share (%) of Total Retail Trade 
1960 1970 19 75 11380 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
INDEPENDENTS 
Beigium 80.6 77.1 75.1 74.1 
France 81.1 67.7 - 51.0 
West Germany 68.8 65-3,64.4 61.8 
The Netherlands 75.9 7: 5.0 74.2 73.2 
COOPERATIVES 
Belgium : 2.1 0.6 
France 2.22.3 Z. 0 
West Germany 0 4.6 5. i 
The Netherlands 1.7 1.4 0.5 0.5 
MULTIPLES ** 
Be 1ai usyt 8.3P 12.4 i 5. -Z, 17.6 
F- rance, Ii. 2 24.3 - 28.7 
West Germany 23.7 27.9 29.6 
The Netherlands 2i. 8 24.9 24.4 25.7 
-------------------------------------------------------- -- 
Independents - Belgium & France - unaffiliated independ- 
ents only. 
Multiples - includes department /variety store organis- 
ations and other corporate chains. 
Source : Various - Institute for Retail Studies 
data oase. 
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compet it a rs. These o rgani sat 1 ons have grown as multiple 
store economies allow savings to be made in overhead costs 
as advertising, promotional, and merchandising costs amongst 
others, are spread over a larger number of un its, thus 
reducing the unit cost of these functions. Similarly, 
wholesale function efficiencies have allowed these groups to 
amalgamate the orders for all their stores, which provides 
the group with a greater bargaining power, allowing them to 
obtain discounts and other concessions from suppliers, that 
are not normally available to other organisational types 
(Cady 1978). The relative importance and power of these 
different organisational types is likely to influence the 
adoption of an innovation. 
2.2.2. The Rationalisation of Operations 
The Grocer (03/04/1982) quotes ! an MaClaurin (the 
Managing Director of Tesco) as claiming ... 
"retailing is the most sensitive of macro ano micro 
economic indicators: the industry as a whole 
continually adjusting to a broad range of market 
forces. " 
Owing to increasing pressures of competition within the 
retai I sector, larger firms have undertaken programmes of 
rationalisation in order to reduce costs and improve 
efficiency. Rationalisation has been attempted through a 
variety of measures. Most noticable amongst these have been 
concentration programmes, through which both establishment 
and organisational scale economies acrue as costs are 
reduced by increasing the size of retail units. However, it 
is recognised that most retail techniques possess optimum 
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size limits above which disecon, omies of scale occur. 
Alternat ively, some firms have attempted vertical 
i nt eg rat ion, whereby the organisation diversifies and 
undertakes multiple functions such as those of retal ler, 
wholesaler and sometimes producer, previously carried out 
by separate organisations. 
Other methods of rationalisation according to. the OECD 
(1973) -include attempts to reduce costs by locational 
change. The retailer has followed consumer locational trends 
towards cheaper edge-of town and suburban sites. Spiraling 
rents in central areas often makes this a favourable course 
of action. 
Finally, the adoption of technical innovations which 
reduce labour costs such as self-service techniques, which 
reduce stockholding costs through the increased speed of 
stock turnover afforded by the adoption of discounting 
policies, and which avoid wastage and mismanagement such as 
scanning and computer based stock control systems, are 
further methods of rationalising an organisation or 
operation. Once again, these factors affecting the overall 
efficiency of a company are likely to influence the ability 
of an organisation to adopt and develop an innovation. 
2. Scale Economies 
Closely associated with both -rationalisation and the 
changing market shares held by different organisational 
types, is the pursuit of economies of scale by retal 1 
companies. The trend towards larger operating units has 
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aI ready been briefly mentioned, ou-c far more important in 
te rms 0ft he potential efficiency and capability of 
o rgani sat 1 ons ist he increasing riumbe r0f mergers and 
takeovers in the sector which has produced larger national 
and even multinational groups. An increasingly greater share 
of retail trade is being conducted through a smaller number 
of stores by a smaller number of enterprises (figure 2.6). 
This concentration of retailing into the hands of large 
companies, refered to as "commercial colossi" by Beaujeau- 
Garnier and Delobez (1979), has allowed for the development 
of important financial groupings with increased power ana 
potential. This is probably the most important trend in the 
organisational component of the retail system, for as Dawson 
(1979A)- observes ... 
"Both structural expansion through retail chain 
creation and vertical integration, and the spatial 
extension, by multi-national developments, create 
large complex entreprises, quite different from those 
operating thirty years ago. " 
Essentially, the trends within the organisational 
component of the retail environment, are converging towards 
the organisational dominance of retailing in terms of market 
s ha re,, efficiency, and future potential by fewer large 
national and multinational organisations. These trends are 
likely to have an influence upon the nature and rate of 
adoption of new institutional developments. 
CONSUMER TRENDS 
The consumer component of the retail environment is 
suoiect tot he same externai influences as t he 
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Fia ure Z. Concentration of Retail Grocery Sales. 
Share of Grocery Sales 1962 and (1972) 
achieved by - 
Country 2% Stores 5% Stores 10% Stores 20% Stores 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
France 59 (45) 73 (59) 81 (66) 90 (77) 
Belaium 5.3 (47) 68 (56) 79 (6%-*#) 80 (69) 
U. Ko 48 ( '27) 65 (39) 755 (51) 82 (66) 
Spain 54 (14) 60 (25) 65 (37) 76 (54) 
Greece 44 56 65 76 
W. Germany 28 (25) 42 (38) 56 (48) 72 (64) 
Eire : 56 48 57 70 
Portuaal "Z' 1 (20) 44 (Z7) 55 (48) 69 (GýD 
Netherlanas 17 (18) 32 (32) 48 (47) 68 (64) 
4%.. # (2%.: )) 50 (35) Italy 34 (N/A) 61 (50) 
---------------------------------------------- 
Nielsen (in Distribucion Actualidad No. 114, Feb. 1965)- 
AC Nielsen Company (1973) 
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organ I sat iona I component, ar-jcj there is naturally a certain 
degree of interaction between these two elements. Several 
aspects of the consumer component have uncergone significant 
changes in recent years, which when combined wit'n the trends 
out 1i ned in organisational benaviour, nave generated the 
development of new elements or institutions within the 
retail system. 
2.1-31.1 . Demographic Characteristics 
"The organisation of consumption, consumer behaviour, 
shopping activity is influenced in the first place by 
the demographic characteristics of the population. 
Changes in these characteristics inevitably mean 
behavioural changes in the population of consumers. " 
(Dawson 1982) 
The rat eaf population growth and location of a 
population have considerable implications for retailing. So 
have the various lines of segmentation made between consumer 
groups, whether the distinction is on the basis of stage in 
the life cycle, age, income, class or ethnic grounds. in 
France the post-war population boom saw a rise in the 
population from 39.6 million in 1946 to 49.6 million in 
1970v and to 53.5 million in 1980 (figure 2.7). This rapid 
growth in the total population., and its inherent effect upon 
t he age structure of the French population placed a 
significant pressure upon the established and outdated 
retail system, and consequently helped to motivate the 
growth and development of the new forms of retailing that 
appeared in France in the early 1960S. Simi larly, t lie 
1 ocat 1 on of this new population qrowtti in the suburbs c3la 
much encourage the growth of d ecent ra 11 sed shopping 
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Figure 2.7 Population Cnange in France 1946 - 1980. 
Total Annua 1 Urban Uroan 
Yea r Population Gro wt fi Population Po P 1-( 1 at io ri 
(Mi 11 i on) (%) (Mi 111 on) (%) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1946 39 846 
1954 42 781 
i962 46 459 
1968 49 655 
1975 52 599 
1980 53 583 
01. ý. 
4.2 070 
1.6 
'-C. ' 
J 
-. C) 
30 
. 29 43 
2.8 
, S4 805 
1.4 
38 --)7, 'j 
1.2 
40 720 
55.3) 
5,8.7 
7 0. L 
72.7 
7.55.6 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
CECOD (1983) 
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facilities. 
- . -. 
a. Standards of Living 
The standard of living achieved by consumer groups is 
f undamerit al impo rtance t0 Shopping habits. Two 
quantifiýable elements of the standard of living - income, 
and the adoption of technical innovations7 are frequently 
discussed as being of considerable influence on changes in 
the retail system. 
Expenditure by the consumer is related to the income 
which he or she receives. The Commission of the European 
Communities (1978) has stated that between 1966 and 1975, 
per capita consumption rose by more than a third throughout 
the Community. This rise in consumption can largely be 
attributed to improvements in the material standard of 
living in Europe. - The successful economic recovery of 
France following the war, fuelled by National Economic 
Plans in which the emphasis was firmly placed upon growth, 
is a well documented aspect of the Fifth Republic. Although 
elsewhere in Europe the rise in the material standard of 
living may nave oeen less spectacular to that, of France 
(where d. isposable income more than doubled in the 1961-1973 
period (Smith 1973)) there has been nonetheless,, a 
significant rise in consumer income in most European 
countries. 
In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed 
riot only upon national differences in disposable income but 
also upon regional variations within countries. 
Unemployment is now a serious economic ana social problem in 
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all West e rn co unt ri es, ana regional differences in 
unemployment, 
(figure 2.8). 
and consequently income, are coviffionpiace 
These differences are likely to persist, despite 
welfare policies aimed at reducing differentials in 
disposable i nco Ste. Richards (Retail and Distribution 
Management 10(2) 1982) suggests ... 
"Incomes policies, equal pay, union power and 
improvements in social welfare such as child benefit 
tended to provide a disproportionate boost to the lower 
paid and women, while the middle classes often felt 
squeezed ... this trend we see reversing ... if only because of the gulf between employed and the unemployed 
and the cuts in the real value of social services and 
benefits. " 
The current economic recession in Western Europe, suggests 
that future rises in disposable income, at least in the 
short term, are likely to be low and differences in 
spending power between various consumer segments may be 
enlarged. These trends will have substantial bearing upon 
consumer behaviour in the future. 
As far as technical innovations are concerned, two in 
particular have had -a significant impact upon consumer 
behaviour during the past two decades. The motor car has 
increased accessibility by reducing perceived distance 
constraints, thereby increasing choice for the consumer. 
The car also permits the purchase of greater quantities an 
each single shopping trip. Bulk buying has been further 
encouraged by the advent of ref rigerat o rs avid freezers, 
which have provided the consumer with improved storage 
facilities. 
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Ficii-tre 8 unemployment in Western Europe 
i. Total Linelyiployment. 
% Of ClVl'ilarl L&DOur Force 
Co unt ry 1960 1970 i97 rz, 1980 1984 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Bel gi usy, 
France 
W. Germany 
ýtaly 
Netherlands 
U. K 
0.7 
1.0 
7.2 
0.7 
1.6 
2.1 
I. -3 
0.6 
4.4 
1.3 
2.5 
9.1 14.4 
6.4 10.7 
4. i 3.3 8.5 
8.0 12.5 
3. %a 6.2 14.8 
%.. ). 7 11.6 3 16.3 
-------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Commission of the European Communities (1984) 
Regional Differences in Unemployment 1981. 
Country and Unemployment 
Regions Rate (%) 
------------------------------------- --------------------- 
1TALY North-West 6.0 
Campania 12.2 
South 10.0 
Sardinia 13.9 
NETHERLANDS West Holland 7.0 
South Holland 12.0 
U. K. South-East 6.7 
West Midlands 12.0 
N oý rt h 13.8 
Northern irelana 16.0 
FRANCE Ile-de-France 6.3 
Nord-Pas de Calais 10.7 
Mediterranee 9.6 
Eurostat (1984) 
37 
The number of shopping trips completed by ca r has 
steadily increased in Europe as rates of car ownership have 
ri sen. Car ownership per head of the population has been 
rising steadily in Europe (figure 2.9), although rates of 
ownership vary between countries. In France, 72.1% of 
households possessed a car in 1962, compared with 61.1% in 
1975,56.6% in 1970, and only 28.4% in 1959 (MinisO! re du 
Commerce et de 1"Artisanat 1976,1980a, 1983). However, as 
Parker (1975) notes an important distinction should be made 
between car ownership, and the availability of cars for 
shopping trips. 
The growth of refrigerator and freezer ownership has 
outpaced that of car ownership, and the majority of 
households in Europe now own a refrigerator (figure 2.10). 
Although countries adopted this innovation at different 
times and at different rates, ownership patterns are now 
broadly comparable throughout Europe. 
Both of these innovations have done much to encourage 
the growth of one-stop bulk buyingv possibly the major 
change in consumer shopping behaviour during the past twenty 
years. 
2.3.3. Convenience 
One common characteristics of these technological 
innovations adopted by the consumer is that they greatly 
reduce the amount of time necessary for shopping. in 1967 
Cox and Erickson commented that one of the major reasons for 
the decentralisation of retailing was ... 
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1gu re . 2.9 Privaze Car Ownership in western Europe 197(--)- 
19 8 C). 
Cars per 1,000 Population 
Count ry 1960 1970 1975 1980 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Be 1 gi. um 86 21 %7; p 267 320 France 121 251 290 343 
W. Germany 88 218 289 377 
Italy 40 190 270 310 
Netherlands 47 191 254 32.4 
U. K. 108 215 249 281 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Eurostat (1984) & Dawson (1982) 
Figure 2.10 Refrigerator and Freezer Ownership in Western 
Europe 1970-1980. 
Country 
% Households Owning - 
Ref rigerator Deep Freeze 
1970 1980 1970 1980 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Belgium 93 45 
France 80 94 5 27 
9= W. Ge rmany 87 %J 17 49 
Italy 92 - 29 
Net he r !a na s- 96 46 
U. K. 61 ý3 %J 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Euromonitor (i9833a) ( 198-, lo) 
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"the emphasis t hat is now be 1 rig p1 aced upon 
convenience in virtually all aspects of life. " 
The growth of the le-isure industry in particular, r1as 
placed an additional claim upon consumers' time ano energy 
as an alternative to shopping, which may often be regarded 
purely as a necessary chore. The chance to shop less often, 
and at more convenient times has been welcomed by the 
consumer. The trend towards fewer shopping trips and 
shopping outside normal working hours has been further 
encouraged by the increasing participation of women in the 
workforce (figure 2.11). 
In short, within the consumer component of the retail 
sector, there has been an increased demand for time-saving 
shopping, which has encouraged one-stop bulk buying and 
longer opening hours. 
2.3.4. Consumer Perceptions. 
The above factors, combined with other trends and 
influences from the general economic, physical, and social 
environments affect consumer perceptions, upon which the 
consumer bases his or her behaviour. Dawson (1982) suggests 
t hat eaA 
11changes in consumption are related to long term 
changes in income and price elasticity and short term 
advertising campaigns,, but there are also broad shifts 
in demand which represent changing social attitudes to 
products. " 
The growth of the convenience and frozen food markets 
in Europe illustrates how changes in consumer behaviour 
initiated by technological development may be sustained by 
changing consumer perceptions as these innovations in food 
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Flaure 2.11 Participation of Women in the WorK force 
Country 
% of Women in Civilian Employment 
I, f- 366 1976 1980 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Belaium 35.2 39.0 37.2 
France : 54.8 37.4 38.5 
W. Germany 36.9 37.8 37.9 
It4ly 27.28.7 33.3 
Netherlands 26.9 %.. )0.4 U. K. 31.7 34.4 39.1 * 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
* U. K. figure for 1979 
E-uromonitor (198. Za) & Dawson (1982) 
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processing became acceptable. In the early 1970s McCurrie 
(1972) showed that 25% of the money spent on food in Britain 
was accounted for by convenience foods 7 and 5% by frozen 
foods, and suggested that these proportions were likely to 
rise. 
The above factors are a few of the many influences 
which work within the consumer component of the retail 
sector to determine-and alter consumer behaviour. Over the 
past two decades the majority of consumers have become far 
more price and time cort-scious. The trend has been towards a 
reduction in the number of shopping trips undertaken, and 
convenience in terms of both price and time has been sought. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
The role of the retail environment and changes within 
it has, increasingly been stressed in relation to the various 
models constructed to explain the appearance of new retail 
institutions? their development, and the reaction of 
established retailers towards them. Any legislation 
introduced by the state in retail sector should grasp these 
issues and attempt to influence them if it is to prove to be 
successful. 
These trends in the organisational and consumer 
components of the retail environment interact and combine 
with the overall public policy framework of the nation, and 
the catalyst of entrepreneurial flair, to produce the retail 
system of a country with its mix of retail techniques and 
institutions. The structural changes occuring in the retail 
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env iro nment in Western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s as 
a result of the changing nature of the organisational and 
consumer components, involving the growing market power of 
the large retail organisations and units, and the increased 
emphasis placed upon convenience by the consumer, have been 
embodied to varying degrees in the major new retail 
institution of the past two decades, the hypermarket. 
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CHAPTER THREE : THE HYPERMARKET - TOWARDS A DEFINITION 
t he Fi naric ia1T1 mes C) fiu ri e 19t ni97.2, Van 
Mussenbroek observed that. .. 
"The hypermarket represents mo re t han just another fo rm 0ff ood Shopping; it is a new concept of 
retail ing. " 
Often the hypermarket is regarded as si, ypIy arl extension of 
supermarket retailing, b ut wh i1 st t he hypermarket may 
exhibit common features with the supermarket, other 
characteristics distinguish it as adi st i rict met hod 0f 
retailing. it is 7 therefore, as Van Mussenbroek suggests, 
mo re realistic to view the hypermarket as a new concept of 
retailing, which has been produced by the hig. hly competitive 
and changing environment of the past few decades. 
The basis of retailing, as in other industries in the 
private sector7 is prof it. In its most simple forly'7 Profit 
could be def i tied as income f rom s a. L es IYI in us costs 
(investment costs7 operating costs etc). In short7 prof it 
can be maximised by increasing income, and red UC i nQ costs, 
and the most innovative institutional developments within 
retai 1 ing have evolved from attempts to attain these two 
goals. 
The supermarket concept, developed in the late 1950s, 
allowed some economies of scale (obtained throuQh the lylo re 
efficient, or more exactly, t he mo re favourabie buying 
cond iti ons available ta certain ret a 11 e rs) to red Uce 
specific costs. These econotries could be passec on to t he 
c ust o me rir, t he fo riy, 0f lower prices, Wh 1 ch intu rn 
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attracte(i t he increasingly price-coriscious corlsl -)-. -11YIL 
larger, more Power, -, -0 pe rat o rs7 
jL 
wL=I'e evoivirjo in the 
ýet aii env iro timen t7 we re in the nest positior, toa bt a1n 
t hese economies of scale7 and were 7t he re-r-o re, abj. e 'G 0 
undercut the prices of their rivals, 2 in oraer to lyla I rit ai rl 
and increase their volume of trade. 
Similarly, the alternative demands upon consumer income 
and the new consumer perspectives generated by the changing 
ma, rk et i rig environment of the late 1960s and 1970sp coupled 
with escalating competition between larger mo re powerful 
organisations7 i tic reased the pressure 0 ti retailers to 
maintain both their share of the market and prof it levels. 
Consumer demands for a reduction in the riumber of shopping 
trips, lower prices, and greater flexibility ano convenience 
in shopping, combined with the development of larger more 
ef f icient and powerful retail organisations to create a new 
retail environment and new pressures, whicri eventually gave 
bi rt h to the hypermarket concept. The hypermarket 
effectively allowed the new consumer demands to be met, and 
provided for either a further reduction, or transfer7 of 
costs through the development and adoption of new besign, 
operating, and management techniques riot previously utilised 
in the supermarket concept. 
I HYPE-RMARKET FEATURES 
Definitions of the tercyt "hypermarKet" vary f rom t he 
s imple 
"essential! y vast sel I ing factories, retailing n O"C 
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on 1yaf 1-111 range of foodstuffs, E) 1-1 t also a 
substantial range of other commodities all under one 
roof. " (Parker 1975) 
to the detaileci, With strict t ectin 1 ca 1 me as u res 0f 
gross area, sales area, employee riumbers, car pare< si-7, e and 
o pe rat i rig ratios. Dawson, Burt and SparKs (196-11) have 
produced a definition listing fifteen features whictl are 
common to the hypermarKet concept (Appendix 
No sivigie, fully adopted definition of the hypermarKet 
concept has been produced, although five features would seem 
to provide common elements in the different definitions of 
t he, hypermarket. These characterist ics essentially 
illustrate the essence of the hypermarket concept. These 
features are 
1. Size Characteristics. 
Car Park Features. 
Ij Locational Charcteristics. 
4. Operating Techniques - designed to reduce costs. 
5. Merchandising Poýicy - designed to increase turnover. 
1.1. Size Characteristics 
The hypermarket site, including both the store and 
associated car park, covers a vast area7 and size is one of 
the most salient f eat u res of the hypermarket. The te rm 
"hyper", the Greek word for above, gives the impression of 
scale, and in France this expression of size is fu rt he r 
evinanced by the tradenames of stores such as malyllylo ut h 
"Ge'eant Casino". "Euromarche" 7 "Titan"I and 
"Continent". 
whilst the applicability of exact size definitions can 
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be q uest 1o tied,, the European convention that a hy pe rma rK et 
-:, =C should have a sales area of at least square metres is 
becoming 1 tic reas 1 -ng Iy accepted as t he st anda rd siZe 
t ýi, resho 1 d. 
it' 91"ta'r'7 the emotive undertones associated 
with the word " hy pe rma rk et 7 has eticouraged afu rt he r 
distinction between "superstores" of to 49,999 square 
f eet of sales area, and the larger "hype rmarket s" with in 
excess of 507 sq ua re feet. 
When the non-sales area consisting of storage anC3 
administrative space is considered, these units become even 
larger in size. it is common for the sales area to account 
for less than 50% of the total gross area of the store, and 
according to MPC (19716) this ratio tends to decline as gross 
area increases. 
Size alone, however7 can riot be used as the sole 
criteria of def init i on7 as many other large retail un 1ts 
fall within these size thresholds. Consequently, other 
features of the hypermarket concept must be integrated into 
any definition. 
Car Park Features 
The advent of the motor car and the motorised shopper 
has been one of the most influential factors in hypermarket 
development. Accord'nglY7 car park facilities should be an 
integral part of any hypermarket definition. 
As with size thresholds, it is questionable to suggest 
any binding car park: sales area ratios, or any other measure 
of car park si Z-e7 as the exact size of the car park 
is 
governed by a large riumber of factors sucri as firm policy, 
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established or expected trading patterns, store s1ze arc 
location") arid local government parking policies. Despite 
these variables, often quoted statistics are ratios OT' OVel' 
. 
20 
places per 100 square metres of sales space, or car parks 
of three times the store sales area. However, MPC (1976) 
suggest a much greater and variable ratio in their study of 
French hypermarkets (figure 3.1). 
If possible, car parks are built on a single level, for 
both consumer convenience and preference, and cost reasons. 
The cost of parking on the ground Level can be approximately 
one Sixth of tile cost of a multi-storey car park (f igure 
- .. 5 
Iýjw A. ). 
As already stated, car park policy will vary from firm 
to firm, and with other external circumstances. in Britain7 
Sairlsbury"s report "Car Parking for Supermarkets" (reviewed 
in The Grocer 17/04/1982). makes several policy suggestions 
t hat are likely to apply to most operators. The basis of 
the Sainsbury policy is that any car park should be operated 
for the benefit of the shoppers. Therefore7 the layout of 
the area should be such as to reduce customer efforts, and 
wherever possible, the firm ShOIAld control the use of the 
car park., discourage long stay parking (by the introduction 
of charges if necessary), and eliminate use by commercial 
vehicles. The study suggests minimum dimensions 
for easy 
and quick parking, namely Days of 4 by metres, With 
3 Bays for extra width of I. J. 2 metres 
for cisabled orivers. 
disabled drivers should be located as close to the store as 
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t- igure Cal- ParK/Sales Area J-< a 7C 1QS I- e tj C 
mypermakets i97Z. 
Average Sales Area Lar Park Size 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
S"1ý. J( lylal C-) C-) SFt6. Lx Sales Area 
I'llea I ulyl C) C-) C) stý. 4 x Sales Hrea 
La rge, 8 2-' C-) 00SqFt4.6 x Sales At-ea 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
in PC; ( 197E: F) 
`7 F igure Construction Costs of Car Parks in Britain 197--7ý- 
Cost Per Space (9) iype of Car ParK 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Ground Level 
Roof Level 
Multi-Storey 
Basement 
647 
*%7j 0o 
Z, 750 
--------- ------------------------------------------------- 
mciýiearie (1975) 
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possible. Trolley bays 15 by 15 feet should be incorporated 
itito the area in the ratio of one to every fifty venicies. 
Locationa! Characteristics 
Closely associated with the si-, -: e of the store and ca r 
park a, re the locational characteristics of the store. Ea rIy 
studies of the hypermarket regarded it as solely an edge-of- 
town phenomerion7 which many of the first developments tended 
to be. However, it is now accepted that hypermarkets can be 
found in a variety of in- or out-of-town locations. No 
specific location is necessary, as long as the chosen site 
is economically viable. As Tanburn (1975) comments ... 
"The crucial requirement for any retailer be he large 
or smalI7 is to have a site or sites, on which he can 
trade profitably, given the kind of business he is 
operating". 
There are several locational factors which should be 
examined in some detail by the operator when deciding where 
to develop a store (Baille 19727 Tariburn 1975, Jones 1981, 
and The Grocer 19/12/1981). The characteristics of the 
catchment population within both driving walking 
distance should be considered. Areas exhibiting rapid 
population growth in the past, and where rapid increase can 
be expected should be sought, and most operators appear to 
prefer a specified density Of population within t he 
catchment area. Employment trends, levels of affluence, and 
car ownership should also be assessed, to allow estimates of 
the potential retail expenditure and turnover of the area to 
be made. The accessibility of a location should come Linder 
close scrutiny, with sites close to a nodal point Or' the 
50 
fytaj or road network being most favoured f rom this point 1- 
viewl as t he -tn it will be readily v1sible 
_to Passing 
COtISU, Yiers. 
Site considerations include the physical size of the 
site, which should be large enough to support the c3esired 
volume of car parking, and allow easy access and circulation 
of consumer and delivery traffic. in the late 1970s a survey 
of 24 French hypermarkets (LSA 652 1978) suggested that the 
hypermarket building itself occupied on average only 2'2'% of 
the total site, and the building and car park together 
accounted for around 76% of the site. Shape and topograpriy 
elements are also important, as are site posts including 
both the rental value of the land, and the length of time 
and associated costs of development of the site. 
Finally, the nature and location of competition in the 
area should be considered. This should take into account 
both established and potential competition i-n the i yoYted i at e 
vicinity, inte rms of the range, types of good sold, 
accessibility, and prices offered. 
All of these considerations relating to the site and 
location are assessed in the context of operator factors, 
namely the scale of the retailers resources, and the type of 
operation that t he operatois believe they can operate 
profitably at that particular time, or in the f ut u re- 
Fu rt he rm o re7 both the location and nature of developmen"t 
will be influenced by government intervention, Which May 
even directly effect the location of, and the type of 
development proposed. 
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3.1.4. Operating Techniqu*es - c3esigned to cut costs. 
The operating policy pursued within the 
concept has two basic aims7 to reduce costs and increase 
tu rn o ve r. As Goodman (1977) observes ... 
"The whole idea. behind a hypermarket is to get as much 
volume of sales through a single store at the lowest 
possible cost. " 
Perhaps a rather crude definition of ai 'Y'S 7 but nonetheless 
this quotation encompasses the basic goals of hypermarket 
operating techniques. 
Reductions of costs are achieved either directly by 
real cuts in the costs of operation, or indirectly by 
transferring such costs to other participants in the 
distribution channel. One method of directly cutting costs 
is through the rather simple and sometimes basic design and 
construction techniques employed in hypermarket units, 
which stress function with few architectural frills. This 
allows a reduction in both construction and decor costs, 
particularly if store fittings can be duplicated from store 
to store. 
Another area of operation where direct or "real" costs 
can be cut is that of energy costs. An increasing number of 
firms are showing interest in systems that recycle heat from 
lighting and refrigeration. In Brita'r'7 Tesco (Retail and 
have revealed that t he Distribution Management 10(3) A: - 
heat i ng syst em installed in each of their new stores is 
cont ro 1 led by a sophisticated cont ro I syst elyl which 
incorporates heat recovery from the ref rigerat ion storage 
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plants. tact) store manager has attended a seminar series on 
ene rgy co rise rvat ion7 and the company nas a comouter OaSeC3 
energy audit system to 'Y10"ItOr ana compare energy usage i rl 
their stores. Since Implementing tills scheme in 1974, Tesco 
claim to have achieved energy savings of around 7.5 
tyli 11 ion. 
The alternative method of reducing operating costs is 
to pass 0na proportion of these costs to either t he 
consumer, the producer, or intermediaries in the channel of 
distribution. One of the major features of hypermarket 
operation in France is the use of pallets and cages to store 
and sell goods on the sales floor. The use of self-service 
methods in hypermarkets allows a reduction in wage costs to 
the extent that in France during the early 1970s, wages only 
accounted for 5% of hypermarket costs, compared to 12% of 
costs in supermarkets, and 15% of costs in department stores 
(The Econom. ist 24/04/1971). Staff costs in the form of 
servicing costs and price-labelling costs are passed on to 
the producer or supplier through the use of pallets and 
cages ... 
"The idea being that merchandise, already price-marked 
by suppliers, is carried in specially designed cages 
straight from delivery vehicle to supermarket sales 
floor, thus reducing warehouse space (and costs). " 
(Retail and Distribution Management J(3) 1975b) 
Cageing has numerous advantages for the retailer. It is 
mo re eff icient and less costly to move the product f rom 
producer to retailer in a reuseable container. Storace on 
the sales floor is increased and more stock is availaDle on 
the sales floor during peak periods. It allows mass display 
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and disciplined space allocation and facings on the sales 
floor, 
with the result that a greater proportion of total 
space may be devoted to sales area. in sho rt cageing 
provides labour and space savings for the ret ai1er., and 
PaCKaging and merchandising savings for the manuf act u re r. 
The sort of merchandise used for cageing must, however7 be 
fast moving, so there are a limited number of lines that can 
be sold this way, although these lines tend to account for 
the bulk of hypermarket sales. 
Further reductions in staff costs can be made by the 
sale of goods through check outs at a single f ront end 
st at i on. in some hypermarkets, the use of scanning systerns 
allows further wage savings by virtue of aut olylat 1c 
stocktaking through the check out. 
These operating policies employed in hypermarkets which 
allow a reduction in wage costs through the use of self- 
service techniques on a large scale, and ttle reduction of 
consumer services7 effectively mean that these costs (or at 
least the cost of effort) ha-ve been transferred to the 
consumer, who now has to serve himself or herself7 and rely 
much more upon personal experience to gain knowledge or 
goods and to make choices between goods. 
This latter aspect has attracted the attention of 
critics7 and many retailers are aware of the reduced 
consumer service in hypermarkets as a result of many of 
these o pe rat i rig policieS7 and attempts inave been made to 
redress this imbalance. The meat and bakery counters of 
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most . 
hypermarkets are now operated by staff to add a mo re 
personal touch. Other less conventional ideas have also been 
inst i gated to counter the accusations of lack of c us to me r 
se rv i ce. One example is that of the Carrefour store at 
Vi 11 iers en Bierre (Bonrer 1975j), which prints a blow-up 
copy of a cash register slip, identifying the companies 
commodity group codes, on its larger paper bags and carrier 
bags, to allow the consumer to check his/her purchases 
against their cash register receipt when they return home. 
Wage costs transferred to the supplier and consumer 
through the adoption of self-service techniques on such a 
large scale are not the only costs to be transferred in 
hypermarket operations. A proportion of transport costs can 
also be passed on to the supplier through employing a policy 
of decentralised management. This allows the store manager 
to be the sole decision maker for any single unit within a 
-he parent framework of goals and guidelines defined by t 
company. In France, Euromarchig refer to this style of 
management as "controlled freedom". 
Decentralised management confers considerable buying 
power and responsibility to the individual store, which 
reduces both administrative delay and costs that can occur 
from a highly centralised operation. The increased freedom 
of buying power through this management method enables the 
store manager to deal directly with suppliers in order to 
negotiate the palletisation or cageing of goods and direct 
delivery to the store. Once again, this saves central 
warehousing and distribution costs., as the often expensive 
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middleman in the distribution channel is bypassed. However, 
the company will only benefit from decentralised management 
if t he st o re managers are of a hig h enough calibre. 
Interestingly, in Britain the trend amongst t he maj or 
mult i pl es has been very much towards the centralisation of 
buying decisions. 
These direct savings in costs are further complemented 
by the transfer of a proportion of transport costs to the 
consumer, who is I-is ua 11 y prepared to travel greater 
distances to shop at a hypermarket in order to benef it " 
from the lower priced goods made possible partly by these 
transfers in costs. 
The retailer can undoubtedly make considerable savings 
in operating costs through hypermarket operations, either 
directly through real cost cutting schemes, or indirectly by 
transferring some of the staff and transport costs to the 
consumer and supplier. Cole (1975b) notes that essentially 
these cost savings ... 
"arise from the buying power of the hypermarket in 
dealing with suppliers; from direct deliveries to the 
store7 i nst e ad of distribution to branches f rom 
a central warehouse; from reduced handling of goods, 
a-rid mechanical stocking of most shelves; and from the 
elimination of transport fleets and maintenance7 
together with much simpler stock control and 
paperwork. " 
However7 Cole fails to make the impo rt ant dist inct ion 
between real SaV'ngS7 and those "savinqs" that are in 
reality only transferred to other participants in the retail 
syst em. 
In 1970, Carrefour claimed that as a result of t he 
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sav i rig S available fr om p urs ui rig t hese ty pes 0f operating 
techniques, their total operating costs (including wages aria 
salaries) only accounted for 10% of sales (Vat, MussenbroeK 
1970). By t he late 1970's this ratio had been fu rt he r 
reduced to under 8% of sales (Marenco 1983). 
1.5. Merchandising Policy - designed to increase turnover 
The other component of the profit equation, other than 
CoStS7 is 'nCoffle' In the hypermarket7 the retailer seeks to 
increase income from sales by increasing turnover. The cost 
savings achieved through operating techniques employed in 
the hypermarket are passed on to the consumer in the form of 
lower margins and reduced prices, yet the true motive behind 
this action is to attract the consumer and generate more 
purchases, thereby increasing turnover. To this end, the 
merchandising policy followed in hypermarkets is one of mass 
scrambled me rc hand is i ng with low margins and high sales 
vo 1 ume. 
Hypermarkets carry a large range of products, usually 
numbering around 2,500 items. This range consists of a wide 
assortment but shallow range of goods, with relatively few 
brands of any one product. The product mix is o vie of 
foodstuffs with low profit margins, which account for the 
majority of sales, and non-food lines with higher margins, 
which account for between 30 and '235% of sales. 
Accordina to the MPC (1976) survey of French 
hypermarkets, ma rg i ris may also vary with the size of un it 
(f igure 3.3)) Whatever the variation between g0 QC3S, z tie 
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igu re Gross margins irl Frencti : --ýyoeriyiai-Kets 
Gross tv'iargin 
Size of HypermarKet slyla iI lyf e C3 1-1 ly, L-a I, Qe 
(Average Size Sq. Ft. ) (30 0(--)(: )) (5Z DOO) (8., C DCO 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Fresh Produce i8.27 1-1-20 
Groceries 9.9., 41 9. FJO 
Non-Food 1.7 1.19. ý09 
Averaae for All Goods 1 55.57 14.84 1 i. 48 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
MPC (1976) 
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overall gross margin tends to be in the region of 12 to iG% 
which followiriq J. - t he deduction of operating CoStS7 UaX7 
maintenance, and investment costs, leaves a profit margin of 
around two to three percent. 
T he two maj or attractions that hypermarkets offer 
consumers (with the motive of increasing turnover) are low 
prices and 1o tiger, mo re convenient7 opening hours. A 
combination of cost savings through economies of scale and 
associated operating policies, plus a merchandising policy 
based upon low gross margins, permits "discount" prices to 
be offered on most lines. At Carrefour in Britain (Retail 
and Distribution Management 1(6) 1973)... 
"Managers buy and have authority to set prices, and 
wo rk t0a gross target figure which is given to each 
department. Their brief is not to be the cheapest on 
every it em, but to price the article below what they 
consider to be a good price in the area, and t hat has 
7th to be matched W, the achievement of a certain 
percentage margin which is set them. " 
Several surveys comparing the price of goods at 
hypermarkets 
. with 
those in other retail out lets (f igure 
3.4) show substantially lower prices in the hypermarket than 
in other retail establishments. However, critics point-out 
that these comparisons give no indication of either the 
quality of produce., or service offered. 
The price discounts offered by hypermarkets are one of 
the main attractions for shoppers, and this is reflected by 
the high preference given to price when consumers are asked 
to suggest reasons for patronising hype rma rket s. A survey 
of six hundred consumers conducted by Le Cabinet dEtudes 
Iserco in Strasbourg showed that 86.4% of those a. uest io ned 
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-S F1au re 1). 4 HypermarKet li-yipacr, - Price. 
ý4 )iu %ý. ) ý- oaait ems -B) 10.2 1tems- 
Carrefour x 
Sa i ris bu ry t 
Budgens ;E4. L 42 
L. a r ref ourEa st Ie1 (3 n 
Pive,. -:, age for eight 
superryiart<e-ts in the 
a rea 
:: 
109. i 
FRANCE 
iype of Store 
Siea 11 
Pveracie Hy pe r. Shops Ot he rs Super. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
A) 
All Produc-cs i () (--) i 10.1 
Food 100 94.5 109.97.7 
Non Food 92.6 11 a 94.5 
B) 
All Products C) C-) 94.1 101.9 98.5 
F resh 
Vegetables i0o 95.7 100.1 100.1 
Processed 
Vegetables 1 C) 0 i04.4 97.7 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources - 
BRITAIN A) Charles Amber & Associates (Retail and Distrio- 
utior, Managemerit 3(l) 1975a) 
B) Financial iimes Basket (Cole ig-15a) 
FRANCE A) Secocip Survey (LSA 697 i979) 
B) insee Survey (LSA 697 1979) 
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v1 ewed low prices as a major atti, action of hypermarKet (LSA 
BC-)7 1981 b) . 
T he other main attraction of the hypermarket concept 
for consumers is the convenient opening hours operated in 
these stores. The majority of hypermarkets are open unti-i 
10 P. M. on most evenings, on Saturdays and (where allowed) 
0n Sundays. These extended opening hours cater for the 
working consumer who can only shop in the evenings after 
work or at weekends. In the Iserco consumer survey, 76.2% of 
the respondents also cited opening hours as a major 
advantage of hypermarket shopping. Both these factors 
combine to enable hypermarkets to generate turnover far in 
excess of most conventional supermarkets and other retail 
outlets (figure 3.5). 
The features of size, car parking, location, operating 
and merchandising policy as reviewed above distill the 
essence of the hypermarket concept. Although not all the 
above characteristics are present in all hypermarkets, a 
basic mix of these features is usually f0 und - Each of these 
categories is interrelated with the others and should only 
be viewed as a separate entity for the purposes of 
simplifying an explanation. As the hypermarket concept has 
evolved varying degrees of emphasis has been placed upon 
different characteristics and features of the basic concept. 
Many other associated operations have been incorporated into 
the hypermarket as the operating firms have diversified 
t hei r range of activities in order to increase t he 
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attractiveness of the store to the consumer. 
THE IMPACT OF HYPERMARKETS 
Comments ref erri nq tot he characteristics of 
hypermarkets would be incomplete without some reference to 
their impact, particularly as the demands for restrictive 
legislation are largely based upon such claims. As Schiller 
(1981) and others acknowledge, the impact of the hypermarket 
upon consumers, other retai lers, and producers, can be 
potentially serious. Traditionally, the impact of new 
shopping developments has been mitigated by increases i ri 
both population and personal' spending. However, in recent 
years the cushion effect of these trends has been curtailed, 
and over the past decade food sales have remained stagnant 
in volume terms. In other words, new innovatory 
developments in the retail system are now occurring within a 
largely static food sector. The retail environfftený is 
unable to respond and absorb the impact of hypermarket 
growth with as much success as was týe case with other new 
retail innovations in the past. Consequently, the potential 
magnitude of hypermarket impact is likely to be great. 
The impact of the hypermarket concept falls into two 
areas, the largely social effects upon price and conSUmer 
choice, and the more physical effects upon existing and 
planned shopping developments. 
1. Social Effects. 
0 -ri e of the characterist ics of hypermarkets, as 
illustrated earlier, is the adoption of low cross ma ra i ns 
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and discount Price policies. Consequentiy, the hypermarKec 
has had a considerable impact, both directly and indirectly, 
upon food and non-food prices. 
Operating policies allow hype rma rkets to offer the 
consumer goods at lower prices than are found In other 
traditional outlets, and it is argued that shops in direct 
competition with the hypermarket will lower their prices in 
response. Hypermarkets can cause a general reduction in 
prices in the immediate vicinity. The Grocer (01/11/1975),, 
commenting upon the MPC survey of European hypermarkets, 
even goes to the extremity of suggesting that t he 
hypermarket is a significant container of inflation... 
"With food prices between 14% and 16% below-those of 
food multiples in town centres, hyperiyvarket growth in 
Germany a-nd France, has, now- become a significant 
factor in helping to reduce inflation... " 
Critics of hypermarket retailing suggest that t he 
berief its of lower prices only acrue to certain segments of 
t he popu1 at 1on (the e1 ement st hat need t hem 1 east I) whi Ist 
those that would derive the greatest benefit from lower 
prices may be unable to make full use of the hypermarket. 
Butler (1973) argues that although rates of car ownership 
will continue to rise7 there will always be a s1zeable 
proportion of the population without a car, and within the 
car owning POPL(latiOn many will not have access to a car 
when they wish to do their shopping. Those who continue to 
be car-less will terid to be the most vulnerable aria needy 
sections of society - the old, unemployed, and disabled 
and without changes in public transport or 1 ocat i ona 
policies, týiese sections of society will riave 
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1 imited access to the nypermarket and wil-I be una b1e to 
beref it f rom t he advantages of jower prices. if this 
a rg ument is extenced, those who can not or wiII -riot use tne 
hypermarket will effectively have to pay disproportionate-ty 
high prices in traditional shopping outlets. 
Hypermarkets may also be seen to effect consumer 
choice7 for as De Angeli (1972-2) comments, t he hypermarket 
tends to standardise technique and presentation7 
t ý'US 
--- 
real choice is restricted as stores begin to look 
like each other. " 
Hi 11 man 1973) also argues that real choice will be 
impaired, as only the mobile sections of a community will be 
able to use and benefit from the hypermarket. 
Thus, opponents suggest that the hypermarket will only 
increase choice for certain sections of society, and will 
effectively reduce choice for others. This will be 
particularly true if the hypermarket has a detrimental 
effect - upon the existing or proposed shopping facilities in 
its catchment area. 
3.2.2. Physical E-ffects- 
The social effects of a hypermarket are at their most 
extreme when what may be termed the "physical" effects are 
t he irg reat est. The physical impact of a store upon 
exist i rig orp1 anned shopping developments, whether a 
district centre or a single st'OP, are extremely difficult 
to measure. The increasing competitiveness of the retail 
sector over the past two decaaes makes it difficult to 
determine whether shops have declined or closed as trie 
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resu It of the 11YPact Of a hypermarket, or owing to ot he r 
trends and pressures within the retail environment. It ýIas 
oft en been t he easiest option to make tne nypei-mai, Ket a 
scapegoat. 
The problems of assessing hypermarket impact a re 
compounded by the limitations of the techniques of analysis 
available to planners and researchers to Calculate the 
likely projected impact or actual impact of a new or 
proposed development. impact studies tend to focus not so 
much upon qualitative effects, but rather upon the 
quantifiable mag ti it ud e of impact. Most im pact studies 
according to Roberts (1982) are too convertionai in both 
tone and approach. There is a need for "more comment and 
less tables". Statistics should be regarded as an 
i 11 ust rat i ve tool7 rather than as an explanation in 
t hemse I ves. 
One common method of impact assessment is the use of 
some form of retail assessment or gravity model. Brehery, 
Roberts and Green (1980) suggest a step by step proceedure 
which they claim is increasingly common in studies concerned 
with the potential impact of hypermarkets. 
1. Future levels of available personal expenditure are 
determined. 
Pa pul at ion isochromes are drawn for the proposed 
catchment area, and the estimates of personal expenditure 
are appl ied t0t hese isechromes - to give the total 
available expenditure in the store catchment area. 
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The -likely turnover of the store is estimated. 
4. The proportion of turrover that is likely to be taken 
f rom consumers living in set isochromes from the store is 
calculated. 
For each isochrome, the share of turnover liKely to 
come f rom it is taken as a percentage of t he total 
available expenditure in that isochrome. 
6. To give an assessment of the impact of a hypermarket 
on existing ýo r planned centres, the places/areas wnere 
expenditure captured by the new store would otherwise have 
been spent is. determined. 
There are several limitations to modelling 1 mpact 1 ri 
this manner, as mathematical models can riot be expected to 
take into account all relevant parameters. Pickering (1972) 
identifies several difficulties with models of this type. 
The models, particularly in Britain, often use data which is 
inappropriate., Such as outdated 1971 Census of Distribution 
d at a, owing t. o the shortage of relia-ble and nationally 
accepted statistics on the distributive trades. The use of 
aggregates., and the delimitation of broad categories, such 
as convenience and durable goods, often means that 
classifications are too widely defined. It is often 
incorrectly assumed that all types of trade are likely to be 
equa I ly transferred to a hypermarket. Simi larly, 
caicLilations of volume of trade on the basis of an assumed 
figure of sales per square foot/metre of floorsapce are 
url rea 1i st i C. Itis difficultv if not impossible, to 
accurately measure consumer behaviour. Finally, models tend 
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to assume that all retail units are entirely independent 0f 
other outlets arid facilities in the same centre or ai-ea. 
An aIte rnat i ve method of assessing impact is cost- 
benef it aria 1 ys 1s. However, this method also poses several 
problems, paticularly with regard to the inputs of the 
analysis. it is as difficult to quantify a cost or benefit, 
as it is to decide what constitutes a cost or benefit. 
Furt hermo re, there is the problem of being both 
comprehensive and exclusive7 so that double counting of any 
variable does not occur. 
To aid planners and decision makers dealing with 
applications for large store developments, a number of 
"before and after" studies are available for reference. 
1hese studies have produced some interesting results, 
negating some of the claims of hypermarket critics. 
Initially it was assumed that the hypermarket would 
decimate the -small shop sector, causing the widespread 
closure of outlets, and creating near monopoly situations 
for the hypermarket operators. However7 the evidence from 
most hypermarket impact studies appears to refute this 
accu's. at i on. Hypermarkets do not have such a great effect 
Upon the small independent trader as was at first suggested- 
the supermarkets and competing multiple Instead it is t 
traders who are more likely to be affected. This suggestion 
is reiterated in the Department of Environment Circular 
96/77 (1977) ... 
"The larger food stores appear to have had very little 
effect on the trading position of the incepencent 
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food retal lers witýjirj f if teen 'Y' I nut es driving time of the larger food stores in t he areas studied ...... indepencent retai lers a eneral ly fe1tt hat I-a-, c es, 
1 nf 1 at ion7 and VAT we re Qreater prob1 ems t r1arl f rom 1a rqe)- fa od st o res. 
InF rance7 the Centre de Recherche et de Prospective 
Commercial (CRCP 197,3) provides a useful review or early 
impact studies7 and implies that following an initial impact 
period, most types of store recover from tne view competition 
provided by hypermarkets. The CRCP report pays particulr 
attention to two studies. In the case of impact upon 
variety stores, the findings of the Centre de Recherches et 
de Documentation sur la Consommation (CREDOC 1972). support 
the riot i on that hypermarket impact will recede with t1 me7 
and suggests that if more hypermarkets are opened in the 
same town, the impact would diminish even further. However, 
CREDOC also suggest that the food sales of variety stores 
may be particularly badly affected by the opening of a new 
hypermarket. 
This latter point is supported by Bibaud7 DaryiestoY7 
Ducom, and Simon (1972)7 who extended an earlier study of 
hypermarket impact in Bayonne, and discovered that variety 
stores were likely to be more greatly affected than 
department stores. Fu rt he re(i o re7 the extent of this impact 
would depend upon the iinportance'of food sales in the store. 
Once again, this report covicluCed that stores within the 
catchment area of a riew hypermarket, had recovered froty, any 
adverse impact within two years of the hypermarket opening. 
hat Bibaud 7 DamestoY7 Ducom aria Simon even suaqest . 11 
hypermarket impact can act as a catalyst to encourage small 
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traders t0 adapt avid modernise when faced by this form of 
compet it i on. 
In qeneral, as Bealijeau-Garnier, Delobez 7 Grandmare, 
and Pages (197',. *) h, &vp- Shown, it is t he Larger Sri o ps anC3 
supermarkets, rather than the smaller outlets, that bear the 
brunt of hypermarKet competition. These larger stores tend 
t0 compete for the same type of clientele arid Shopping 
trips as the hypermarket, whereas smaller shops are mo re 
complimentary in nature. 
A mo re recent study, considering the impact of the 
18,2000 square metre Ivry Bords de. Seine commercial centre 
(which contains a Carrefour hypermarKet with 11,250 square 
metres of sales area) again suggests that the impact of 
large area retail developments, particularly upon small 
.0 traders, has been exaggerated (Institut la Boetie 1984). 
Trends in shoo numbers int he catchment area of this 
development merely reflect those trends common to the French 
retail sector as a whole, and only 12 of the 62 small 
retailers interviewed (olne year after the opening of the 
centre) complained of a lasting fall in their turnover. 
Those that were affected in the long term appeared to be 
ffiarginal - enterprises, already in a precarious position, 
whilst the more dynamic retailers had responded to the new 
centre by improving service aria q '-(a 11 t Y, and by maK i ng 
changes in the product -lines that they carried. It was also 
noted that although ', '. 'PO jobs had been lost in local snops, 
the centre itself had created 550 jobs. 
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As Dawson k 198oc)) has noted,, essentially -c he impact 
st ud i es carried aut in France, suggest six instances when 
hypermarket 11Y, Pact is at its greatest. Tj hese are... 
1. In non-specialist shops selling by mass merchandising 
t ec hn iq ues. 
2. In general goods shops, rather than in quality goods 
or specialist shops. 
3. In very small shops, which are economically marginal 
anyway. 
4. In large self-service stores of the same general type 
as hypermarKetS. 
5. In stores which are operated by older retailers who 
show a general inability to adapt; or in stores operarea 
by very young retailers7 who lack the financial resources 
to adapt. 
6. In shops located very close to the hypermarket. 
The vast majority of surveys suggest ttiat the impact of 
hypermarkets UpOn existing facilities are not as 
catastrophic as originally feared. 
Impact will also vary from area to area depending upon 
local conditions, as Seale (1977) SIAQgests ... 
"hypermarkets will have 1 ess impact on existing 
shopping facilities in areas where consumer demand is 
growing, while in areas where demand is stagnant (and 
w, here there is already considerable "natural" death of 
shops), they can only prosper at the expense of other 
outlets and a greater impact shouic be expected. " 
In Britain, t lie Carrefour hypermarket at CaerphlIly 
has probably received t lie most at t ent 1o ri, anc3 brief 
summaries of the impact studies concerned with this store 
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Carl be found in The Grocer (15/0-, l/1975),, cox ( 19725) 7 and 
Retal 1 Dist ribut lo*ri arjc3 1, ýjarjagelylerlt i. he RG RU (I(F, ) 197. 
(Retail Outlets Researcý-, Unit) at Manchester Business School 
conaucted a consumer SArV t- ,in Ug List and ey a *C tils szore i 
September 19 7 30. The study asked consumers where they had 
shopped prior to the opening of the Carrefour. The results 
of this survey (Thorpe and McGoldrick 1974) 
7 suggest 
that 
the independent retailer has been less affected by the 
hypermarket than the multiple retailers in the area (figure 
3.6). 
The fi rst Donaldsons survey of neighbourhood centre 
shops in Caerphilly and the nearby valleys (Lee, Jones,, and 
Leach 1973) showed that although the district centres of 
Pontypridd, Bargoed, Blackwood, and Whitchurch, were all 
heavily dependent on food retailing, the impact of the 
Carrefour hypermarket was spread throughout the region, and 
each centre lost a small proportion of its trade, rat he r 
than any one centre being particularly badly affected. 
Another report by the stockbrokers, Capel-Cure, Carden 
and Co. (1973), shows that although businesses- close to the 
hypermarket lost trade initially following the opening of 
the store, in most cases this trade had been recovered 
within a few years. 
Other reports on different hypermarkets in Britain 
support the findings of the various Caerphilly studies. 
Bridges (1976), in his report on the York Asda, Shows that 
of those retailers interviewed,, under 50% of food o ut I et s 
were adversly affected by the new store., and 8(--)% of t "le 
72 
Figure Hypermarket Impact - the Caerphilly Carrefour. 
- Shops previously used 
Cooperatives 3,5 % 
Multiples 20 % 
Independents 15 % 
- in terms of market share ... 
Multiples contribute 50 % of Carrefour"s consumers 
Co o pe rat i ves contrib * ute 
34 % of Carrefour"s consumers 
Independents contribute 16 % of Carrefoui, "s consumers 
Thorpe & McGoldrick (1974) 
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stores surveyed be 1i eveC t hat t he hypermarket 11ý10 
effect" upon their turnover (fiQure 'Z. 7). 
i he results of bot r T 11 the French and Brit isn ilylz)act 
surveys Would seem to Support the Conclusions ci rawn 
Schiller (1981) ... 
"The evidence is clear and consistent that the impact 
of freestanding SlAperstores is diffused over a large 
area. Rat he rt han destroying the nearest centre, as 
was often predicted, they have diverted a small amount 
of sales from a large number of surrounding centres. " 
Several reasons for the negligable impact of 
hypermarkets 0n sma 11 independent traders have been 
suggested, and Hopwood (1977a) summarizes these. T he 
hypermarket avid small independent store essentially serve 
different sections of the food marKet. The hypermarkets are 
visited for weekly shopping, whilst the smaller stores cater 
for the "topping-up" trade. in effect-, independents operate 
a mo re flexible range of operating hours, reaching o the r 
sections of the Community such as shift workers and 
tourists. Finally, the independent trader is becoming 
increasingly efficient, through the membership of voluntary 
chains and buying groups, which give the small trader more 
scope to adapt to increased competition. 
%. J. 3 SUMMARY 
The hypermarket as a retail institution has evo'lved in 
response to the changing conditions of t he retai I 
envi ronment. T he growth of large retail enterprises wit h 
the resources and ability to adopt and develop large retail 
stores, aria t he consumer demand for one-stop shoppir1g, 
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t 
1 C3 11 re7 Hypermarket impact - the York Adsa. 
- effect of Asda upon retailers income ... 
Grocers Other Fooc 
---------------------------------------------------- 
I tic rease 41 %3E7. 
No Change 10 % 
Dee 1i rie 49 % 36 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Bridges (1976) 
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offering conven'ience an(3 lower prices, combined to prod . uce a 
set of unique features and operating techniques provicitiq a 
riew form or concept of shoppirig. 
The appearance of any new innovatioti as r inK, daek ant 
Taddeo (1971) suggest, usually provokes a negative response 
from those who feel most threatened by the new development, 
in the case of the hypermarKet, the existing sma 11 
retailers. Calls for legislative protection ensue, despite 
the evidence of surveys throughout E-urope consistently 
showing that the physical impact of hypermarkets upon 
existing retail facilities has often been exagerated. in 
most cases the decline of certain groups and types 0f 
retailers7 and retail iristitutiovis7 can be attributed as 
much to their own inability to respond and adapt to the 
changing retail environment, than to direct competition from 
the hypermarket. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : THE RETAIL SECTOR IN FRANCE 
Before any discussion of the legislative response of 
the state to hypermarket c3evelopment can be discussed, the 
Chang i ng env i ronment aI forces which gave birth to t Vie 
hypermarket concept . and the characteristics of this novel 
retail institution need to be placed within the context of 
the French retail sector. Some insight of the diverse 
institutional and organisational features of the French 
retail system, and their relative positions within the 
market is necessary to provide a clearer understanding of 
the reaction and behaviour of the actors involved in the 
debate concerning the Loi Royer and its effects upon 
hypermarket development in France. 
The French retail sector is commonly regarded as one of 
contrasts. France has initiated many of the new retail 
institutions developed during the last 150 years, often 
pioneering innovative moves in the retailing world (Knee 
1982). For example, the department store evolved in France 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century; the late 
1920s, and early 1930s saw the rapid development of the 
European style varieLy store; whilst more recently, France 
has been at the forefront of the development and adoption of 
the hypermarket concept. 
Yet in contrast, France still retains a large 
proportion of small., family-owned retail businesses. T he 
comments of Watson-Dunn made in 1962 are still largely valid 
today... 
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"the -retailing system is overly fragmented, and 
efficiency is nandicapped by retailer acceptance of 
inefficient practices handed down from the isolationist 
past., a sometimes irrational disregard for tylaximisinq 
profits, and concerted action on t-he part of some store 
managers designed to st ety, t he tide of retai 1 ing 
i tin o vat io ns. " 
The retai 1 sector in France has often been very slow to 
adapt to changes within the system. Napoleon Bonaparte"s 
jibe that Britain was a nation of shopkeepers could quite 
comfortably bp- applied to France. 
This polarity between old and new exists within the 
retail sector in terms of both types of outlets and retail 
techniques operated, and in the organisational forms at work 
in the sector. It is', 1, herefore, necessary to be aware of 
these differing features, and the relationships that exist 
between them, when attempting to analyse any particular 
aspect of retailing in France. 
4.1. SALES METHODS 
Several sales methods may be observed in the French 
retail sector (Brosselin 1971). The exact mix of techniques 
practiced varies with both the different types of outlet and 
organisational forms found. The most common retail methods 
are .. 
4.1-1. Traditional sales from fixed outlets 
The longest established and most widespread sales 
technique. This method is used for all types of good anC in 
a wide variety of outlets. Often the salesperson is just 
as7 if not more, important than the good sold. 
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4.1-2. Self-service 
This sales method has seen the most rapid adoption over 
the past twenty five years. The major characteristic of 
self-service is the absence of a salesman/woman. Self- 
service has been adopted by most organisational sectors and 
in a variety of outlets,, but development has been most rapid 
in. the food sector. The greatest advantage of this 
technique for the operator is the savings in lab, our costs 
which it allows. 
4.1.3. Discount sales 
A met hod closely associated with self-service 
techniques particularly in larger outlets, but increasingly 
bei-ng distinguished as a separate category. The maj ar 
emphasis with this sales method is upon reduced profit 
margins and low prices, which may pertain to all of the 
stock or a limited section of stock. 
4.1.4. Mail order 
A form, of direct sales to the consumer. Although mail 
order in France first appeared through department stores, 
usually no shop unit is required as consumers make purchases 
through the medium of a catalogue. The low densities of 
population in many areas of France suggest ideal conditions 
for the adoption of mail order techniques, however., this 
sales method does not appear to have reached its true 
potential in terms of market share (figure 4-1). 
4.1.5. Automatic vending 
Allows twenty-four hour retailing in certain locations. 
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Figure 4.1 France - Retail Sales by Mail Order 
Saies of Total Retail 
------------------------- 
970 
19-14 
1978 
1962 
" 
U. 
U. i3 
1.1 
1.3 
------------------------- 
CECOD (1983) 
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This technique is generally restricted to sinall bulk it ems 
SIACn as cigarettes7 and chocolate. The advantages for tne 
operator are that this method requires little stock ho 1di rig 
and takes up the minimuty, amount of space. For the consumer, 
speeci of service and convenience provide benefits. 
4.1.6. Sales in the home 
Door to door retailing may be employed not only for 
goods, but also for services as in the case of insurance. 
4.1.7. Market sales/Sales rounds 
Sales from non-sedentary market traders and sales 
rounds vary in importance from area to. area, and may account 
for a significant share of trade in rural areas. 
0 
4.4s TYPES OF OUTLET 
These different sales techniques are employed in a 
variety of outlets, which themselves enjoy certain distinct 
characteristics. As with the mix of retail techniques, the 
different forms of outlets operated by organisations varies 
considerabi. y. Large organisations may operate several types 
of store ranging from hypermarkets to smaller traditional 
outlets. Consequently, no valid cateaorisation of 
organisatiori: outlet type: retail technique can be made. 
4.2.1. Traditional Outlets 
The most numerous type of unit in France, despite a 
fall in numbers in recent years. These outlets tend to be 
slyla i ri size, employing traditional counter saies 
techniques with sales staff, al, though self-service and other 
techniques may be adopted depending upon the motivation anc 
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resources of the store owner. 'ji 
t; As fingure 4.2 showsl is 
type of store is largely operated by indepena . ent t rad e rs, 
with two thirds of the food sales achieved by these outlets 
in 19 8 -31 
1 going through those o ut I et s operated by 
independents. 
4.2.2. Department Stores - the "Grand Magasins" 
The depart-ment store is a French innovation dating from 
the 1850s. These types of store retail a wide range of 
goods and services from distinct "departments" within the 
one unit. Sales are generally staff assisted and 
traditionally there is little or no food sales. For a 
considerable time, department stores displayed numerous 
advantages over other types of outlet. They sold a wide 
range of produce under one roof at competitive prices, 
consumers had free entry to the shop and were under no 
obligation to buy, and the special atmosphere generated by 
these stores encouraged sales. 
However, there are inherent weaknesses in the 
k 
department store format which came to the fore as the retail 
sector became more competitive. The major problem with this 
type of outlet is the running costs incurred from employing 
a large staff, and maintaining and insuring the large 
stylishly decorated stores. These problems, amplified by 
compet it 1 on from other types of outlet, have forced some 
department stores to adapt by creating food departments Or 
adopting self-service techniques for part of the operation. 
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1g ur e 4. France - Food bales by Type of Store anc Form 
of Organisation i98. '. L 
of Food Sales (196,. ý 3) throuah 
Type of Store 
Hype r- Supe r- Variety T rad 1tio ria i 
Owners-hip markets markets Stores Outlets 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Multiples 
Cooperatives 
Buying Coops. 
Variety Store 
Grandes 
25.6 - 
5.4 
. 71 
. 4.. 6 
34.7 -7 
0.4 
t: F 
Surfaces 
independents 
%. Ja. 6 
4.. U 
100.0 
7.9 58.3 66.4 
---------------------------------- ------------------------ 
Gallo (1984) 
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4.2 - -3 - Variety Stores - the "Magasins Populaires" 
These shops offering "unique prices" (as reflected in 
tradenames like Prisunic, Monoprix7 and Uniprix) were 
initially regarded as the poor man's department st a re. The 
concept was developed 'in the United States by Wooiwortý' wr1O 
opened a series of five ana ten cent stores in which all 
goods were sold at these prices. The variety store first 
appeared in France in the 19-30s, and after a few years 
abandoned the set-price formula of the initial concept in 
favour of the department store formula of selling goods by 
type rather th an price groupings. The major difference from 
department stores is that variety stores generally contain 
food departments, employ more of the modern retail 
techniques such as self-service, and offer lower prices. 
'es and Supermarkets 4.2.4. Superett. 
Superettes and supermarkets sell predominantely food 
goods by self-service techniques, although counter service 
may be retained for certain goods. In France official 
definitions reserve the term "superette" for self-service 
units of between 120 and 399 square metreS7 and 
"supermarket" for self-service stores with between 400 and 
2,499 square metres of sales space. 
The term "supermarket" encompasses a wide variety of 
stores, and in France, David (1981) has distinguished four 
sub-types of supermarket. Discount supermarkets like those 
t rad i ng under the Leclerc or 
low prof it ma rg 1 ns 
intermarcheo'* logo, operate on 
of around 12%, and rely 0 ri ahig ýI 
turnover of low priced goods to generate profits. 
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Neighbourhood supermarkets tend to be located in areas with 
a high density of population as they rely on a cat chment 
popu I at i on within walking distance of the store for their 
trade. They operate on margins of about 18% and fresh 
produce accounts for a good proportion of turnover. 
A third type of supermarket is the "large range, h1gh 
quality" store, which according to David, exhibits an up- 
market presentation and is found in higher class suburbs. 
Margins in this type of store are in the region of 20%. 
These stores tend to have a smaller range of non-foods and 
greater emphasis is placed upon grocery goods and fresh 
produce. The food departments of some department stores may 
be placed in this category. 
Finally, the food supermarket of variety stores are 
distinguished as a further sub-category by David. As the 
location., management, and general retail policy of these 
units is integrally associated with the remainder of the 
variety store., it is difficult to operate mass merchandising 
techniques to the same degree as in other supermarket 
types, and consequently prices tend to be high. 
4.2.5. Hypermarkets 
The characteristics of the hypermarket have been dealt 
with in Chapter Three. However, it is necessary to 
elaborate further between hypermarket centres and single 
units, when one considers the hypermarket concept as a type 
of store or sales environment. The majority of hypermarkets 
in France are not isolated units, but were built with or 
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have since added a "galerie marchande". This "galerie 
marchande" turns the single store into a small commercial 
centre through the addition of a mall containing a number of 
small shop units which are ! eased Out to other operators. 
This development offers advantages for all concerned. 
For the hypermarket operator, it increases the 
attractiveness of the outlet through the addition of extra 
facilities and services - in effect increasing the range of 
goods and services offered on the site. Whilst other 
operators have the opportunity to benefit f rom the 
considerable pulling power of the hypermarket "magnet", and 
as units are usually rented, they are able to do so with 
reduced investment costs. Finally, the consumer benefits 
through the increased range of goods available at the one 
site. 
However, as Liepmann (1973) observes in his study of 
independent retailers in commercial centres, the independent 
trader who takes up the opportunity to enter a "galerie 
marchande" must make some compromises. Often the 
independent will have to revise his or her management policy 
and store assortment in order to complement those of the 
hypermarket - as i nt eg rat i'o-ri is more successful if the 
independe, nt appears to be a natural extension of the 
hypermarket. In order to achieve this, t he independent 
usually needs to reduce his or her margins and prices, and 
to trade for longer hours. 
The most important compromise, however, is that in 
order to generate harmony between the various independents 
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in t he centre, collaboration is essent ia 17 and the 
independent is required to sacrifice some of his or her 
Ina 1v1C3, Aa1 ISM for the collective good of the ca roup. This 
change in attitude and status can be the most difficult 
adaption req ui red from the independent. Co nseq uent 1 y, 
Liepmayin concludes that the independent retailer should 
carefully study the advantages and disadvantages before 
committing themselves to this type of development. 
4.2.6. Other Outlets 
In addition to the traditional small specialist shops, 
certain other types of outlet may be found in France, SUCH 
as the collective shop, and more recently the discount 
store. The idea of a collective shop originated in Sweden 
in the early 1960s. A group of complementary entreprises 
and services combine in a collective group to operate a 
single store. The combination of their activities often 
gives the store the range of goods or services available in 
other types of outlets. In the collective shop each trader 
maintains his. or her own legal and financial independence, 
but benefits from collaboration and collective management 
which deals with most of the technical and commercial 
aspects of the store7s operation. 
The discount store is becoming increasingly common 
throughout western Europe. These outlets provide a limited 
range of "essential goods" (often stocking only one brand of 
eacn good) sold at low prices by self-service techniques 1n 
small rather basic units. The emphasis in these stores 15 
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very much on low price S7 and costs are held down by low 
labolAr and decor costs. 
In pu re numerical terms (figure 4., Z ") severai broad 
trends in establishment numbers can be identified. The 
total number of retail outlets in France declined frory, 1960 
to 19701, and then rose through the 1970s, only to fall again 
in the early 1980s. However,, important differences may be 
observed between sectors. The number of food stores has 
declined throughout the period whilst, in contrast, non 
food stores have increased in number. Within both of these 
sub sectors, local and speciality food stores and non 
specialist non food stores have seen the greatest decline, 
whilst "large area" food, and specialist non food outlets 
have risen in number. Over the same period, despite the 
general decline in shop numbers, the sales area of retail 
outlets has risen (figure 4.4). This trend towards fewer 
(but larger) outlets is particularly acute in the food 
sector. 
When the market shares of different types of outlet are 
assessed (figure 4.5) the most noticeable trends over the 
past twenty years are the declining share of retail sales 
taken by department and variety stores, traditional food 
(including superettes and small self-service), and the food 
specialists. These losses have largely been at the expense 
of the supermarket and particularly the hypermarket. 
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711 
gu re 4. Z France - Number of Retail Establishments. 
i otal Numoer of Szoress. 
Year 00C Norl ý-00(3 
---------------------------------------------------- 
. 71 i, 360 586 500 316 000 270 500 i96r, 5 58 -u7i 80C. ) 295 000 288 800 
1970 569 OoO 275 000 294 ooO 
1975 0 oo(- 1 57 1 800 ýJll 800 
1979 604 250 256 000 %. )48 250 
--------------------------------------------------- 
CECOD (198.3). 
2. Annual, Crianges in Shop Numbers. 
iype of Shop 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTAL +9 685 +6 414 -1 552 487 
019 986 721 -i Iýi 15 FOOD +I ja 
ý. 871 large area + 400 ++ 397 + 228 
local. & 
speciality + 619 -1 224 1 118 187 
NON FOOD +8 666 +7 400 +1 466 
108 non special ist 77 151 
L 
specialist +8 743 +7 551 570 +1 574 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insee (1981) (i982) 7 
-r 
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Figure 4.4 France - Retail Floorspace. 
Sa ! es A ree " S- a ue re met res 
Year I otai t- 00 (3 i\iori FooQ 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1966 
1977 
1980 
30i 
3 2.1 91a 
39 356 
7 790 1 -%: 7# 511 
3 .., 0 784 12 11ý4 
12 875 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ministýýre du Commerce et de iArtisanat (1960a) (198Z) 
Figure 4.5 France - Market Shares by Type of Retaii Outlet 
1965-1982. 
of Total Sales 
iype or Store 1965 1970 1975 1980 11382 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Department & 
Variety Stores 8.3 7.3 5.8 
Hypermarkets 0.2.6 12.6 
Supermarkets 1.8 4.9 6.8 9.0 10.3 
*1i. C) General t-ooU 24.8 2 1.12.5 - 
Mail Order N/A 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.13 
Food Specialists 19.9 17.2 14.5 i7 13.2 
Other Non-Food 45.1 45.1 47.4 45.6 45.0 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
* includes superettes and other small self service 
CECOD (1983) 
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4.3. COMMERCIAL CENTRES 
Although not strictiy a shop type7 commercial centres 
are such an important element in the retail st ruct u re of 
France (figure 4.6). providing a unique retail environment 
that they merit further consideration. Traditiona-Lly owing 
to the influence of central place theory upon planning 
thought, commercial centres have been classified on a 
hierarchical basis into three categorieS7 all of which can 
be observed in France. The neighbourhood centre contains a 
few small shops and a supermarket which serves a population 
of between 5,000 and 15,000; the community centre consists 
of a larger supermarket, hypermarket7 or variety store, plus 
a number of comparison goods shops, and caters for a 
population of 30,000 to 100,000 - most of the hypermarket 
centres considered above would fall into this category; and 
finally, the regional centre is characterised by the 
presence of one or two large "magnet" stores in addition to 
up to a hundred comparison shops and serves 250,000 people. 
The regional centres are owned, developed, and managed by a 
single developer (which may be a group of commercial 
interests) as a single unit. 
Owina to changing economic conditions and other 
developments in the retail sector, further categorisations 
of commercial centres have been made in recent years. 
Retail and Distribution Management (9(4) 1981) suggests that 
the larger centres may be further distinguished as either 
pure shopping centres" seen as the traditional regional 11 
shopping centre with "anchor" stores at either end of a mall. 
composed of specialist shops and boutiques such as the Parly 
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Figure 4.6 Oer of Commerclai i France - Num- Ce-ntres 1971-' 
L. ofyime rc ia1. Cent re aef ined as 3, o Sq. in. of sales a rea 131 us 
ten or more retail outlets. 
Yea r To-tal New Cent res 
1971 14 4(--) 
1972 187 44 
197 3 40 
1974 . 242 15 
1975 2.169 .2 ý- 7 
1976 297 
q77 "T 
1978 9 
350i5 
1980 3o 599 
198-1 -)7 Z, 14 
'86 13 19 8 A2, '%7.1) 
IT 
LSA 731 1979, & LSA 877 198%.; P. 
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cent re; or as "shopping centres as part of new towns", 
where the centres are much iarger witti tne aily, of extending 
their catchment area as is the case with Evry 2, and the 
Cergy Pontoise centre; or f inal ly, t Fie cent re may be 
regarded as an in-town centre as part of a redevelopment 
programme as is the case of the centres of La Part Dieu in 
Lyon, and Saint-Sever in Rouen. 
Dawson (1983) has further extended the traditional 
classification of shopping centres, delimiting six main 
types within which various sub-types may be identified. 
Within the first category of "general purpose free-standing 
cent res ",, the sub-types of reighbourhood, community, 
regional,, st ri p., and super-regional may be found. infill, 
extension, and core replacement centres are foUnG in the 
"general purpose centres in shoppi . ng districts" or "renewal 
centre" category, whilst New Town centres and downtown 
megastructures fall into the "multi-use centre" category. 
The other categories of "ancillary centres" and "speciality 
centres" include hotel office, and transport-associated 
sub-types, and purpose-built, and recycled building sub- 
types respectively. The final category suggested by Dawson 
is that of "focused centres". 
Large regional centres are commonplace in most of the 
major urban centres in France (map 4.1). According to Solal 
(1973) they exhibit many commom features of oesign and 
management. The actual plan of a centre is influenced by 
site characteristics particularly the si. -;. e, topography, 
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rad i rig and zone restrictions relating to ryl o st 
cent res t he basic plan consists of a mall connecting t he 
major anchor stores7 which may be multi-level I-tyl itS. The 
lyla 11 is enclosed t0 pe rfyt it all. weather Shopping and 
landscaping features such as fountains,, and sculptures which 
combine with piped music to create an attractiv. e shopping 
environment. 
The merchandising mix found in the centre is determined 
by carefully conducted market analysis. The major "anchor" 
0r "magnet" stores7 usually department stores, 
hypermarkets, or well-established chain stores,, are located 
at either end of the mall and account for up to 50% of the 
total floorspace available. Located in the connecting mall, 
preferably in open-f ronted shops are amixtu re of 
complementary goods or service outlets. Only certain ratios 
of retailers in the same line of trade are permitted, to 
create a balance of shop types and generate 'a "town centre" 
env iro noment The wide range of service facilities found in 
centres a re,. primarily designed to endorse it" S 
attractiveness, as the director of the Polygone centre in 
Montpellier, M. Cailloux comments ... 
"The Polygone also has services. There are banks, bars 
and restaurants, týhree cinemas, a travel agency and a 
dry cI eane r. But the role of the Polygone is 
commercial7 and all the services on offer are 
merchantile with the intention of drawing the clients 
... we do a number of exhibitions and shows 
but this 
is with a commercial interest to attract the clients. " 
(Noble 1977) 
The independent retailer in the mall is required to 
meet certain financial conditions or guarantees,. to develop 
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and Maintain an outlet of sufficient standard or quailty irl 
order to integrate With t he general atmosphere and 
presentation of the centre. A carefully chosen balance of 
outlets is essential to the economic viability of the 
centre... 
"Success of a centre is a well-balanced competitive 
assortment of large and small stores; larger stores 
with names to bring in customers, smaller stores with 
special ability to provide the frosting on the cake. " 
(Solal 1973) 
The accepted practice is for centre management to lease 
units within the centre to tenants on a percentage rental 
based upon turnover, with a fixed minimum guaranteed rent. 
In order to calculate this re"t7 the management requires 
complete access to the trading figures achieved by each 
tenant. The tenant also pays all real estate taxes and 
common area insurance and service charges. A turnover-based 
rent is favoured because it encourages efficiency, as it is 
in the interests of both owner and tenant to maximise retail 
turnover per square metre. 
The terms of the lease generally require tenants to 
join the centre7s merchants association or a GIE (Groupement 
.0^ d' Interets Economique). This organisation encourages mutual 
cooperation between tenants and works for the general 
interests of the centre. Solal regards a strong association 
as an essential ingredient for a successful centre. 
The day to day management of the centre is carried out 
solely by the centre promoter, who undertakes communal 
activities such as security, cleaning, maintenance,, and 
publ icity. The Promoter, Commonly an organisatiorl, 's 
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dependent Upon an external supply of furlds 7 and will often 
enter i y1t 0 partnership with af inancial backer in the 
building and development of the cent re. The escalatirig 
costs of developing and operating the larger commercial 
centres, has led , 
to an increasing number of partnerships of 
this kind. 
4.4. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to establish a 
class if icati on of French retailing enterprises by 
organisational type. One would imagine that structural 
trends within the retail sector towards concentration would 
simplify this exercise, but this is not so. The number of 
retail enterprises actually rose in the late 1970s (figure 
4.7). The subtleties of legal structures and relationships 
are not always easy to disentangle. Similarly, commercial 
accords, and diversification into different sectors confuse 
traditional classifications even further. However, despite 
these difficulties7 several well established categories of 
organisation do exist, and the characteristics of these 
groupings must be outlined as the majority of statistical 
data and literature refers to these classifications. 
4.4.1. Independent Commerce 
I 
The characteristics of the independent trader are well 
known and documented. The retail business tends to be 
family owned and staffed, with few "external" employees. 
Outlets are small in size and, as independents have to 
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Figure 4.7 France - Number of Retail Enterprises 197i-. L'ý36i 
Year Total Food Non Food 
----------------------------------------------- 
1974 387 501 
1975 -377 240 
1976 385 164 
1977 402 966 
1978 409 504 
1979 411 231 
1980* 417 539 
1981* 417 318 
136 067 
128 033 
127 882 
132 497 
134 422 
134 579 
134 595 
133 647 
451 4.34 
249 207 
257 282 
270 469 
'27 5 162 
276 652 
286 981 
285 165 
----------------------------------------------- 
* Estimates 
Insee (1983) 
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obtain goods through wholesalers, channels of cistribution 
are lengthy, resulting in higher costs and prices than In 
most other forqis of coiYuYierce. 
This organisational type is the longest established7 
and still accounts for the greatest proportion of OLItlets 
and retail turnover in Western economies. France is no 
exception to this rule, and the independqnt sector exhibits 
most of the characteristics and trends evident in this 
organisational category throughout Europe. The independents 
are predominant in the food sector, accounting for 75% of 
fresh food sales in 11375,, but they also control sizeable 
proportions of certain non-food sectors7 70% of clothing 
sales and 54% of hygiene goods in 1975 (Dayan 1981). As 
elsewhere7 the independent sector in France has been 
declining, with their share of retail turnover falling 
steadily from 88% in 19507 to 81% in 19607 75% in 19707 and 
51% in 1980 (figure 4.8). The number of outlets controlled 
by this organisational category has also declined, largely 
in the face of increased competition from other 
orgarisational types. 
4.4.2. Associated Commerce 
One way for the independent trader to compete with new 
retail developments is to collaborate with other traders. 
Legally these groupings consist of simple associations, 
which allow the members to pool together their resources for 
buying and service functions. Associations may be 
ho ri zo-nt al, where all tile members perform tile same function, 
or vertical, where members perform complementary functions, 
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Figure 4.8 France - Market Share by Type of Organisation 
1950-1960. 
% of Total Retail Sales 
Organisation 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Department/Var- 
iety Store Co. 3.5 4.8 6.6 5.4 6.0 
Multiples 4.5 5.35 6.8 8. 
Grandes Surfaces 
- Food I---5.3 6.6 
- Non Food 0.9 : 4.1 2.7 Z: ý. 2 N/A 
Mail Order --- N/A 4.3 
Cooperatives 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.0 
Affiliated indep- 
endents 
- Voluntary Groups 0.3 21.0 3.7 6.4 8.3 
- Buying Groups 1.2 2.53.0 3". 2 6.7 
Unaffiliated 
independents 87.9 81.1 74.9 60.0 51.0 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Dobler (1981) & Euromonitor (1983b) 
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such as collaboration between retailers and wholesalers. In 
some associations, collaboration may oe of both a horizontal 
and vertical nature. The first forms of associated commerce 
were cooperative groupings, and after 19207 associations 
became commonplace with the birth of groups such as the 
Comptoir Cooperatif d"Achats (1922.2), Codec (1924). and La 
Hutte (1929). The success of wholesaler-headed groups in 
Holland and in the USA also resulted in the adoption of the 
voluntary chain concept in France in 1955. 
Andrieux (1972) identifies four main aims of associated 
comme rce. Firstly, these groupings allow members to gain 
more favourable buying conditions by combining t hei r 
purchasing power. Secondly, communal publicity, and 
modernisation of outlets increses competitiveness, Thirdly, 
the association allows assistance with managerial problems 
through advice and personnel training, thereby i ric reas i ng 
the efficiency of members. Finally, financial positions are 
improved and investment potential increased through communal 
investment. 
Two fo rms of associated commerce are commonly 
distinguished in the literature... 
4.4.2.1. Cooperative Groupings of Retailers 
These associations have an horizontal structure and are 
more common amongst retailers than wholesalers. Originally, 
t he Communal buying groups formed by this type of 
association only performed the wholesale function. However, 
over ti me the role of these groups has widened and other 
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functions have been added. 
egroupings0f basic principles of cooperative 
retailers are democrat ic management, f reed om of buy 1 rig 
(part ici pants need not buy solely through the group, they 
may use other channels), freedom of entry and exit (althougýi 
usually certain conditions must be observed), and access to 
communal services. 
There are numerous advantages for the independent 
through the communal buying and other facilities offered by 
this type of grouping. However, financial obligations can 
be heavy, particularly when joining such a group, and buying 
tends to be periodical, so retailers may be obliged to hold 
more stock than absolutely necessary. 
Dayan (1,981) identifies several conditions essential 
for the success of this type of association. These include 
a large number or participants., faithfulness of members., the 
willingness to adopt modern retailing techniques and to 
collaborate for the collective good of the group, and 
finally, a proficient and realistic plan for the group. 
1he major cooperative buying groups that fall into this T 
category are Codec-Una and Unico (figure 4.9). Codec-Una 
was formed by the 1972 aiy(algatyiation of two of the longest 
established retail groups in France. Codec was founded in 
1924 by a consortium of ten grocers, headed by Moreau-Dupuy. 
In 1964, the group opened its first depot to supply its 
associalted retailers, and replaced the previous system of 
pre! iminary orders which often required traders to order 
mo re stock t han req ui red. Codec offered six distinct 
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services to its mem be rs - administration facilities, 
f inance,, ca mme rc ia1 serviceS7 economic st ud i es . depot 
management, and information. The other part of this grol. 1 P7 
Una, was created in the Paris region by Bouchard in IK -6 and 
provided a similar package of services for its members7 
until the group ran into financial difficulties in the early 
1970s and merged with Codec. 
Unico developed from the old retail group Comptoir 
Cooperative d"Achats in 1960,, and serves its associates 
through three distinct subsidiaries. The Comptoir 
Coope rative d7Achats (CCA) fulfills all commercial 
operations including the production and packaging of Unico 
own brand products, and the modernisation of outlets. The 
Sociie"*te Central d'Achat et de Paiements controls the payment 
of goods bought, and the financial investment of the group 
is managed by Sedeco. In 196611 the group formed a joint 
subsidiary company, Unicodec, with the Codec group, but this 
project was soon aborted. 
In other retail sectors the leading groups of this type 
are La Hutte in sports and leisure goods; Mobilier de France 
in furniture, - and Ucodroco (Union des Cooperatives be 
Droguistes Marchands de Coleurs) in the pharmacy sector. 
4.4-2-2. Voluntary Groups 
Cooperative retail groups are designed to shorten 
distribution channels by bypassing the wholesaler element. 
in response to this, wholesalers have created their own 
vertically st r uct u red grou ps, c0 IYI(Yl 0 Y1 1y refered to as 
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vo I unt a ry chains. This forty, of association originated in 
the USA during the first world war and appeared in i7rance in 
t he 1950s. 
Many of the characteristics of voluntary groups a re 
simi lar t0 those of cooperative retail grou ps, aIt ho I-Ig h 
there are important st r uct u ra 1diffe rences. Wholesalers 
are at the head of the chain7 and coordinate the wholesale 
and retail activities of the group. The wholesaler controls 
and operates the centrale d'achat (buying organisation) 
which acts as an intermediary between the producer and 
retailer7 and provides the goods and services required by 
members of the chain. A second organisation within the 
chain devises the group"s general policies and oversees the 
retai I members7 although each retailer keeps his or her 
financial independence. Hierarchies may exist within 
chains7 with regional chains affiliated to national 7 and 
national to international chains. 
Ret-ail members attain the same advantages and 
disadvantages as in other formis of, assoc*ated commerce7 but 
in this type of organisation the wholesaler is guaranteed a 
share of the market. 
In France there are four leading voluntary chains in 
the food sector. Sopegros-Avaiyt is the oldest and one of the 
leading chains. Sopegros was founded in 1945 as a simple 
buying group which included a riumber of wholesalers. i ri 
1957 a section of Sopegros wholesalers and associated 
retailers created the National Federation of Avam which 
launched t he nationally recognised traderames Avaiyi7 
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Sup" Avam, Vivo and ifafor traditional out let s and 
supe ret t es, and ifaprix for supermarkets. By 197*. ý. ' Avam 
controlled the largest number of self-service shops, and 
Sopegros controlled a third of the supermarkets found in 
the associated commerce sector. The group provides a number 
of services for its members through a range of subsidiaries 
foremost amongst these being Somocoda (modernisation of 
outlets), Sedipa (publicity), Sopeda (finance and 
investments) and Sogetradis (information). 
Another impo rt ant voluntary chain is the Promodas 
controlled Segedes chain. This organisation was formed 
under the name Ege in 1955, by a rumber of wholesalers who 
slowly adopted the voluntary chain concept. The retail 
element of the chain retains the Ege logo, whilst the 
wholesale function is performed by Segedes. A third 
organisation made up of representatives from these two 
elements provides the link between. the two. The Segedes 
chain is a member of the Vege International group. 
The Alimengros-Kergao Service chain evolved from the 
first wholesale grouping in France, the 1931 founded 
Alimengros group. In 19537 this group created Sodiproma 
which introduced the tradename Kergao-Service for associated 
retailers. In the early 1970s Alimergros was absorbed by 
the Spar chain, but the well established Kergao banner was 
ret ai ned. 
Finally, although the French Spar chain was only formed 
as in 1955, v it has long been regarded as one of-the pioneers 
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of the voluntary chain movement in France, and as a model 
voluntary chain. The chain was established in the image of 
the Dutch Spar orgarisation by a group of dissident 
wholesalers f rom A1i meng ros In t lie early 1970s Spar 
embarked upon a concentration programme with the absorption 
of Alimengros and an agreement of collaboration with the 
Paris based chain Tip France. 
Voluntary chains also exist in the non-food sector. 
The principle ones being Madame in the electrical goods 
. .0 market; Cate'OFna in the DIY sector; Galeries Barb'e"S, Levitan 
and Crozatier in furniture; and Sermo, Seldis and Saneb- 
Citex in the textile trade. 
4.4.3. Integrated Commerce 
Like associated commerce, integrated commerce is 
characterised by groupings of establishments - for buying 
purposes. The major difference between the two forms of 
organisation being that in the case of integrated commerce, 
all the individual outlets are owned and operated-by the one 
commercial organisation. There are essentially four main 
types of integrated commerce in France, although recent 
trends in organisation as a result of concentration and 
diversification have blurred some of the traditional 
divisions and certain retail companies may now appear to 
fall into more than one single category. 
4.4.3.1. Branch Multiples 
By definition these are organisations which operate at 
least four units, but generally many more, usually -in a 
certain well defined retail sector. The organisation is 
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controlled by the central services aivision which determines 
Iong and short term policy goals for the whole group. This 
Civision also coordinates the branch outlets and cont ro Is 
all the technical, legal., and financial resources of the 
organisation. The individual outlets operate under the 
organisation"s well established tradenames, although an 
organisation may operate more than one logo. 
Individual store managers follow the regulations aria 
guidelines laid down by the organisation. The wholesale 
function may be performed by a centrale a'achat which the 
company owns or is affiliated to. In the branch multiple 
sector there is a tendency for several multiple 
organisations to be affiliated to a single large centrale 
d'achat such as Paridoc, Locigda7 or Camas. 
The first multiple groups in France were La Maison 
Buhner formied in 18227 and Fe"Olix Potin founded in 1845,1 but 
it was in the late 1860s that multiple organisations became 
commonplace. The growth of this type of organisation was 
particularly strong in the food sector. 
The development of food multiples (the Maisons 
d"Alimentation a Succursales (MAS)) exhibited a strong 
regional element, with early growth concentrated in the East 
and Centre-East areas. The groups La Familistere, Bonat et 
Mignot, Goulet Turpin, and Ets Mauroy originated in Riems, 
La Ruche Picarde at AmienS7 Les Economiques de Normandie at 
Rouen7 Wibault at Sin-le-Noble., and Casino, !A liment at ion 
.0 Stephanoise, and les Docks Foreziens in St Etienne. Over 
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t he past aecade, mergers and acquisitions in th1s 
organisational category has resulted in the creation of mo re 
nationally-identifiable groups. 
Most of the branch multiples have pursued a policy or 
. rat i onal isat i on, closing some of their smaller outlets and 
replacing others with supermarkets and hypermarkets. This 
trend is reflected in the sales by outlet profile for these 
organisations (figure 4.10). 
The major branch multiple organisations in the the food 
sector are Casino, which with its subsidiaries 1" Epargne, 
and Somaca is the largest food multiple in the country; 
Docks de France; Radar; Comptoirs Modernes; and Cedis 
(figure 4.11). 
Branch multiple organisations are relatively 
underdeveloped in the non-food sectors, with the exceptions 
10 of shoes (Andre); clothes (Armand Thierry -Sigrand, and 
Conchon Quinette); and the babywear markets (Materna and its 
owner Prenatal). 
4.4.3.2. Department Store / Variety Store Companies 
These organisations, as their title suggests, primarily 
operate department and variety stores. This type of company 
performs both wholesale and retail functions and generally 
owns its own centrale d'achat - for example Au Printemps 
own Sapac, and Galeries Lafayette control Spam. The 
Organisation may control stores both directly and indirectly 
through either affiliation contracts or joint subsidiary 
companies with other retailers. 
Aristide Bauciant is universally regarded as the father 
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of the department store 7 after tile opening of his first Bon 
March e' shop in Paris in 1852. This store ut i1 ised new 
retai 1 tecnniques which have since become synonymous with 
department stores. The successful formula pioneered by Ban 
Marche' was soon imitated by others - Le Louvre (opened in 
1855), Bazar de 17 Hiatel de Ville (1856) 
7 
Nouvelles Galeries 
(1861), l 
Au Printemps (1865) 
7 La 
Samaritaine (1670), and 
Galeries Lafayette (1895) (Brosselin 1971). Increased 
competition and market oportunities in other sectors have 
since tempted many of these organisations to diversify into 
other areas. 
. 
Closely associated with the department store groups are 
the variety store companies. This type of organisation 
illustrates some of the problems of attempting a strict 
categorisation of retail firms by organisational type. The 
majority of these organisations, are controlled by department 
store operators. Uniprix was created by Nouvelles Galeries 
in 19287 Prisunic by Au Printemps, in 19317 and Monoprix by 
Galeries Lafayette in 1932, the same year as Mag Est of 
Strasbourg and Galeries de Mulhouse founded Uniprix. To 
confuse the issue further, these companies also tend to 
manage their stores as branch multiples. 
As most of the variety store operators are strongly 
linked to a parent department store organisation, t hei r 
operational st r uct u re of ten overlaps. Generally they 
patronise the centrale Cj 7 achat and other service facilities 
controlled by the mother organisation, although indepenaent 
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va r1 et y st o re compan 1 es, may af fiIi at eto ot he r cent ra 1 es. 
There are three leading depart ment /va r iety store 
organisations in F rance (f igure 4.1.22) . The Ga ier1 es 
Lafayette g ro up controls the Monoprix variety store cha in 
and two centrales - Spam (Socie'ote' Parisienne a'Achats et ce 
Manutention) and S, ca! (Socie"te" Central d'Achats) which supply 
their own and affiliated stores. Au Printemps, which has 
recently diversified into other retail sectors owns the 
Prisunic variety store chain,, and centra le d'achat, Sapac 
(Societe Parisienne d'Achats en Commun). The Nouvelles 
Galeries organisation now controls the formerly independent. 
Bazar de I'H8""tel de Ville department store group, along with 
the La Mda (MaiSon d7Achats) centrale and the Uniprix 
variety stores. Finally, the Paris-France group (taken 
over by Radar in 1980) controls the Aux Dames de France ana 
Trois Quartiers department stores, and has a share with 
Magasins Rieunis in the Parunis centrale d'achat. 
4.4.3.3. Consumer Cooperatives 
The largest retail organisation in France is a group in 
which the emphasis is placed upon serving the consumer 
rather than on making profit - the Cooperative Society. 
Technically, the various cooperative societies are made Lip of 
consumers 7 personal capital. Shares may be bought at 
company outlets and have no commercial value apart from a 
nominal price. The share issue is theoretically unlimited, 
but each family is only allowed one vote irrespective of the 
number of shares in its possession. Shareholding has 
benefits for the owner in the form of a year-end dividend, 
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Figure 4. i*-. ' 
Stores 198i 
1-rance - Lea 'ing- Deroartment/Variety Store 
Groups 
GalerieS L-aTayecce I cepartment S-cores. 
-. 2,71 "Monoprix" variety stores 
91 owned 
180 affiliated 
Au Printemps 55 department stores 
- 25 owned 
- 30 affiliated 
, J46 "Prisunic" & "Printania" 
variety stores 
- 121 owned 
-4 manacied 
- 2221 affiiiated 
64 specialist shops (clothes) 
NolAvell. es Galeries 86 department stores 
- 67 "Nouvelles Galeries" 
- 17 "BHV" 
-2 "Mac3lylod" 
58 "Uniprix5 variety stores 
45 garcen centres 
Performance - Turnover (Million F) 
Group 1976 197-ý 1978 1979 198o 198i 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Gal. Lafay. 
(Retai 1) 
(Wholesale) 
Au Printemps 
(Paretir, Co. ) 
Nouv. Gal. / 
1400 1576 1752 1676 220 45 244-. 
1171 1239 1354 1462 1575 178Z 
'96 414 470 659 229 337 US 
541', ' 
1175 
%5972 
1 -4: 95 
6520 7597 7947 970 
17'.. '9 1956 14 %. l 1 1799 
76 18 8152 9287 127o I 13 7 *.. -: ý`%: j 15 1 --S 7 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Marenco ( 198%-SF ) 
115 
us'Aa 11 ya percentage discount on the total VallAe of goods 
PlArchased (althouah 1 ri rece-rit yea rs the va 1 ue of th1s 
dividend has decreased considerably as profits have been 
reinvested in the Society), ana ini access to services 
provided by the Movement, such as banking and inS'Arance. 
Each shareholding pa rt ne r is entitled to vote for the 
leadership of the regional cooperatives7 and these reaional 
bodies do likewise for the two central national 
associations7 the FNCC and SGCC. 
The first Consumer Cooperative in France was formed in 
July 1935, when Michel Derrison opened his Le Commerce 
Veridique grocery st o re 1n Ly 0 However, the real 
forerunners of the modern cooperative movement appeared in 
northern France in 1860, following the development of Robert 
Owen"s "Equitable Pioneers of Rochdale" which initiated the 
Cooperative Movement in England in 1844. 
-The first Cooperative Congress, the Union Cooperative, 
was held in Paris in 1855, and evolved into the FNCC 
(F9de'Oration Nationale des Coopoeoratives de Consommation) in 
1913. At this time the FNCC was composed of just under nine 
hundred local cooperative societies, and by the 1920s this 
number had risen to around four thousand. The laroe number 
of member societies gave the Cooperative Movement a highly 
fragmented nature, and greatly hampered its efficiency. The 
Societies themselves were, however, aware of this problem 
and embarKed upon a massive concentration and integ rat ion 
programme in the inter-war period, which culminated in &Q- 
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creat i on of fifty Societies in the 1940s. Following the 
secona woria war, this trend towaras concentration was 
co nt in 1-ted to the extent that7 according to Roger Kerinac7 
the President of the FNCC in 1977... 
"in 1960 we had powerful Regional Societies bu4,, - 
these Societies had no commercia7i 7 financial 7 or social 
policy in common ...... each of these Societies would 
observe with scepticism the revolution which developea 
in the field of distribution, showing disbelief towards 
the view techniques, which they considered either all 
right for others or calling for the strongest 
resistance. This marks the time when the French 
consumer cooperatives began to lose ground compared 
with the most dynamic of their competitors. " (in 
Hopwood 1977b) 
Pressure for change from the more progressive Socities 
forced the establishment of a series of study groups 
following the 1964 -Congress. These aroups recommended the 
strengthening of exiting central facilities, a regular audit 
of member Societies' accounts, and the creation of a retail 
service to ad, 4ise and assist members with financial and 
trading difficulties. The proposed retail service took the 
form of the National Investment Committee, which issued 
recommendations to member societies on key projects. 
Furthermore, the reorganisation and concentration that these 
post-war moves provoked lead to the adoption of a five year 
development plan to control and monitor development in 1971. 
The organisational structure of the Cooperative 
Movement is centred upon the two national bodies, the FNCC, 
which coordinates the Movements policies, ana the SGCC 
(Societe Ge'nerale des Coope6ratives de Consommateurs), the 
organisations centrale d'achat. The Movement also controls 
a number of subsidiaries which provide a variety of service 
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facilities for members. The Caisse Centrale de Cre"d-it 
0, Cooperative (CCCC) controls t tie 1o ng term i rives-cmen-c 
0 of pr og ramme of the Movement, and t he C red it Menag er 
Cooperative supplies the cheapest crealt in France. Ot he r 
services available to members include cooperative hotelS7 
the cooperative bank, 7 
insurance, education, librat-y 
facilities, laboratory testing of goods, and information and 
publicity facilities. 
The members of the FNCC may be divided into two 
categories. At one level are the twenty-three Regional 
Cooperatives (figure 4.13). which have a permanent contract 
with the SGCC and coordinate regional expansion ana the 
absorbtion of local cooperatives that are in financial 
difficulty. Whilst at the lower level the local Societies 
under the control of the the regional cooperatives enjoy the 
status of a branch outlet. Various local and specialised 
coope'ratives, largely involving butchers and bakers, are 
also affiliated to the FNCC, but these groups do not have 
permanent contracts with the SGCC. 
Like other organisations in France over the past 
decade, the Cooperative Society has embarked upon a policy 
of rationalisation involving the closing of marginal outlets 
and the opening of larger self-service store (figure 4.14). 
The Movement has-developed hypermarkets since 1970 in an 
attempt to keep pace with its competitors. The Cooperative 
Movement also produces a significant proportion of tne goods 
that it sells. In 1978 the Movement was amangst the top 
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Figure 4.1-%. S France - The Cooperative Movement - Leading 
Regional Societies. 
Performance - Turnover (Million F) 
-i Society 19 75 1977 IS-4 79 iDa i 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
4 -6- AI sace 798 1076 17(--)"3 
Champagne 1 I'Z4 1448 
74-. 
d: - - 254 225 
Charentes 1 %-; F76 3 174%L . 192 285 Cd Escaut et Santre 436 530 642 759 
Flandres et Artois 947 1175 14.2 7 
lie de France et 
I'Orle ans 566 725 10ý '34 
Lorraine 1452 1956 2422 '4974 Picarde 494 684 611 99i 
Pyrennes-Aquitaine %3 02 "S 60 420 5 13 o Rhone-Medite"rranee 6ý7,4 740 895 1117 
St Etienne 508 576 680 845 
Sin le Noble-Denain 5-.: )7 73)2 1 C) C) 
U.. C. S. M. 198 318 665 758 
WHOLE MOVEMENT 14445 17914 21758 
Leading 13 Societies as 
% of whole Movement 82.8% 82.0%. 83.8% 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Marenco (1983) 
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igu re 4.14 France - The Looperative movement. 
A) Number of Outlets 
0 ut let 1970 1975 i 978 1,38C) I196 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypermarkets 24 4 4. -1 
Supermarkets '34 119 278 310 -Z) 
Superettes 681 1016 1107 1172 1114 
Small Self- 
Service 2470 . 2544 2,444 
Traditional 7136 5566 2446 2489 1990 
Mobile Vans 169 142 129-1 9 
Other 115 102 151 174 19 "S 
TOTAL 8056 6988 6687 659 -IS 6 2: -'7 6 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Marenco (1963) & Eurofood (1978) 
B) Sales by Type of Outlet 
% of Total Group Sales 
1970 1974 1978 1980 9a 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypermarkets 
Supermarkets 
Superettes 
Traditional & 
Small Self- 
Service 
Other 
1 12 
10 20 
23 23 
65 43 
I 
2 
21.7 
22.6 
'S *- . .2a I 
, 7,,. 8 
22. 
21.5 
29.0 2-L. _3 
3.7 7.7 
ý- 
Ir -7 
Z, J. 'I 
23. '%j 
19.4 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
lylarenco (1983) & Eurofood (1978) 
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twenty-five food processing companies in terms of sales, and 
was the secona most important coffee importe 1-7 and accounted 
for more than 7% of the total market for product ranges such 
as oi1, past a, canned food, and vinegar (Eurofood 1976). 
This producer element to the Cooperative Society accounts 
for the high proportion of own-brand proaucts in its stores. 
In 1980, the Cooperative Movement accounted for 3.0% of 
total retail sales in France, and 5.0% of all food sales. 
These market shares were considerably higher in certain 
#0 departements, for example in Charente-Maritime, (17), Meuse 
(55), Aisne (02) 7 and Aube (10) the Cooperative Soc'eties 
held between 6 and 11% of total retail sales7 and between 1.3 
and 20% of food sales in 1978 (Eurofood 1978). 
4.4.4. Discount Organisations 
The concept of discount trading first appeared in the 
late 1940s in the USA. in France., two types of discount 
companies may be distinguished, the original pioneers of 
the concept (who now largely consist of affiliated 
independents), and the "Grandes Surfaces" organisations. 
4.4.4.1. The Pioneering Discounters 
In 1949? a former Jesuit priest, Edouard Leclerc 
attempted to Imoralise" retailing by selling goods to the 
public at greatly reduced margins. He opened his first 
store at Landernau in Finistere (29) at the age of 23, 
initially buying biscuits direct from a local factory and 
selling thety, to the public at 25% below the usual prices. 
Leclerc gradually expanded this strategy into all groceries, 
emp! oying six basic techniques iri his store wnicn Anarieux 
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(1972) regards as the essentials of ciiscoijnting. 
i- Supplies were bought in large quantities directly 
f rotyl producers, in order ta shorten channels of 
distribution. 
2. Retail margins were reduced to around 11%. 
3. General and investment costs were minimised by 
selling from somewhat stark or bleak outlets. 
4. Fast moving products were sold to increase turnover. 
5. The notion of productivity was introduced into 
retailing. 
6. Goods were sold at low prices to abolish the ideas 
"abusive profits" or "exagerated margins", 
Initially the local tradesmen ignored Leclerc but, by 1952, 
the success of his store alarmed them enough to persuade 
manufacturers and wholesalers to threaten to stop supplying 
him unless he reviewed his operating policy -a traditional, 
although illegal, method employed to prevent competitive 
operators reducing prices. 
Leclerc responded to this move by complaining to the 
government7 and in response the Lanniel government of 19535 
issued a decree asserting the illegality of imposed prices 
and refusal of supply. Ardagh (1977) suggests that this 
legislation ... 
"remains the key to all post war progress, in 
distribution. Without it, Leclerc would have perished 
and tile new supermarkets might have had the greatest 
difficulty in starting. " 
The support of the government encouraged Leclerc to expand 
throughout Brittany and eventually into other areas of the 
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country. In 1959, Leclerc opened a store in Paris7 and was 
again faced 6y determined oppositioti, witti the leader of tne 
Pet its et Moyevine Entreprises Fe'Ooderation re f erri ng tI lyl to 'l, 
as a 01 a 
Ila bowl of vitriol hurled in the face of French 
commerce to disfigure and dishoriour it, to the profit 
of the big capitalists and international tri. Asts. 
(in Ardagh 1977) 
Once again, competitors induced suppliers to hinder Leclerc 
by delaying deliveries, and sending the wrong goods. As in 
19537 Leclerc reponded by appealing to the government, and 
in March 1960 the Gaullists reissued the warnina about 
breaking the 1953 decree. Eventually, Leclerc"s competitors 
conceeded and began to challenge him along more conventional 
lines by lowering their own prices and margins. As 
his techniques began to be widely adopted, Leclerc developed 
a system of affiliation for other independent retailers to 
trade under the Leclerc banner. In 1962, the formation of 
the Galec centrale d"achat allowed further expansion, as it 
replaced the previous less-efficient policy of buying 
through regional centrales. 
The Leclerc affiliation allows independents to use the 
Leclerc 1ogo7 with its associated reputation, in ret u rn 
for certain concessi ons. To join the Leclerc group t he 
independent trader must affil-jate to Galec and only purchase 
f resh produce and regional specialities on their own 
account7 although the trader is under no obligation to stock 
all the lines offered by Galec. Members retain a certain 
flexibility of pricirig, as long as the overall gross margin 
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Ai 7 on total sales (excluding VAT) does riot exceed 14%. 
mem be rs are expected to employ and trai in apprentices 1n -t he 
Leclerc methods7 and no retailer is allowed to open a second 
Leclerc outlet I. Ant iI he has successf ul ly t ra 1 tied an 
aprent ice. 
LeclerC7 S methods were adopted by other traders. 1n 
1958, Roger Berthier opened his first Saveco store in 
Grenoble, but the major discount competitor to Leclerc is 
the Intermarche' group. This group was founded in 11369 when 
a dispute between Leclerc and one his principle adherents, 
Jean-Pierre Le Roch (the director of Leclerc's first Paris 
store), resulted in Le Roch leading a breakaway group of 95 
Leclerc retailers who formed a holding society called Ex- 
Enterprises, which created the Scaex centrale and adopted 
the intermarche tradename. 
4.4.4.2. The "Grandes Surfaces" Organisations 
The second category of discount operators are tkose 
that primarily operate large area stores. The retail 
methods employed in these outlets are similar to those of 
Leclerc, but occur on a much greater scale, which in turn 
allows further economies of scale unavailable to smaller 
discount traders. 
"Grandes Surfaces" discounters operate in most sectors 
of the market, the major groups being Carrefour and Auchan 
in the food and hypermarket sectors; Conforama ana Levitan 
in the furniture qoods sector; and Darty in the electrical 
goods ma rk et . These organisations usually awn 
their Own 
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centrale d" ac hat7 for examp 1e Samod int he case 0f 
Carrefour. 0 ut let s are controlied either airectly by t he 
parent companY7 through j0i tit subs 1dia ry compani es in 
association with other retailers, 0 11 * by a franchise 
agreement. Over the last decade most of the companies in 
this category have diversified into other retail sectors. 
The activities of organisations in this category shall be 
dealt with in more detail in later Chapters. 
4.5. COMPANY FORMATS AND FORMS OF ALLIANCE 
The importance of independent organisations in the 
French retail sector is further illustrated by t he 
proportion of retail enterprises that are legally -registered 
as private or "personal" enterprises (figure 4.15). Ali 
firms which have their head office in France must be 
registered under French law. in France them are three 
legal types of corporations (Societe`*s de Capitaux) and three 
types of partnership companies (Douglas 1975). All 
corporations are subject to a corporate income tax on net 
profits and shareholders are liable for personal income tax 
only on dividends recieved. The three types of corporation 
are... 
.0 ap 
1. Societe Anonyme (SA) - which is broadly the 
equivalent of the British public holding company.. 
U eeA Responsabilite Limitee (SARL) -a format Soci'**t*o 
% 
very similar to the British private limited company. 
Commandit'O' par Actions -i ri effect, a te e ýP Socie en 
special partnership formed by shares. These orcanisations 
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Figure 4.15 France - Legal Forms of Retail Companies 1982. 
Form of Company % of Total 
---------------------------------------- 
S. A. R. L. 16.0 % 
S. A. 11.6 % 
#0 Ste. en Nom Collectif 0.8 % 
Private Enterprise 67.3 % 
Cooperative 1.1 
Others 3.0. 
.e Insee, (1983) 
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are similar to the SAs., except that their directors are 
personaliy responsible for company losses. 
The three types of partnership available are ... 
1. Socie"te en Nom Collectif (SNC) - this is equivalent to 
the general partnersIhip, in which partners are liable for 
losses. This type of company is common amongst smaller 
family firms. 
. -I Op . 00 40 4. Societe en Commandite Simple -a very uncommon form of 
limited partnership. 
. 00 40 3. Societe en Participation - the equivalent of the joint 
stock venture when companies come together, often for a 
limited period of time in order to participate in a 
particular project. 
As personal income tax is applied to directors of 
partnerships, most firms favour the corporation company 
formula7 and in particular adopt the SA or SARL varient. 
0- OV A Societe Anonyme is owned by its shareholders, and may 
borrow money f rox, the general public by issuing bonds, 
provided that the company capital is fully paid up, and that 
the company has been in existence for two years and has 
issued two shareholder-approved balance sheets. 
Shareholders are only liable for company debts up to the 
am ount of the par value of the shares they own. The 
manaaement of a SA is either through a board of directors 
(traditionally between three and twelve in number) elected 
by shareholders for a period of three years; or through a 
council of shareholders and a management coffunittee, made 
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possible by the law of 24th july 1966, which allows for a 
committee of between two and five members, controlled oy a 
three to twelve Man COUnCiLlm 
There are numerous similarities between. a Societe 
Anonyme and a Socige Ote A Responsabilite' Limite'e, ouc the SARL 
format reseffibles a partnership in that it can not issue 
bonds and its capital is held in the form of non-negotiable 
shares. A SARL is operated by a manager who need not 
necessarily be a shareholder, but whose powers can be 
limited by articles of association and byelaws. Any 
decision. that is made by 50% of the company's capital is 
binding. One advantage with the SARL format is that it may 
be converted to a SA at any time. 
Therefore, the basic diffe-rence between a SA and a SARL 
is that a SARL has fewer sources of finance, other than its 
members and their bankers. In addition the management of a 
SARL has fewer legal bindings, concerning such things as 
meetings, than a'SA. Finally, transer, of shares held in a 
SARL is liable to a registration tax, whereas it is tax free 
in the case of a SA. 
t he As suggested at the outset of this section on te 
organisational structure of French retailing, the 
concentration and diversification trends within the retail 
-sector have instigated the adoption of various means of 
cont ro 17 which allows organisations to C ut across 
t rad itio via 1 categories and rapidly employ techniques and 
types of o ut I et generally associated with other 
organisational types. Franchise agreements and joint 
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subsiblary Companies are just two of the methocs employed 
all organisational groups as a mearis of expansion, which has 
created a olurring of traditional categorisations. 
I= 
'e 1u . 1.. F ranc n is 1 no 
The franchise is a form of commercial collaboration 
which allows one retailer or Organisation to adopt the 
tradename, t rad i rig characteristics, and associated 
reputation of another. in 1982, CECOD estimated that 
franchised stores took 6.7% of the retail trade7 and 
distinguished four types of franchise. A producer franchise 
such as those offered by Rodier and Descamps allows 
different organisations to produce goods for the one group. 
Distributor franchises allow a retailer to adopt the 
methods of others. industrial franchises, usually regarded 
as first generation franchises7 allow the production and 
retailing of a product under licence from the parent company 
- the most famous example of this perhaps being Coca-Cola. 
Finally, the service franchise exists in the service sector 
of the market with names like Transalpino (travel) and Copy 
2000 (rapid copying) (Colonna 1983). 
The distributor franchise, which is most widespread in 
the retail sector, is a contract usually between the 
franchising company's centrale d'achat and the franchised 
retai I er. This contract takes the form of a payment Of an 
ent ry f ee, an annual royalty often ca 1 cu 1 at eci as a 
proportion of turnover, avid a commitment to purchase a set 
It ini lylum proportion of goods from the centrale. In ret u rn 
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t he f ranchi see receives t he fo Im 1-t !a packaae Qft he 
r ranchi si ng o raani sat i on. Some examp 1 es 0ff ra-ric ti 1 se 
contracts for indepenGent retailers are qiven in figure 4.16 
(Dayan 1981). The franchise method has arown rapidly from 
34 franchise tradenames existina in the retail and service 
sector in 19717 to '%. )85 f ranchisors, covering over 18,000 
out iets in 1982 (f ioure 4.17). 
This type of collaboration is beneficial to bot h 
participants. it allows the franchising company to create a 
retail chain without having to directly finance it7 it 
auarantees the company additional i tic o me from annual 
royalties, and increases the value of purchases made from 
the centrale. The franchisee benefits from gaining entry to 
a particular sector at a reduced investment, through a 
commission rather than through a large initial outlay. The 
franchise also guarantees permanent help and assistance, and 
generally, through the adoption of an established tradename, 
an increased turnover. As CECOD (Dayan 1981) note ... 
"franchising is a method of -distribution in which a 
personal enterprise, with personal capital, is 
managed as if it is an element in a large 
organisation, with a national reputation, 
tradename, and standardised eqiAipment, products, 
and services. " 
A national survey of franchisees (LSA 929 1984b) 
covering 164 tradenames revealed that 55% of franchisees are 
female, the majority are young (two thirds were below 45 
years of age), and their level of education is above the 
national average. Furthermore, two-thirds of t he 
respondants had no previous experience in the commercial 
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Figure 4.16 France - Examples of Franchise Conditions 1971 
Annual Minimum % 
Name Entry Fee Royalty on of Purchases 
Turnover from centrale 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Cat e"'na none 3.0 % 60 
Eram payment for 1.5 % 33 
sign 
1% 
Levitan 700 F p. a. 3.4 % 25 
Promo-France proportional 1.2 60 
to sales area 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Dayan (1981) 
Figure 4.17 France - Growth of Franchising in 1971-1983. 
Yea r 
Number of Number of 
Franchisors Franchisees 
-------------------------------------------- 
1971 34 2 000 
1977 108 7 500 
1979 303 10 696 
1981 330 13 696 
1982 385 18 313 
1983 379 19 687 
-------------------------------------------- 
Euromonitor (1983b) and Le Commerce Moderne 621 1985 
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sector. 
4.5.2. i0irit Subsidiary Companies 
Over the last decade,, as initial costs of development 
have risen, and financial risks have increased, there rias 
been a trend towards the format-ion of joint subsidiary 
companies to develop either one type of outlet or in one 
region of the country. These joint companies allow initial 
investment costs to be spread between the two companies, and 
by their very nature spread any liability. As shall be shown 
later, alliances of this nature have become increasingly 
common with certain companies in relation to hypermarket 
development. as they have sought to extend their influence 
geographically. 
4.5.3. Other Alliances 
Finally, it is necessary to comment in a little more 
detail on the role of the centrale d"achat as alliances can 
be constructed through affiliation with centrales. The 
centrale negotiates the cost, type and delivery of goods 
with producers, and complements this service with a variety 
of other facilities such as advertising, statistical 
information, and legal and financial counselling. in return 
for these services, the centrale receives a commission 
calculated on the value of the products bought from it, or 
in relation to the turnover of the affiliated group. 
Although many centrales are controlled by one specific 
organisation., for example Samod (Carrefour), the SGCC 
(Cooperative Movement), Auchan (AUChan)7 and Sapac (Au 
Printemps), and operate solely for the stores of that group, 
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others are open to independents or regional o rgani sat i ons. 
The affiliation of a number of different organisations to 
one such centrale allows these different groups to adopt the 
same tradename and benefit from the advantages of appearing 
to be a major national chain. The affiliation of various 
I 
independent retailers to either Galec (Leclerc) and Scaex 
0* 
(Intermarche is one example such an association. AIt ho ug h 
one of the most important centrales in relation to this type 
of association is Paridoc, which controls the Mammouth and 
Suma tradenames. A variety of regional multiple groups are 
affiliated to Paridoc, and have adopted the tradenames of 
the centrale (figure 4.18). 
4.5. SUMMARY 
This complex mix of retail techniques, institutiors7 
and organisations that makes up the retail sector in France 
provided the stage upon which the hypermarket made its 
ent ry. 
_ 
Despite the trends towards fewer, but larger stores, 
and the loss of ma-rket share by the traditional independent 
traders and small retail outlets, these forms of 
organisation and institution were still dominant in the 
French retail sector of the mid 1960s, when the hypermarket 
arrived on the scene. The inability or unwillingness of 
these groups to respond, and adapt to the changing retail 
environment, saw them turn instead to the government for 
legislative protection. 
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Figure 4.18 France - Membership of tne Paricioc Centrale 
C3" Actlat 1981. 
Afflilated Stores - %`F 677 Stores 
- 75 Hypermarkets (Mammouth) 
- 380 Supermarkets (Suma) 
- 52 Superettes 
-3 169 Branch Stores 
-I Department Store 
Major Affiliated Retail Groups 
- Cedis Group 
- Cedis 
- Economiques Troyens et Docks Reunis 
- Ets Charenton 
- Docks de France Group 
- Docks de France 
- Doe Francois 
- SM Doc 
- Ruche Picarde 
- Cofradel 
- Economats du Centre 
- Guyenne et Gascogne 
- Ruche Meridionale 
- SASM 
- Un i lylas 
Points De Vente (1983) 
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CHAPTER FIVE : PUBLIC POLICY IN THE RETAIL SECTOR 
Although state intervention in economic sectors sucri as 
agricult ure aýid manufacturing is a common feature of Most 
nat 1 ons7 general !y there iS an absence of any conerent 
policy specifically designed for tile retail sector. instead 
there tends to be a set of piecemeal policies which deal 
with particular aspects of retailing. This failing has been 
noted by many, including Boddewyn and Hollander (19722), who 
in the conclusion to their seminal work on public policy in 
the retail sector7 stated that ... 
"f ewl if any, countries have a public policy toward 
retailing, de facto or de jure, but they usually have a 
set of policies that deal with retailing more or less 
(mainly less) explicitly, coherently, and 
consistently. " 
This situation has arisen as government priorities have 
t rad it ional ly focussed upon the prodIACtive sectors of the 
economy, rather t han Upon the d1 st ri but i ve sector. 
Retailing has consequently only received marginal atterition') 
as the productive sectors have been viewed as the prime 
providers of wealth, and power., p resent i rig the greatest 
opportunities for economic growth and development. 
However7 as Boddewyn and Hollander (197.2) observe, this 
situation began to change in the early 1970s, with more 
emphasis placed upon policies relating to the distrIbUtiVe 
t rades, as oovernments realised (or accepted) that 
di st ri but 1 on was riot merely a simple intermediary process 
between Droduction and COnSLIMptiOn. NUmerous explanations 
may be suggested for this change in attitude. Economical ly, 
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retailing and the distributive trades in generai, have been 
recogn i sed as a growing economic sector, and as a lyla 10 -1- 
emol oyer. Moral factors closely related to consumption t1ave 
also played a part, as governments have recognised the need 
to protect consumers, particularly those in Underprivileged 
grou ps. Furthermore, from a social point of view, retailing 
is a major employer of certain difficult employment groups, 
such as school leavers7 and part-time workers. 
Other influences relate to the physical impact of new 
retail institutions and innovations,, as the subUrbanisation 
of both consumers and retail facilities has created anxiety 
over tile future of the central business district, and also 
certain groups representing the interests of retailers and 
consumers nave an ability to apply pressure UpOn 
governments. Finally, Boddewyn and Hollander suggest that 
the growth of international observation and cooperation has 
provided governments with examples, of the problems and 
solutions followed in other countries, and they also refer 
to ... 
in government intervention 11some b, 1-tilt-in mechanism 
wherby once regulation starts somewhere in the economic 
system it has to be progressively expanded to the rest 
in order to plug various loopholes. Consequently, 
retailing is getting more attention because, ina way, 
its turn has come. " 
, 
jail AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE RETAIL 
SECTOR 
Some government policy effects will be indirect, in the 
sense that policy measures aimed at other economic sectors 
136 
wi 11 have some impact upon the distribution system and 
retailing. Various Policies influencing the distribution of 
popul at ion and income will have a genera' ily'Pact UPOtl t he 
consumer element of the retail env i ro nment . whilst mo re 
specific decisions, such as the removal of private 
t ranspo rt f rom town centres for env iro nment a1prot ect 10n 
purposes will have a more direct effect upon consumer 
shopping patterns and town centre retailing. 
Where direct government intervention in the retail 
sector has occurred, and policies have been ai med 
specifically at the distribution sector, two major goals can 
be -identified (Dawson 1982). The aeneral aim of such 
policy measures has been to reduce conflict between various 
participants in the retail system. Conflict may arise on 
numerous occasions between consumers and retailers; local 
g ove rnment representatives and retailers; large corporate 
organisations and society; and even between different retail 
institutionS7 as large self-service stores clash with 
smaller traditional service outlets. 
The second major focus for public policy in the retail 
sector has been the encouragement of social responsibility 
on the part of institutions within the sector. In this 
respect, attempts have been made by týie state to gain, 0 T, 
force social concessions f rom retail organisations. 
Occasionally organisations have vo 1 t-triteered týiese 
concessions freely, particularly in respect to catering for 
t he needs of elderly or inf i rm shoppers, th ro 1-ig ht he 
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provision of free bus services, teleshopping facilities, and 
special shopping hours at Christmas. However 
7 in many 
cases, the government has had to force social responsibility 
upon retail organisations. One example of this is "planning 
gain", whereby permission for retail development is made 
conditional upon the provision of social and community 
facilities alongside any commercial development. 
More specificallY7 Boddewyn avid Ho 1 lander 197-2') 
identify five principal goals of public policy toward 
retailing., which would appear to be common t0 most 
countries. One major aim of retail policy is undoubtedly 
the protection of small retailerS7 which is seen as 
desirable for a number of reasons. Small scale retailing 
can be perceived as providing opportunities for various 
lower level groups to move up the social order, and as a 
means of i nt eg rat i ng t he commercial middle class 3. tit o 
society and preventing conflict between them. Fu rt he rmo re., 
protection of small retailers is seen as necessary to 
preserve certain values or ways of life which might be 
considered as desirable in a pluralistic society, and also 
to create and maintain a reservoir of entrepreneurial talent 
for future development. Last, but not least, this form of 
action rewards and retains an important political group. 
A second major goal of retail policy is the improvement 
of retail efficiency. The encouragement of more efficient 
distribution systems can do much to rest r1 ct inf 1 at I On. 
Increased efficiency may be obtained by encouraging new r(iore 
efficient retail innovations, or by raising the productivity 
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of the existing retaii structures, througn educatiori7 t he 
adoption of new retail techniqueS7 and the encouragement of 
collaboration and cooperation. 
ýClosely associated with improving retail efficiency is 
the third aim identified by Boddewyn and Hollander, that of 
stabilising retail prices. This objective usually becomes 
high priority when prices are excessively depressed or 
inflated. Often competition is encouraged to achieve some 
degree of price stability, hence the widespead decline of 
support for resale price maintenance policies. 
A fourth objective., that of consumer protection, has 
steadily become more prominent and increased in scope from 
the basic prevention of fraud and deception, to encompass 
regulations dealing with the display of labelli-ng., weights 
and measures,, pricing policies, and accurate advertising. 
Finally, since the 1970s, in connection with land use 
controls and a general increasing concern over the 
environment, protection of the environment itself has 
become a fifth aim of public policies relating to the retail 
trades. 
Most of these specific objectives are concerned witin 
some form of conflict resolution within the retail sector. 
It is commonly recognised that many of these conflicts arid 
the growth of public policy in the retail sector, have 
occurred owing to the arrival of new, and often "aggressive" 
ret ai1 institutions such as the hypermarket. These 
developments have challenged the position of existing retail 
139 
st r uct u res, evic ou rag 1 ng claims of unfal-1, competition and 
advantage, leading to demands for state i tit e rvent ion. 
Dholakia and Dholakia . (1978) suggest t ýIat in advanced 
capitalist economies7 t he increased intervention of t he 
state 1nt he retail sector has been largely due to t he 
development of large scale retail organisations and 
i nst it lit i ons ... 
"t he pressures for ... policy originate f roty, the 
protectionist demands of an atomised trade alarmed by 
the growth of large scale retailing. " 
5 2. APROACHES TO RETAIL POLICY 
The resolution of conflict in the retail sector is 
generally attempted through one of two different approaches 
(Dawson 1979a). Policies may be introduced which seek to 
achieve objectives through a more equitable distribution of 
market power, or by improving the economic efficiency of 
B0 4- institutions within the distributive sector. %. n 
approaches may seek to achieve the same specific goal. For 
the aim of obtaining low priced food distribution the equity 
approach would involve policies which support or subsidise 
smaller retailers to allow them to compete on price terms 
with larger organisations. Whereas the efficiency motive 
would promote policies that encourage the development of 
arganisations that are able to distribute food at low 
prices. The essential difference between these two 
approaches is that the equity motive tends t0 consider 
retailing as a social service, whilst the efficiency 
approach considers retailing as purely an economic activity. 
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These differing approaches tend t0 foci-is action LIDOY, I 
different areas of public policy. 
W . -# I uj 04aIa he Equity Apprc), acil. 
Those Policies based upon a more equitable distribution 
system fall into two main policy areas. The cont ro 1of 
market power is often regarded as the restriction of the 
activities of larger organisations to prevent Monopo. Ly 
situations devel9ping, and consequently Consumer choice 
being limited. Some policies in this area may increase the 
efficiency of the distribution system, but most will tend to 
limit or restrict attempts to increase efficiency. Policies 
may seek to control the power of an individual organisation, 
by the prevention or control of takeovers and mergers with 
the aim of restricting organisational monopolies. 
Alternatively, policies may attempt to control spatial 
market power by regulating the development of 
est ab1 is hment s. 
The second policy area where the equitable approach to 
public policy is dominant is that of consumer protection. 
Conflict between consumers and retailers is common and most 
countries have policies and legislation to protect the 
consumer from malpractices. This area of pol-icy has become 
increasingly popular for several reasons. The adoption of 
mass merchandising techniques has presented the unscrupulous 
operator with the opportunity to exploit defective products, 
whilst the vast number of consumer goods becoming available 
on the market as technology progresses, requires increasing 
141 
ca re to be taken over safety and quality standards. 
Furthermore, the consumer has become more sophisticated, and 
better 1nfo rmed and more willing to assert hiS or her 
rights. 
5.2.2. The Efficiency Approach. 
When public policy in the retail sector is motivated by 
the desire to increase the efficiency of the distribution 
system, the type of policy pursued will depend greatly upon 
the actual definition of efficient or efficiency, which will 
vary according to different political philosophies. The 
types of policies resulting from this approach are often a 
response to immediate and obvious conflicts in the retail 
system and fall into three areas. 
Firstly, policies are utilised which control what are 
regarded as restrictive marketing practices. In this case., 
the intention is to preserve and encourage competition, in 
line with the political philosophy that increased efficiency 
results from increased competition. - Protection of this 
kind, such as the Robinson-Patman Act in the USA, which made 
discriminatory supply terms for larger retailers illegal. 
maintains more companies in the retail sector. 
Secondly, policies may be pursued that will either 
restrict entry to, or encourage exit from, t he retail 
sector. Unrestricted entry to the sector can encourage the 
creation of a large number of marginal entreprises, whicri 
may soon die. Alternatively, exit promotion schemes allow 
for the rationalisation of the retail sector7 through the 
removal of inefficient firms. 
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Final ly, t he state mayi tit rad uee policies WhIch 
encourage modernisation anci investment. In this area, t he 
go ve rnment may take positive action by either di rect 1y 
subsidising or investing in retailing, or by stimulating 
private enterprise activity. Education and training 
schemeS7 and the encouragement of voluntary g roups f0r 
independent retailers would fall into this area of policy. 
5.. 3. PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES 
Whichever approach is taken to issues, there are 
numerous instruments available to the state through which it 
I 
can seek to achieve its objectives. The 'Commission of the 
European Communities (1978) have identifl8d seven broad policy 
measures followed by governments in the retail sector. 
%is 34 1a Rules on Competition 
A wide range of legislation falls into this category, 
but most can be ident if ied under two sub-categories. 
Monopoly control legislation is applied to all sectors of 
the economy, with the specific aim of controlling potential 
abuses of market power. This type of legislation protects 
both consumers and other distributors, and is important 'in 
manag i ng power relationships within the marketing channel 
and t rad i ng re 1 at i ons hi ps between man uf act urers ana 
retailers. The major problem with monopoly cant ro 1 
legislation is t he ident if icat ion, definition, and 
measu rement of market power, at botn a local and national 
level. However, negative legislation or control policies of 
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this kind have often been ineffective7 as organisations find 
loopholes to exploit. Corisequent'Y7 there has been a trend 
towards encouraging business self-regulation. 
More specifically aimed at the distribution sector are 
the second type of competition policies, which control 
particular retail techniques and proceedures which are 
considered detrimental to competition. Legislation in this 
sub-category covers aspects such as the regulation of 
promotional practices, loss leading practices, and refusal 
to sell or supply, all developments which can be abused and 
which can create unfair competition. 
5. : S. 2. Rules on Establi. shment 
It is often suggested that freedom of entry to the 
ret'ail sector will provide a self-regulatory check on the 
creation of monopolies. However, despite freedom of entry 
having been established in the EEC through the treaty of 
Rome7 some countries (most notably Italy) have limited 
control upon the birth rate of companies in the distribution 
sector through various licensing proceedures. The licence, 
which permits establishment, usually requires the applicant 
to have received some training in the distributive trades. 
These policy instruments are designed primarily to cont ro 1 
organisations, rather than individual stores. 
5.3.3. Policies on Vocational avid Further Training 
The effectiveness of any rules on establishment, based 
upon licensina controls7 is closely linked to the 
government's commitment to directly provide and encourage 
vocational courses and training facilities, especially in 
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the small fi rm and distributive t rades sector. These 
instruments can be used as part of a positive7 a eve 1o pment a1 
retail policy, in contrast to many of the other legislative 
steps which are primarily negative and relate to cont ro 1 
policies. 
4. Policies on Taxation 
Taxation also affects the distributive trades, 
especially variable taxes such as VAT. Furthermore, 
differing local tax rates can make significant differences 
to the operating costs of a firm, and it is sometimes 
suggested that the lower taxes and rates paid. on suburban 
sites has done much to encourage retail decentralisation. 
5.3.5. Policies concerned with Buildings and Rental of 
Premises 
Legislation introducing controls over individual 
establishment (as opposed to organisational) location, which 
is often referred to as retail p1 anti i ng, is widespread 
throughout the EEC, and is usually operated through land use 
planning machinery. Most legislation concentrates upon 
potential problems associated with urban areas, although 
there is increasing concern over the provision of shops in 
rural areas. 
The overall objective of establishment location 
legislation is generally to ensure a mix of store types and 
locations which achieves some socially acceptable, concerisus 
definition of "adequate provision" of retail facilities. 
Gene ra 11 y, there are two types of establishment location 
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pal icies. Either control is attempted through the existing 
framework of land use planning policies, as is the case in 
Britain,, or specific regulations are introduced to control 
solely the location of stores. Whichever option is pursued, 
the legislation is generally i mp 1 ement ed at t he local 
government level, which can pose problems in the 
interpretation of policy, but whicri provices for the easier 
integration of retail issues into the overall planning 
env 1ra nment . 
5.3.6. Legislation providing Financial Aid to Distributors 
Many countries have introduced various systems of 
financial aid specifically for small businesses engaged in 
the retail sector. The specific objectives for these types 
of schemes are to protect new organisations from problems 
that they may encounter in the first years of operation; to 
soften the competitive climate for small traders by 
effectively providing them with a subsidy; and to provide 
finance for the modernisation and rationalisation of 
establishments operated by small traders. 
Generally, much of this aid is provided in the form of 
low-interest, or interest-free loans and is initiated at 
either the regional or local level. Although the majority 
of aid schemes of this type provide finance for small 
traders to convert to self-service, or to refit and 
modernise a store, some general measures such as tax 
allowances and regional and urban development schemes, may 
also apply to larger organisations. 
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%is %Is 7. Social Measures 
Financial aid iyiay also be provided by the state to 
resolve potential social problems encountered by specific 
groups in the distribution sector. ' Most of these schemies 
encourage the closure of smal 1. economically ma rg i na 1, 
retai 1 entreprises in which the owners are close to 
retirement age. Legislation of this type helps to speed up 
rationalisation programmes within the sector, and acts as an 
anti-poverty measure. 
Any of these policy instruments is likely to have 
implications for other policy objectives and measures, even 
though legislation may be geared to one specific problem. 
Similarly, the scope and variety of issues that arise in the 
distribution sector, means that no single policy measure can 
solve all of the problems. 
5.4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD RETAILING 
The development of any coherent state strategy with 
regard to the retail sector is hampered in most countries 
by the general structure of planning systems. Retail 
and location planning traditionally straddle several local 
and central government departments, and there is often no 
single government department or agency to coordinate public 
policy for the distributive trades. This lack of overall 
control and coordination means that there is usually little 
information available from which coherent and comprehensive 
retail strategies can be derived. 
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One consequence of the absence of any overall strategy 
is that the policy measures that are undertaken tend to be 
responsive rat her t han pre-emptive. T he choice of 
particular approaches and instruments depends upon the 
government"s perception of problems and conflicts within the 
sector. Generally, the government only becomes aware of a 
problem after a conflict has begun. Consequently, most of 
the specific measures and policies adopted by the state in 
the retail sector are responsive and tend to be negative or 
control-type policies, rather than being positive or 
constructive in nature,, through the anticipation of change. 
A further problem facing public policy in the retail sector 
is that policy is often implemented by different levels of 
government within a country. In addition, owing to the 
growth of international cooperation and the formation of 
groups such as the EEC, conflict may arise between national 
and international approaches and policies. 
Also, as Dawson (1980a) observes, evaluation of 
specific policies is difficult, due to a number of problems 
relating to the identification of objectives, and the 
measurement of effects. Once again, the lack of central 
state direction or coordination compounds these problemS7 as 
survey design and proceedures tend to be different and 
consequently hinder any attempts at comparison between 
studies. The vicious circle is continued as these problems 
of comparability and assessment limit the information f rom 
which coherent strategies can be developed. 
Essentially the final approach taken by the state 
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toward retailing, and the specific type and mix of policies 
t hat it adopts will depend 1-100n the government 7S perception 
of problems and objectives7 which will in turn be governed 
by the economic interest groups itivolved, and the pull of 
political ideologies. The role of pressure group politics 
i ri inf1 uenc i ng g ove rnment decisions should notbe 
underestimated in any aspect of planning and state 
intervention, as Hayward (1978) acknowledges. 
Various interest groups exist within the distribution 
sector7 all of which look toward the government for Support 
against actual and potential competitors. Events which 
alter the status quo may threaten certain groups, so me of 
which may be powerful enough to exert influence7 and 
successfully defeat, or at least restrict., "innovative- 
int rusions". Although referring specifically t0 general 
economic pI ann i ng, Hayward (1978) stresses the important 
role that politics can play in determining the approach to 
problems, and the mix of policies adopted in planning 
policies... 
"it is even more difficult to separate politics from 
planning t [Ian it is to separate politics from 
adm ini st rat i on. The planner both in communist and non- 
communist societies, is a technocrat, whose expertise 
is adapted to suit political purposes. Any pretention 
to separate political ends from planning means is as 
illusory as the technocrats claim to reduce partisan 
passions to the serene, scientific dimensions of a 
series of equations. " 
ACCESS TO POWER IN FRANCE 
Ovie of the most striking features of French society is 
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the role of interest groups in policy making. As shall be 
shown in the next Chapter, the pressure groups of smal 1 
retailers had considerable infI 1-tence upon the measures 
introduced by the government in France to combat the growth 
of large retail stores. To enable a clearer understanaing 
of the influence and methods employed by such groups it is 
nec-, essary to consider the relationship between the 
i nst it ut i Otis of state and these groups, particularly with 
regards to the potential avenues to power available to these 
groups. 
According to Ashford (1982), France often appears to be 
an anomaly, for although since the Revolution authority has 
had to be seen to have conformed to the popular will, there 
has been considerable difficulty in developing the 
institutions necessary to support this concept of democracy. 
Consequently, France throughout history has remained 
vulnerable to "political adventurers and heroic leaders". 
The political and historical development of France has 
endowed the state with an elaborate and top heavy 
administrative system, which according to Kesselman (1970), 
is characterised by "overinstitutionalisation and political 
constraint". In the 1970s when the government was pursuing 
a strongly centralised philosophy, one explanation for the 
dominant role of the bureaucracy, was found in Crozier's 
concept of "the stalemate society", which provided an 
explanation of collective behaviour throuqil a description of 
national character. The French people were perceived as 
seeking to avoid face to faceconflicts, so they became 
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dependent upon the administration. This generated cycles of 
neglect and rapid adjustment, which fu rt her reinforced 
centralisation and the power and influence of the 
bureaucracy. Throughout the resulting complex system of 
legislation and proceedures, inst it ut iona I unce rt ai tit y 
(Ashford 1982) dominated, as popular views of individual and 
collective rights., and the actual executive and legislative 
rule of the state were not clearly defi. vied nor understood. 
Decisions made by the state could often appear to be 
confusing avid arbitrary, and group frustration was further 
compounded by restricted access to power th ro ug h 
conventional c hanne 1 s, 7, owing 
to the ineffectiveness of 
parliament. At the heart of this problem lies the structure 
of local government in France. Of the close to 387000 local 
autharities7 only 159 contain a population of over 30,000 
inhabitants7 arid 90% serve less than 22,000 people (Kesselman 
1970) . This fragmented structure 
impairs efficiency and 
restricts adaption and change at the local level. 
The mayor of a commune has in many ways a dual role, 
representing both the electorate7 and as he or she is 
responsible to the prel"fet, the state. The mayor in France 
can become a powerful f igure, particularly through the 
accumu I at ion of offices (cumul des mandats), to maximise 
their local influence and authority. Ashford (1982)1, notes 
that two thirds of the deputies in the National Assembly, 
and 96% of Senators have accumulated offices. This often 
results in national politicians retaining the mayorship of a 
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commune. Hence 7 as Wilson (unpublished) notes 
11what counted in France at the local level was not so 
much the political affiliation of the local tylayo I, Out 
rather his personality. " 
The overall weakness of political parties at the local 
level has further ennanced the role of personality and 
charisma of individuals in local politics. In addition, the 
relative strength of the left wing political parties, at 
the expense of the centre and right wing groups, at the 
local level often lead to conflicts between the different 
tiers of government, which again hampered any concerted 
challenge for power through the conventional channels of 
local government. Kesselman (1970) concludes... 
"the consequences of the overinstitutionalisation of 
local governments, prefectual administrations, and 
political parties is to preserve their symbiotic 
interdependence, stiffle participation and adaption, 
and contribute to more general stagnation within the 
French body politic. " 
One of the major features of the 1956 constitution 
establishing the Fifth Republic, was the strengthening of 
the position of the executive in relation to parliament. 
This again did much to increase the frustration of interest 
groups with the conventional channels to authority. Wright 
(1978) concludes ... 
one of the most strlKlng characteristics of the Fifth 
Republic has been the rapid decline of parliament ... 
the demise of the French parliament may be 
attributed to a combination of factors - the 
constitutional restrictions, governmental ill-will, tile 
obstructionism of the administration, IChe indifference 
of individual members of parliament, aric the domination 
of par 1i ament by a disciplined pro-governmental 
coalition. " 
Although the government is constitutionally responsible 
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to parliament, and whilst parliament defines the general 
parameters of government action, and can maintain a check orl 
the executive through parliamentary questions7 amendments to 
Di 1 ! S7 or by exposing scandals, pa r1i ament a ry power has 
undoubtedly been curtailed since 1958. 
. 
Constitutional restrictions include severe limits upon 
the time parliament is allowed to meet (five and a half 
months) I and the c3pvernment's effective control over the 
timetable and agenda of both the National Assembly and 
Senate. The financial powers of parliament have also been 
curtailed, and the committee structure of the National 
Assembly has been made less specific and more unwieldly. in 
effect, parliament7S power to bring down the government has 
been limited to a vote of censure7 the defeat of any bill 
which the government has turned into a vote of confidence, 
or the rejection of the government7s statement of general 
policy as presented by the prime minister. 
U-nC O'nst it ut io na 1 factors limiting the power of 
parliament', noted by Wright (11978), include the indifference 
and attitude of deputies to governmental abuses of power, 
the incapacity to deal with the volume of legislation 
presented to it during the short sessions, and the inability 
to control and monitor the implementation of measures voted 
through parliament. Legislation carried through parliament 
becomes law through a series of decrees, which can restrict 
or twist t he spirit and i tit ent ion of the origi via 1 
legislation. 
The frustration generated by the limited influence of 
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parliament, the weakness of local political parties., and the 
dominance of political personal it ies, all of which 
restricted access to authority, in many ways enco u rag ed 
discontent sect i ons, of the population to seek less 
conventional channe 1s to power in the f0 rlyl of various 
pressure groups.. - 
legiven the weakness of political parties and the 
legislative, groups may aquire more effective influence 
and provide more essential service than groups in more 
stable systems. " (Ashford 1982) 
Ashford even suggests that the violent nature of many 
protest groups may be attibuted to this frustration with the 
political and administrative system... 
"In a policy framework, much of the protest and even 
violent behaviour of the French may be attributed to 
institutional uncertainties. 
5.6. THE ROLE OF PRESSURE GROUPS 
As Wright (1978) acknowledges, t he te rm "pressure 
group" encompasses a wide variety of organisations and 
groups which may not initially appear to fit the term. 
Certain political parties may be viewed as intellectual 
pressure groups, whilst more traditional interest groups may 
form political parties to f ight certain elections on 
specific issues. Similarly, large firms may also wield the 
same influence as pressure groups, particularly if state 
owned7 and different state institutions may act as -interest 
g rO LIPS ChafflPiOning their own interests wnen competing far 
limited resources with other sections of the administrative 
ffiac hi rie ry. Undoubtedly there are a broad number of areas 
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and issues in which the state comes into contact with either 
traditional pressure groups, or organisations and interests 
behaving in a similar way. 
Certainly in the case of France, interest groups (in a 
variety of guises) have played an important part in policy 
decisions. The impact of any such group will depend upon 
the image, membership and finance, and cohesion of the 
group. Generally, membership and resources will rise during 
times of crisis., but will then fall away quite sharply once 
the status quo or its objectives are attained. 
Safran (1977) suggests that during the Third and Fourth 
Republics, interest groups had closer links with political 
parties, which allowed access for their views to parliament. 
However, de Gaulle7s contempt for pressure groups, avid t he 
constitutional reforms of 1958, have reduced the 
effectiveness of this traditional channel to power- The 
fragmentation of the French administrative system, with its 
small constituencies, the personalised relationship between 
the representatives and the electorate, and the weakness of 
political parties, has encouraged interest groups to be at 
their most coherent and active at the local level, and 
to intensify their activities at election time (Ehrmann 
1976). The influence of certain interest groups upon local 
politicians has to some extent created a myth as to their 
power... 
11not t0 oppose them was considered a legacy of 
political wisdom handed own, largely as it were, from 
generation to generation. " (Ehrmann 1976) 
o me of the larger, better organised and mo re 
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nationally established groups nave acnieved 
institutionalised access to power through representation on 
the Social and Economic Council, anc other committees. 
However, as Safran (1977) shows, their representation on the 
council has declined during the Fifth Republic, and the 
real influence of groups on this and other committees must 
be open to question. Bureaucrats resent7 and avoid the 
involvement of interest groups in the decision making 
process, recommendations made by these groups are often 
ignored, and there is a defined hierarchy of "approved" 
organisations with which the bureaucracy will deal. 
Effectively, access to power for interest groups 
through legitimate channels is limited7 and as these groups 
grow both in size and in the resources at their command7 
they are likely to turn to other avenues to achieve their 
goals. As Safran (1977) notes ... 
"The result of frustrated interest group access is a 
growth of spontaneous or extrainstitutional political 
action exemplified by general strikes, street 
demonstrations and vio, lence. " 
Wright (1978) identifies four models of state-pressure 
group relationships which may provide a framework for 
analysing pressure group activity and behaviour. The 
domination-crisis model, relies upon Crozier's idea of a 
"stalemate societyll. The desire to avoid face to ace 
confrontat 
'OnS7 
and the existence of a powerful and 
centralised bureaucracy hampers the influence and activities 
of interest groups which become fragmented. Groups, wary of 
cooperation, fight amongst themselves to defend thier own 
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interests and effectively maintain the status quo. Change 
can only be brought about by sporadic upheavals, but then in 
the periods that follow the staus quo reasserts itself. ' 
Consequently 
... 
"the state dominates, the group and imposes its 
directives upon them in autlioritariaii fashion. But 
7 fearful of insurrection, it is unable to impose radical 
reforms which can be effected only in a crisis 
situation. " 
Although the endemic and open conflict model also 
assumes an authoritative state, fragmented interest groups., 
and the role of crisis as a catalyst for reform, these 
features st eit f rom t he functioning of political 
inst it ut i OnS7 rather than from the characteristics of the 
population. This model suggests that the decline of 
parliament since 1958 and the associated closure of 
traditional channels of access to authority has restricted 
the political leverage of groups. In turn7 t his has 
increased their frustrat'or'7 and encouraged them to consider 
extra-institutional activity in the form of open conflict, 
often of a violent nature. Strikes, illegal obstruction, 
and street violence of a political, nationalistic, or 
sectoral nature may follow. 
The other two models distinguished by Wright _ 
(1978) 
view the state-pressure group relationship more as one of 
cooperation rather than conflict. The corporatist and 
concerted politics models are centered upon partnerships. 
The concerted politics model argues that state-group links 
are both desirable and inevitable. Cooperation is 
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inst it ut ia na I ised in the search for consensus ano rational 
decisi on making. 
-- 
In the corporatist politics model 
cooperation is again desired and institutionalised, but 
riot ions of a hierarchy of grou ps, discrimination arid 
privilege are'developed as certain groups are favoured in 
return for their support. 
Finally, the pluralist model sees the state as 
attempting to bring about adjustments between conflicting 
interests, rather than enforcing the "general interest". 
Accommodation and incrementalisation become dominant 7 and 
power is diffused between a large number of groups. Small 
changes in the. status quo occur., rather than major shifts, 
which may offend particular participants in the system. 
Wright cites examples which SUPPGrt each of these 
iyoodelS7 and exceptions which discredit them. Whilst no 
single model can be adopted as a general theory, particular 
models may explain specific relationsnips between interest 
groups and the state. Essentially, the type of-relationship 
that, develops will depend upon both the power and influence 
of the particular interest group concerned, and the attitude 
of the state7 or the relevant section of the state 
machinery, to this group. - 
Amongst the factors suggested by Wright (1978) t hat 
contribute to the power of an interest group are the access 
that it enjoys to decision makers, and the strategic role 
that it may play in the nations social and economic life. 
Of equal, if not more,, importance at certain times, will 
be the electoral influence wielded by the g rol. tP7 
-- 
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particularly if it has the strong backing of public opinion 
ori t"s cause. 1 rl certain sectors, the ro Ie of 
countervai 1 ing forces, the attitude towards tile g ro up of 
specif ic decision makers, and the degree of representation 
achieved by a group may be crucial. Internally, the groups 
cohesion, fi riaric ia1 resources, technica-I expertise7 it7S 
ability to mobilize the membership, and its level of 
combativity are important. Finally, it should be rememoered 
that changing political and social circumstances, and policy 
changes made by the state will influence the power of the 
interest group. 
With regards to the attitude of the state towards a 
group, six possible stances have been identified by Wright 
(1978). The state may enter into collusion with certain of 
the more powerful groups, which will benefit from specific 
privileges. AlternativelY7 both sides may retain their 
independence and genuine collaboration may occur to form a 
symbiotic relationship. Particularly troublesome and 
influential groups may receive favourable discrimination for 
political mot ives, as attempts are made to pacify this 
group, and to absorb it into the institutional framework. 
At the other end of the spectrum all, or specific groups may 
be totally resisted7 or the state may reluctantly tolerate 
certain groups - primarily on the basis of electoral fears. 
SUMMARY 
There are numerous alms. that the state may pursue 
in relation to public policy measures directed at the retail 
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sector. Similarly, there are various approaches that can be 
ta Ken, and instruments utillsec., in orcer to try ,. Co acnieve 
these goals. As shall be shown later, in the case of the 
Loi Royer, the legislation was primarily aimed at Confilct 
reso 1 ut i on wit h the specific intention of protecting the 
slyla 11 retailer in mind. The oovernment in France adopted 
what may be regarded as essentially an equity approach to 
this issuell seeking to control market power through the 
control of certain retail establishments. 
As shall be revealed in the next Chapter, this 
part icul. ar package of aims, approaches and instruments was 
determined largely by the influence of the small retailer 
pressure groups, who became increasingly militant in their 
actions as traditional channels to power were closed to 
t hem. In relation to the endemic and open conflict model of 
state-pressUre group relationships, the extra-institutional 
activities of these groups extracted "political" concessions 
from the government in the form of legislative controls upon 
the development of large area retail outlets. 
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CHAPTER SIX : RETAIL LEGISLATION IN FRANCE 
Many of the five fundamental goals of pubilc poilcy 
toward retailing identified by Boddewyn ana Ho 11 ande r 
(1972) underlie the policies that the French government has 
followed in its attempts to influence the evolution and 
development of the distributive trades. More specifically, 
in the same volume, Cortesse (1972) suggests that French 
retail policy has evolved around three major objectives. 
Firstly, the lowering of distribution CoStS7 by the 
regulation of retail price levels in the short terM7 and 
through the encouragement of more efficient forms of 
distribution in the longer run. Secondly, the protection of 
those small and medium sized businesses threatened by 
closure, which could create numerous social, Pol't'Ca'7 and 
utimately economic problems. Finally, the slowing down of 
the growth rate of large surface stores, justified by the 
assumption that all traders should have an equal chance to 
develop. Therefore, 'excesses of competition (in this case 
ýegarded as large area stores) should be curbed, and the 
small independent retailer should be provided with the 
intellectual and material means necessary for development. 
There appears to be some contradiction between these 
conflicting aims. The modernisation of the distribution 
system in France was desired, to reduce the costs of 
distribution, yet the rate and form of this modernisation 
was to be restrained to prevent the disruption of the 
social, economic and political status quo. These opposing 
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objectives, and the resulting conflict between them., is 
reflected in the policy measures towards retailing that the 
French government has adopted since 1960. The policies 
followed prior to 1972 had the common aim of attempting ... 
"to promote movement7 create innovation and stimulate 
competition. (Fries 1978) 
and contrasted with those devised since 1972., when there 
appears to have been a fundamental change in government 
attitude - from one of encouragement to one of restraint and 
restriction, designed to slow down and control the growth 
rate of new forms of retail distribution. 
6.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Following the second world war, the prime objective of 
planners in France, and the main consumer of public 
resources, was the provision of adequate housing. However, 
the large-scale housing developments which resulted from 
this channelling of resources, were generally. lacking in 
accompanying infrastructure. Steps to remedy these 
deficiencies were soon taken by the government in the case 
of health and education facilities, but commercial 
infrastructure, traditionally the responsibility of the 
private sector, remained underdeveloped. 
The first indication of government interest in the 
retail sector was an acknowledgement of the shortage of 
retail facilities in the new urban developments. Circular 
number 61-437 the "Fontanet Circular" of 24th August 19617 
issued by the Minister of Construction and the Under- 
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Secretary of Commerce, suggested guidelines for commercial 
development based upon the ratios adopted by the SCIC 
0 .0 (Socie'te Centrale immobilie're de la Caisse des De'Opots et 
Consignations) for their own commercial projects, in an 
attempt to ensure that a minimum of retail facilities were 
provided in recently constructed districts -(Romec 1977). 
The Circular suggested that developments involving more than 
1,000 housing units should be accompanied by a survey of 
commercial needs conducted by the developer (Coquery 1976). 
This survey should include an assessment of the present and 
potential buying power of the development; suggest the best 
type ýin terms of size and location) of retail facilities 
to accompany the development; and include a review of 
existing and proposed shopping facilities. ' For projects 
with less than 500 housing units, the quidelines suggested 
that one of the units should be used as a shop. 
According to the Fontanet Circular, three categories of 
I 
commercial development should be incorporated into new urban 
areas - secondary shopping centreS7 offering everyday goods; 
primary shopping centres., offering a wider range of goods; 
and public market places. The suggested guidelines were, 
however 
7 often 
ianored and did not take into account new 
forms of retail outlets such as the supermarket and 
hypermarket. Despite these shortCOM'ngS7 as Beaujeu-Garnier 
and Bouvert-Gauer (1979) comment, this circular was 
important as it provided the first evidence of central 
government interest in retail provision and suggested that 
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retai I ing should be regarded as a "basic inf rast ructure" 
rather than as a pUrely "social factor". Anotner important 
element of the Circular was the reiteration of t he 
illegality of refusal to supply tactics used by suppliers to 
combat the emerging discount organisations. The involvement 
of the government in the retail sector was fu rt her 
enhanced by the formation of an inter-ministerial working 
party to study the general problems associated with 
commercial centre development. 
The initial acknowledgement of the problem of 
underprovision of retail facilities was repeated in the 
Fourth Nationa-I Economic Plan of 1962, which again suggested 
the appropriate type and volume of retail infrastructure 
that should be provided in urban developments. The 
equivalent of a shop of 130 square metres per group of 60 
flats, or 2.2 square metres of gross area (1 square metre of 
sales area) per housing- unit was recommended, along with the 
development of a centre consisting of eighteen shops per 
17 000 housing units. The Commerce Committee of the Fourth 
Plan criticized the lack of construction guidel'neS7 and 
argued that all development plans should be submitted to the 
administration, illustrating the amount and type of any 
proposed commercial facilities to be included in the 
development. The administration would reserve the right to 
impose commercial equipment ratios on plans where none 
existed. However, despite these views no clear cut 
directives were issued. Once again, implementation of these 
guidelines was left to the discretion of the individual 
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developers, and no control mechanism was established to 
ensure that the suggested standards were adhered to. 
During the preparation of the Fifth National Economic 
Plan 
. 
(published in 1966) the Commerce Committee was 
reinforced ' to consist of eight working groups and thirty- 
five sub-groups. This gave some indication of the increased 
emphasis placed upon retailing by the Commissariat Gene'Oral 
du Plan. The Committee once more criticized the lack of 
adequate retail facilities in large housing developments, 
but the major part of it"s report concentrated an the 
problems of accessibility in existing town centres and to 
shopping facilities. It was suggested that in view of the 
. increase 
in car ownership, peripheral shopping centres such 
I 
as were developing in the USA might provide the solution to 
many of these problems. The strong reference made to the 
USA model, despite an acknowledgement that conditions were 
very different in Europe, did much to encourage the growth 
of large scale retail units, and set the scene for the 
spectacular growth of the hypermarket institution in France. 
6.2. "CONSTRUCTIVE" LEGISLATION 
The early advisory role adopted by the government 
assumed a more positive expression in 1966, following the 
transfer of the responsibility for building to the Minister 
of Equipment. The first piece of legislation after this 
move was the "Directive on Land" of 30th December 1967, 
which introduced the "Code c3" Urbanisme. " (Code of City 
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Planning) based upon two land use documents which were to be 
d rawn up and approved before development could take p1 ace. 
The two documents covered different levels in the P1 ann i ýIg 
.0 wo 
process. 
_ 
The "Schemas Di rect e 1. t rs d ', Ainenag eiyient et 
d" Urbanisme" (SDAU) defined the long and medium term future 
land use within the designated areas, whilst the "Plans 
d7Occupation des Sols" (POS) regulated individual projects 
within the relevant SDAU, during the short term (Georgel 
11374). 
The SDAUs, drafted for all towns with a population in 
excess of 10,000, consisted of two elements,, a report of 
the existing situation and a plan for future development, 
drawn up jointly 'by the state and other authorities 
concerned. A commission designed the plan from files of 
1 #4 information provided by the departemental public works 
service, or by a contracted town planning agency. The draft 
Sch-ema was then submitted to the various administrative 
services and municiple councils to which it was relevant, 
who then had three months to either endorse or reject the 
proposal. Final appiroval for the plan came from the 
Minister for Equipment. 
The POS, by their very nature, needed to be compatible 
with the relevant-SDAU. These documents established the 
detailed regulations applicable to the land uses suggested 
in the SDAU. However 7 these regulations could 
be relaxed if 
it was deemed necessary. The POS was drafted by a working 
group of similar composition to that which drew up the SDAU, 
and the final edition of the POS was approved by the Pre'Ofet. 
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These two town planning documents gave the government 
or1 ocal authority the ability to control the levels of 
co mme rc i al infrastructure provided in new u. rban 
developments, and marked the government's first step towards 
positive interest and control in retai I ing - albeit 
indirectly through general land use legislation. This role 
contrasted with the previous advisory stance taken by the 
government. 
1he Circular of 29th July 1969 on "the place of 
commercial infrastructure in the development of towns" was 
another move towards positive government intervention in the 
retail sector. The Circular acknowledged "the traditional 
principles of freedom of development and of competition" 
within the commercial sector, but regarded commercial 
infrastructure as a problem of "equipment" and defined three 
objectives for commercial planning. 
Future development was to be balanced, with the least 
possible cost to existing communities; planners and 
developers were fo note the opposition of the small traders 
towards large retail units; and the financial position of 
the central business district was to be considered. The 
Circular stated that the consideration of commercial 
planning documents was a necessity. The SDAUs should define 
areas for commercial development, whilst the POS was to 
regulate development and ensure that the necessary 
infrastructure was developed by the promoter. 
The most i Y, po rt ant outcome of the Circular was, 
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tiowever7 t he creation in each de"partement of a fifteen 
member planning CO Kilt i ss ion, consisting of administrative 
and commercial representatives 7 and chaired by the Prefet. 
As Coquery (1976) notes, the motive behind the formation of 
these committees was to achieve a formalisation of 
participation by the various "actors" in the commercial 
development field ... 
"this committee 0 .9a must unite the representatives 
of all forms of commercial activity; wholesalers, 
department stores and variety stores, multiples, 
consumer cooperatives, voluntary chains, associations 
and isolated retailers. The local chamber of commerce 
and industry and chamber of trade should also delegate 
a representative. The d4partemental director of 
equipment and d9partemental director of internal 
commerce and prices should always be members of the 
committee. Fi na 11 y, there should be a representative. 
of the consumers and one or other personalities known 
for their expertise in the field of commercial 
equipment, chosen by the prefet. " (Coquery 1976 - from 
the original Circular) 
The role of these Commissions was consultative, and they 
were required to express their opinions on all proposed 
commercial developments involving a sales area in excess of 
107000 
square metres. 
In December 1969, Jean Coll'n7 a senator from Essone 
(91) attempted to reduce the size threshold of developments 
falling under the auspices of the newly formed Commissions. 
Collin argued that the. growth of large store retailing was 
proceeding at too great a pace to allow the small traders to 
adapt. T he government opposed this view and Chirac 
(Minister of Finance) stated that large store development in 
Europe was inevitable, and a function of the modernisation 
essential if the French economy was to maintain its place in 
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the European market. A mixed commission of the National 
Assembly proposed an amended version of the Collin proposal 
which was accepted. These amendments7 put into effect by 
the Circular of 27th May 1970, reduced the si, -, r-e threshold 
necessary for a proposal to seek the advice of the 
consultative planning commissions to 3,000 square metres, 
and renamed these commissions the "Commissions De"partemental 
d7Urbanisffie Commercial" (CDUC). 
This legislation represented a course of action half- 
way between complete freedom of competition7 and restriction 
of development, as the Commissions were instructed by the 
1970 Circular to "look favourably" upon projects for large 
stores proposed by the cooperatives, voluntary groups and 
independent groUPS7 and projects that involved the creation 
of both large surface stores and traditional outlets. In 
October 1971 the Minister of Economy and Finance published a 
review of the CDUC meetings that had occurred since their 
creation until July 1st 1970 (Coquery 1976). This revealed 
that 270 of the 370 projects discussed by the Commissions 
had been approved, but more importantly, nearly 2 million 
square metres of the proposed 2.2 million square metres of 
sales space had received a "favourable advice". Thus, 
whilst appearing to support the growing opposition of the 
small traders towards large scale units, the covernment had 
done practically nothing to restrict their developmemt. if 
anything, this lack of regulation in the legislation of both 
1969 and 19707 indirectly encouraged the growth of large 
o ut let s. 
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The government also undertook other lec3islative steps 
in the 1960s that were designed to encourage the evolution 
and modernisation of retailing in France. Various f'inancial 
institutions were created to provide capital for small and 
med i um sized traders to modernise their businesses 
(Ministere du Commerce et de 1'ýrtisanat 1978). The Crie"dit 
Hotelier Commercial et Industrial (CHCI), established a 
network of 160 offices to provide tax-free loans for between 
8 and 15 years. These loans could cover up to 70% of 
investment costs. In 1976,4649 loans., totalling 1544 
million francs were made to businesses in the commercial and 
service sectors from this fund. A similar credit service7 
offering medium and long term loans for the moderrisation of 
retail outlets., was provided by the Cre6dit National. These 
loans are rarely less than 500,000 francs in value. Consumer 
and retailer cooperatives could obtain funds from the 
Cre'Odit Coo pe"O rat i f, and It he Soci e5te"s de Devele"oment Regional 
(SDRs) provided further finance for new entrepreneurs who 
had few alternative openings into the money market. 
Retail information and training centres were also 
established in the 11360s (Cortesse 1972). The Centre for 
Studies and Training of Technical Assistants in Commerce was 
almost totally government subsidised7 and trained "technical 
commercial assistants" to advise small traders. Local 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry established Instituts de 
Prommotion Commerciale (Commercial Upgrading instituitions) 
for employers and heads. of firms., and in 19657 the Centres 
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de Pe rf ect io rinement Comme rc ia1e (Centres for Continued 
Commercia! Training) were created t0 organise part -t ime 
courses for active businessmen. These schemes were 
compleffiented in the early 1970s by a government allowance 
which was equivalent to a days salary for participants on 
these various courses. 
in addition7 since 1956, various attempts haa been maae 
to reduce the pressures of taxation in the retail sector. 
The major move in this field of policy was the extension of 
value added tax to retailing from Ist January 1968. This 
legislation, introduced in the law of 6th January "3667 
acted as an incentive for commercial investment and 
development, as it., represented the end of the archaic system 
of double taxation in some sectors of retail'r97 and as a 
sales tax (as opposed to a tax on gross profit) it was paid 
by the consumer. Most importantlY7 businesses could deduct 
the amount of tax payable on goods which represented a fixed 
capital investment, from the total amount of sales tax due. 
The system of VAT introduced was, however7 rather 
elaborate as the rate of tax varied between types of good 
from a standard rate of 20% to 7% on solid food products, 
and 33% on a number of luxury goods (including photographic 
and cine equipment and cars). To overcome the problems that 
differential rates of VAT posed for the small retailer7 
special arrangements were made, in the way or a contract 
and a simplified systeM7 for the small businessman 
(National Chamber of Trade 1973). 
A contract agreement covered a two year period, with 
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the level of the contract agreed at the end of the first 
year of the two year term. This contract method or payment 
was the standard proceedure for traders whose turnover was 
under 500.000 francs from the sale of merchandise, or the 
provision of accommodation. Further tax concessions could 
be obtained by those involved in the contract system if 
their total VAT payment fell below certain levels. Complete 
exemption from payment was allowed if the business VAT 
charge was less than 1,350 francs per year, whilst below a 
level of 5,400 francs, a progressive tax rebate applied as 
the total VAT bill approached the complete exemption level. 
A further simplified system of VAT could be adopted by 
those traders -whose turnover was not more than double the 
levels allowing the contract agreement. This system allowed 
VAT to be paid monthly on the basis of an accounting formula 
used to estimate the level of tax. A coefficient, which 
took into account the VAT deductable, in respect of purchases 
and overheads (the previous years ratio between total 
turnover and the tax payable before deduction of tax 
relating to investment and total turnover) was applied to 
monthly turnover, and then the VAT relating to investments 
actually carried out was deducted from the resulting figure. 
At the end of the year, accounts were adjusted in accordance 
with the volume of business actually completed by the 
business. 
Various other tax burcens upon the small trader were 
removed in the early 1970s to encourage modernisation and 
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investment. In 1971 
7 supplementary 
tax was aboilshed 7 and 
in 19722', the rate of conveyancing dues was real-teed from . '0ý1- 
to 16'6%7 to allow a greater mobility of businesses. 
Final any sma 11 trader employing iess than two waae IY7 
earning staff could claim a 15% rebate on the taxation of 
licences (National Chamber of Trade 1973). 
All of the measures iaken by the government prior to 
1972y were aimed at creating a better- fiscal and 
administrative environment in the hope of encouraging retail 
investment and innovation in France. In many respects, 
these measures can be regarded. as having been largely 
successful in these aims, taking into account the rapid 
growth and spread of new types of retail out I ets., 
particularly the hypermarket and associated -large outlets., 
in the late 1960s, and early 1970s. 
However7 this success meant increased pressures of 
survival for others in the retail sector, particularly the 
small independent traders who were-generally slow to respond 
to these incentives. This organisational sector often 
vigorously opposed the development of large stores, and t he 
continual opposition of the small traderS7 man. ifest in 
increased political lobbying and militant action, lead to a 
fundamental shift in government attitude and policy towards 
the large retail outlet. 
The first evidence of a change in attitude on behalf of 
the government calve in 1972, ouring tne pea#< year of 
hypermarket openings in France. As Coquery notes in his 
1975 thesis (in Beaujeu-Garriier & Bouvert-Gauer 1979) ... 
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" it WaS7 t he re, -r- o re7 up t0 the oovernmen-c. which had f inal ly encouraged the growth of modern, iarge scale 
commerce7 to proceed to we iQ ht i rigs 0fa social 
character which would correct particular results of the 
change in the structure of commerce. " 
This new political environment was reflected in the laws of 
-'ýrd July 1972, which reformed the o1c age pensions of the 
self employed, bringing them into line with those for other 
wage earners, and of 11th July 1972, which allowed 
collective shops of independent tradesmen and cooperative 
societies to form associations at either the distributor (to 
compete with larger units) or sales level (to obtain more 
favourable price s from suppliers). 
The new government attitude culminated in the law of 
13th July 1972, which although not yet restricting the 
development of large scale units, showed a more forceful 
response to the plight of the small trader. This 
legislation, introduced initially for five years, was 
intended to assist elderly shopkeepers by providing them 
with compensation on their retirement (Dawson 1977). Two 
types -. of grant were introduced,. Special compensation 
grants for those still in business, but having difficulty 
selling t he irp rely, i ses, and grants from social f lands far 
those who had stopped trading before 1973, but whose 
businesses still remained unsold. Both of these flands were 
financed by an assistance tax of 0.3% of social security 
cont ri but i ons levied upon firms with an annual turnover in 
excess of 5007000 francs7 and by an additional tax of 15 
francs per square metre on all retail stores of over4 C-) C-) 
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sq ua re metres of sales area that hac been bulit since 1960. 
6L . 3. THE CHANGE Ii, 4 GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE 
The rapid growth of large scale retail units 1nt he 
early 1970s prompted a change in government attitude7 from a 
const ruct ive out look, encouraging these new forms of 
retailing, to a much more defensive one7 aimed at slowing 
down their expansion. Fries (1978) suggests three forces 
encouraged this new approach. Firstly, political pressures 
upon the government to protect the small and medium sized 
retailer. Secondly, town planning considerations which with 
one eye upon developments in the USA, saw the out-of-town 
stores as a potential threat to the continued viability of 
both the Central Business District and rural facilities. 
Finally, historical and economic forces stressed the need to 
preserve fair competition, and demanded a limitation upon 
the dominant positions already achieved by some of the large 
retail groups. 
However7 the c3overnment7s ability to meet these demands 
was severly limited within the existing legislative 
framework. One possible control over the development of 
large stores was through the limitation of building permits. 
A building permit was... 
11 req ui red from all publ ic and private persons, for 
all acts of construction carried out anywhere in the 
country. it is necessary for all construction, even 
those that do riot require foundations. " (Lemasurier 
1975) 
This control over development was created by the law of 
15t h JUne 1943, and the only exemptions from these pe rm Its 
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(introduced by the law of Zrd jarjuary 19-69) were s-cate works 
0% 
connected with public buildirIGS approved HLlYis (Haoitation a 
.0 OP Loyer Modert - t'he French equivalent of local aut ho rity 
housing), and any of the approved development zones, t he 
ZUP, ZAC, and ZADs. 
Applications for building permits were made to the 
local administrative authority, to the local mayor for 
applications of under 1,000 square metres, and to the Pre"Ofet 
for applications of over 1,000 square metres, who then had 
two months to approve or reject the proposal, or defer the 
permit for two years (Douglas 1972). Appeals could be made 
against any of these decisions. Control through this 
mechanism Was. however, largely illusory, as the permit was 
designed primarily to control technical specifications 
rather than site locations. Furt he roto re7 as the permits 
were granted by the local administrative authority, the 
wishes of the planners were often superseded. 
The only other development controls available to the 
government in 1972, were in the approved urban development 
zones (Rottier 1974). The local authority had complete 
1% 
control over development in these areas. The "Zones a 
Urbaniser en Priorite" (ZUP), were areas designed for new 
Public development. The -local authority or contracted 
agency responsible for the zone had rights of pre-emption 
over the land for fakir years, and could acquire land at a 
f ixed price. After construction had taken place, Taxe 
Locale d7Eq ui pmen t was levied t0 pay fort he new 
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i nf rast ruct u re deve 1o ped. 
The "Zones d"Ambionagement Concerte" (ZAC) introduced 
t he Iaw of `)Oth December 1967 were designed primarily for 
residential development. A local plan (PAZ) was drawn up in 
place of the normal POS7 and development of this zone was 
usually contracted out to a private company who built their 
0 wn infrastructure. Thus, the f inancing of this type of 
zone was transferred from the local authority to the private 
sect o r. 
The third category of approved area7 the "Zone 
*0 oe II d'Amenagement Differe (ZAD) was instiqated in 19"7 to 
prevent speculation by private developers on the fringes or 
ZUPs. These designated zones of "future aevelopment" gave 
the local authority a pre-emption right over the whole of 
the delimited area for fourteen yearS7 although a land owner 
within a ZAD could force the government to purchase their 
land within one year of the delimitation of the ZAD, or 
forfeit their rights of pre-emption. 
Although the government had absolute control over all 
development in these areas, the zones only covered limited 
areas of any town or city. Furthermore, the lack of a 
legislative control over devre-lopment was not the only 
obstacle to government action, as other factors either 
directly or indirectly restricted their powers of control. 
One of the most fundamental issues affecting government 
intervention was the basic rights of the individual. The 
"Le Chapelier" Act of 22nd and 17th March 1791 proclaimea 
the 
freedom of the individual to establish himself or herself in 
177 
commerce. The only prerequisite for setting i-to a business 
was that týie I-r'Clivioual concerned stiould either be a Frericti 
Nat i ovia 17 or should hold a foreign businessmans pe rm 1 t. 
This riaht of establishment datinq f rom the Revo 1 ut 1 ori 
remained at the foundation of the legislative and regulatory 
mecnanisms in government po I icy. Consequently, any 
restrictions placed upon the individual7s freedom to 
establish a business could be construed as an attack u C) 0n 
the basic rights of the French citizen. 
Furthermore7 government attempts to improve the lot of 
the small trader by improving the environment within central 
business areas., through redevelopment schemes, were often 
doomed to failure due to the existing lease system, the 
"Proprie'te' Commerciale". established in the law of 20th 
June 19267 codified by decree on 30th December 1953, and 
confirmed by the law of 12th March 1965 (Cortesse 197.. '-). 
This lease system entitled the holder, on expiration of his 
lease, to either a renewea lease or substantial 
compensation, usually an eviction indemnity equal to the 
value of the business in question plus the costs of movement 
and establishment elsewhere. 
These commercial leases were set for periods of at 
least nine yearS7 and rents were only reviewed every three 
years, on the basis of the quarterly index of cons-t. ruction 
costs published by the government. Thus7 once a small 
trader was established,, his or her removal without consent, 
even if the move would be beneficial, was almost 
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impossible. This system also had the effect of restricting 
entry into commerce to some extent, as a substantial amount 
of initial capital was required to purchase a lease. 
6.4. RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION - THE BACKGROUND TO THE "LOI 
ROYER" 
The first legislative step to specifically control 
commercial development was law number 73-1193 of 27th 
December 1973. This law,, known as the "Loi Royer" after its 
principle architect the then Minister of Commerce and 
Crafts, Jean Royer, grouped together and extended many of 
the previously issued laws and decrees concerned with 
commerce. 
This legislation, was initially registered by Royer's 
predecessor, Yvon Bourges, who was appointed to the newly 
created post of Minister of Commerce and Crafts in 19722n 
However7 the bill was adopted and fundamentally revised by 
Royer7 and first placed before the National Assembly on 15th 
June 1973. The timing of the law's introduction7 fo1loW'nC-3 
a period of unrest amongst the small traders and during the 
year of National Assembly elections, generated suspicions 
that 'the law was primarily a political move to pacify what 
was regarded as an influential section of the electorate. 
These views appeared to be confirmed by it's restrictive 
nature which was contrary to the government's previOUS 
desire to modernise the distributive sector. 
Some of the reasons for the importance and influential 
role played by pressure groups in French politics and 
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society have been discussed irl the previous Chapter, aric . 
t hese a ro ups naa much to do with the charige in g ove rnment 
attitude towards larae store retaiiinq. P*urthermore, in the 
1970s the administ ration had an earlier exampie of pressure 
group activity in the small shopkeeper sector to whicti they 
could refer. The rise of the Poujade movement in the 19 50S 
was a reminder of the influence that this organisational 
sector COIAld wield. 
ine rapid industrialisation of France during the Fourth 
Republic had a great impact upon the small shopkeeper, who 
had benefited from wartime shortaaes. in addition, tills 
group were badly affected by tax changes following the war 
which introduced more controls over assessment, and 
penalties for evasiori. These rapid developments threatened 
marginal small entreprises who at the time had no pressure 
group through which to voice their grievances. iri theory, 
the CNPF (Conseil National du Patronat Francais) represented 
the interests of all businesses, but in reality, was a 
mouthpiece for larger concerns. Simi larly, the CGPME 
., .0 (Confederation Gene"rale des Petits et Moyennes Entreprises) 
represented small industrialists rather than shopkeepers and 
craftsmen. Denied any formalised access to power, the small 
traders responded with militant action. 
*23 rd July 1953, at St Cele in Lot (46), small On 
shopkeepers disrupted tax audits by blocking the doorways of 
shops to prevent tax inspectors entering. This method meant 
that the store owner could not personally be charged witn 
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0 t)St r uct i0 VI or evas 1 on. As a mearis of disruption tni I is 
tactic soon spread, arid in November 1955', S) the UDCA (Union ae 
Defense des Commercants et Artisans) was founded in carlolls 
under the leadership of a thirty-three year 01d7Pier re 
Poujade. The movement rapidly oecame associated with its 
dynamic leader. 
"Potraying hi mse If as a simple man of the people, 
the 7petit gars7 who spoke in shirtsleeves7 he used the 
vocabulary of the streets (and fields) to rally the 
oppressed slylal I man. The metamorphosis of the UDCA 
into the Poujadist movement reflects his success in 
cultivating this image7 as well as his tireless travels 
spreading the word in the early days of the movement. " 
(Eatwell 1982) 
By the summer of 1955 7 the UDCA had 3567000 members and 
central reserves of 160 million francS7 but had achieved few 
of its aims. To remedy this situat'on7 Poujade entered the 
political -arena with the formation of the UFF (Union et 
60 Fraternite Francaise) which developed a strongly nationalist 
t heme. In the parliamentary elections of January 1956, the 
UFF and its allies gained 11.6% of the vote and 52 seats. 
According to-Eatwell (1982), the electoral success of the 
UFF could be attributed to the fact that it represented the 
perfect protest party., and it attracted the shopkeeper and 
craftsman vote, whi6h had previousiy been either 
heterogeneous or non-voting. 
However7 1956 was to be the peak of popularity for the 
Poujade movement. Many UDCA members were against the 
political i nv o1 vement of the movement, and internal 
divisions weakened the effectiveness of the parliamentary 
group. When the UFF opposed de Gaulle in the 1958 
181 
eI ect ia ns7 it was not supported by its 'members, arid received 
onLy of the vote. 'I -his snub to Poujade was followed by a 
S1 um Din the membership of UDCA f 1-C)'Y' ý(DC)7 0()o i r, 195 at0 
i0ol 000 in 1959, as Poujade was increasingly seen to be 
involved in conspirational pojitics. 
During t he 1960s, Poujade began to distance himself 
from the militant act i an upon which he had built ills 
popularity, insist ing that protest was only valid if the 
c3overnment did not listen to arievances. Pompidou further 
encouraged this stance by agreeing to consult Poujade on 
matters effecting small business. This had t. he effect of 
diluting the militancy of Poujade, to the extent that he 
supported the government during the events of May 1968, and 
in 1970 the UDCA manifesto even suggested a programme 
involving a contract with the government. To many small 
shopkeepers it appeared that the rebel of the 1950s had been 
tamed. 
The decline in Poujade's support and the decreasing 
emphasis placed upon protest and confrontation by the UDCA 
during the 1960s, encouraged the growth of a new militant 
small shopkeeper movement. Contrary to Poujade"s insistance 
upon dialogue with the government and his dismissive 
comments regarding the value of militant action, the 
concessions gained by those protest groups involved in the 
disruptions of 1968 appeared to suggest that protest action 
could be successful. The major concern of most Slylal 1 
traders in 1968 was the new tax system introduced by the law 
of 1966. This legislation, alonaside the unpopular 
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int roduct ion of VAT, made health insurance obligatory f01, 
small traders anC craftsmen. However7 trus system was less 
favourable than t hat introduced for other self em p1o yed 
grou ps. These grievances were further enraged with the 
int rod uct i on of an austerity programme in November 1968, 
which further increased VAT, but allowed concessions for 
large business. 
As complaints grew, and the UDCA seemed to be 
supporting the government and beecoming institutional ised, a 
new protest group called CIDCAPL (Comit'S d'Information et de 
Defense des Commercants Artisans, et Professions Libe"Prales) 
was formed in December 1968. This group attracted 120,000 
people to a rally held in Grenoble in February 1969, and as 
the movement grew in size and traditional channels to 
authority were closed to it, it turned to militant action. 
in March 1969 a strike was called in protest against tax 
increases. In 1ýordeaux, 7,000 demonstrators clashed with 
tile police, in Vannes windows of large stores were smashed, 
and in Lorient the main railway line was blocked (Hargrove 
1969). In April, Gerard Nicoud, the twenty-three year old 
secretary of the CIDCAPL and 400 supporters sealed of the 
town of La Tour du Pin7 and sacked the tax office. Nicoud 
was arrested (The Times 12/04/1969)7 and his supporters 
demandinq his release clashed with police. As a aesture of 
support, the CGPME organised a one day strike on 16th April 
196917 but many of Nicoud 7S supporters distrusted the CGPME, 
and preferred more militant action (The Times 17/04/1969). 
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wit h the approach of the ce Gaulle referendum 0 TI rea iona1 
and Senate ref o rm, Nicoud was released and concess 1 ons 
0romi sed 
De Gaulle was subsequently defeated in the referendum, 
a defeat which according to i\i ic0 ud owed ty, uchto the 
shopkeeper vote. inevitably parallels were drawn between 
Nicoud and Poujade, as the press recognised the role that 
CIDCAPL could play as a pressure group. A role noted by 
Ardagh (1969) in The Times ... 
"a National rally of small shopkeepers due to be held 
in Grenoble on May 19th may well help to decide the 
French presidential eI ect i on. It was the defection 
of this class of voters that,, as much as anything else, 
caused President de Gaulle's downfall. If they turn 
against M. Pompidou too, they could prevent his victory 
from being a foregone conclusion. " 
However, Nicoud was quick to dismiss any comparison with 
Poujade. He had no wish to pursue a political career, and 
the CIDCAPL was keen to preserve its apolitical stance, to 
the extent that the group refused to endorse any specific 
candidate in the presidential elections. 
On his accession Pompidou promised the small traders 
concessions, but none were forthcoming, and in the Autumn of 
1969 a new campaign of direct action was launched. On the 
night of 25th September 1969, the Gaullist mayor of La Tour 
du Pin, and two policemen were kidnapped by militant 
shopkeepers (Mortimer 1969). Nicoud went underground, and 
was condemned to ten months in prison and fined 400 francs 
for his part in this incident, in his aosence. -1 Wo mont hS 
later, Nicoud gave himself up, and an appeal court reauced 
his sentence to a six months suspended sentence UtIortimer 
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1970a) . 
Duri no 1970 Ni ic0 I-to arld Fa 1-k iI ot -t tie eaaer0 -F 
ario t he r lyli 1 It ant slyla 11 shopkeeper allot-tol UNATI (un i0r 
Nat i anal e des Travai 1 leurs ince'Operidants) -tau red t he 
country proclaiming their cause and demanding a meeting with 
the prime minister7 Chaban-Delmas. When this request was 
repeatedly denied, both groups called for protest action in 
support of their ai IYIS. Roads were blocked throuahout 
France, including Paris., where over 1., 000 arrests were made, 
and Nicoud was once again arrested and sentenced to six 
months imprisonment (The Times 26/03/1970). Nicoud7s arrest 
sparked off more demonstrations, and in May events took a 
new course with a series of bomb attacks on the South 
European pipeline at Revel-Tourdan, the Grenoble law court 
and police station (Mortimer 1'970b) 7 and the burning cown of 
a Carrefour store at Venissieux (Mortimer 1970c). 
Meanwhile, Nicoud had his sentence reduced to two months on 
appeal and was released on May 25th 1970. 
During the summer of 1970, the CIDCAPL and UNATI merged 
to form CID-UNATI with a hierarchical network of National7 
10 departemental and canton committees under the leadership of 
a general secretary. ThuS7 the protest movement became a 
more formalised pressure group. Nicoud blamed the violence 
of 1970 on the intransigence of the government7 and c1ai oyied 
that he was always prepared to meet the administ ration. 1n 
July 197C), the government finally bowed to the demands for a 
meeting arid met with the new CID-UNA71 croup. 
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t he early L970s, support for the group grew as 
membe rsh 1p rose f rom i 40 7 000 i ri ilMD to' 2" 107 1972 
(Eatwell i 98JI-) The movement was P a), t1c ula r. L Y well 
organised at the local level arid provided extensive services 
for its members. At the National level 7 the p rog ramme 
adopted over the 1970-72 period demanded the complete reform 
of the 1966 social security law; the control of hypermarkets 
arid supermarkets, and an end to the-tax concessions granted 
to large businesses; and the reform of local taxat'on7 
especially the patente. 
The meetings held between CID-UNATI and the government 
made little progress, and Nicoud again called for 
demonstrations in support of the small traders aims. 
N iCoUd7 s arrest and the imposition of a fourteen month goal 
sentence did little to quash the protests, and abstention in 
the 1972 referendum an extending the EEC was recommended to 
CID-UNATI members. In the summer of 19727 with ce Gaulle's 
defeat fresh in their minds, the government appeared to give 
in to many of the demands of the small traders with the 
release of Nicoud 7 the creation of a new ministerial post 
for commerce and crafts in a government reshuffle (Brogan 
1972) and the legislative moves of July 1972. The timing of 
these concessions would seemi to point to electoral fears, as 
Nicoud himself realised, claiming that his release was ... 
11 not an act of clemancy, but much more an act of 
wisdom at the coming elections, for fear can breed 
wisdoryi. " (Hargrove 1972) 
Despite these apparent concessions, in 193733 CID-UNATI 
we re in the position to extract even further pledges fro tyi 
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the g ove rnment. Pa r1i ament a ry elections were 01-te in t he 
Spring, and in May the tax inspectors went on strike 1n 
protest over the lack of government action against those who 
had avoided tax assessments following a CID-UNATI o rg an i sed 
boycott. Nicoud warned that the concessions of 1972 were 
not enouan ... 
"if the government thinks it has lulled us with a 
f ew paltry reforms, it is mistaken. Chaban goes. 
Messmer appears. We could not care less. " 
(Hargrove 1972) 
it was in this hostile and threatening environment that 
parliament met to debate the Royer bill, and CID-UNATI 
increased the pressure by sending a letter to pach deputy 
informing him that his attitude towards the proposals would 
be closely watched and not forgotten at the next elections 
(Wigg 1973). 
Any suggestions of political motivations were further 
enhanced by the personality and actions of the legislation's 
chief sponsor, Jean Royer, who had been appointed Minister 
of Commerce and Crafts in the second Messmer cabinet of 
April 1973. Royer, the mayor of Tours, had been elected to 
the National Assembly in 1958 as an independent, declaring 
himself to be "a free man entirely independent of parties 
and pressure groups" (Keesings Contemporary Archives 1974), 
and had achieved a certain notority following a vigorous and 
well publicised campaign against pornography in Tours in 
1971. Royer was outspoken and unpopular, seen as 
representing the same conservative political current as 
Poujade in the 1950s. Despite his denials of any personal 
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ambition behind the law 
1br us h aside a!! accusat i ons or insinuations that 
1 tit end t0 undertake a journey of Q reat political 
amb it i on7 or for the reassurgence of neo-poujaOisme- 
(Doyere 1973b) 
Royer"s motives for sponsoring the law were widely 
questioned in the press at the time. Views that were 
enhanced by an unprecedented publicity tour around France to 
explain the law to traders and., critics would argue, 
confirmed by his canditure in the Presidential elections of 
May 1984, following the death of Pompidou. 
The law did have considerable poitical undertones, as 
The Economist magazine foresaw... 
"(tile) real difficulty for the neo-Gaullist regime, 
as for its predecessor, lies in a contradiction. Its 
ambition is to modernise the economy, to eliminate the 
inefficient and the marginal. Yet it has to rely on 
the political and electoral support of the very groups 
it wants to eliminate. " (The Economist 11/04/1970) 
The small shopkeeper sector represented an influential four 
million voters, "an essential element in the stability of 
the Republic", according to Soustelle (Schifres 1973), and 
posed political problems, especially for Giscard d'Estaing, 
then the Minister for Finance and favourite for the 
Presidential elections. For any legislation restricting 
innovations which would reduce prices seemed contrary to the 
governments aims of countering inflation This apparent 
contradiction was eagerly exploited by opponents of the 
legislation in the press... 
"One says that it will act to regulate an economic 
and social problem. I rather have the impression that 
one wishes to regulate an electoral problem. " 
(Fournier,, of Carrefour, in Doyere 197-1: )a) 
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The Royer bill had a tough journey through pa rI 1 ament, 
debate lasting for three weeks and witn votes taken on over 
four hund Týed amendments to the original craft of t tie 
legislation suggested by a National Assembly Committee. 
Even Giscard cancelled a holiday to speak in the debate 
(Eatwell 1982). The majority of these proposed amendments 
were blatantly in favour of the small traders and to many 
confirmed the accusations of political/electoral motivation. 
Some of the more extreme suggestions were that hypermarkets 
should be required to sell goods at prices at least as high 
as those that the wholesalers charged small traders, or that 
hypermarkets, should pay the same wholesale prices as small 
retailers (The Economist 06/10/1973). Other areas of 
contention included the revised composition of the CDUCS, 
with the original proposal being that traders should account 
for half of the members of these commissions. The 
Socialists in particular objected fiercMy to the transfer of 
authority from. elected representatives to "the near 
equivalent of medieval guilds" (The Economist 20/10/1973), 
and won a reduction in the number of retailer 
representatives on the CDUCs to a third. 
6.5. THE TEXT OF THE "LOI ROYER"_ 
The law in its final form, consisted of sixty-five 
art icles aro uped into five parts headed "Principles of 
Location" (articles I to 10); "Social Disposit ions" 
(articles 11 to 24) ; "Economic Dispositions" (articles 25 to 
52); "Education and Professional Development" (articles 53 
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to 61) ; and "Other Dispositions" (articles 61 to 65). 
The three chapters of the "Principies or Location'' 
defined a number of programmes instigated by the law, 
fundamentaly aimed at solving the economic,, legal, and 
social problems of small traders. Art icle one in this 
section acknowledged that ... 
"liberty and freedom of entreprises are t he 
fundamentals of commercial and craft activities. 
arid stated that public intervention should allow for the 
expansion or all forms of business7 ensurina that new forms 
of retailing did not kill off others., thus creating gaps in 
the commercial system. To this end, public organisations 
should cooperate towards greater technical and financial 
assistance for small businesses. Moves were also instigated 
to bring about fiscal equality within commerce7 and between 
commerce and other economic sectors. As a result7 article 8 
provided for the replacement of the "Paterte" (the tax on 
small businesses based upon the number of employees and the 
rental value of premises) by an occupation tax, from the 
1st January 1975. Si'mi larly, in the field of social 
security benef its, the distrib, 14tive and craft sectors were 
to be progressively harmonised with the general recime. 
The ' "Social Dispositions" section of the law contained 
lengthy articles (11 to 13) on the special compensatory aid 
scheme for small retailers introduced in 1972. This law was 
further adapted to help independent traders in that f rozen 
assets were no longer to be included in the assessment of 
retirement pensions, the rights of survivina spouses to aid 
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we re es aol shed', and age limit qualifications for 
handicapped traders were removed. Other benefits covered in 
this section included sickness and mat e, rn ity benefits 
(art icies 14 to . &-. 10) 7 retirement pensions (articles 
1 
1 to 
and family allowances (article 24) 7 all of whicri were 
t0 brought into line with the general system applicable to 
other economic sectors. 
The roles of the Chambers of Commerce and Inaustry, and 
Chambers of Trade were reviewed in articles 25 to 27 of the 
part of the law concerned with "Economic Dispositions". The 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry had their role in the 
preparation of SDAU and POS documents reaffirmed, and their 
powers were extended to allow them to supervise the 
installation or conversion of retail developments and to 
provide access to capital funds for developers. 
The consumer was catered for in chapter three of this 
section which devoted a long series of articles (37 to 46) 
to improving the conditions of competition. Amongst the 
measures introduced were those which forbade discriminatory 
prices, the resale of goods at a price lower than the 
purchase (3 ri ce, and fraudulent deception. Conditions were 
also established for the provision of "free" samples and 
services, and the problems of "white lie" advertising were 
discussed, stressing the problems of proving intentional 
deception and outlining the role that Consumer Associations 
should play in this field. 
Additional measures encouraging the adaption and 
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mo a erni sat lon of retailing were estabiisheci in articles 47 
to 52. Further credit facilities were made available from 
tile FEDES, (Fonds cie De"veloppement Economique et Social) for 
traders who wished to adapt or convert their businesses7 for 
integration into one of the forms of associated independent 
retailing, and for young people wishing to train for the 
trade. Loans f roty, this f und could cover 75% of any 
investment costs for a period of eight to twelve years at an 
interest rate of 14.75%. 
The fourth part of the law, entitled "Education and 
Professional Deve Ia pment ",. provided a renumeration for 
traders who undertook professional courses, and 
significantly altered. the terms and conditions of 
apprenticeships. The most controversial element in this 
area was the lowering of the starting age for 
apprenticeships to fifteen, a move vigorously defended by 
Royer. In addition, apprenticeships were now to lead to a 
technical qualification upon their completion. 
Finally, the fifth part of the law established that 
each year from 1974, the government7 following Consultation 
with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Chambers of 
Trade7 would produce a report for present at i on before 
parliament an the evolution of the commercial and craft 
sectors, with particular reference to the application of the 
law. 
However, the most important elements of the Loi Royer, 
as far as the development of large stores was concerned, 
were the changes made in articles 28 to 34 in the role and 
. 1\ 
192 
function of the urban planning commissions first establistied 
in the Circular of 29th July 1969. The new *Commissions 
Departemental d' Ur ban i sme Commerciale (CDUC) were granted 
far more extensive powers than their predecessors. The 
CDUCs were to be composed of nine locally elected 
rep resent at i ves, including the mayor of the town or commune 
in which development was proposed, appointed by the Conseil 
ýO 40 General; -mine representatives of local business interests, 
eight appointed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and 
one by the Chamber of Trade; and two representatives from 
Consumer Associations appointed by the Prefet. This 
Commission was presided over by*the non-voting de'Opartemental 
#0 Of Prefet assisted by the departemental Director of Public 
Investments', and the Director of Competition and Prices. 
These Commissions were to consider three types of 
planning application 
- Applications for proposed retail developments of more 
than 3,000 square metres in total area7 or 1,500 square 
metres of sales area. These threshoids were reduced to 
2,000 and 
17000 
square metres respectively in communes of 
fewer than 40 7000 inhabitants. 
Applications for extensions or increases in the sales 
area of an existing outlet already at the size limits 
defined above7 or if the outlet would exceed these limits 
following an extension of more than 200 square metres. 
Plans for converting existing buildings into retail 
units of the above sizes. 
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, he CDUCs were to reach a decision, T st at i ma t hei r 
reasons, within four months of the application being iodged, 
or permission was deemed to have been granted. Appeals 
against dec isi ons could be made within two moriths of t he 
CDUC verdict to the Minister of Commerce and Crafts by 
either the Prefet, one third of the members of the CDUC7 or 
the applicant. When an appeal was made the Minister of 
Commerce and Crafts consulted a second committee7 the 
Commission Nationale d'Urbanisme Commercial (CNUC )7 for 
advice. 
This National Commission consisted of nine locally 
elected representatives7 five appointed by the National 
Assembly and four by the Senate; nine business 
representatives appointed by the Minister of Commerce and 
Crafts; and two consumer representatives appointed by the 
consumer associations belonging to the Comite' National de la 
C0 ns 0 Inlylat i0r. Following the comments of this Commission the 
Minister had three months to decide the fate of the appeal. 
These provisions were brought into force by decree 
number 74-63 of 28th January 1974, and the CDUCs started 
work in May 1974. Various Circulars have since been 
announced making amendments to the law and clarifying 
certain grey areas. The Circular of 3rd May 1974, issued by 
Jacques Boyon (Royer7s successor) clarified the role of the 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry with respect to the law. 
The Chambers were to take a more positive role in the 
preparation of town planning documentS7 and 1n the 
establishment of training courses for business managers as 
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o ut 1i red in the legislation. In relation to the CDUCs the 
Chambe rs were to supply the Commissiovis with the lylaxilyll-tly, 
amount of information available7 and were to enlist the help 
of any local government department necessary to achieve this 
end. FinallY7 the Chambers were to nominate the eight 
commercial representatives on the CDUCs from distinct 
categorieS7 one from the department /variety store sector7 
one f rom branch mult iple or consumer cooperative 
organisat ions; and of the six remaining from independent 
commerce7 one was to be chosen from non-sedentary retailing, 
and one from associated trading. 
The most extensive Circular issued by the Minister of 
Commerce and Crafts in relation to the Loi Royer was that- 
published on 10th March 1976 by Vincent Ansquer. This 
Circular was intended to "answer several of the questions 
raised by the operation of the CDUCS". The first section of 
this document was concerned with technical definitions of 
terms used in the law such as "retail unit". lssales area" 7- 
"gross area", and "extension". The term "sales area" was to 
include all surface area where merchandise was exposed ana 
to which the consumier had access for buying, including the 
area between the check-outs and exits. However7 "service" 
floorspace such as cafeterias and restaurants and small 
shopping precincts were to be excluded from this definition. 
The 1976 Circular also excluded certain categories of 
development from the scrutiny of the CDUCs - such as service 
establishments (hotels, rest aurant s, cinemas, banks, and 
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ha i rd resse rs) . ma 11 order outlets, wholesale unitS7 and 
public markets. This section of the Circular also contained 
a series of examples and test cases of the appropriate 
decision to be made in cases were modifications had been 
made t0 the application and which were difficult t0 
interpret clearly from the literal wording of the law. 
Guidelines as to the nature of certain applications 
were provided in this document. An application could be 
resubmitted to a CDUC if it had been modified, and 
applications for several units constituting a commercial 
centre were to be filed as a single application under the 
name of a promoter if possible. Alte rnatively, all the 
applications were to be dealt with at the same meeting of 
the Commission. 
The most important element of this section of the 
Circular was, however, the establishment of the "fiche 
analytique" which was to provide the basic information and 
statistics for the CDUC. This fiche was to be issued to all 
of the members of the CDUC and their deputies, and was to 
conform to the layout illustrated in an appendix to the 
Circular. The fiche was divided into two sections, the 
first of which was entitled "information concerning the 
dossier" and which was to contain ... 
1. The Applicant - including his or her identity aria 
capacity, revealing any partners in the project. 
2. Tile Situation of the Project - illustrating the 
commune concerned, the exact spatial location of 
the 
proposed development, and the existing and proposed 
feeder 
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ro ad s. 
The Details of the Project - size of site and -in it 
the nature and type of tradinq activity proposed, cetai is 
of any planned auxilary developments, and of car parking 
facilities. 
4. The Conditions of Access for Traders (if applicable) 
- including details of lease arrangements, annual charges 
and rents. 
5. Employment Created. 
6. Provisional Estimates of Turnover. 
7. The Timetable of Development - to reveal any 
envisaged extensions or larger associated developents. 
8. The Proposed Date of opening. 
Information concerned with'the likely local effect of 
the project was contained in the second section of the 
fiche, and included economic aspects such as ... 
1. Details of the Catchment Area - the composition of 
the population in the area and future projections of 
demographic growth, along with details of consumer 
characterist ics. 
2. Details of Commercial Equipment in the Catchment Area 
- giving figures of the amount of floorspace (by type of 
development) covered by existing units, by developments 
. authorised since the Loi Royer - including details of 
refused applications - by any pending projects, and by 
projects just below the size thresholds requiring a 
decision from the CDUCs. 
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Details of the Effects upon Consumer Prices. 
avid 'r, ne as oec-u s re i at 1 no luo -covjyl oianning issues 
i tic 1 ud i nq 
1 The Compatability of the Project with the DesignateG 
Land Use Documents. 
2. The Suitability of the Site - with reference to 
administrative and legal limitations 7 and access to public 
services. 
All of these reports were to show the advantages and 
disadvantages of the project, in terms of the "spirit of the 
law", and if all the relevant reports concerned with an 
application had riot been received before the meeting of the 
CDUC7 the dossier was to be referred to the next meeting. 
ý . 00 Final ly, the opinion of the Commission in the departement 
adjacent to the commune of the proposed development was to 
be sought, and in the absence of this view any decision was 
void. 
The third section of Ansquer's Circular c3ealt with the 
proceedures to be adopted by the CDUCs. The quorum for a 
valid decision was set at three quarters (12) of the 
membership of the Commission. Any member who was directly 
associated with an application was to abstain, and his or 
her place was to be taken by the relevant deputy. The 
applicant was entitled to submit any information to the 
Commission which he or she felt was relevant, and was 
allowed access to the CDUC dossiers on the proposal. 
Furthermore7 the authors of these reports could be summoned 
before the Commission to expand on their findings if this 
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was deemed necessary. 
All members of the CDUCs were to keep their votes 
secret., and the Commissions could riot grant an authorisation 
conditional upon modifications (in either area or nature) to 
the project. The CDUCs were to deal with the proposal as 
submitted, and any alterations made by the developer 
required a new application to be filed. All members of the 
Commissions and the. applicant were to be informed of the 
CDUC decision as soon as possible, and the decision was to 
be published in the press in the standard form of ... 
"In course of the meeting of ... (date) ... the CDUC 
of ... (deipartement) ... has decided to grant the 
authorisation sought by ... (applicant) ... for 
... (nature of project and gross area) ... at ... (precise location)... ." 
Final ly, the Circular demonstrated the rights and 
obligations of- the successful applicant, reitterated that it 
was forbidden to transfer an authorisation, and reaffirmed 
decree number 75-910 of 6th October 1975., which announced 
that an authorisation lapsed if the project-had not been 
started within two years of the authorisation having been 
granted. This last clause had been introduced to prevent 
firms obtaining an authorisation for development on a site, 
and then freezing this development until a more favourable 
later date. 
During the election campaign of November 1977, further 
amendments were hinted at when the Prime Minister, Raymoric 
Barre, indicated that the law might be changed to "foster 
competition alylovICI independent retailers and 1a roe 
retai lers". However7 within a few daYS7 Barre had corrected 
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this statement, refering instead to a "balanced growth" of 
independents and large retailers. Once again, po lit lea! 
considerations could be seen to have been influential, as 
DiMaria (1978) commented ... 
"t he political pressure f roa, small retailers and 
f rom t he i tic reas i ng politicised Consumers" 
Associtions is just too big in France to expect any 
po 1 icy change. " 
Beyond these amendments and speculations7 the Loi Royer 
operated as established until September 1981, when the new 
Minýster for Commerce and Crafts in the Socialist 
government, Andre Delelis, suspended the authorisation of 
applications, Whilst the government reviewed the state of 
ur ban retailing. To facilitate this review, each 
lop departement was required to produce an inventory of all 
existing commercial developments of over 400 square metres 
in area. All public associations, including the Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, were to be placed at the disposal 
of-the Pr'eOfet for the compilation of this report, which was 
to be sent to the relevant CDUCs and Conseils Ge6ore"ral by the 
autumn for the addition of their views on possible 
commercial developments. The final documents were then to 
be sent to the Ministry of Commerce and Crafts by 31st 
December 1981. The intention of this exercise was to 
provide an information base for the reference of the CDUCs 
and CNUC. 
6.6. SUMMARY 
The rapid construction of large housing developments in 
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France to deal with the accommoaation snortage foIIowIrig tne 
war, was riot accompanied by an equal expansion in commercial 
i rif rast ruct ure. Co nseq uent 1 y, most new urban developments 
in France were underdeveloped in terms of retail faciiities, 
and an outdated co mme rc ia1 syst elyl, domi nat ed by slyla 11 
inefficient independent traders continued to characterise 
the distribution system in France. 
The government became increasingly aware of this 
problem in the early 1960s, and was faced with a dichotomy. 
The desire to encourage retail evolution and new forms of 
retailing within the distribution system, was opposed by the 
wish to minimise the effects that this development would 
have upon the existing retail structure. These contrasting 
and conflicting aims were borne out in the public policy 
measures adopted by the government towards retailing. 
From the mid 1960s until 19727 the government pursued a 
policy of encouragement towards new large area stores, or 
perhaps more correctly, a policy of minimal interference, 
and indirect discrete encouragement. However, the rap 3. d 
growth of hypermarkets and associated developments in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s presented apparent economic, 
social, and town planning dangers. These issueS7 combined 
with the militant, extra-institutional activities of the 
influential small retailer pressure groups, close to 
approacning elections, ult imately lead to a. change i r, 
government straltegy. The introduction of the Loi Royer in 
late 1973 illiustrated the new government attitude towaros 
large stores - that of restraint and restriction of t hei r 
201 
spread and development. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : TRENDS lN HYPERMARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Before consioering t he p roj ect sfor hype rma rKez 
eve 1o pment that have been proposec since týle L01 týOyer Was 
introduced, it is necessary to evaluate any noticable trencs 
relat ing t0t he st c3 res t hat have o pened. Certain store 
characteristics, spatial development and ownership patterns 
are all aspects which the CDUCs and CNUC have the potential 
to influence. Given the aims of the legislation, one might 
assume that if the law has been successful, there will have 
been a decline in the number of hypermarkets opened with the 
resulting spatial consequences reinforcing ex 1 st i no 
locational patterns and floorspace densities, along with a 
reduction in the dominance of the large retail organisations 
in the hypermarket sector. 
There are several sources of hypermarket listings 
available in the French retailing literature, notably the 
"Libre Service Actualites" Atlas and the "Points de Vente'l 
Panorama, both of which provide annual lists of hypermarkets 
by departement and operating organisation. The problems 
caused by differing definitions have been briefly discussed 
earl ier, and discrepancies uncoubtedly exist between these 
two published lists, However, by combining these two major 
sources with company annual reports, many of these anomolies 
can be resolved, and a comprehensive directory of French 
hypermarkets was compiled. This directory forms the basis 
of the analysis in this chapter. 
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7.1. HYPERMARKET CHARACTEERISTICS AND TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT 
view of the potentially restrictive oowers d ra tit ea 
to the CDUCs tnrough the special proceedures establisheo 13Y 
the Lol Royer, One would expect to observe a marKec3 slowing 
down 1n the hypermarket growth rate since týje legislation 
was i tit rod uced. However7 as a new hypermarket unit Wiii 
take between one and two years to build, a construction 
delay should be expected before any reaction to the law is 
visible in terms of the number of new hypermarkets o peneo. 
Consequently, the first indications of tne impact of the Loi 
Royer should not be expected until either 1975 or 1976. 
Analysis of the number of hypermarkets opened each year 
(figure 7. IA) reveals a noticable decline in the number of 
units opened in both 1974 and 1975 (the years immediately 
following the Royer legislation) from a peak of 62 new 
openings in 1972. Since 1975 the number of new stores 
-"0 opened each year has fluctuated around a figure of about 1ý 
units per year, although there is evidence of a 'further 
marked decline in the growth rate in 1978. The same data 
Plotted over a three year running trean (figure 7. IB) 
accentuates this decline in openings from 1973, and again 
shows the levelling out of the growth rate to around -LO new 
units per year during the second half of the decade. 
i tie most striking observation to be made f rom t hese 
f igures is t hat t he ma i ri decline in new st o re openings 
was underway before the Loi Royer COUId be expectec to riave 
had any effect. The construction delay means that the units 
opened in 1974 and 19757 when tne decline in new stores was 
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Figure 7.1A : Number of Hypermarkets Opening per Year 
1963-1982. 
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most mark ed, wo tA 1a have oeen plannecj I ana. c onst r uc -L, 1 on wo ua 
have started an these hypermarkets prior to the lecisiation. 
Furthermore, as Loquery (1976) ana otýiers have suages-ceo, it 
is likely that the peak of new store openings in 19T.; -' 
is 
somewhat art if icial as many developers, ant ici pat 1 rig 
restrictive legislation following the antics of Nicoud and 
the CID-UNATI,, increased the pace of development before 
legislation could be introduced. Consequently, the decline 
in the growth rate of new hypermarkets may even have 
commenced as early as 1970 when7 as figure 7.11A illustrateS7 
the number of new store openings was less than the previous 
yea r for the first time. Certainly, by the time the 
legislation was introduced the rapid growth rate of the late 
1960s was showing signs of slowing down (figure 7.1B), avid 
it iS UnIiKely that without the Loi Royer the riumber of new 
units opened each year would have maintained the high level 
f 1972. 
These observations sugg-est that more deep-rooted 
economic trends may have had as much influence on the number 
of new stores opened as the Royer legislation itself. The 
timing and nature of company expansion policies, ano t fie 
availability of investment capital for developers will have 
played a role, as Ltridouotedly aid the oil crisis of 197-3 aria 
its associated effects on the French economy in general. 
The oi1 crisis had a consideraole impact orl t he reric n 
economy, which following the nationalisation of French oil 
companies in Algeria in 1971 relied upon the Madle East for 
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of its oil neecs. These factors may well have oeerl 
responsible for a large portion of the decline i ti the 
construction' of new stores in 1974 anc3 1975. 
, he effects of the Loi Royer may, therefore 7 not oe as 
striking as initiai impressions might suggest, a view wnich 
iSSU bst ant i at ed by looking at the total number of 
hypermarkets in France, and the numbers of stores owned Oy 
different companies and groups (figures 7.2 and 7.3). From 
these figures there would appear to be little indication of 
a major decline in hypermarket growth in France. The total 
number of hypermarkets in the country continues to rise 
steadilY7 with only a slight chance in the growth gradient 
since 1975. Furthermore, the change in this gradient is 
accentuated by the "false" rise in new openings immediately 
before the legislation. SimilarlY7 the growth rates of those 
companies with a substantial number of hypermarkets do not 
appear to have been adversly affected by the legislation, 
And they have continued to grow at their different rates. 
The company growth curves reveal more short term variations 
than the national curve7 owing to the smaller numbers of, 
- of economic units involved and the fact that the impact 
changes resulting from such events as the oil crisis will 
have had a more tangible short term effect on the investment 
capacity of individual orgainisations, particularly the 
smaller ones 7 than on the 
total hypermarKet population. 
Over the study period7 the closure rate of hypermarkets 
has been fairly constant rising from arouna two stores per 
year between 1970 and 1974 to four per year from 1974. Some 
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Figure 7.2 : Total Number of Hypennarkets 1963-1982. 
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of these stores have reopened at later dates following 
either t tie acqui sit i on 0f the unit by a new owner 01, 
extensive refurbishment. Characteristic of these stores is 
t he hypermarket operated by Docks de France at Chamoray les 
Tours, which closed early in 19827 to move to a new building 
situateci in the same street. 
One noticable trend in the numbers of stores a Pen i rig 
after the Loi Royer is the sig-nificant contribution mace to 
tile total number of store openings each year since 1976 made 
by stores which were previously either a supermarket or 
other retail outlet, and have been upgraded to hypermarket 
status by extending the sales area of the original outlet. 
(refer to -Figure 7.1A). Units of this type have accounted 
for approximately one third of the new openings each year. 
This trend reflects both the increasing use of extensions to 
enlarge exising units rather than bui ld new o ties, an 
adaption to reduce costs and DIAtmanouever the CDUCs (as 
shall be discussed later) 7a tic the adoption of 
the 
hypermarket concept by the independent sector. Figure 7.4 
illustrates the doiytinarice of the indepencent sector in the 
case of "upgraded" hypermarketS7 as development by enlarging 
the floorspace of an existing store is generally the easiest 
and least expensive method for an independent retailer to 
create a hypermarket unit. This type of development has 
been increasingly employed as a means of expansion by the 
MI-I 1tipIe sector in recent years, as companies have 
rat i ona 1i sed their operations, closing smaller outlets and 
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Figure 7.4 : Proportion of Hypeimarkets Created by 
Upgrading Other Retail Outlets. 
100 
90 
80 
70 
L 0 
GO 
L 50 CP 
CL 
0 
110 
30 
20 
I 
10 
0 
I 
I 
"Grandes 
Surfaces" 
Mý 
,., ept. / All 
Multiples Coops. Variety Independents 
Stores 
Type oF Organisation 
210 
ext end i ng the sales areas of others to enlarge them to 
hypermarKet status. 
I The growth of hypermarket floorspaqe (figure 7.5) 
obviously reflects the numbers of units opened7 although the 
change in the growth gradient is more pronounced than is the 
case for hypermarket numbers, owing to a trend towards 
smaller hypermarket units. 
Analysis of the average size of hypermarkets opening 
each year (figure 7.6) shows a decline in the average siz -, e 
of new stores from around 5,500-6,000 square metres of sales 
area in the late 1960s/early 1970s to around 4,000-4,500 
square metres at the begining of the 1980s. Although the 
legislation will have had some influence on this decline in 
the size of new stores, as it is to be expected that 
smaller p rojects would be treated more favourably by the 
CDUCs., once again the law may be seen as merely reinforcing 
general trends already underway before the introduction of 
the legislation. 
There is evidence of a decline in store size prior to 
the creation of the new CDUCs. Store size was falling 
before 1975,, when the first of the stores authorised by the 
CDUCs avid CNUC would be expected to open, s ug g est i ng t hat 
more general economic factors have influenced store si-":, e. 
Inflation arid competition for sites will ýiave increased t he 
costs of both land and construction,, encouraging t-he trend 
towards the less costly smaller unit. This trend will have 
been re info rced as the larger agglomerations and markets 
were occupied7 forcing developers to look towards smaller 
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Figure 7.5 : To+-al Hypermarket Floorspace 1963-1982. 
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owns avid tyti cid 1e ma rKet 
s7 whose sma 11 er cat enment 
POPUlatiOt's c: 01-ý10 OtIlY 5UPPQrt slylaller stores. he c. ec Ia ne 
in tne average size of new hypermarkets also reflects he 
qreater proportion of stores created by the "upgrading" of 
supermarkets and other outiets, which by their very na-; k-I 1-t re 
tend to be smaller in size than purpose-built hypermarkets. 
These factors are reflected by the differential growth 
rates of different size categories of hypermarkets (f igure 
7.7). For ease of discussion, stores have been categorised 
by by size into four groups representing small, medium, 
large, and very large outlets. The smailest size category 
of hy. permarket, those with a sales area of between '- 7 50() 
and 4,999 square metres, has continued to grow rapidly, 
and has increased as a proportion of the total number of 
hypermarkets opened each year from a low of 38.7% in 197'. 2,7 
to 59.5% in 19767 and 75.8% in 1982. Interest 'ng IY7 t he 
very large categories of hypermarkets, those with over 
10,000 square metres of sales space7 appear to have 
T maintained their, albeit very slow, growth rates. Instead, 
it is the growth rates of medium si. zed outlets of between 
5vOOO and 7,499 square metres and particularly the large 
stores, those of 77500-9,999 square metres, whA:. ch have been 
curtailed7 a trend which is as easily explained by economic 
factors and market saturation especially int he Ia rge r 
markets, as by the likely distaste of the CDUCs and CNIUC for 
projects of this sl--: re. 
There are also i nt e rest i rig diffe rerices int he 
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Figure 7.7 : Total Number of Hypermarkets in Different 
Size Categories 1963-1982. 
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ciiaracterist ics of hypermarkets wh ichfa! I into t hese 
different si-.:. e classes7 although unforti-mately -the ri a t, u )- e 
of the data base does riot allow for trie consideration of any 
ti yie element in the anallysis of these characteri-tics. 
mentioned in Chapter Four, there are essentiaiiy three types 
of hypermarket development in France. Those in commercial. 
centres7 defined here for classification purposes as ttiose 
with a minimum aross area of 5,00o square yietres with at 
least ten boutiques; hypermarket centres -a hypermarket 
with fewer than ten boutiques; and single hypermarket 
units. The commercial centre type is the most prolific form 
of development with 52.9% of the hypermarkets established by 
1982 falling into this category, compared to the 22.5% that 
are hypermarket centres7 and the 24.5% that are single 
hypermarket units. 
Figure 7.8 shows that the vast majority (70%) of medii-w-ri 
sized and larger units, those with over 5,000 square metres 
of sales area., are located in commercial cent res, whece: -ks 
the smallest units (2. )500-4,999 square metres) are evenly 
found in all types of hypermarket development, but have a 
below average representation in commercial centres, arid 
appear to favou. r single hypermarket developments (35.8%). 
The adoption of ancillary facilities (cafe 7 aut 0- 
centre7 and garden centre) which can greatly enhance the 
ze of attraction of a store development, varies with the si. 
hypermarket. Cafe' or restaurant facilities are found in 66% 
of all hypermarket developments, but would seem to be 
essential in larger units as 90% of hypermarkets witn over 
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ý-- IQu re 7.8 HypermarKet CýIaracterisszics 
ype of r4ypermark-et. 
of Stores in Each Si" -ye Category 
Size Commercial Hypermarket Hypermarket 
(Sq. ryl) Centre Cent re On 1y 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
7 
4v 999 33.7 ULF - 35.8 5!, 000- 77499 77.1 11.0 11.9 
7,500- 97999 83.9 4.8 
107000-127499 77.8 16.7 5.6 
127500 + 71.4 14. -3 14.3 
Aii 52.9 
------- --------------------------------------------------- 
B) Hypermarket Features 
of Stores in Each Size Category 
size wit h with With 
(Sq. M) Cafeteria Auto-Centre Garden Centre 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
: 419 000- 4 7999 48.4 24.2 8.1 
51000- 7,1499 86.4 57.6 6.8 
77500- 97 999 95.2 80.6 16.1 
10,000-12,1499 94.4 77.8 27.8 
12,500 +. 92.9 78.6 28.6 
A 11 66.2 42.7 10.1 
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77 500 square metres of sales space have this facility. T he 
presence of an auto centre follows a similar pattern 7 being 
fo und in 4'. g-: '% of all hypermarkets7 but is most common in 
those with over 7,5(--)0 square metres, of sales area (7'1j% or 
, Y, ore) . Garden centres are a'less widespread feature7 f 01-t"(3 
in only 10% of all hypermarket developments, bur again are 
mo re representative of the larger units, found in 217% or 
more units with over 10,000 square metres, of sales area. 
All three types of ancillary facilities are undersubscribed 
in the smallest units (2,500-4,999 square metres), largely 
owing to o w-rie rs n1p patte"S7 which allows the larger 
diversifieCI companies who control the largest stores to 
incorporate these facilitieS7 whilst the independents who 
tend to run the smaller stores have little access to these 
facilities. 
The characteriýý tics of those hypermarkets that have 
opened over the study period would seem to suggest that the 
trends observed7 namely a decline in store openings and 
store size, were in evidence before the Royer legislation 
could be expected to have had any impact upon development. 
These and other trends may also find explanation in more 
general economic factors as easily as in the effect of the 
legislation. Furthermore, growth has co nt in ued at a 
constant pace since the instigation of the law. 
7.2. SPATIAL ASPECTS OF HYPERMARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Almost half týhe d6parteoterits (42) in France now have a 
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density of hypermarKet floorspace of over 5)(D square met res 
per i7 
000 inhabitants. This compa res wit h only tn ree 
10, departements falling into this category in 197 (, Ytap 7. iA 
and B), and suggests that development has not been seriously 
curtailed by the Royer legislation. in addition7 there 
seems to be a strong correlation between some of the areas 
with the highest densities of hypermarket floorspace and the 
most densely populated departements - for example the Paris 
region (d6partements 78,917 93, and 94) and Bouche-sdu Rhone 
(13). and to lesser extent Rh8ne (69)7 AI pes-Ma rit1 yies 
(06)? and the Nord (59) - reflecting the importance of 
population density and the attraction of the largest 
agglomerations with regards to the market or catchment 
potential of a site. This feature is even more apparent 
when the number of hypermarkets in each de'opartement is 
compared to population density (maps 7.2A and B). 
The overall widespread pattern of high density of 
hypermarket floorspace is due largely to the favourable 
conditions for hypermarket growth which existed in France in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition to these socio- 
economic factors the rapid growth and spread of t he 
hypermarket concept may well have been aided by the IaCK Of 
a well established supermarket and self-service sector in 
France in the late 1960s. Self-service techniques and the 
supermarket concept developed later in France than in Great 
Britain, and appeared at around the same time as t ýie 
hypermarket. Consequently, the hypermarket arrived 
or soon after other forms of self-service 
wit h 
retailing, aria 
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Man 7.1A : Hypermarket. Density (Floorspace) 1982. 
Map 7.1B : Hypermarket Density (Floorspace) 1972. 
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Map 7.2A : Nunber of Hypemarkets 1982. 
"1 
0 
, Number of I. 
stores 
0 
4-6 
Map 7.2B : Population Density 1981 
7-9 
10-19 
20 + 
6 
4 
grg 
ImarT 
0 
Density 
Pop'n/K, 42 
r- - -7- 
-) -) n 
0-99 
100-199 
200-299 
22 300-399 
400-499 
500 + 
old not have to coiyipete against an already well esta0iislied 
and o ra an 1 sea self-service network As a result of trils 
factor there was great potential for the rapid adoption of 
the hypermarket concept in France in the 1960s. 
In some areas of the country, notably the So ut h- 
East,, West Coast7 no rt h-east Cent re,, and Eastern Border 
regions there appears to be a complementary pattern of 
supermarket and . hypermarket density (maps 7.1 and 7. %3) . 
This feature is especially true of the early periods of 
hypermarket adoption., when the higher than average densities 
of supermarket floorspace in these regions coincided with 
low densities of hypermarket floorspace. This relationship 
does not, however7 hold for all areas. in some cases both 
densities are very similar, and this pattern has oecome 
less pronounced with time. 
The spatial diffusion of any innovation is commonly 
controlled by two process; the hierarchy effect, through 
which the innovation spreads to the larger urban centres; 
and thp neighbourhood effect, which sees the outward spread 
of the innovation within a region from its source. Both 
these elements of the diffusion process-are evident in the 
spread of the hypermarket concept throughout France, and tile 
Loi Royer would seem to have had little impact upon these 
natural process. 
As maps 7.4A and B illustrate., the initial development 
or hypermar . Kets was concentrated in or near to t tie Maj 0r 
agglomerations and urban centres. When the locations Of 
the 
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Map 7.3A : Supernarket Density (Floorspace) 1982. I 
* 
Map 7.3B : Supermarket Density (Floorspace) 1972. 
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Map 7.4A : Hypennarkets Opening Between 1963 and 1969. 
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first stores to open is compared with the population a. ensity 
map f0r 19687 there appears to be a strong corre I at ion 
between the areas with the hig hest popuiation censities, 
which contain the major agglotyierat ions such as the Paris 
Basin, the North, the North-East, the South Coast, the 
Rhone, Brittany, and the d6partetyients containing Toulouse 
(31), Bordeaux (33), and Tours (37) - and those hypermarKets 
opened dy 1969. This spatial pattern can largely be 
attributed to the hierarchy or non-competitive effeCt7 as 
these stores opened initially in the major marketS7 thus 
avoiding competition from other units7 and allowing themi to 
exploit the largest catchment areas where the chance of 
failure was perceived as low. 
The major exceptions7 in 19697 to this explanation of 
location based upon the hierarchy effect, are the absence 
of hypermarkets in the Bouches-du-Rh*O"ne de"partement (1-1"jr )7 
which contains the Marseilles agglomeration, and the Loire 
departement (42), which contains the large urban areas of St 
Et i enne, Roanne7 
, and 
St Chamond, However this situation was 71 
soon remedied in the case of Bouches -du-Rhone with the 
opening of four hypermarkets in the departement during 1970, 
and the lack of development in the Loire may be explained by 
the strong peneration of hypermarkets in the Lyon 
agglomeration in neighbouring Rh'O"'ne (69). In addition7 by 
1969 there were signs that the neighbourhood effect upon 
innovation diffusion was becoming increasingly influential 
in accounting for the spatial spread of hypermarkets, With 
the appearance of a string of stores in the less densely 
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populareo departements to the 
d10 ciepartemeilts. 
no rt hof the central 
This changing pattern of soatial growth owina to t he 
increasing 1 vif 1 uence of the neighbolarhood effect 1-t p0n 
diffusion pat te rns, is more clearly i 11 IASt rated int he 
series of maps (map 7-5) showing the location of new stores 
opened at five yearly intervals - in 19677 1972,1977,1 and 
1982. From a pattern based upon initial developments 
concentrated it, the most densly populated centres in 1967, 
there is widespread growth in the middle markets and smaller 
townS7 along with the appearance of competing stores in the 
larger agglomerations by 1972. These stages are followed by 
the spread of the hypermarket to the more isolated 
10 departements., such as Pin (01) and Savoie (73) in 1977, 
and finally 1982 is characterised by continued infiliing in 
smaller centres and less densely populated deipartements, 
including those on the southern and north-western edges of 
the Massif. 
the spatial spread of hypermarkets is closely related 
to company development and expansion policies, which can 
also be seen to exhibit features of the hierarchy and 
neighbourhood effects. Company development policies have 
been particularly important in relation to both of these 
diffusion processes, as retailing in France is characterised 
by strongly regionalised retail organisations. Nat io na 1 
tradenames do exist, but many of these belong to affiliated 
groups such as the Leclerc banner for independent traders 
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Map 7.5A : Hypermarkets Opening in 1967. 
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and t hat 0f Rand Point fort he Cooperative Societie S7 
hypermarkets. However, even these national tradenames still 
exhibit a strong inclination7 i VI te rms of store 
concentrat"Y17 towards their regional origins. Hence, the 
Leclerc t radename is particularly well represented in 
Brittany and the West, ) whilst the Rond Point banner is most 
numerous in the North and North-East, the areas containing 
the largest and strongest of the Cooperative Societies. 
the geographically , 
Similarly, widespread Mammouth 
banner is the tradename of the Paridoc centrale, to which a 
variety of regional multiple retailers are affiliated. 1n 
1982, the 77 hypermarkets carrying the Mammouth tradename 
were operated by several multiple retail organisations. 
Docks de France owned 28 stores directly, and posessed a 
50% shareholding i. n Cofradel which ran a further 6 stores, 
the Sociedhe** Alsacienne de SuperMarche'os (SASM) controlled 7 
stores, Cedis 15, Economats du Centre 8, Guyenne et Gascogne 
4, 
# and La Ruche Mei5ridionale 13. By virtue of the distinct 
regional character and concentration of these groups the 
Mammouth. tradename has achieved a national market coverage. 
The SASM stores are concentrated in the far North-East7 
Cedis is located to the south Of SASM7S territory in the 
North-East, Economats du 'Centre are to be found in the 
Central region of the country7 La Ruche Mie'ridionale in the 
South and Eastern areas of the South-West with Guyenne et 
Gascogne in the west coast section of the South-West, 
Cofradel occupy the Rhone valley and South-East region7 and 
finallY7 Docks de France are concentrated in the West, North 
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and Paris regions. 
Docks de France are one Of the few companies wnicn nave 
developed strongly outside their home region, and this ýJas 
been achieved primarily by the acquisition of other 
companies with hypermarket operations. The parent company 
of Docks de France operates in the north-west of the Central 
region and has long established subsidary companies, Doc 
Francois operating in the south west of the country and SM 
Doc concentrated in the Paris region. The group has 
recently expanded and achieved a national coverage of sorts 
(map 7.6A) through the acquisition of a 50% holding in 
Cofradel in 1979, and the control of the northern based 
multiple retailer, La Ruche Picarde in 1980. 
Of all the hypermarket operators, Carrefour is the one 
major retailer with a long established national hypermarket 
penetration (map 7.6B). The parent company has its 
traditional base in the Rhoo*ne vally and Paris regions, but 
the group expanded into the national arena at an early stage 
in its history, initially by franchising its tradename 
through the company's centrale, Samod, to 14 stores owned by 
Cora, Grand Magasins Ardennes, and Promomag in the North. 
These franchises were given up in the early 1970's, as 
Promomag developed their own Continent banner in 1973. Cora 
followed suit in 1974, J and the stores of 
Grand Magasins 
Ardennes were taken over by Carrefour themselves in 1976. 
As well as the use of the franchise concept, Carrefour 
has widened its geographical market by developing outlets in 
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Man- 7.6A : Hypeimarkets OPerated by Docks de France 1982. 
Man 7.613 : Hyper-markets operated by Carrefour 1982. 
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reg i ona I ma rket s through subsidiary companies owned on a 
50: 50 snare basis with established multiple retailers based 
in the regions in question. in 1967, the Sogara subsidiary 
was founoed witn Guyenne et Gascogne to develop Carrefour 
stores in the South-West7 arid this venture was followed in 
1972 by the creation of Soracma with Docks Lyonnais and 
Docks de Nevers (Soracma was eventually absorbed by 
Carrefour in 1976), the formation of Grandes Surfaces de 
Distribution (GSD) in conjunction with. l'Allobroge in the 
South-East7 and Sogramo with Comptoirs Modernes in the 
North-West region of the country. 
ýOther organisations which have adopted a more national 
geographical spread are Auchari (map 7.7) and Rallye (map 
7.6). However, the development of these two firms differs 
from that of Docks de France and Carrefour in that they have 
both expanded into other regions essentially througn 
building their own stores, rather than through acquisitio. n 
or collaboration with other retailers. 
Auchan have penetrated south from the Nord (69) and 
Pas-de-Calais (62) de6partements into the Paris basin7 the 
Rhone Valley, Bordeaux and the South primarily by 
constructing their own units, although the company has 
purchased some individual stores during this expansion (in 
19827 7 of Auchan's 33 stores had been acquired in this 
way). However7 unlike Docks de France the group has 
acquired any major regional companies. 
not 
Similarly, Rallye has expanded from its Brittany base 
through the western regions to the Rhone valley and souttl 
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Map 7.7 : Hypemarkets Operated by Auchan. 
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coast. The spatial diffusion of both of these groups again 
illustrates the influence of the hjerarchy and neighbourhood 
processes of spatial diffusion. Consequently, development 
outside the home territory has been focused primarily upon 
the larger markets of the Rhone (69), Gironde (33)7 and 
Bouches-du-Rhone (13) delopartements and the Paris region; 
whilst over the same time period both of these firms 
haVe7 
through. the neighbourhood process of diffusion, continued 
to open stores in the middle markets and smaller centres of 
their own regions, thus filling in gaps in these areas. 
The effect of the neighbourhood, or infilling process 
is most evident in the development of those hypermarket 
operators which have remained strongly regionalised in 
nature, such as the Docks du Nord-Mielle-Cora group in the 
North (map 7.9), and Cedis in the North East (map 7.10). 
Both of these retailers have continued to expand within 
their own distinct regions and have obtained a- high density 
of stores in these particular parts of the country. Cora's 
commitment to this form of regional strategy was reaffirmed 
in 19801 when the group attempted to consolidate their 
position in the North with an unsuccessful bid for the La 
Ruche Picarde company. 
in general, the highly regionalised nature of French 
retail firms has reinforced the neighbourhood effect, as few 
firms attempt to expand nationally on a large scale, but 
instead restrict their development to specific areas of the 
country. This tendency may offer a further explanation of 
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tile rapid growth and high density of hypermarket numbers and 
floorspace in France, as the national growth and spread of 
the hypermarket concept can, to some extent, be viewed as an 
amalgamation of a number of. rapidly developing regional 
markets. 
The widespread high density of hypermarket floorspace 
in 1982 would suggest that the natural processes of spatial 
alffusion have proceeded unhindered by the Loi Royer. The 
regional teridancies of French retaiý organisations has 
contributed to the high level of infilling of sites and the 
consequent geographical spread of the hypermarket. One can 
even argue that the Loi Royer may have indirectly reinforced 
this pattern of regional based expansion. It is likely that 
the CDUC system will have placed even further restrictions 
upon expansion outside the region where the organisation is 
based, as these Commissions might be expected to treat 
applications from an unknown "external" retailer with 
greater hostility than those from the established regional 
retai leri 
7.3. ). OWNERSHIP TRENDS 
As discussed in Chapter Four, there are several types of 
organisation operating within the French retail sector - the 
"Grandes Surfaces" organisations (GEGS), the branch 
multiples (MAS), the Cooperatives, the departitent /variety 
store groups (GM/MP), and the independents - and it is 
important to differentiate between these categories when 
considering ownership trends, as their distinct 
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characteristics have affected the way in which they have 
developed in the hyperifiarket sector. 
The proportion of bot n hypermarket floorspace aria 
number of units owned by the different organisational 
sectors has changed over ti me. Since the introduction of 
the Loi Royer, one might expect to observe a decline in the 
proportion of both numbers and floorspace owned by the large 
retailers, particularly the "Grandes Surfaces" groups, as 
the CDUCs and CNUC reinforce the position of the independent 
sector. However, this does not seem to have occurred. 
As figure 7.13 reveals, the "Grandes Surfaces" groups 
have increased their share from. around 30% of hypermarket 
floarspace in 1970 to 52.6% in 11382, whilst their share of 
the number of stores has risen from 23.5% to 41% over the 
same period (figure 7.10). Similarly, affiliated 
independents (those belonging to groups like Leclerc, Codec 
and Intermarche) have seen their ownership shares rise from 
5.2% in 1970 to nearly 18% in 1982 in terms of the number of 
units, whereas., because stores operated by independents tend 
to be small, their share of floorspace has risen more slowly 
from 3.7% to 10.9%. Much of this growth in the independent 
sector can be explained by the increased tendency of 
independent retailers entering the hypermarket sector to 
join an affiliated group, rather than to "go it alone", as 
was a more common feature of this organisational sector in 
the early years of hypermarket development. Finally, the 
Cooperative Societies have also increased their ownership 
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shares very slowly from 2.8% of hypermarket floorspace 1 ri 
19707 to 6.7% in 1982 T with a corresponding rise from 4.3% 
to 8.8% in their share of the number of outlets. 
These gains have been at the expense Of other 
organisational categories. The department /variety store 
groups have seen a rapid decline in their share of the 
hypermarket sector from 16.8% of floorspace and 14.8% of 
numbers to around 3% in both instances over the same twelve 
year period. This rapid decline is largely accounted for by 
the reorganisation which took place between Au Printemps and 
Euromarche'O (which shall be discussed later) which resulted 
in the Au Printemps hypermarkets being taken. over by 
Euromarche'* in 19767 and the sale of the Decre hypermarkets 
in the early -1970s. This decline has, however, levelled out 
since 1977, and there are signs of increased activity, both 
directly and indirectly, by this organisational category in 
the hypermarket sector over the past few years. 
The share of hypermarket floorspace controlled by 
unaffiliated independents has declined from nearly 14% in 
1970 to only 2.1% in 1982, and has been accompanied by a 
similar fall from 18.3% to -. 1%4% in the number of 
hypermarkets which they own. This decline, as suggested 
above, is largely due to the classifications used for 
analYS'S7 as most independents now join affiliated groups so 
births in this sector are now almost negligible. Finally, 
the branch multiple organisations have declined slowly from 
32.3% to 24.8% of hypermarket floorspace and from 33.9% to 
25.6% of numbers over the same periods. 
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Although, the share of hypermarket floorspace is close! y 
related ta7 and thus mirrors7 the share of the riumber of 
out lets owned by a particular organisational type, t he 
differences between these two shares is also a function of 
the size and type of hypermarkets owned. 
As one can observe from figure 7.11, the "Grandes 
Surfaces" organisations, own the largest hypermarkets., with 
an average size in excess of 6,500 square metres of sales 
space, although this figure has been declining in line with 
national trends. Similarly,, although the affiliated 
independent share of the number of hypermarkets has risen 
substantially., the corresponding rise in floorspace has been 
less spectacular as their stores tend to be smaller in size, 
with an average sales area of 3,500 square metres. The only 
organisational category to increase the average size of 
their hypermarkets over the period is the Cooperative 
Societies. 
These differences in types of store operated are 
further evident from the store profiles (figure 7.12) of 
different organisational groups. The independent 
organisations are made up almost exclusively (over 90% of 
their stores) of units falling into the smallest size 
category (2,500-4,999 square metres) compared with the 
"Grandes Surfaces" organisations, which have a much wider 
range of store types. 
Fu rt he rmo re, the independent orgarisations, already 
characterised by the ownership of satall outlets., have taken 
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an increasing share of the hypermarkets fallinq into this 
category. Howevei-7 in line with the national trend of a 
greater pro po rt ion of view store openinqs i ri t ýj 1S size 
range, the "Grandes Surfaces" groups have increased t he ir 
share of sma I ler outlets, arid consequently, the ownership 
of these small types of store relative to larger stores has 
risen within this organisational category. 
The "Grandes Surfaces" groups have also increased their 
dominance in the large store sector. This is predominantly 
due to the fact that although, fewer of these large stores 
are being built, the vast majority of those that are 
constructed belong to "Grandes Surfaces" companies. 
Within each organisational category, certain individual 
companies or retail groups may dominate (figure 7.13). in 
the "Grandes Surfaces" category Carrefour"s share of the 
stores owned by these organisations has declined relative to 
other companies, as the firm has concentrated much of it"s 
expansion abroad or in new retail sectors, whilst other 
companies such as Auchan arid Continent have made steady 
progress. In fact, the Carrefour group is not declining in 
real terms, and continues to open stores in France, but as 
the organisational category has expanded, a greater share of 
this growth has been taken by other firms. 
In the branch multiple category, the majority of 
floorspace is associated with the Paridoc centrale, ana 
trades under the Mammouth banner. Paridoc's share of 
floorspace in this category has risen from 57.4% in 1972 to 
79.1% in 1982, despite the exit of Comptoirs Modernes from 
245 
u re 7.1 Z HypermarKet Floorspace 1-ri Orgarlisational 
Categories - by Specific Firms 1972-1982. 
Company Share 
Organisation 1972 1977 1982 
------------------------------------------------------ 
"Grandes Surfaces" 100.0 100.0 100.0 
- Auchan 15.4 17.9 
- Carrefour 49.2 33.2 30.3 
- Continent 6.9 9.8 10.9 
- Euromarche" 8. "1 17.9 18.3 
Multiples 100.0 100.0 100.0 
- Casino 14.5 15.7 22.9 
- Cedis 6.9 9.3 10.7 
- Docks de France 18.7 16.20.7 
- Radar 18.7 16.4 13.2 
(Paridoc CDP) 57.4 59.3 79.0 
Affiliated Inaeo. 100.0 100.0 10O. C) 
- Leclerc 29.4 42.9 60.7 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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the centrale in 11381. As far as individual companies 1n 
this category are concerned,, Docks de Prance has halted its 
dec 1ini rig share of floorspace - largely owing t0 the 
acquisition of La Ruche Picarde, whilst from the same 
position in 1977, Radar has continued to decline in 
i typo rt ance reflecting the closure andý sale of stores under 
tile company"s rationalisation programme, and the lack of new 
growth because of the financial difficulties facing Radar 
since the acquisition of the Paris-France department store 
group in 1980. In 1984, Radar sold its hypermarket division 
to Cora. 
Finally, in the affiliated independent category, 
Leclerc has continued to dominate with over 65% of the 
outlets and 60.7% of the floorspace in this category 
affiliated to the Galec centrale and trading under the 
Leclerc banner in 1982. 
It would appear, that despite the Loi Royer with its 
intention to strengthen the position of the independent 
retailer vis a vis the large retail organisations7 the large 
retail groups have continued to grow and increased their 
dominance in the hypermarket sector. The large retail 
groups, traditionally the owners of the largest stores, are 
now themselves in response to national trends, developing 
smaller stores which will bring them into even more direct 
contact with the independent operators in the hypermarket 
sector. Fu rt he rmo re, t he noted growth in hypermarket 
ownership by affiliated independents may only be illusory, 
. 2.47 
as the growth in this category has been matched by a decline 
in the unaffiliated indepe-ridents' ownership of stores. 
7.4. CONTINUED GROWTH - SOME EXPLANATIONS 
The preceeding analysis of the stores that have opened 
would seem to suggest that hypermarket development in France 
has continued at a fairly strong pace, and that the Royer 
legislation has had only limited success in its goal of 
limiting such growth. Ever in the areas where the law seems 
to have met with some success, such as the decline in 
average size of new outlets, other explanations based upon 
changing economic factors may appear equally viable. 
Although the number of units opening each year may have 
declined7 the total number of hypermarkets and floorspace 
has continued to rise with few signs of restraint. The 
observed decline iry annual openings appears to have been 
underway before the law could have been expected to have had 
any effect. Furthermore., the number of new stores opening 
each year has remained relatively steady at around 30 units 
per year, and fluctuations in this number may be plausibly 
explained by economic factors influencing the financial and 
investment capabilities of developers. 
One might argue that "real" openings have actually 
declined more than is apparent 7 because of 
the greater 
proportion of new units created by "upgrading" or extending 
sma IIer st o res. However, this trend may be explained by 
factors other than the impact of the CDUCs and CNUC- 
The 
increased involvement of affiliated independents in the 
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mypermarket sector may accoLint for a growth in the number of 
upgraded url its7 and simi larly this form of deve 1o pryient 
becomes more attractive to other types of organisation as 
regional saturation approaches, forcing up the development 
cost of the remaining sites. 
Other trends such as the declining average size of new 
stores may also be explained in terms of rises in costs, the 
movement towards smaller markets with reduced catchment 
areas, and the increased participation of affilated 
independents in hypermarket development. 
The law also appears to have had little impact upon 
ownership patterns. The "Grandes Surfaces" organisations, 
the groups which the law hoped to restrict, have maintained 
or increased their dominance in the hypermarket sector. 
Those larger retailers who appear to have lost their 
positions in the sector have done so for a variety of 
reasons. The decline of the department /variety store 
category may be attributed to the statistical quirk of the 
Au Printemps-Euromarcheo' deal as well as to the general 
decline of these organisations, in the retail sector as a 
whole. Similarly, the slight decline of the branch multiple 
category is in part due to the highly fragmented nature of 
this grouping7 with some of the smaller multiples becoming 
acquisition targets for the "Grandes Surfaces" 
organisations, and due to the tendancy for some companies, 
such as Guyenne et Gascogne and Comptoirs Modernes, to 
develop hypermarkets through their joint subsidiary 
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companies with Carrefour rather trian by themselves. As t he 
management avid strategy of these subsidiaries is controlled 
by Carrefour, t hese units are attributed to the "Granoes 
Surfaces" firm. 
The one apparent success whicti could be attributed to 
t he Royer legislation is the growth of the affiliated 
independent organisations. This would seem to suggest 
greater opportunity for the independent to develop in the 
hypermarket sector. However, when one takes into account 
the decline of the unaffiliated independents, this rise in 
influence . may only reflect a rise in affiliations. 
Consequently, growth may be illusory as the total 
independent share of hypermarket developments has remained 
roughly constant. 
Furthermore, this growth whether real or illusory may 
be silently welcomed by the "Grandes. Surfaces" 
organisations., as these independent stores become prime 
takeover targets., particularly if the independent is 
unaffiliated. There may be some substance to this claim, as 
the acquisition of both smaller companies and individual 
units has become an increasingly common feature of the 
development strategies of the larger retailers. in 
addition, the growth of affiliated independents may pose a 
threat to the unaffiliated independents who now find a new 
highly organised competitor within their own organisational 
category. 
The continued growth of the hypermarket sector and the 
increasing dominance of the "Grandes-Surfaces" organisations 
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within this sector, may find some explanation in two 
noticable t rends which have grown in st rengt n since t tie 
introduction of the Loi Royer. The rise in the importance 
of both acquisitions and the ext ension of existing units, 
in company strategy suggests that these methods of expansion 
are being increasingly employed to counter any effects that 
the CDUCs and CNUC may have had on development. Both of 
these tactics have also become more attractive as economic 
factors have forced up the costs of developing new units. 
The CDUCs and CNUC have no control over either company or 
store takeovers, and, as shall be shown later, there is 
evidence to suggest that applications made to the 
commissions for extensions to existing outlets have a 
greater chance of receiving authorisation than applications 
for new hypermarkets. These two trends also imply the 
approach of saturation, or at least a scarcity of 
favourable sites, particularly at a regional level, a 
feature which has been reinforced by the regional expansion 
policies followed by many companies. 
Takeovers, defined in this analysis as the acquisition 
of 50% or more of the share capital of a company, have 
become a common feature of the hypermarket sector since 1976 
(figure 7.14). These takeovers take the form of both the 
acquisition of individual units, usually from independent 
retailers and small companies, and the takeover of larger 
retail groups, quite often with a diversified raticie 0f 
activities in addition to their hYPermarket operations. 
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Figure 7.14 : Total Number of Hypermarkets Taken over 
1971-1982. 
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The acquisition of La Ruche Picarde by Docks de France 
in 19807 and the absorption of Soracma. by Carrefour in 1976 
ilave aiready been mentioned. in addition, Auchan absobed 
its small sudsidiary companies Lemaire in 1975 aria Bonprix 
in 1977; Cedis took over Econamiques Troyeris Docks Reunis in 
1977, and the GEM hypermarkets of the Goulet Turpin group 
became Euromarche'o stores in 1978. 
One of the major takeover and reorganisation episodes 
in the hypermarket sector was the Au Printemps-Euromarche 
deal of 1976. In 1972, EuromarchS took over the management 
of the Au Printemps hypermarkets which operated under the 
Escale tradename, and the two companies formed a joint 
subsidiary, Euro-Expansion, to develop new hypermarkets 
under the Euromarche'00' banner. In 1976, Euromarchie followed 
through an option to buy out the Au Printemps hypermarkets 
and the Au Printemps share in Euro-Expansion which was 
proposed in the- 1972 deal. In return, Au Printemps became a 
shareholder in Euromiarcht, retaining 24.3% of the capital. 
This deal has been referred to previously in this chapter as 
a statistical quirk, for although the department /variety 
store group sold their stores, they have retained an 
interest in the hypermarket sector, albeit indirectly. 
There have also been several unsuccessful takeover 
attempts which would have had considerabl. e impact upon the 
ownership structure of the hypermarket sector. In December 
1972, Carrefour attempted to absorb all its joint subsidiary 
companies (Sogara, Sogramo, GSD, and Soracma) and in 197-3 
tried to purcýiase the franchised stores owned by Cora. 1 
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1.9797 t he Docks 01.1 Nord-Mielle-Cora group indirectly 
acquired 4 share in Radar7 through a 10% holding (raised to 
2) 521% by 198 1 in Revillorl Freres, Who controlled -Z', '*', % of Raciar 
in 1982. The battle for Radar"s hypermark-ets intensified in 
1982 when Carrefour took a ', L-'% share in Radar, avid Galeries 
Lafayette, the department /variety store group wnich owns 
the SCA centrale and Monoprix hypermarkets acquired a J. 0% 
share7 which was raised to 25% by 196Z. This saga was 
finally concluded in April 1984, when Radar agreed to sell 
its hypermarket division to the Cora group. 
The importance of takeovers is illustrated in fi gure 
7.157 which shows that in 1977 more hypermarkets and 
floorspace exchanged hands than were opened. in the period 
1977 to 198117 there were half as many takeovers as there 
were new units opened. This implies that for same firms 
expansion through acquisition is as viable as conventional 
expansion by the opening of new stores. 
When the nature of takeovers is examined (figure 7.16), 
one can see that the "Grandes Surfaces" organisations have 
been the g reatest beneficiari. eS7 which may explain their 
continued growth relative to other organisational categories 
in the hypermarket sector. The independent category has 
been the most vulnerable and lost the most stores. The 
maj ar it y of t hese, outlets belonged ta unaffiliated 
independent retailers. The branch multiple organisations 
have been the greatest exponents 
strategy7 
of the acquisition 
but as they 'have tended to take over competitors 
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gure7. j. 5 Importance of Tai<eovers in tne r-y, 2er, yarKet 
Sector 11971-1982'. 
(Numoer) Ratios (: -'loorspace) 
Number of iakeovers Takeovers 
Year Takeovers i\4ew Un 1ts New Un 1ts 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1971 C). 06 
1972 0.05 0.04 
1973 2 0.04 O. (DE 
1974 Z 0.08 0.09 
1975 9 0.53 0.60 
1976 1 0.30 0.34 
--"8 1977 %j 1.05 1.47 1978 17 0.89 0.68 
1979 15 0.56 0.68 
1980 24 0.92 1.26 
1981 8 0.2.4 0.20 
1982 7 0.21 0.18 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 7.16 Orgarlisatiovis involved in Take Overs 1971- 
1982. 
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in their own organisational category they have -iost mo re 
stores than they have gained. Of the 5-. S7 gairis and 58 losses 
i-n ttie brancri multiple category, *33 have been tne result of 
intra-category deals between multiple firms7 such as the 
acquisition of La Ruche Picarde and Cofradel by Docks de 
France. 
Further reference to figures 7.14 and 7-15, reveals 
that there has been a reduction in the number of takeovers 
in the past few years, which can be attributed to the 
general financial recession, and-the fact that the most 
susceptible stores and companies have been taken over. The 
growth in the number of affiliated independents has done 
much to enhance the survival of the independent hypermarket 
operator. 
The growing proportion of new hypermarkets that result 
from upgraded supermarkets and other retail outlets suggests 
an increase in the use of extensions as a means of expanding 
floorspace. Parallel to this trend, there has been 
considerable extension of existing floorspace amongst those 
hypermarkets already built (figure 7.17A and B). 
The 233 exten, _sý- ions that 
have been made to existing 
hypermarkets between 1968 and 1982 has added 324,200 square 
metres of sales area. Over the same period, 115,751 square 
metres of sales space was lost owing to rationalisation 
programmes carried out on existing stores. Ca nseq uent 1 y, 
there has been a net addition of 208,449 square metres to 
the existing' stock of hypermarket floorspace. Allowing 
for 
an average size of hypermarket of 5,000 square metres 
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Figure 7.17A : Thtal Number of Extensions to Existing 
Hypermarkets 1968-1982. 
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Figure 7.17B : Total Floorspace of Extensicns to Existing 
X105 
Hypermarkets 1968-1982. 
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(higher than the average area of new outlets opening since 
1978) this mearis that the equivalent of 41 new stores nas 
been added in the form of floorspace extensions to existing 
units. it is noticable that tile majority of this additional 
floorspace has been added since 1974. 
Usually it is the smallest size category of 
hypermarkets (2,500-4,999 square metre) which have been 
enlarged in this way. Over 50% of all the extensions fall 
into this category. A further 25% of'the extensions fall 
into the next size category (5,000-7,4913 square metres). Of 
all the extensions7 134 or 57.5% have not resulted in the 
store changing size categories, and 58% of the stores which 
have been extended have remained in the smallest size 
category following the addition of new floorspace. Of those 
hypermarkets which have charged size categories after the 
addition of more sales area, 44% have changed from the 
smallest (27500-4v999) to the medium size (57000-7., 499) 
category. 
The use of extensions (figure 7.18) is again dominated 
by the "Grandes Surfaces" organisations7 reflecting their 
sectoral dominance in terms of the number and floorspace of 
hypermarkets that they own. InterestinglY7 the branch 
multiple groups have taken an increasing share of the 
extensions completed, and as the number of extensions has 
risen7 this signifies a real 7 not merely relative, 
gain. 
This trend suggests that the muItipl'e organisations may be 
concentrating their resources on rationalisation and 
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Figure 7.18 Organisational Use of Extensions 
Orc3anisation 19 7 *@-: -' 
Proportion of Total Extensions 
N um be r 
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refurbishment of existing units, at the expense of new ones, 
possibly reflecting site sat u rat i on in their C3 1 St 1 rICt 
regional markets. This explanation would also go same, way 
to explain tne slow aecline of the yo , groups' share of Alt iý)!, 
the total number of hypermarkets and hypermarket floorspace 
in France. 
The use and importance placed upon the extension of 
existing units depends not only on the companies i nvest merit 
strategy, but also upon the number and size of existing 
stores in a de6partement and the attitude towards this type 
of development of the relevant CDUC. In some areas, 
notably Brittany and the departements to the east of the 
Paris region, the number of extensions has equalled, and 
often exceeded, the numbe, r of new- stares opened in that 
100 departement. 
The importance of extension floorspace in relation to 
new floorspace is naturally less pronounced owing to the 
differences in size 'between the two types af development. 
However,, a similar spatial pattern emerges of areas where 
the floorspace added through extensions is significant when 
compared to new hypermarket floorspace. These spatial 
patterns relate to the specific conditions prevailing within 
each deopartement, and need to be examined in the light of 
applications for different types of development made to the 
departement CDUC, before any great significance can be 
attributed to them. 
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7.5. SUMMARY 
This analysis of the trends in hypermarket development 
suggests that the Loi Royer has hao little impact i. Ai: )on t he 
rate and type of new developments. The total number of 
hypermarkets arid total hypermarket floorspace has continued 
to grow, and any noted decline in these features may be 
explained by a number of factors relating to changing 
economic conditions and their effects, particularly upon 
costs; the strong regional nature of the retail trade in 
France; and changes in ownership patterns, as well as by any 
impact that the Loi Royer may have had. 
The natural diffusion of the hypermarket concept 
throughout France has continued with little apparent 
interference from the Loi Royer, and high densities of 
hypermarket floorspace have, become widespread. The CDUCs 
may even, by placing more potential obstacles in front of 
national expansion strategies, have in fact encouraged the 
traditional regional concentration of many of the large 
retailers, which has done much to reinforce the 
neighbourhood process of diffusion and the consequent 
infiling of sites in the various regions. 
The use of different methods of expansion such as 
the acquisition of competitors and the extension of existing 
units has helped to maintain growth, especially the growth 
of the large retail organisations. The Royer legislation 
has been either unable (in the case of acquisitions) or has 
seemed unwilling (in the case of extensions) to combat these 
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rorms of expansion, thus negating any impact that the CDUCs 
ff, ay have had on overall growth patterns. 
Consequently, in terms of the hypermarkets that have 
opened t he position of the independents has not been 
noticably improved, and if anything has c3eteriorated. There 
are signs that in line with national trends, the larger 
retai 1 groups a re developing smal ler hypermarkets, 
previously the domain of 
"the independent hypermarket 
operator. This trend may well restrict the opportunities 
for the traditional independent to enter the hypermarket 
sector,, whilst the appearance of a growing affiliated 
independent sector could present new problems for the 
traditional independent trader. 
IL 
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CHAPTER EIGHT : THE COMMISSIONS DEPARTEMENTPL D' URSANISME 
COMMERCIAi 
mo re comprenensive assesstyierit of the imoact of t he 
Loi Royer on hypermarket develoo, yierl-C 1 Yl F rance lylay be 
obtained from analysis Of the applications made to both the 
CDUCs and CNUC for retail outlets. This exercise reveals 
the nature and quantity of proposed oevelopments and gives 
so me impression of the proportion arid types of projects 
which the legislation may have effected. In addition., any 
changes observed in the characteristics of the-applications 
will give an indication of the different strategies pursued 
developers, either in response to the economic 
environment or in a bid to oýutryiarioeuvre the CDUCs arid CNUC. 
By combining information an the results of CDUC and 
CNUC meetings published in Libre Service Actualite'Os and 
Points de Vente, a detailed list of applications was 
constructed. This data base revealed -the de"Opartement and 
, proposed pro lect, 
the name of the location (commune) of the %J 
applicant7 the composite parts of the project in terms of 
sales area, the date and decision of the CDUC and7 if 
applicable7 the CNUC decision. 
As with any secondary data base, considerable reliance 
must be placed upon the accuracy of the original ci at a. it 
was ho oed that by comoirling I tne information from t ýie two 
separate origi na 1 sources many discrepancies could be 
resolved. The resulting list of applications does, 
however, differ from the official summary lists of projects, 
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pu .oI is hed by the tylinist ry of Commerce anG Crafts in 
arinua 1 
t tie 1r 
report to Parliament on the aol: )Ilcatic)rl of t he Lo 1 
I Hoyer. i hese SUmma ry Ii st sprod uced by t he Mini st ry co rit ai ri 
ayl element of double counting, as each 1ndivIdual comporient 
of an application is recorded separately in t he u ty, mary 
sheets. For ex am pie, a proposal for a commercial cent i, e 
containing a hypermarket as the main magnet store., but with 
I 
TY a furniture/household goods store, a DI outlet and a number 
of boutiques in the same centre is registered as four 
separate applications on the official summary sheets. Yet 
in reality, only one multi-type dossier was presented to 
the CDUC for consideration. 
In the rev i sed data base used in this study, atl 
application of this nature is recorded as a hypermarket 
based project. Si ty, iIa rl y, a proposal for a commercial 
centre in which a DIY store is the principal element, is 
recorded as a DIY unit application- Each application is, 
therefore7 recorded by it7 s principal component only. This 
met hod, it is felt, gives a more accurate indication of the 
type and volume of applications for retail development that 
have been placed in front of the CDUCs and CNUC. 
The re is also some variation in the number of 
applications made each year between the official statistics 
arid the revised data base upon whicýi this analysis is based. 
These differences are caused primariLy by discrepancies in 
recording proposals for development made at the the end of 
t he year. T he problem is further compounded t he ti lyle 
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delay oet ween an application being lodged wit ht he 
commissions and a decision. In some cases it Is unclear as 
to -wtiether the information publishea in LSA Ol- Points de 
Vent e refers t0 the bate of applicatiot-, or t tie date 0f 
deci si On. This can cause differences between the two 
sources particularly for applications made at the tu rn of 
the year. 1 ri order to atinimise the effects of these 
problems most trevids in this analysis have been viewed over 
a three year period. 
8.1. THE CDUCs AND APPLICATIONS FOR MAJOR NEW STORES 
The number of applications for major retail 
developments made to the CDUCs between 1975 and 1982' are 
shown, classified by the major element of the proposal, in 
figure 8.1. The presentation of data in LSA means that the 
1974 figures for furniture/household goods stores,, 
department and variety stores, DIY stores and boutique 
developments are not comparable with those given for later 
years. Co nseq uent 1y7 IChe early figures have been omitted. 
The high number of applications made for other types 
developments, such as those for hypermarket (116) and 
supermarket (114) based projects, does, however7 suggest 
that the total number of applications falling into these 
categories in 1974 would have been high. This is to be 
expected as developers tried out the new, and unt est ed, 
regulat i ons. 
From 1975, -I, -, he total number of all applications made to 
the ODUCs each year exhibits a slow decline until 1980, wner' 
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t he re was a soectacular rise in the mumber of Proposals. 
T he snarp rise in the riumber of projects placed oefore T; tie 
CDUCs in 1980 is largely due to an increase in trie riumoer of 
proposals piaced for the construction of the large area 
retail out lets - hypermarkets, furniture/household goods 
stores7 and DIY stores. The most likely explanation for 
this rise is the approaching presidential elections of 1961, 
for as shall be shown in Chapter Teti there is evidence to 
suggest that elections have had a significant effect lApon 
the behaviour of the CDUCs and CNUC. Since 1981, the steacy 
downward trend in the total number of applications has 
reasserted itself. 
The overall success rate for all types of major 
applications has remained fairly steady at around 32%, after 
failing from about 50% in the first few years of the 
legislation. There is an indication that the success rate 
has started to rise since 1981, but it is too early at 
present to confirm this trend. The resulting overall low 
success rate for applications at the CDUC stage might 
suggest that the Royer legislation has seriously curtailed 
new retail developments in France, considering that less 
than a third of all proposals made to the CDUCs since 1977 
have been authorised by these Commissions. 
Geographically, as map B. I illustrates, applications 
for large retail developments (excluding bo ut iq 1-te 
based 
. 40 
projects) are concentrated upon the departements Contairling 
t he maj orur ba ri settlements, rialylely Paris a"d 
t he Lio i re 
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Map 8.1 : CDUCs - Applications for Major Retail DeveloFrient 
1975-1982. 
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valley, the Rnone valley, Alsace-Lorraine and tne North, the 
marsei I le, 101-tiol-Ise an bOI'C3(=-al-(X I-eC]Jorls arid Brittany. 7 
i he spat lal dist ribut i on of success rat es for a 11 
app! I cat ions reflects the overall low acceptance rat e0f 
lop projects by t he CDUCs. In on. 1y 24 aeparrements is -c he 
acceptance rate above 50%. and these areas largely coinci-de 
with areas where relatively few applications were made. Of 
the 35 departements in which over 21 applications for 
development based upon large retail units were placed before 
the CDUCs,, only 6 show a success rate of over 50%. The two 
departements in which the success rate was- 100%v Creuse 
(23) and Gers (32) 7 received only one application each. 
The highest number of accepted proposals CZIG) was in the 
Nord departement (59)., where 7-, '; F applications for new retail 
development were made -a success rate of just under 50%. 
Fu rt he rmo re, in the other six doepartements in which twenty 
or more projects were authorised by the CDUCs, only in 
Bouches-du-Rhorie (13) did this represent a success rate 1n 
excess of 60%. 
There is no apparent correlation between the political 
colour of the departement and the success rates of 
aPPI 'Cat 'OnS7 suggesting that retail development is not an 
issue which raises the traditional left versus right 
po 1 it ical cotif ront at 1 on.. The decision would then seem to 
hinge on local condition, 57 inclucjing local persona L it ies, 
and there are no particular de pa rt ement sin whictl 
autilorisations could be said to be easily obtained. 
The higri numbers. or applications made each year points 
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t0a ce rt ain ove rsubsc rI pt Io ri 0f part icuia r types o 
proposais, wi«un success oLpiýIC oýI a perceýI-tage bas , 
through excessive numbers of appijcatlotls. T r, i is 7no weve r, 
is the overall Dicture for all types of app1icaulorls fall, rIg 
i. inder the juristiction of the CDLJCs. and it is reasonaole to 
assume, gi veVI t he dif fering Mtmbers of Proposals f0r 
different types of development 7 that certain types of 
application will receive different treatment by the CDUCs 
than others. 
8.1. Boutique Based Projects 
Of the 94 applications made for boutique based projects 
between 1975 and 1982,6-, -; rp were authorised by the CDUCs. 
This success rate of 67% is the highest for any of the major 
retai 1d eve 1o pmerit s. As figure 8.2 shows7 the number of 
applications made each year for this type of project fel 11 
f rom 1978 (15) to 1981 (4), but 198.2 heralded an upturn 
(12). 
The success rate for boutique based developments has 
fluctuated and exhibits no apparent long term trends. 
However, as these types of projects are generally proposed 
or at least supported by, arid provide opportunities f0r, 
collective groups of the more progressive (and influential) 
local independent traderS7 it is interesting to note the 
high success rates for these projects in the years of t he 
iocal departementai council elections, namely 1976 (70-6%. ), 
1979 (70%) and 1982 (58.3%). 
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1. Department and Variety Store Based Projects 
The a epart ment and variety storE? companies . nave . ýl a0 
some disappointlng experiences wit h comme rc 1 a! cent re 
d eve l opment s, particularly in the Pal-Is regjol. 1, wriere La 
Samaritaine withdrew f rom the Duatre Temps regional shopping 
cent re7 and Au Printemps. left Creteii Soleil. These events 
seem to be reflected in the number of applications made to 
the CDUCs for this type of project. From 9 and 8 
applications per year in 1975 and 19767 now only the 
occasional application is made (figure 8.2). 
Twelve or 42.9% of the 28 applications made to the 
CDUCs for this type of development between 1975 and 1982 
have been authorised. The low number of applications 
involved makes. any attempt at identifying long teriyt trends 
in the success rate for projects based upon department and 
variety stores a rather futile exercise. 
8-1.31. DIY Store Based Projects 
The proportion of all applications which are for D1Y 
store based developments has been increasing slowly from 
1978. In the 1976 to 1978 period around 11 proposals per 
year were made to the CDUCs for projects of this nature. 
Since 1978 the number of annual app-lications has risen by 
almost 10 units per annum to 47 in 198.22, (figure 8.3). This 
type of proposal had an overall success rate of 4E. 9% over 
the 1975-1982 period7 although the sucess rate fell f rom 
around 60% in the mid 1970s7 to a stable 433% in the early 
1980S. 
Proposals for development based upon a DIY store is a 
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Figure 8.2 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Boutiques and 
Department Stores. 
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Figure 8.3 : CDUCS - Applications based upon Furniture/ 
Household Goods and DIY Stores. 
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relat ively new innovat i on7 when comparea witri t he ot he r 
projects dealt with by ttie CDUCs. The geographical spread 
of ttlis type of loroject (mao illustrates týie yoI. JthfIjI 
stage reached in the retail life cycle by this inrovation7 
as it is lightly represented 1nte rms of numbers 0f 
app! icat i Otis, wit h the most concert rated numbers of 
proposals made in some of the major settlement departements, 
tiotably the Paris region, Bouches-du-Rhorie 1 %30 )7 Gironde 
(33), and Marne-et-Loire (49). The larae numbers of 
.4 
departements where no applications have yet been made again 
re 1. at es to the youthful stage of this form of development, 
as these areas are predominantly the secondary markets in 
terms of population density. There is still ample 
opportunity for the DIY based projects to develop in the 
maj or cent res, so there is no need for this retail 
innovation to penetrate these secondary areas at present. 
The spatial pattern of success rates shows predomina'ntly 
high (in excess of 50%) success rates, with 16 dCapartements 
where all the applications we're accepted. These high 
success rates partly relate to the low numbers of 
applications made, and to the low saturation levels of the 
DIY store based project. 
8.1.4. Furniture/Household Goods Store Based Projects 
A similar type of development to the projects focused 
upon DIY stores are those centred upon a furriture/household 
goods outlet. However, this type of project is at a 
much later stage of development in the retail life cycle. 
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-Map 
8.2 : CDUCs - Applications based upon DIY Stores 1975-1982. 
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I, tie large numbers of applications made for projects of tnis 
riature in the mid i970sq? declined in the latter part of ttie 
c3ecac3e7 on! Y to increase rai. oicjiy again in the eariy `3 8 (--) S 
'7 (figure 8.. )). The average size of the magnet store in these, 
appl icat 1 on-S has risen steadily from around 2? 400 sq ua re 
metres of sales area in 1975, to 3,00C) sqUare met res in 
1982. Over the same period 7 however, the success rate for 
these types of project has fallen from approximately 65% to 
45%. In all 7 57.8% of all the applications based upon 
furniture/household goods outlets have been authorised by 
the CDUCs. 
The later stage in the retail life cycle that this form 
of development occupies, compared with the DIY based 
projects can be seen by referring to the geographical spread 
of applications (map 8.3). As was the case with proposals 
focused upon DIY stores, the greatest concent rat i on of 
applications for this form of development are located in the 
densely populated de'o'partements. However,, the more advanced 
stage of the f4rniture/household goods based projects is 
revealed by a far greater infilling of applications in the 
secondary market areas than was evident for the those 
focused upon DIY outlets. 
The areas where this type of application has achieved a 
100% success rate are exclusively the secondary market 
. ao aepartements, where a limited number of proposals have been 
made. In addition, the success rate in departements where 
over 10 applications were made, the Alsace region, the Noro 
(59), and Finistere (29). has also been high, at over 5('. )% 
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Map 8.3 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Furniture/Household C, 
Goods Stores 1975-1982. 
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and reaching 75% in Finistere. These high success rat es 
achieved in departements where the most applications were 
, Y, ad e, suggests that the furniti-tre/householO gooos based 
developments, whilst being mo re widespread thar, -C hose 
cent e red upon DIY stores., have not yet ac hIe, ved t he 
saturation levels reached by those projects that are based 
upon hypermarkets, which obtain low acceptance rates in 
the areas where they make the most applications owing to the 
widespread occurrance of hypermarkets throughout these 
areas. 
8.1.5. Supermarket Based Projects 
The number of applications made to the CDUCs each year 
for projects based upon supermarkets fell slowly between 
1974 and 19777 and then stabilized at a figure of around '155 
proposals per year (figure 8.4). More importantly., however, 
after falling from 26.6% in 1975, to 13J. 1% in 1980, t he 
proportion of all applications for major retail developments 
that involve supermarkets, has risen steadily to 18.9% in 
1982. 
This suggests an increasing emphasis placed upon this 
type of project by retail developers. As noted in the 
previous chapter, there has been a marked increase in the 
number of new hypermarkets opened by upgrading or extending 
supermarkets. The increased use of this tactic is oorne out 
by the average size of the applications made to the 
CDUCS 
for supermarket developments, which has risen from a 
iow of 
1,350 sq ua re metres of sales area in 1976/77 
to over 
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Figure 8.4 : CDUCS - APPlicatiOns based upOn Supermarkets. 
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1,850 square metres in 1982 (figure 8.5A). This represents 
an increase in the average sl--:, e of this type of a 13 ý3 1.1 cat lorl 
of -56% over the five year period. 
The i tic rease in average size is due largely to the 
greater proportion of all supermarket applications that fail 
into the 2,000 square metres and above size category (figure 
8.5B) - which has risen to 40% of supermarket applications 
since 1979. At the same ti me, the p ro po rt ionof 
applications in the less than 1,000 , square metres size 
category., applications in which the whole development is 
above the thresholds of the CDUC., ever though the 
supermarket component may fall below the size thresholds7 
has fallen to less than 10%. This relative change has been 
brought about by a decline in the number of sma 11 
supermarket projects., rather than by any spectacular rise in 
the number of large supermarket applications. Despite this, 
these trends do suggest that in the most recent years, 
developers have been applying for larger supermarkets, 
possibly to provide a base from which to extend the 
floorspace to hypermarket status. 
This trend in development strategy may reflect the 
ýiigher success rates attributed to supermarket applications, 
which over the 1974 to 1982 period stands at 47.8%, when 
compared to the lower success rates achieved by hypermarket 
Proposals. Just as important, the increasing proportion of 
large supermarket applications since 1979, cDincides with an 
upturn in the success rate for supermarket proposals, which 
had previously been declining from over 50% in 1975 to under 
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Figure 8-5A : CDUCs - Average Size of Supermarket Applications. 
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Figure 8.5B : CDUCs - Supermarket Applications by Size 
Categories. 
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in 1979 ffigure 8.4). 
Geog rapnical !y (map 8.4) aPP- icat ions f or t fils type of 
deve 1o pmerit we re made in all but 10 c6partements with t he 
greatest rumber of proposals again concentrated in the 'Y' C) St 
densly populated de" part ement s. The areas witti the highest 
acceptance rates generally correspond with those areas where 
five or fewer applications were made7 although in the Nord 
(59), Gi ronde (33)7 and Meurthe et Moselle (54) 
departeitents, where over 10 applications were made, the 
acceptance rate exceeded 50%. 
8.1.6. HypermarKet Based Projects 
Of all the various types of proposals for retail 
developments centered upon large area stores placed before 
the CDUCs between 1977 and 1980, approximately half of these 
applications were for projects based upon hypermarkets. 
Prior to these dates, hypermarket applications accounted for 
30% of the total number of proposals, and in 1981 and 1982 
this share again fell to around 42%. 
This underlying decline in the importance of 
hypermarket applications in relation to other types of 
development in the 1980s, particularly in view of the 
greater importance being placed upon large supermarket based 
projects7 would again seem to indicate a change in 
application strategy on the part of the developers. The 
saturation of existing hypermarket un itsint he iy, a jo r 
markets forcing developers to look towards smaller markets, 
coupled with the increasing number of applications 
for 
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Map 8.4 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Supermarkets 
1974-1982. 
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rly pe rma rK et s made by t he i ride pericent sect o r. fu rt me r 
supp a r-c 9t he suggestion that a subtle chanae in t he 
C3 . eveiapment strategy of food store deveiopers is underway. 
1 ri pure numerical terms tile aemanc f C))- hy pe riya rK et 
sites has remained fairly constant at around 90 applications 
per year since 11377, with the exception of a rapid rise in 
ttie number of projects placed before the CDUCs in 19801P 
prior to the presidential election (figure 8.6). It was 
commented upon earlier in this chapter; that in view of the 
low success rates obtained by certain types of applications, 
developers might make excessive numbers of proposals to 
counter these low acceptance rates. These high numbers of 
hypermarket applications would appear to support this 
assertion, as the country could clearly riot support an 
additional 90 store openings per year. 
The average size of the hypermarket element of these 
applications has remained fai. rly constant over the study 
period (figure 8.7A). In the first year of the new 
regulations the average size of the hypermarket element was 
just under 6,500 square metres of sales area. This fell to 
5,770 square metres in 1975, and has fluctuated around the 
5,500 square metres mark since, reaching 5,337 square metres, 
in 1982. The hypermarket element generally accounts for 
approximately 60% of the floorspace i Y1 the whole 
application. 
if the 
hypermarkets 
2,500-4 7 '3913 a, 
applications for projects based upon 
are classified into four size categories of 
5,7000-71499; 7,500-9,999; and over 10,000 
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Figure 8-. 6 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets. 
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Figure 8.7A : CDUCS - Average Size of Hypermarket Applications. 
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Figure 8-7B : CDUCS - Hypermarket Applications by Size 
Categories. 
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square met res of sales area,, a clearer oi ct u re of t he 
cnarlOeS occurring amongst ttle applications mac3e for tnis type 
of development from this exercise ffig, ure 8.7B). Firstly, a 
aecline a cc ur red, i Y1 the first few yea rs 0ft tie i aws 
existence, in the proportion of applications that were basec 
upon hypermarkets which involved a very large un it (over 
10,000 square metres) as the' magnet store. This trend no 
doubt reflects the increased costs of development7 and the 
saturation in the large markets required to support a Unit 
of this magnitude. SecondlY7 there has been an overall rise 
in the proportion of applications centered upon hypermarkets 
in which the hypermarket element of the proposal fell into 
the smallest category (2,500-47 999 square metres), 
particularly since 1979. This post 1979 trend appears to 
have occurred at the expense of those applications which 
v involved a hypermarket proposal which fell into the large 
(7,500-9,99*3 square metres of sales space) size category. 
Both of these trends reveal a move from applications 
involving large hypermarket developments to smaller stores, 
reinforcing the assertion that a change is occurring in the 
development strategy of the food store developers. 
Over the 1974-1982 period, only 172 or 20.9% of the 840 
applications made for retail development focused an 
hypermarkets., were authorised by the CDUCs. This represents 
by far the lowest success rate for any type of new major 
retail project. The success rate for this type of proposal 
declined over the first half of the study period, reaching a 
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low of 13.6% in 1978) the year of elections to the National 
Assembly, and then recovered slowly in the 
(figure 8.8A). 
early 198C)s 
The average size of those proposals co tit a in i rig 
hypermarket projects that were authorised by the CDUCs, 
closely mirrors the average size of all applications that 
were made for this type of development as does the average 
size of rejected applications. Although those applications 
which were authorised did tend to be slightly smaller than 
the average size for all proposals of this type, and only 
exceeded this average figure twice, in 1977 and 1980. The 
authorised projects also tended to contain a slightly 
smaller hypermarket element (58% of the total area) than was 
the average for all applications of this nature. 
Although 50% of all applications made to the CDUCs 
based upon hypermarkets, contained a hypermarket element 
that fell into the small size category (2,500-4,999 square 
metres), it is interesting to note that, when the medium 
(three year) trends are analysed (figure S. BB)., the success 
rate for this category, and for the medium size category 
(5,, 000-7,, 499 square metres) fell below that for the large 
size category (7,500-9,999 square metres) between 1978 and 
1980. 
If the composition of the applications for this type of 
development is analysed by the type of firm making the 
proposal (figure 8.9), one can see that the majority of 
applications are made by t he "Grandes Su rf aces " 
organisations (38% over the study period), whilst the number 
28R 
Figure 8.8 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets. 
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and proportion of all hypermarket proposals put forward by 
t he independent retailers has risen noticably since 1978. 
This latter t rend provides further explanation for the 
increased proportion of smaller hypermarket applications 
made towards the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, as 
the average size of the hypermarket element in the proposals 
made by the independent retailers has tended to be 
approximately 1,000 square metres smaller than tile average 
size for all projects. The share of all hyperotarket based 
applications made by the branch multiple groups has remained 
relatively constant over the 1975-1982 period, but with a 
slow decline from 1978. 
As figure 8.10A reveals, over 70% of the applications 
made by the independent firms fell into the small (27500- 
4,999 square oretres) size category, compared with only 
27.8% of the projects proposed by the "Grandes Surfaces" 
organisations. Conversely, on 1y 19.8% and 6.9% of the 
independent sponsored applications were in the 5,000-7,499 
and 7,500-9,999 square metres size categories respectively, 
whilst 37.1% of the "Grandes Surfaces" applications fell 
into the fomer medium size category and 23.9% in the latter 
large category. 
These total figures for the 1974 to 1982 period, 
disguise some distinct trends in organisation oevelopment 
strategy over the period (figure 8.10B). The proportion of 
app Ii cat ions for hypermarket based projects made 
by t he 
independent organisations each year, which fall 
into the 
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Figure S. 10A. CDLJCs - Hypermarket ApplLications by Size 
Category and Type of Organisation (1,374- 
1982 Period). 
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small (", 500-4,999 square metres) size category has steacily 
riselrl over the study period. Whilst the proportion of all 
applications made by the branch multiple firms, Wilch fa 11 
irit 0t his size category has declined d ramat i ca 11 y. This 
decline is due as much t0 the increased number of 
appl icat i ons made by the multiple groups for 1a rge r sized 
stores, as to any reduction in the number of smaller 
projects placed before the CDUCs by these organisations. 
In the 1977 to 1978 period,, the "Grandes Surfaces" 
o rganisat ions increased the number of applications which 
they made for medium sized stores (57 000-7,499 square 
metres), resulting in a sharp rise in the proportion of all 
their applications which fell into this particular size 
category. This feature, along with the aecline in the 
proportion of proposals made for large (7,500-9,999 square 
metres) and very large (10,000 plus square metres) outlets 
in the total number of applications made by the "Grandes 
Surfaces" groups, reveals a trend in this organisational 
category towards the development of smaller units than has 
traditionally been the case. Interestingly, the branch 
multiple groups appear to be going against this tendency to 
apply for smaller hypermarkets, and an increasing proportion 
of all the proposals made by these types of companies has 
fallen into the large size category (7,500-9,999 sq ua re 
(Yiet res) . 
There also appears to be some difference in the 10 r1C3 
term trends exhibited in the success rates enjoyed by 
different organisatlonal types (figure 8.11). The 
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Figure 8.11'. CDUC; s - Success Rate of Hype rona rket 
Applications oy Organisational Type. 
Success Rate M 
year running mean) 
Organisation 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 ! 981 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
"Grandes 
Su'rf aces 3 2.171 '4-., 4.6 17.1 16.1 16.7 i7.9 
Multiples 23.5 3; 1.0 19.16.1 1 -Z'. 2 155.4 8.4 
Independents -: ) 1.023.2,2 4.9 2 1.9 28 . 14.4 
All 'A". 7. '5' 23.6 18.1 16.6 17. -2- 17.9 19.4 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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aijt ho ri sat ion rat es 0f appIlcations made by G randes 
Surfaces" fi rms closely mirrors the trends evident in t he 
overal 1 success rates -for all based proposals. 
i ýie success rate for firms in the independent sector, 
ilowever, after being greater thAn that or'G rand es 
Surfaces" firms in the late 1970S7 largely on the basis of 
two good years in 11376 (40.6% authorised) and 1979 (23.5%), 
fell steadily over the study period to finish below that of 
the "Grandes Surfaces" groups in 1982. The proportion of 
applications made by branch multiple firms that are 
authorised by the CDUCs has similarly fallen over the 
period. Supr 'S'nglY7 in view of the aims of the Royer 
legislation7 the only success rate to exhibit any long term 
upward trend is that of the "Grandes Surfaces" firms. 
Within these different organisational categories it is 
possible to assess the fortunes of various individual 
companies. As some applications in the data base were 
acredited to property developers it was not, however, always 
possible to attribiate proposals to specific retailerS7 so 
the actual figures for individual firms may in reality vary 
from those given here. 
It was possible, from the data base to trace 79 (25.2%) 
of the 313 proposals within the "GrandeS Surfaces" category 
to Carrefour. The next most prolific applicant in this 
category was Euromarch'e"* with 52 (16.6%) proPOSalS7 
followed 
by Cora with 46 (14.7%). Although the number of 
applications made each year by the Carrefour group 
has 
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remained fairly constant, the proportion of all applicati-ons 
made within this organisationa! category which can be 
attributed to Carrefour, has slowly fallen from 40.9% 1n 
19767 to 15.2% in 19797 recovering to in 7h1s 
t rend exhibited by Carrefour may be explained by the larger 
numbers of applications made by competitors7 notably Cora 
and Rallye in the late 1970S7 and EUromarchbo' in the early 
1980s (figure 8.12). 
Within the "Grandes, Surfaces" categorY7 the average 
size of the hypermarket element of applications has 
fluctuated, depending upon the number of proposals iytade each 
year, around a relatively constant mean. One noticable 
exception to this rule is Carrefour7 who seem to have 
steadily reduced the average size of their applications from 
8,000 to 6,000 square metres. 
The success rates for"applications within this category 
seem to vary froit firm to firm. Carrefour, with only 
of their applications authorised, and Euromarche7 with a 
success rat -e of 17.3%7 fare badly. Whemas, Auchan are tile 
most successful of these types of organisat'on7 having 
received an authorisation for 14 (32.6%) of their 43 
proposals. 
in the independent sector, Leclerc is the most prolific 
applicant7 accounting for 58 (31%) of the 187 proposals 
which could be attributed to this category of organisation. 
There has been a sharp rise in the number of projects put 
forward by Leclerc in the early 1980S (figure 6.13). 
However7 only 12 or 20.7% of these Leclerc applications 
have 
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Figure 8.12 
CDUCs - HYPennarket Applications 
by "Grandes Surfaces"Organisations. 
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Figure 8.13 : CDuCs - Hypermarket Applications by Independent 
Organisations. 
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been authorised over tne study period. Althougn it should 
I oe noted tnat tnis ratio is greater trian tile overall success 
rate for the whole of the independent sector. 
Ana I ys is of the geographical pattern of applications 
for development based upon hypermarkets reflects the mature 
stage in the retail life cycle reached by the hypermarket 
concept (map 8.5). There were large numbers of applications 
fort his form of development in the most populated 
00' departements, but also there were significant numbers of 
applications made in the secondary market departements, and 
only six departements failed to receive a single hypermarket 
application over the 1974 to 1982L period-. This pattern, 
with high numbers of applications in the secondary markets, 
contrasts with the spatial spread of applications observed 
for the younger forms of retail development, such as the 
furniture/household aoods and DIY store based projects, 
seen earlier. 
The spatial pattern of the success rate in each 
departement also shows the "maturity" of the hypermarket 
concept, reflected by the low rates of authorisation in the 
departements with the most numerous applications, as 
development has already occurred in the areas. The greatest 
success rates have been achieved in those departements where 
fewer applications were made, and where there were few 
existing stores. 
By comparing tile total number of applications made to 
the CDUCs for hypermarket developments with those made for 
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Map 8.5 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets 
1974-1982. 
A) Number of Applications 
Number of 
A=lications 
B) Success Rate % 
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all projects (based upon hypermarkets, supermarikets7 D -L Y 
stores, ana rU rn itu re /ino use no Idao oa so ut 1 et s), t Ii r0U0 110 '_( t 
the whole of France it is possible to Calculate the expected 
0f hypermarket applications for each c3eoa rc emenr', 
assuming t hat t he national ratio of hypermarket to al! 
. 610 applications would be repeated in every departement. This 
'. OW pro, cedure allows the identification of those departements 
which have been over- and under-subscribed with applications 
for new projects focused upon hypermarkets. 
The resulting maps (map 8.6), reveals Migher than 
expected 'numbers of hypermarkets applications in the area of 
the upper Rhone valley and Savoy region, where-there has 
been fierce competition between companies to secure the 
lucrative markets in these areas, extencing over the 
national border into Switzerland. Also exposed are less 
obvious target areas which have also been oversubscribed by 
hypermarket applications., namely the de"'partements to the 
west and south of-th. e Massif. 
In contrast7 there have been fewer than expected 
applications for hypermarket development in many of the 
major market areas, the Paris region in general 7 Bouches- 
dia-Rhone (13), Gironde Meurthe et Moselle (54) 7 Loire 
Atlantique (44) and throughout the Brittany peninsular. In 
all these areas the hypermarket was well established before 
the Royer 'Legislation was introduced, and consequently, they 
provide little scope for major new hypermarket growth. Th is 
spatial pattern of undersubscription of applications in most 
of the major market areas, would seem to suggest týie new 
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Map 8.6 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets 
1974-1982. 
A) Oversubscription 
B) Undersubscription 
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regui at i ons were int ro a ucea too lare to nave any Maj 0r 
effect upon the spatial spread of the nypermarket7 as t tie 
p ri ma ry ma rK et areas had been penetrateo -iong oer o re t tie 
legislat'Orl could have had any effect. 
A further interesting feature of the spatial diff us 1 on 
of the hypermarket concept7 viewed by the applications for 
new development, is the pattern of applications made by 
some of the major retailers. These patterns often reflect 
t he deg ree of their national or regional penetration 
(map 8.7). Carrefour, a group that acheived early national 
penetration has made applications for new hypermarket based 
development in most areas of the country. In each of the 
three time periods recorded on map 8.87 the company t1as 
placed proposals before the CDUCs throughout several areas, 
with a tendency to concentrate on specific die0partements over 
i me. 
Rallye, the Brittany based traditionally regional group 
has attempted to expand at the national level, arid map 8.9 
reveals this policy. Init ial ly, during the 1974 to 1976 
period, applications were concentrated in the traditional 
home market area of the organisation, with limited sorties 
outside this area. The 1977 to 1979 period, and to lesser 
extent the 1980 to 1982 period, however, illustrate the 
attempts made by Rallye to penetrate other market areas, 
resulting in applications being made in departements some 
distance from Brittany. Cont rast ing ly, Cora Oyiap 8.10) has 
continued to concentrate c3evelopment in their home reg 1 on,, 
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Map 8.7 -. CDUCs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets 
1974-1982. 
A) Carrefour 
B) Rallye 
C) Cora 
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Map 8.8 : CDUCs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets 
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Map 8.10 : cDucs - Applications based upon Hypermarkets 
Cora. 
Number of 
Applicatioris 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5+ 
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anO nas on1y slowiy attempted to expand from the North-East. 
The vast majority of the applications made by the group have 
oeerl centred upon the ceopar-cemen-cs in rne North and No rt h- 
East 
As this review of the applicatioris maoe to the CDUCs 
for new retail developments based upon large area stores has 
Shown7 there are considerable differences - both in the 
vo1 ume of applications and the success rates achieved by 
different fo rms of applications. Overall 7 38.5% of the 
applications received by the CDUCs during the 1975-1982 
period of study were authorised. However7 all types of 
applications, with the exception of those focused upon 
hypermarket units, obtained success rates greater than this 
average. Only 20.9% of the hypermarket applications were 
authorised over the 1974 to 1982 period. This statistic 
alone would suggest that the CDUCs have looked very 
unfavourably Li p0 -ri the vast majority of hypermarket 
applications. 
8.2. THE CDUCs AND APPLICATIONS FOR EXTENSIONS TO EXISTING 
STORES 
In addition to controlling applications for new retail 
developments proposing a store with over 1,500 or1,000 
square metres of sales space, the CDUCs are required to 
authorise or reject projects for extensions of over 200 
Square metres to existing buildings if this extra floorspace 
will create a retail unit greater than the above size 
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tnresholds. 
D 1-t ri rig t he 1974 t0 i9a- Perloo of analysis, 874 
app! icat i Otis we re made to the CDUCS for extens i ons 
e xi st i ria retal 1 Lurl its supermarKets ny pe rma rK et s, 7 
department and variety stores, furniture/household. goods 
stores and DiY st o res) and 47.7% of these projects we re 
a Lit ho rised (figure 6.14). The total number of appiicatlons 
for extensions rose steadily each year until 1979") then 
increased sharply in 1980,, before slowing down again in 196i 
and 1982., although the number of applications made in 19 a 
was still 20 more than in 1979. 
T 1he success rate for this type of application . tIaS, 11 Ke 
t hat for applications for new st o res, declined unt 1 .1 
1979/801, and then slowly recovered. Throughout the period 
of analysis the overall success rate for all extension 
applications has exceeded that' for new stores by 
approximately 10 percentage points. 
The geographical spread of applications for extensions 
to outlets naturally relates to the location of existing 
stores. Consequent ly, as map 8.1 1A illustrates, t he 
greatest numbers -of applications for extensions have been 
made in the major market areas, where a wide range of 
existing store types are found. The proportion of extension 
applications authorised by the CDUCS is higher than that for 
new retail developments in most de'opartements, and just over 
.. e half (48) of the departements exhibit success rates of over 
50% for this type of application (map Generally, 
týie highest tuccess rates are found in the departements witýi 
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Map 8.11 : CDUCs - Applications for Extensions to Existing Stores 1975-1982. 
A) Number of Applications 
Number of 
Appl. icaticns 
B) Success Rate 
Success Pate 
M 
""".. ". 
"". "S 
.S 
z 
312 
0 
1-5 
6-10 
0 
1-24 
25-49 
W--A 22 11-15 
16-20 
21 + 
50-74 
75-99 
100 + 
low numoers of applications, aitnol-tch razes of aixcharisation 
exceed 50% ir, pal, ts of Alsace-Lorraine7 and the North7 where 
t i-ie re are aco ris 1 ci e rab 1enu iyt oer0f apol icat 1 Otis 
e)(tensioris to existing stores. 
or 
As was the case with applications for new retail 
develpoments, there are differences in both the volume of, 
and the success rates of proposals for aifferent types of 
extensions. 
8.2.1. Extensions involving Department and Variety Stores 
The number of applications for extensions to either 
department or variety stores has rema i ned constant at 
ap proxi mat e1y 10 such proposals per year (figure 8.15). 
This fo rm of project achieved the highest rate of 
success of all the types of extension applications, with 
over 71% of the proposals placed before the CDUCs 
authorised. The small number of applications that fall 
into this category again MaKes the identification of overall 
trends difficult, as the success rate has fluctuated from 
year to year, although there is some evidence of a slight 
downward trend in this rate over the ý975 to 1982 period. 
8-. 2.2. Extensions Involving DIY Stores 
Extensions involving, DIY outlets have Only been 
recorded as a separate category in the official statistics 
since 1978, which allows few long term conclusions to be 
drawn concerning this type of application. Over this short 
five year period, the annual number of applications 
has 
remained fairly constant, at around 12 proposals per year, 
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Figure 8.15 : CDUCS - Applications for Extensions to 
Furniture/Household Goods and Department/ 
Variety Stores. 
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ttie success rate has risen from approximately -56% zo 
ust und er 70% over the same pe)-Icjcj. 7 , he relativeiy -iow 
rat es of aut no ri sat 1on acri i evea in 1978 5%) and i9 79 
(46- 2%) has ensu red t hat et ween 1978 and L 982,55.6% ofa 11 
applicatio"s in this category were acceptea by the CDuCs. 
8.2.3. Extensions involving Furniture/Household Goods 
Stores 
Over 220 appl-ications were made during the 1975 to 1982 
per I oa for extensions involving furniture/househoid g 000S 
storeS7 and j list over 70% of these proposals we re 
authorised. A fall in the number of applications made each 
year for this type of development in 1977, was followed by a 
slow rise in volume until 1981, when there was another fall 
in 1982. The success rate for this type of project has 
fallen steadily over the whole period (figure 8.15) to 
around 62% in 1982. 
8.2.4. Extensions involving Supermarkets 
The sharp rise in the volume of applications made to the 
CDUCs for all types of extensions in 1980, was largely aue 
to an increase in the number of proposals involving 
supermarkets, which doubled during 1980 (figure 8.16). 
This category of extension was the most numerate over the 
study period accounting for 343 applications. Between 1975 
and 1982,30.3% of these applications were authorised. Tile 
success rate fell sharply from 1975 to 1978, and then 
improved in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
An increasingly important component of the applications 
in this category were those which were intended to enlarge 
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Figure 8.16 : CDUCs - Applications for Extensions to 
supermarkets - 
350, 
A) Total Number of Applications 
1501 Excluding 
Ci 1/ Super. to Hyper. 
. 01 
S& 
-It ----------- T ------ T11 
76 77 78 79 80 81 
Year ( End ) 
100- 
801 
(32 
B) Success Rate (Three Year Ruming Mean) 
74 
70J 
Goi 
a# 
50- 
io 
cn 
30--il 
20. 
101 
e 
71 75 
11 
\eý-- 
-T --r- -II 
7G 77 78 79 
Year ( End) 
80 ei 82 
316 
an existing supermarket into a hypermarket. This type of 
aOL-I--, ication has oecome a noticaole element from 1977., when 9 
C) ft he 40 applications made that year were of this type. 
After 19777 applications of this nature accoun-cea for at 
least 25% of those proposals involving supermarkets. Tile 
majority of these applications were mace by companies in tne 
independent sector (65% of the total). Most P romi nent 
alylonc3st these organisatons was Leclerc, which accounted for 
51% of all the applications for extensions that would create 
a hypermiarket sized store from an existing supermarket. The 
branch multiple organisations were responsible for a further 
26.5% of this type of extension proposal. However, the 
CDUCs have been particularly severe upon this sort of 
application, and only 12.5% (13.6% of those presented by 
independent firmis) of all these projects were authorised 
over the stuay period. 
The increase in this formt of application, along with 
the rise in the number of applications to enlarge 
supermarkets generally, would appear to confirm the 
suggestion that a change in the development strategy Of 
retailers has occurred7 with a greater emphasis upon smaller 
units than in the past. This smaller development, on or 
around the hypermarket size threshold of 2,500 square metres 
of sales area, is more suited to the reduced catchment areas 
of the secondary markets Wh'Ch7 as saturation levels have 
been reached in the primary marketS7 have become the areas 
with the greatest potential for new developments. 
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Extensions invoiving Hypermarkets 
The numoer C) f aPPlicatiorls lylacle for extensions -C 0 
exist ing hypermarKets has rema i ned fairly , Constant at 
approximately Z-Z proposais per year since 1977, witti a peaý< 
of projects of this nature occurring in the pre-election 
year of 1980 (figilre 8.17). Of this category of 
application, 37.5% were authorised by the CDUCs over the 
1974-1982 period, as the success rate fell slowly from j IASt 
over 30% in 19797 before recovering slightly by 1982. 
in organisational terms7 the majority of applications 
for this type of project have been made by the "Grandes 
Surfaces" firms which account for 46% of the proposals. T he 
next most prolific exponents of this type of extension 
application nave been the branch Multiples (2,6%) and 
independents (17%). The success rates experienced by these 
different catagories of organisation over the study perioc 
have been relatively similar, with 37% of the "Grancies 
Surfaces". and 36.9% of the branch miultipleS7 proposals 
authorised, compared to 30% of those applications placed 
before the CDUCs by the independents. The most successful 
organisational category with regards to this form of 
application has oeen the Cooperative Societies, with 7 of 
their 9 projects authorised. 
Within the "Grandes Surfaces" category, Carrefour have 
been the most dominant group, accounting for 25.9% of all 
the projects of this type applied for by ttils organisational 
sector7 followed by Cora with 17.3%, Auchan with 16% and 
Rallye both witti I J. rz%. However, wittl EurotytarchL I 9 aria 7 
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Figure 8.17 : CDUCs - APPlications for Extensions to 
Hypermarkets. 
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once agairl Lecierc has domitiated the m-tinber of applicatioris 
Mac Ie by indepencent retailers for this -type or project, 
account ing for 80% of the proposals, 41.2% of which were 
aut ho ri sed. 
Although the success rate for all applications for 
extensions to existing stores mirrors that of applications 
for major new developments, with regards to declining prior 
1979? and then slowly rising, it has remained 
consistently higher than that for new outlets. The volume 
of applications for extensions has remained relatively 
constant each year for most forms of retail development, 
with t he exception of those projects relatina to 
supermarkets which rose sharply in 19807 and which has 
remained at a high level since. 
This feature would again appear to support the 
assertion that developers are paying greater attention to 
the development of smaller units, on or around the 
hypermarket size threshold, rather than concentrating their 
efforts solely on hypermarket development. The increased 
participation of the affiliated independent retailers 
in 
large store development, and the emphasis placed upon 
rat i onal isat i on and ref urbishment programmes 
by branch 
multiple companies are also reflected in this trend. 
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SUMMARY 
i tie re are significant differences in t he vo -1 1-ime of 
app 1i cat 1 Ons and success rates for the cifferent types of 
app! i Cat i Or' made to t he CDUCs. Whi ist most types of 
application for new retail developments o ot ai ned success 
rates of 40% and above, those projects based upon 
hypermarkets have fared ba(3iy, with less than A! _ý "', 0% of these 
proposals authorised. On the basis of these figures alone, 
particularly gi ven the voI ume of, applications for 
ilypermarket based development7 it would appear that the Loi 
Royer has seriously curtailed hypermarket development. 
However, more detailed analysis of the applications 
made to the CDUCs reveal certain trends which may indicate a 
changing strategy on the part of the developers, for which 
the Loi Royer is less well prepared. CertainlY7 since the 
turn of the decade, there has been a far greater emphasis 
placed upon proposals for smaller hypermarkets, and larae 
supermarkets. Whilst the observed decline in the size of 
hypermarket projects relates to an increase in the number of 
applications for this type of development by independent 
retailers, it also reflects a greater emphasis placed upon 
si*, na 11 er developments by t he "Grandes Surfaces" 
organisations. Suprisingly, in view of the proposed aims of 
the legislation, there is little evidence of any bias 
towards i ndependent -backed projects, avid proposals made 
by 
the larger retail organisations are viewed just as, 
if riot 
more, favourably. 
in Suppo I't of these trendS7 t he re has been a rioted 
321 
increase int he applications for extensions t0 existirig 
supe myta rKez s, part icularly triose proposals that wouic 
enlarge exising stores to hypermarket status. Th is ag aI r) 
cotif i rms the cýjange in strategy towarcs larger supermarkets 
arici smaller hypermarkets. 
-1 
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cHAPTER N1 il,, i E THE COMMISSION NATIONAL D' u RD Ai\4 IS ýyi COMMERCIAL 
Alt hQIAg h less than nalf of the proposals placea before 
the CDUCs for new retail deveiaptyients, and ex t ens 1o ris t0 
exist i rig stores have been auttiorised, considerabie use nas 
been made of the appeal POceecil-Ire outlined in articles IJ 
and 33 of the Loi Royer, by both applicants and members of 
the CDUCs. Over 650 (38.8%) of the applications made 70 11 
new major retail developments, and more than 300 -725%-) 0f 
the proposals for extending existing outlets, have oeen 
taken to appeal during the 1'975 t0 1982 period. 
Numerically, the volume of applications taken to appeal eacri 
year for both categories of proposal, rose in the 197C)s, 
peaked in 1980, 'the year before the presidential elections, 
and then declined in the early 1980s. Similarly, for both 
categories of application, over 40% of proposals were 
referred to the CNUC between 1978 and 1980, and more than 
50% in 1979. 
However., as figures 9.1 and 9-. '. 2 illustrate, there is 
a significant difference in the frequency of appeals between 
both the number and proportion of applications in bot il 
catecories wtllcn were authorised at the CDUC stage, arid 
those Which were rejected. Over lChree times as lylaýly 
applications which were reiected by the CDUCs were re-Ferrec 
to the CNUC over the i975 to 198.2, period, t han was t he case 
with triose authorised by these Commissions. 
As appea13 
concerning applications rejected oy tiie CDLJCs are usually 
made by t he project applicant, wnereas -appeals ag ai rls'rl 
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1 ca u i, % e :Di0 'n Se 
-LiYIDL=r at"IC 
PrOpOl'ZiOrl 
TaKen to H-ppeal 
A ut hori sed Rejected 
Applications by C: DUC by CDUC 
Dat e Appeals k, %) Appeals M Appeals M 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Major New Developments 
1975 519 (27.1) 10 8.8) 105 5) 
1976 75 (29.9) 22 -(17.6) 1. Z., 6 (42.1) 
1977 71 (36.0) la (26.15 
1978 80 (46.5) 9 iia (Go. 
(67.2) 1979 (53.8) 14 
1-ZI -(58.4) 1980 (47.6) 23 (25.6) 185 
24.4) 14E (45. - 1981 8E (37.7) 20 
1982 68 (34.9) 24 124 (35.5) 
1975-82 662 (38.8) 140 
- A. Ex t, evis 1 ons 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1975-82 
(2... 3) 
Cat 10 ris 
1049 (48. (-)) 
12 (15.8) 1 
12 (15.0) 0 
24 (25.5) 1 
46 (46.0) 4 
54 (52.4) 5 
72 (45.6) a 
52 (37.1) 11 
34 (27.6) 9 
306 (35.0) 
-Ir r4 
ýj -# 
i. 9) 25 (44.0) 
0.0) 28 (42.9) 
2.4) 52 (44.2) 
9. (. -)) 56 (75.0) 
1.9) 61 (80.3) 
12. ', S) 93 (68.8) 
(17.5) 77 (53.2)- 
(15.5) 65 (38.5) 
( 9.4) 46 _uS (57.7) 
-------------- -------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 9.2 : CNUC - Applications Taken to Appeal 1975-1982. 
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aut ho ri sed projects are made Dy eitner memoers of t ýie 
. 00 -, coly1missi orls ort he P rei-e-c 
.t 
ýI isS 
r-i 0 WS th at t ile 
deve 1o pers/appi i cant s mace far greater use, of t he appeal 
proc edure t han C3 idt he CDUC me m be rs and t tie Prefet. 
Ho weve r, as f igure 9.2 shows., since 1979 there rias been a 
progressively greater use of the appeal proceedure by t; tie 
CDUCs and P refet particularly in the case of applications 
for major new developments, whilst the applicants have 
referred proportionately fewer of their projects to t he 
CNUC. These trends may in part be explained by the attitudes 
of different Ministers, as shall be shown later. 
9.1. MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
As far as the volume of appeals deal ing wit h 
applications for new retail developments are concerned, the 
greatest proportion of all appeals made in this category are 
for proposals based upon hypermarkets (59.22%), followed by 
those for supermarkets (16%) and those based upon 
furniture/household goods stores (13.4%). 
Over the 1975 to 1982 period, 25.2% of the applications 
Centred upon furniture/house hold goods stores were referred 
to the CNUC, as were 32.4% of supermarket applications, and 
54.1% of hypermarket app! icat ions (figure 9.3) - For each of 
these different categories O-f application, the volume of 
initially rejected applications taKen to appeal outnumbers 
the volume of initially authorised proposals referred to the 
CNUC. In the case of furriture/household goods 
applications by a factor of -u/i 
store 
compared to Z. 8 for 
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F" igure CNUC - Applications for Major New Developments 
Taken to Appeal cy Type of Proposal i9715-i982. 
I ype 
Number of Number of 
Applications Appeals 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
HypermarKet 
Supermarket 
Furniture/Ho use ha lo 
Goods Stores 
Depa rt ment / Va r1 et y 
Stores 
DIY Stores 
Boutiques 
All Types 
724 (840) 392 (455) 54.1 (54.2) 
327 (441) iO6 (128) Z2.4 (29.0) 
"T = -. r 
ULP %. i %.: j 89 -7,1= -1 . ýj n . 4. 
6 
161 57 
94 12 
1707 FS - XZ' 
i. 4 
i2.8 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
NB Figures in brackets are for 1974-1981ý' period. 
13 el 17 
i. t De rma rK et., and 4.6 for hy pe riyta 11 K et praposa is. 
between 1974 and 455 of trhe 840) applications mac Ie 
to the CDUCs for c2evelopment f0c-I. Ased uPoIrl a nypermarKet were 
taken to the CNUC on appeal. The vas-c majority of t hese 
appeals were for projects rejected by the CDUCs. I 
other worlds, were made by applicants. However 7 unlike in 
other categories of new retail development, a high 
proportion of those projects authorised by the CDUCs (44.2%) 
were referred to the CNUC, and this proportion has risen 
over the study period (figure 9.4). It would, t he ref o re, 
appear that members of the CDUC ard the Pre'Ofet are far more 
prepared to appeal against decisions authorising hypermarket 
projects, than decisions supporting other types of new 
development. The corresponding figures for other types of 
application we re7 13.3% for supermarkets; 9.3% for 
rurniture/household goods stores; 27.1% for DIY stores; and 
16.7% for department and variety stores. 
Of all the appeals made concerning applications for 
hypermarket development, 43.9% were for the smallest 
category of store size (2,500-4,999 square metres) and 34.1% 
for the medium size category (5,000-7,499 square metres). 
However7 the proportion of proposals in each size category 
that were taken to appeal was relatively constant across all 
the size categories, varying from 52.0 to 59.4%. Those 
appeals made by the applicants seem to have been Niade 
uniformly in all size categories, rang ing from 53.6 to 
63.3%, whereas proportionately fewer appeals were macie 
for 
'128 
Figure 'D. 4: CNUC - Proportio-ri Of HyPeVMaYKet AOQj1CRtIO*r-'S 
Taken to Appeal 1974-1982-'s 
Dat e 
% of those of those 
% of All Authorised Rejected 
Applications by CDUC by CDUC 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1974 54.33 
1975 37.8 
1976 47.3 
1977 44.6 
1978 64.8 
1979 62.4 
1980 65.0 
igsl 51.6 
1962 50.0 
ý70 -: p -, 
w-. > .i 
55.6 
40.0 
50. o 
47.1 
56.0 
60.0 
55.0 
65.1 
42.6 
45.5 
45.5 
67.1 
66.2 
66.9 
50.0 
48.4 
1974-1982 54.3 44.2 56.9 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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fal 1 ing i tit 0 the small 500-4 app! i cat i Ons (75 7999 so ua re 
, yiet res) size category C-15. -, S%). and very large size (over 
i0,000 square yietres) category (18.2%) by the members of the 
. 0001- CDUCS or Prefet. 
The majority of appeals against declsions by the CDUC 
concerning proposals for hypermarket development, relate to 
applications initially made by the "G randes Surfaces" 
companies (40.4%),, followed by the branch multiples (20.6%), 
and the independent firms (20.2%). It would appear tilat the 
CDUC and Pr6fet are most hostile to medium and large size 
developments proposed by groups from the "Grandes Surfaces" 
sector, as 51.31: ý% of the appeals made against CDUC decisi. ons 
authorising development, are associated with projects put 
forward by this type of organisation. in contrast, only 
15.8% of tile appeals made by the CDUC members and Prefets 
are for projects proposed by branch multiple firms, and 
14.5% for projects put forward by the independent sector. 
This, pattern of hostility towards the "Grandes Surfaces" 
organ i sat ions no doubt reflects the influence 
. 
of local 
traders and elected representatives on tile CDUC. 
As far 
applicants 
Surfaces" 
retailers, 
illustrates, 
as the total number of appeals made by the 
are concerned, were made by "Grandes 
cofyipatlieS7 compared to 21.6% by multiple 
and 21.3% by the independents. As figure 9.5 
over 50% of all the applications made for 
hypermarket development were taken to appeal, irrespective 
of the organisational sector responsible for the proposal. 
silyli larly, a 11 t he organisational types appealed against 
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Fiqure 9.55: CNUC - Hypermarket Applications Taken to 
Appeal by Organisational Type 1974-1982. 
Proportion M of Applications made by 
Organisational Types Taken to Appeal 
of those of those 
of All Authorised Rejected 
Organisation Applications by; CDUC by CDUC 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
"Grandes Surfaces" 58.8 54.2 60.2 
Mult i pies 61.0 48.0 63.6 
Co o, Pe rat i ves 51.9 -7.8 6: 5.9 Depa rt ment /Va ri et y 
Stores 62.9 71.4 
1 independents 50.33 39.3 52.6 
Ot he r 44.8 27.8 41.5 
A! 1 Types " 44.7 58.3 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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mo re t han 50"/. of their appilcatjoýjs w-rjicýj we re rej ect ed, 
wtilist only the "Granoes Surfacs" o roani sat, (-iris Iao over 50"/. 
of their authorised proposals referred to t tie CNUC, by 
either members of the CDUC or the P re'Of et. ! rid ivi dua I 
companies withi VI the organisational categories seeffi to be 
fairly equa IIy treated, in that the proportion of thei I 
applications that were taken to appeaI, either by the 
CDUC/Pr'eofet or themselves, tended to reflect the overall 
position of the organisational category' concerned. 
Spatially, there appears to be little overall pattern 
to the geographical spread of appeals. Although 
numerically, the greatest number of appeals were mace in 
those di5partements that received the largest numbers of 
app 1i cat i ons,, and where the new retail forms had been 
established for some time. 
The areas with the greatest proportion of applications 
for new major retail developments taken to appeal generally 
corresponded to those where the volume of applications was 
low (map 9.1). in the cases of the longer established 
retail developments, hypermarkets, supermarkets, and to a 
lesser extent7 furniture/household goods stores7 the 
proportion of applications taken to appeal tends to be 
highest in the secondary markets that have riot yet reac iied 
saturation levels for these types of development, and where 
the developers are increasingly looking to concentrate their 
efforts. 
Although the applicants, especially "Grandes Surfaces" 
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Man 9.1 : CNUC - Proportion of Applications for New Retail 
Development Taken to Appeal. 
A) All Major New Develogrents 1975-1982. 
B) Based upon Hypermarkets 1974-1982. 
Proportion of 
Applications 
Iaken to Appeal 
0 
... 1.1 - 
0 
1-24 
m 
50-74 
75-99 
100 + Ee-/. 2 25-49, 
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C) Based upon Supe=arkets 1974-1982. 
D) Based upcn Furniture/Household Gocds Stores 1975-1982. 
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a-re the greatest exponents of týie organ l sat ions, aPPea 
qro c-! eci ure, triere is evicence triaz tne members of tne CDLCs 
aylcj the Prefets have becoming increasingly wiIjing to re fer 
projects a ut ho rised by the CDUCs t0t he CNUC. . 1. fl 
part icular, this review suggests that the CDUCs and Prleofets 
. nave been particularly hostile towards projects based 1-1 0 ti 
medium and large sized hypermarkets proposed by f)rms in the 
"Grandes Surfaces" sector. 
9.2. EXTENSIONS TO EXISTING UNITS 
in the case of applications for extensions to existing 
bui idi rigs, the majority of appeals have been made for 
proposals involving supermarkets (, 52.6%), followed by those 
concerned with hypermarkets (29.1%). Owing to the large 
number of applications made for extensions to existing 
supermarKets at the CDUC stage, the number of appeals in 
this category only represents 46.9% of the number of 
applications for this type of development, compared to the 
52.3% of those applications to extend existing hypermarkets 
that were referred to the CNUC (figure 9.6). However, it is 
worthy of note that of the applications for extensions to 
existing supermarkets, 62.5% of those proposals that would 
have resulted in the creation of a hypermarket sized store 
have been referred to the CNUC. 
As was observed with the appeals against decisions 
relating to the development of new retail o ut let s, t he 
volume of appeals concerned with applications that were 
initially rejected by the CDUCs far outnumbers those for 
335 
i. g ure CNUL AýDz)i. Lcatiors foi- ; Extersio-r-is to 
CDýx Y, l AaDe0f 'ý) Ms a, 7 )l 0 ID LI L 
ype 
Hypermarkers 
All Supermarkets 
(Super. to Hyper. 
(Super. Only 
Furriti. tre/mousenold 
Goods Stores 
Department /Variety 
Stores 
DIY Stores 
All Types 
Nummer of 1-1 lYt 0 L- 1- 07 
ý4. PQJ I Cat 1a tjS ýipqe aIs 
4 
j. 7C-) 
3 421 
80 
26 "S 
89 
6i 
ii.. 
-- -p 
4E. Si 
C-. 
c,. 
42 2) 
-A-l. '2 7 
77 
57 
29 
9 
18 
128 
11.7 
874 tZ 0E 
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a0pilcations that the CDUCs' accepted. The most soectacuiar 
example of tnis, is in the case of t-nose proposais 'ýjvo*., v-, rjC3 
st-toermarket deve 1o oryie-rit s, forW ti 3. C ". 1 e1 even t- imes mo re 
i-ej ect ed t han aut rio r1 sed appilcations were referred to trie 
CNLJC- 
Reference tofi c3 ure shows ttiat the proportion of 
all applications for extensions that were taken to appeal, 
mirrors the t rencis exhibited by the proportion of all 
app 1 icat ions for new developments, but exhibits a sharper 
rise7 al beit from a lower original position, in the late 
1970s. This trend, which brought the propo rt i on of 
extension applications into line with that-for new retail 
developments, may well have come about as low success rates 
for applications for new developments in the mid-late 1970s, 
and other economic factors relating to the costs of 
developing new stores, forced developers to consider a 
greater use of extensions to existing buildings as a means 
of maintaining growth. 
As suggested earlier., the majority of t he 
applications for extensions involving supermarkets that were 
taken to appea!, were those that had previously been 
rej ect ed by the CDUCs (91.9%). Furthermore,, the appeals 
against rejected supermarket proposals represented 61.9% of 
all the proposals for these types of extensions that t he 
CDUCs rejected. In contrast., only 1.2,. 5% of supermarket 
extensions that the CDUCs authorised were taken to appeal. 
in view of the suggested changes in 
development 
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st rat eg i es pursueci by o rg- an I sat io ns., ac ing a reat er 
etyiprias 1s 1-1 p0n smal ler hyper, ytarKet and large s upe rm ar Ket 
developments (whicn could be erilarged to hypermarket St at us 
at a later c3ate) , the characteristics of those applications 
for extensions to existing supermarkets that would result in 
hype rma rk et sized stores, are part icularly interesting. 
since 19777 although the total numbers or proposals ralling 
into this category have been low, over two thirds of t he 
applications for this type of project that were rejected by 
the CDUCs have been taken to appeal. All the different 
organisational sectors have applied against rejections for 
this type of development with equal vigour. 
Of the applications for extensions to ex ist ina 
hypermarkets, 64.5% of those rejected by the CDUCs were 
taken to appeal by the applicant, compared to the 310.3% of 
those authorised by t, he CDUCs that were referred to t Vie 
CNUC by members of the CDUCs or the Preifet. The members of 
the CDUCs and the Pre6fets appear to have been equally 
hostile to projects of this type irrespective of the nature 
of the proposing organisation. In the case of applications 
put forward by organisations in the "Grandes Surfaces", 
branch multiple and independent categorieS7 approximately a 
third of the projects authorised by the CDUCs have beerl 
appealed a0ainst. All organisational types have appealed 
against rejected applications to a similar degree. These 
figures suggest that applications for extensions to existing 
hypermarkets are viewed with less hostility by the members 
of the CDUCs and the Prefets than projects proposIng new 
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sr. o res. 
The spatial pattern of the proportion of applicatiotis 
for ext ensi ons tnat have been taken to appea. L - (lylap 
again largely reflects the number of applications mad ei rl 
. 1#0 eacn departement., with areas of relatively few applications 
experiencing a greater proportion of appeals. 
Analysis of the appeals made to the CNUC for extensions 
to existing units reveals that most appeals are for projects 
concerned with supermarkets. The low proportions of 
applications that were initially authorised by the CDUCs, 
which are then taken to appeal by members of the CDUC or the 
0, Prefet, suggests that this type of proposal is viewed as 
less damaging to the existing retail st-ructure of the 
d6partement than projects for new retail 'developments. 
The importance of the extension application should not, 
however, be underestimated in view of the increasing number 
of new hypermarkets that are derived from extending existing 
supermarket floorspace. This is emphasised by the rising 
number of applications for extensions to supermarkets that 
would create a hypermarket that are taken to appeal by 
developers. This would seem to indicate that applicants are 
making increasing use of this method of expansion in their 
development strategies., particularly in view of the severity 
with which the CDUCs are dealing with applications 
for new 
Mypermarkets. 
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Map 9.2 : CNUC - Proportion of Applications for Extensions 
to Existing Stores Taken to Appeal. 
A) All Extensions 1975-1982. 
1975-82 
B) Extensicns to Hypermarkets 1974-1982. 
19 
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Ja I'liINISTERIAL ! MPACT 
The overal 1 iYPact of ministerial d E? C: ISi Otis Can be 
seen i ri figure 9.7. The success rates of a!! types Of 
applications for new retail beveiopment wittl ovel- i, Ooo or 
!,, 500 square tyietres of sales area have been increased, with 
the exception of those projects based upon boutiques, and 
department or variety stores. Whilst in percentage terms 
the effects of ministerial decisions may not appear too 
significant, as the highest increase is that of 8.7% in the 
case of supermarket applications, in reality because of the 
large number of applications made for supermarket,, and 
particularly hypermarket development, the number of 
additional units authorised by the Minister becomes an 
important factor. 
In all., the effect of Ministerial intervention 
(figure 9.8) has been to add 37 supermarket, and -LA 
hypermarket based projects to the totals authorised by the 
CDUCS. The low or even negative numbers of applications 
authorised by the Minister in the 1981 to 1982 period is 
explained by the freeze on CNUC authorisations introduced by 
Delelis in July 1981, and which lasted until the first 
quarter of 1982. The most plausible explanation for the 
decline in the number of additional authorisations made by 
the Minister in 1980 is the imminence of týie Presidential 
elect i ons7 prior to which the Minister was less likely to 
overturn CDUC decisions and hence risk the wrath of voters- 
The Minister has overturned 336.7% of all the appeals 
made against CDUC decisions for projects concerned Witt, 
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e Sj. 7 Ir-: -f f ect of iriviisteria-, Decj s- Ons upon Success I- -1 ;. Rates 
Success Rates (%) 
lype of Application CDUC CNUC Difference 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
All Major New Developments --r 38.5 42.3 8 
Hypermarkets * 20.5 23.4 
Supermarkets * 47.8 56.5 + a. 7 
Furniture & H"' hold G7 ds 57.6 62.0 + 4. 
Department /Variety Stores 42.9 42.9 
DIY Stores 46.9 48.6 + 1.7 
Bout iques 67.0 67.0 - 
All Extensions 47.8 61.0 -+- 1 ZS .2 
Hypermarkets 37.5 53.4 + 15.9 
All Supermarkets 30.3 49.3 + 19.0 
(Super. to Hyper. 12.5 37.5 + 25.0) 
Furniture & Whold Gds 70.9 76.7 + 5.8 
Departitent /Variety Stores 71.4 77.9 + 6.5 
+ 10.6 DIY Stores 59.6 70.27 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* NB Figures marked by an asterix are for 1974-1982 period. 
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i-t pe rma r Ket aevelopment. Ho weve r7 only since 1,381 (W it n 
the exception of one appea. L in 1974) tias 't tie M1ni sc er 
overturnea CDUC aut ho ri sat i ons. lytea nw hiIe74.2 --/- of t he 
appeals, brought by the applicants 7 against CDUC rejections 
have been transformed into authorisations oy trie M1ni st e r. 
Only in one year before 1980 aid the Minister fail t0 
overturn less than 50% of the appeals made by applicants 
against rejections received by a project at the CDUC level. 
When appeals made against CDUC aecisions concerned 
with hypermarket based projects are considered, over 100 
(22.9%) of the appeals brought before the CNUC have been 
overturned. In this instance, however, the Minister seems 
to be firmly on the side of the CDUC members or Pr6fets, 
upholding 52.6% of the appeals made by these groups against 
authorisations made at the CDUC level. in particillar, the 
Minister is very severe upon projects put forward by 
independents, upholding 72.7% of the appeals brought against 
CDUC authorisations for projects proposed by these groups by 
the members of t-he CDUC or Pr'eOfet. 
In contrast, only 16.9% of the appeals made by 
applicants against CDUC rejections of hypermarket proposals 
have received Ministerial support. Only the high volume of 
appeals made by applicants against CDUC rejections has 
ensured that an additional, p rev i ously rejected, 
hypermarket projects were authorised following t he 01"10C 
stage. 
The Minister appears to have authorised p rev io us Iy 
345 
rejected aPPlications in deo'partements where a larqe u in E) er 
of applications nave been made, but WrIere the success rat a- 
has not i3een Particularly nion (map 'D. Z rit otnis 
0' category fa 11 the cepartements of Savoie 77 Calvados 
(! 4) . Se i ne-Ma riti me (76) 70 rne 
(61) 
71 Lolre-AtIantique (44). 
and Ille-et-Vilaine (35) - largely departemerits on the 
fringes of the major marKet areas. There is n0Q Ov io I-is 
spat ial pattern t0t he areas in which t he Mini st er has 
overturned Previously authorised projects. 
When considering only supermarket and hypermarket 
applications (maps, 9.4 and 9.5) 7 the Minister again appears 
to have o ve rt u med previously rejected decisions in 
. 10 departements with high numbers of applicationsly 
generally low success rates. For example, Loire-Atlantique 
(44) v Charente-Maritime (17), Calvados (14) 7 Seine-Maritime 
(76), Seine-et-Marne (77) and Val-de-Marne (94) in the case 
of supermarket applications, and ille-et--Vilaine (35) 7 
Sao ne-et -L ai re (71) *# 
Rhone (69) , No rd 
(59)., Haute-Savoie 
(74), 
v Savoie (73) and Bas-Rhin (67) for hypermarket 
app Ii cat i ons. 
There is a less apparent pattern to the originally 
autharised applications that have since been overturned by 
. 40 tile Minister. Some departements correspond to those where 
few applications t00Ki place7 but where success rates were 
I 2 rligh such as the Somme (80), Oise 
(60)7 
and Ai sne (0. ) f 0), 
ýIypertyoarkets. Whi lst others correspond to areas with high 
numbers of applications for hypermarket development, but low 
success rates, such as the Loire (42), Pin (01 ) It 
Sarthe 
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map 9.3 : CNUC - overall Effect of Ministerial Decisions 
upon Applications for New Retail Develognents 
1975-1982. 
A) Additional, Applications Authorised. 
B) Additional Applications Rejected. 
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Map 9.4 : CNUC - Overall Effect of Ministerial Decisions 
upon Applications based upon Super-markets 1974- 
1982. 
A) Additional Applications Authorised. 
B) Additional Applications Rejected. 
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1. p 9.5 CNUC VIA Overall Effect of Ministerial Decisions 
upcn Applicatims based upon Hypermarkets 1974- 
1982. 
A) Additional Applications Authorised. 
B) Additional Applicatia'S Rejected.. 
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(72 7 and Morbihan (56). 
The effect of Ministerial intervention h as no weve r 
been greatest, in both riunnerical and percentage terly'S 7 in 
relation to the applications for extensions to existing 
developments (refer to figure 19.7). The sLiccess rate for 
all applications for extensions has risen by 13.2% to over 
60% as a result of Ministerial intervention. Ca nseq uent I y, 
all the major types of extension had success rates of over 
50Y.. s except for those for supermarket extensions which rose 
to 49.. 3%. The Minister has had the effect of raising the 
success rates for individual types of extension application 
by between 5.8 and 19%. 
As the greatest percentage rises in success rates have 
occurred in the supermarket (+19%) and hypermarket (+15.9%) 
categories., which are numerically the largest categories, 
the effect of Ministerial intervention has been quite 
significant. Over the 1974 to 1982 period the Minister 
authorised a further 28 applications for extensions to 
existing hypermarkets, (figure 9-9) and no less than an 
additional 65 proposals for extensions to supermarkets 
between 1975 and 1982,20 of which would result in the 
creation of a hypermarket. 
Over the study period, 54.9% of all the appeals made 
concerning extensions to existing hypermarkets were upheld 
by the CNUC. Neither form of appeal, from applicant or 
CDUC/Prefet7 appears. to have been favoured and in both 
instances 55% of appeals were upheld. Once again, 
t he 
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numerical superiority of appeals made by applicants agains-c 
CDUC rejections accounted for the overall numerical increase 
in authorisat ions. There is no real distinction int he 
ministeris response t0 appeals made by 
organisational groups. 
different 
Following the intervention of the CNUC, 47.8% of all 
applications for extensions to supermarkets that were taken 
to appeal were altered. The Minister was equally severe on 
each form of appeal, upholding 46.2% of the appeals made by 
the CDUC/PrI5fet against previous authorisations7 and 47.9% 
of those made by applicants against CDUC refusals. The 
excess of applicant appeals over CDUC/PrCzfet appeals has 
resulted in the net gain, of 65 authorisat ions in this 
category. 
A distinction should be made between those supermarket 
extensions that would lead to the creation of a hypermarket, 
and those that would not, particularly in view of the 
increasing number of applications for this type of 
development made to the CDUCs. Of the appeals lodged 
against decisions concerning this form of extension7 52% 
have resulted in the reversal of the original decision. 
The consequent rise in the number of authorisations for 
this type of extension by a further 20 Un'tS7 which trebles 
the CDUC success rate 7 
is due to the fact that 11 times 
more appeals were made by the applicants than by 
the 
CDUC /P Ae" f et . 
The Minister was especially favourable to 
CDUC/Pre"fet appeals, upholding 754A, compared to 
50% for 
those sponsored by the applicant. 
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I tilisl as was the case with extensions for ex i st 1 rig 
ilypermarkets, -the adcJitional autý -foiiow' -torisations. gal 1rIQ 
ministerial intervention were only achieved because of t he 
large numbers of appeals placed before the minister by t tie 
applicants, compared wittl tile volume of appeals made by the 
CDUC/PreT-e, c 7 as the CNUC appeared to favour neither form of 
appeal. 
mere are no obvious spatial patterns to Ministerial 
decisions concerned with extension applications (map 9.6) . 
Applications rejected by the CDUCs have been authorised by 
the Minister in the de6partements with fairly low success 
rat es irrespective of the number of applications made 
therein, for example around Paris, Brittany and the West 
Coast,, where the volume of applications was high, and in 
those along the Spanish and Swiss/Italian borders, where few 
applications were made. Decisions have also been overturned 
in areas with high numbers of applications and fairly high 
success rates 7 such as Alsace-Lorraine. 
The overall effect of all Ministerial decisions has 
been to intensify the success rates achieved by all 
categories of applications in certain areas (maps 9.7 and 
9.6). This is particularly true in the case of extensions, 
whp-re the number of doeoopartements with less than a 50% success 
rate has been reduced from 47 to 22. The corresponcing 
reduction for applications for new retail developments has 
been from 7.2 to 61. 
When individual types of applications are considered7 
353 
Map 9.6 : CNUC - Overall Effect of Ministerial Decisions C- 
upon Applications for Extensions to Existing 
Stores 1975-1982. 
A) Additional Applications Authorised. 
B) Additicnal ApplicatiCns RF-- Eýý. "Ed 
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Map 9.7 : Success Rates for Applications for New Retail 
Development 1975-1982. 
A) After CDUC Stage 
1975-82 
I 
B) After CNUC Stage 
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Map 9.8 : Success Rates for Applications for Extensions to 
Existing Stores 1975-1982. 
A) After CDUC Stage 
B) After CNUC Stage 
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-t tie i lyl pact Of Ministeriaj. decislOrls rjas t, acj a lyl 1-1 c r-I ore 
oronouncec sDat iaI effect (lylaps 9.9 arid 9.1C-)). PO r 
hype rma rKet applications t he success rates 1 ti t tie 
bepa rt ement st0t he north of Par's have general ly been 
red uced, whi lst those in Savoy have 
Success rates for applications for 
been rei nro rced 
new supermarket 
a eve lo pment s t1ave been increased in the area to the so ut h- 
west of Paris7 towards the Brittany peninsular, and in the 
southern sections of the Massif. 
Applications for extensions t-o existing hypermarkets 
have seen their success rates partially reinforced in the 
So ut K, Brittany, and to the north and east of Paris 
(IYIa, P 9.11 ). Whi lst those projects for extensions to 
supermarkets that would create hypermarket sized stores have 
become more successful in the North,, the South and alona the 
West Coast (map 9.12). Interestingly7 of the ten 
departements in which the success rate of this type of 
application has been raised to 1004A following the decision 
of the CNUC,, five of these correspond to d'eopartements in 
which the success rate for new hypermarket, development was 
zero, and in three departements in which the success rate 
was less than 25% after the Ministers intervention. 
The Minister would appear to have had a significant 
impact upon the success rate for certain types of 
application, in particular those for extensions to exising 
retai 1 unitsv for which the overall success rate has been 
raised to over 60%. Owing to the volume of appeals made 
f, o r 
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Map 9.9 : Success Rates for Applications based upon 
Hypermarkets 1974-1982. 
B) After CNLJC Stage 
On I'sm 
I 
Map 9.10 : Success Rates for Applications based upon Supenriarkets 1974-1982. 
A) After CDUC Stage 
B) After CNUC Stage 
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Map 9.11 : Success Rates for Applicaticins for Extensions to 
Existing Hypermarkets 1974-1982. 
A) After CDUC Stage 
B) After CNUC Stage 
no 
Success Rate 
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Map 9.12 : Success Rates for A7, Dplications for Extensions 
. 
Enlarging Supermarkets to Hypennarkets 1975- 
1982. 
A) After CDUC Stage 
B) After CNUC Stage 
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some projects (riot ably t hose ro r nypermarKetS aria 
S i. A pe rma rk et s) considerable numbers of additional proposals 
have oeen authorised following tne i tit e rvent io ti of t tie 
ýjj nist e r7 with tne ensuing consequences for success rates 
and sc)atial patte-rns of development. 
9.4. SUMMARY 
in all, over one third of the applications to the CDUCs 
for new retail development and extensions to existing stores 
have been refeirred to the CNUC on appeal. in general, t he 
vast majority of appeals have been made by the applicants, 
and in rel at i on to proposals involvinq new hypermarket 
development. However, the CDUCs and the Pr`efet appear to 
have been particularly hostile towards projects based upon 
medium and large sized hypermiarkets proposed by firms in the 
"Grandes Surfaces" sector. In view of the changing emphasis 
within application strategies suggested in the previous 
Chapter, it is noticable that since the late 1970s, an 
increasing number of applications for extensions to existing 
supermarkets and hypermarkets have been taken to appeal. 
1he Ministerial response to these appeals has shown 
some signs of political and electoral influence, ana whilst 
the Minister appears to have firmly supported the CDUCs and 
rb"' ets, in terms of the niAmber of appeals against 
previously authorised hypermarket developments which have 
been upheld, there has been a tendency for him to support 
the applicant in relation to appeals concerning supermarket 
proposals. This apparent bias may help to partly explain 
362 
tile greater emphasis placea 1APOtl supermari-cet proposals Oy 
C) . evelopers in the late 1970s and early I 
With regards to appeals invo1vina applications foI, 
extensions to existing units, although Mlinisterial decisions 
have raised the success rates for a!! types of proposals to 
around 50% and above, there appears to be little sign of any 
'0 bias towards either the applicant or the CDUCs and Pre'Ofet, 
or for any particular type of project. However7 the volume 
of appeals lodged by applicants for both extensions and new 
developments has ensured that significant gains have been 
made following the Minister's intervention. 
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CHPPTER TEN : THE CDUCs PND CNUC - PN EVPLUPT! üiN 
ine preceeding analysis of ttle appilCaClOrIS Mad Ie to the 
CDUCS and CNUC f or new retail ceveiopments aria 
extensions to existing stores would seem to suggest triat týie 
Loi Royer has been Successful in restricting the cevelopment 
of certain types of outlet. Well over half of a!! t he 
applications made for view retail developments between ! 974 
and 1982 were refused by the two Commissions. Only 38.5% of 
all applications were authorised by the CDUCs, and this rate 
of success was only raised to . 
42.3% following the 
intervention of the CNUC. On the basis of these statistics, 
exponents of of the legislation would claim that the law has 
achieved its primary aims of protecting small retailers from 
the "unfair" competition of the large retail stores, 
parti, cularly as only 20.5% of the applications mace to the 
CDUCs for hypermarket development were authorised, and only 
23.4% after the decisions of the Minister were taken into 
account. 
However, more detailed analysis of the types of 
applications made to the Commissions, and the workings of 
the CDUýCs and CNUC reveal that such claims of success may 
6e 
premature. The law has had many effects uporl hypermarket 
development but., as the increased share of both hypermarket 
numbers and floorspace controlled by the large organisations 
suggests, the legislationý has done little to improve 
the 
Position of the small retailer segment in the 
distribution 
sect o r. 
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lo. l. THE COMMISSIONS - REAL BLOCKAGE1 OR iriERE DELAY '? 
The availability of the names of applicants arid the 
exact location of projects, allows for ama re detal lea 
analysis of the proposals for new development presented to 
the CDUCs and CNUC, than that based upon the quanCity anC 
type of application alone. If the applications f0r new 
developments are analysed by de'opartement over the 1974 ta 
! 982 period, it is common to observe a particular developer 
making numerous applications for the same location over a 
period of time. Similarly, numerous competing organisations 
may maKe applications for the same site. Consequent ly, a 
single site may be the recipient of several applications. 
Thus, it becomes important to distinguish between the total 
number of applications, and the total number of sites or 
locations upon which applications were made. 
The most noted example (Bonnet 1982) of this feature is 
the number of applications made for hypermarket development 
in Villefranche-sur-Saone7 a town of 507000 inhabitants in 
the Saone valley. This town, situated 20 km from Lyon, and 
15 KM from a Carrefour hypermarket at Ecully, was 
characterised by a relatively old-fashioned commercial 
structure, for although possessing five supermarkets none 
had a sales area of greater than 1,200 square metres. 
Consequently, the town provided considerable potential 
for a 
hypermarket operation and attracted numerous applications 
from a wide variety of sources7 including 
Docks Lyonnais, 
Arlaud, Labruyere-Eberle, Rallye7 Auchan, Cofradelj 
Genty 
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Cathiard., and Leclerc, as well as from the commercial centre 
developers Cenco and Segece. On one occasion, no fewer than 
eight seperate dossiers for hypermarket development in this 
town were placed before the CDUC, all of which were 
refused. In all, eighteen applications were made for this 
potential site, before Casino finally received permission to 
develop a 4,, 316 square metre hypermarket in 1979. 
Although the Villefranche example is unique in terms of 
the volume of app. lications for the oine site, it is riot 
uncommon for potential sites to attract. multiple 
applications. It is a well established tactic of developers 
to submit a new proposal for development on a site where a 
competitor is seeking an authorisation from the Minister, as 
the Minister is then likely to refuse the project before him 
on the grounds that he can not make a decision until he 
knows the attitude of the CDUC towards the new project. 
One consequence of this policy is that a certain degree 
of overcounting occurs in the total numbers of applications 
made to the CDUCs and CNUC for development. Whilst in gross- 
10 numerical terms, a departement may have received twelve 
applications for a hypermarket based project over the 1974 
to 1982 period,, because of multiple applications for a 
single site., this gross total may disguise the fact that 
e 
Only four potential sites existed in the departement, and 
these four sites attracted all twelve applications. Thus, 
the overall figures presented for the volume of applications 
made, do not represent the number of potential or 
'It r 1-te " 
sites for development. The CDUCs. by refusing applications 
I 
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for a site7 may only delay development and encourage further 
applications for the same site. 
By analysing the number of applications made in each 
le departement by virtue of jocation", it is possible to amencj 
the quantity of hypermarket aPPlications made to the CDUCs7 
to ref I ect the number of sites upon which develoolylent was 
sought, rather than relying solely the total number of 
applications in a de'opartement. This gives a much clearer 
indication of the potential, and demand, for hypermarket 
development in France. Thus., although between 1974 and 
19827 840 applications were made to the CDUCs for 
hypermarket based projects, oniy 470 cistinct sites were 
involved. The true number of potential hypermarkets7 
reflected by the number of sites upon which applications 
were made, is likely to be even less than this figure, as 
this does not allow for applications made to different 
communes which may be locateid in close prox'M'tY7 and 
consequently share the same target catchment area. 
This reassessment of the number of potential sites has 
repercussions for the success rates of projects based upon 
hypermarket developments. Rather than only 20.4% (172 
authorisations f rofn 840 appl icat ions) of p ro po sed 
applications being successful at the CDUC stage, the success 
rate for hypermarket based applications is raised to 34%, as 
160 of the applications made on the 470 potential 
hypermarKet sites received an authorisation from the CDUCS. 
The authorisations number 160 rather than 172, as this 
367 
takes into account applications authorised initially by the 
CDUCs. but then rejected by the CNUC 7 ttius releasing the 
potential site for further applications. On the same basis, 
the ultimate success rat ef0r hy Pe rma rk et applications 
following the intervention of the Minister is raised from 
23). 4% to41.7 %. 
SimilarlY7 the success rates for those hypermarket 
applications made by the "Grandes Surfaces" organisatioris 
should be raised from 23.0% at the CDUC stage, to 36.0% 
after Ministerial intervention. Individual companies within 
this sector experience rises from 21.5% to 31.4%, and from 
17.3% to 32.4% in the cases of Carrefour and Euromarchlg,, and 
from 32.. 6% to 46.4% in the case of Auchan. 
This assessment of the applications made for 
hypermarket based development, suggests that any conclusions 
drawn simply from the overall volume of applications made 
and authorised7 do not give a true indication of the 
potential for hyperma-rket development, the demana for such 
development, and the success of this type of application. 
10-2. CDUC: - DECENTRALISATION OF AUTHORITY, OR "SYMBOLIC 
FILTER" '. ) 
One might expect that the decentralisation of the power 
of authorisation to the CDUCs made through the Loi Royer, 
would have given these local commissions immense control 
40 
over retai 1 development in the departemient concerned. 
Particularly as Royer expected týje tylinister of Commerce anQ 
Crafts to overturn relatively few CDUC decisions, and only 
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those which appeared to be against the spirit of the law. 
However, as many critics of the legislation - notaoly 
marchand (1979) and Keeler (1985) - have pointed 0 1-1t, t he 
large number of appeals made to the CNUC effectively means 
tilat the real control over new retail development rests with 
the Minister. The decisions of the CDUCs often seemea to be 
largely inconsequential. This feature was noted as early as 
September 1974, by Le Blanc ana Levy (1974). who suggested 
that owing to the influence of the appeal pro., c, edure, the 
CDUCs should be regarded as nothing more than a "symbolic 
fi lter". 
The effect of Ministerial intervention on overall 
success rates hasýalready been shown in Chapter Nine. In 
the case of hypermarkets, if the total number of 
applications made between 1974 arid 1962 are considered, 
54.2% of these applications were referred to the Minister, 
and 22.9% of these appeals resulted in a CDUC decision being 
reversed. The result of this was that 12.4% of all CDUC 
decisions concerning proposals for hypermarket development 
were overturned by the Minister. This accounts for the rise 
in the success rate for this type of project from 20.5% to 
23.4% following the CNUC stage. 
The impact of Ministerial decisions is, however, more 
pronounced if one refers to the number of sites upon which 
applications for hypermarket developments were presented. 
Although only slightly more sites were 
the subject of 
appeals (58.5%) than was the case with applications 
(figure 
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10.1) 7 
the effect of Ministerial decisions is far more 
i Mpo rt ant when sites., rather than applications, ) a Ile 
considered. Over one third (36Y-) of the appeals made 
against CDUC decisions concerning applications mace fo r 
specific sites were successful in obtaining a reversal of 
the original CDUC decision. This resulted in 21.1% of all 
the CDUC decisions concerning sites for hypermarket 
development being overturned. 
As at Ist January 1983, in just under half (48%) of the 
sites upon which applications had been made for hypermarket 
based development the current status of these sites, 
whether authorised or refused7 had been decided by the 
Minister. Furthermore, in over one third (34.9%) of tile 
cases where the decision of the Minister concerning a site 
was the final one7 the Minister"s pronunciation had reversea 
the original CDUC decision. These Ministerial decisions 
have the effect of raising what might be referred to as the 
real success rate for hypermarket projects., that for sites 
upon which applications were made, rather than the total. 
number of applications, from 34% after the CDUC stage to 
41.7%, an increase of almost 80% from the somewhat 
misleading figure of 23.4% based solely upon the total 
number of hypermarket applications. 
The i mpact of Ministerial decisions has varied witt, 
different Ministers7 (over the study period of 1974 to 1982,17 
there have been six different incumbents of this Post), anQ 
more critically, with the approach of National elections- 
Vincent Ansq Lte r, the first Minister of Commerce ana 
Crafts 
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gu re I C). I Ministerial Effect upon Hypermarket 
Applications 1974-. 1982. 
Applications Sites 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of Applications 840 470 
Number of Appeals 455 275 
Number of Appeals in which 
CDUC decision reversed 104 99 
of Applications 
taken to Appeal 
% Appeals Overturned 
All Applications 
Overt u rned 
5 4.2'% 
22.9% 
12 4. '/. 
58.5% 
36.0% 
21.1% 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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to hoid off ice after the legislation had been 1 nr. rod ucea, 
Occupied t he post f rolyl june 1974 Unt i1 ilt ay 1976, and 
commenred upon the lc)% of CDUC cecisiorls wtlich he overturriec 
during the first year of the operation of the jaw (LSA 1975 
Keeler 1985) 
"This figure is sufficiently large to show that7 in 
accord with the will of the legislator, the last word 
rests with the state, and sufficiently modest for the 
d6partemental commissions to have a perception of 
exercising a real power of decision. " 
However7 as Keeler (1985) argues, Ansquer had failed to 
realise that he had overturned almost 30% of the decisions 
taken to appeal, as the figure of 10% quoted referred only 
to the total numbers of applications made to the CDUCs. 
Comment has already been made in Chapter Nine to the 
coincidence of certain trends in applicat'o. nS7 CDUC and CNUC 
decisions, and the timimg of elections. in February 1981 
Co-hen-Chabaud (1981) commented that... 
"with the approach of the electionS7 authorisations 
for large stores have fallen. " 
and Fries (1981) a former Director of internal Commerce, who 
further emphasises the role of elections by admitting that it 
was 
"the calendar of elections which in fact determined 
the rhyt h m- -! of authorisations and rejections 
.... decisions were rarely predicated on considerations 
of urbanism, and even less on economic criteria, but 
rather solely on political grounds. " 
When t he effect of Ministerial intervention is 
considered over the 1974 to 1982 period (figure 10-2), 
there 
appears to oe evidence of a tightening or Ministerial 
contro17 illustrated by a reduction in the number of 
CDUC 
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Figure 10.2A : Applicaticns for New Retail Developments 
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refusals that were overturned by the CNUC7 prior to the 
Nat i ona 1 Assemo !y elect ions 0r 1978 and i981. 
In contrast,, the Minister appears to aUthOrlse consicerably 
mo re, applications than ttie C: DJC: s in post electiorl 
especially following the 1978 elections. 
pe ri a cis 7 
The impact of elections upon the Ministerial cecisions 
is again endorsed by Jean Fries (1978) ... 
'gat election times this restrictive measure tends to 
get tough; planning permission becomes harder to 
obtain. " 
Consequently, Fries suggests that the law should be regarded 
more as an additional obstacle to large store aevelopment 
rather than as the "systematic blockage" t hat is often 
suggested. 
These comments and a review of Ministerial impact upon 
CDUC decisions suggests that there is indeed a case for 
claiming that the real authority still rests with the 
central administration, despite the apparent 
decentralisation of power to the CDUCs. 
10.3. THE COURTS OF APPEAL -A NEW LEVEL OF CONTROL ? 
The influence of the CDUCs over commercial development 
was further questioned in June 1979 when the Council of 
State overruled a CNUC pronouncement confirming a previous 
CDUC decision (J-Ph Vidal 1979). in 1976 the CDUC of Landes 
refused an application for an extension of 570 square metres 
to a Leclerc supermarket at Dax owned by the 
Ardour 
Distribution company. The applicant then appealed 
to the 
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ONUC 7 only 
to have this appeal refused by the Minister of 
commerce, Pierre Brousse. Not satisfied with this decision 
Ardour Distribution then appealed to the Administrative 
Tribunal of Paris7 but the Tribunal only confirmed the CDUC 
and CNUC, decisions. However, a further appeal against these 
decisions made to the Council of State, was successful in 
June 1979, and for the first time the Council of State 
overruled a Ministerial decision. 
T 1he Council of State argued that bq? cause of demographic 
growth in Dax the extension would not lead to "the crushing 
of small enterprises and the wastage of commercial 
equipment" (Ecodis 15/10/1979). This decision had great 
consequences, as it opened up a view course of appeal for 
disgruntled applicants, and also raised the question of the 
motivation of Ministerial decisions. 
However7 the Council of State was riot the only external 
body to become involved with the operation of the CDUCs and 
CNUC. In November 1980 (Rochard and Peretie 1981), the role 
of the judicial courts in the workings of the Lai Royer 
became even more influential when the Administrative 
Tribunal of Besancon ordered the closure of a 8,200 square 
metre commercial centre, focused upon a Mammouth hypermarket 
operated by the Cedis groUP7 which had opened in May 1980. 
Twenty-two months earlier7 the Minister of , 
Commerce and 
Crafts 
7 on this occasion 
Jacques Barrat, had authorised the 
Cedis project, and refused a similar scheme proposed 
by 
Sada 1 despite the latter project hav i rig the majority 
support of t he CDUC. Tile Acimi nist rat 
ive Tribunal 
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conseauently declared that the decision taken against the 
Sacial. project amounted to an "illegal refusaill 7 and as t he 
authorisation of the Cedis proposal created a quasi-monopoly 
for the group in Franche Comte, the authorisation for this 
development was withdrawn. This pronouncement meant t. liat an 
appeal to the judiciary had now succeeded in havina an 
operating hypermarket declared illegal. 
As Gerard (1980) and the Minist'e"Ore du Commerce et 
17Artisanat (1960b) report, by November 19807 t he 
Administrative Tribunals had received 127 appeals against 
the decisions of the CDUCs and CNUC since the Loi Royer was 
introduced. Of. these appeals, 79 had been heard by the 
Tribunals, 58 of which were won and 14 lost by the 
Administration, whilst 6 cases were withdrawn, and in one 
case no decision was reached. Over the same time period, 
the Council of State heard 20 appeals on issues of 
commercial city planning, 7 of which were won by the 
administ rat ion, 5 lost, and one withdrawn. Following the 
Council of State"s decision concerning the Leclerc extension 
at Dax, the number of appeals brought before the judiciary 
doubled from around 15 to 30 cases per year. 
Most of the appeals made to the judiciary sought 
Judgements over the composition and functioning of the CDUCs 
and the appeal proceedure of the CNUC. in other cases, 
judgements were sought as to the applicability of the 
ODUC 
or CNUC decision in relation to the principle of the Loi 
Royer. A Ministry of Commerce document (Ministe"'re du 
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Commerce et 1"Artisanat 1980b) 7 identified four main areas 
of co tit ent io ri Upon which the majority of t hese j ud 1c1 al 
appeals appeared t0 be based. Firstly, applicants 
quest ioned sect ions of the laws pro c: edure7 such as the tirfie 
allowed for ari appeal following a CDUC decision, did this 
time period start from the date of the CDUC meeting or t he 
date of notification of the CDUC decision ?A second area 
of debate was the field of application of the law. Problems 
arose over the definition of "Sales Area". an issue which 
prompted the Ministerial Circular of 10th March 1976 in an 
attempt to resolve'some of the problems of definition (see 
Chapter Six). Other problems of definition focused upon the 
term "economic unit"V and raised such issues as should 
several small stlores in close proximity be regarded as a 
larger commercial entity or not ? The third general area of 
contention revolved around the questioning of t he 
interpretation and legality of decisions7 and finally, 
debates occurred over the suspension or deferment of 
authorisations for commercial planning reasons. 
The position of the judiciary with regards to 
overruling a Ministerial decision was further strengthened 
by the law of 11th July 1979, which required the Minister to 
give a written reason or justification for any refusal of all 
appeal. This was an attempt to counter accusations that the 
Minister was much more liberal with his judgements than the 
CDUCs. particularly in the regions (Delabez 1985). 
Th is 
legislation allowed the judiciary to a emana from 
the 
Minister his precise motives for any decisio "7 and these 
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motives needed to be botn materially arici jucjic: ially co r rect 
with regards to the principles cefineJ in the Loi Royer (L. SA 
753 1980a). As there are some apparent Contradictions 1 yl 
the basic principles speit aut in týIL= first section Of t he 
legislation (Chapter Six) this gave the jualclary 
tremendOUS Scope for questioning Ministerial decisions. 
These events,, encouraging the increased intervention of 
the judiciary in the operation of the Loi Royer would appear 
to have created a new level of control superceeding both the 
CDUCs and CNUC, with the consequence that the CDUCs control 
over commercial development is even further reduced. 
10.4. OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE LAW 
One of the most important effects of the law as far as 
the developers are concerned is that the legislation has 
considerably increased the cost of building a large store. 
Messerlin (1982) argues that the Loi Royer has introduced 
uneccessary costs for the consumer (figure 10.3). If the 
demand for distribution services is D-D, then without the 
legislation this demand could be met by a sales area of OQ 
at a cost of OE. However7 as the legislation restricts the 
sales area to OR? demand can only be met at a cost of 0A. 
Consequent'Y7 any restriction in the floorspace of new 
units 7 owing to the 
legislation has increased costs by EA, 
and this cost is ultimately borne by the consumer. 
Messerlin further shows that surveys have revealed that 
wil i1 st construction costs have stabilised (owing 
to 
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Figure 10.3 : "Political Costs" of the Loi Royer. 
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rationalisation and the standard isat i on of const ruct i on 
ec hvi iq ues7 eq ui pment7 and fittinas) and land costs a re 
variable7 other costs have risen because of the legislation. 
These politicai costs have become an important e1 ement in 
the overall costs of development. They include the cost of 
surveys and the preparation of dossiers for the CDUC and the 
costs of delay whilst an application is a ut hori sed. 
However, the most important element is the additional costs 
of providing local infrastructure and Oeveloping the social 
and community facilities which may be a precondition of any 
aut ho ri sat i on. 
There are numerous examples of the increased costs of 
development in the literature. Messerlin (1982) quotes the 
case of a Continent hypermarket at Mortigny les Cormeilles. 
in order to obtain an authorisation for an extension of 
2,400 square metres to add small shop units to this store, 
t he owners had to pay out million francs to develop t he 
town inf rast ructure, instal 1a 'pub! ic market f or 30 t raders, 
allow two cinemas int-o the commercial centre and take the 
first ten employees for new jobs created by the extension 
from Montigny les Cormeilles. In addition to these costs, 
this agreement took three years to negotiate. 
Several other examples of the poitical costs of 
development -are cited by Rochard and Peretie (1981). 
At 
Epagny, a village of 840 inhabitants near Annecy in Haute 
Savoie (74), the municipality received 5 million frarics for 
tile opening of a 5,000 square metre Auchan hypermarket. 
For 
a site near Toulouse7 the local communes demanded 15 aill1ion 
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francs "for routine infrastructure and a future i rid ust 1,1 aI 
zone" 7 p! us a percentage of sales, f roiyl 'Lelere f or a mocest 
supermarKet7 and it is claimed that Carrefour paid 140 
million f rancs, for a project in the Merlan q Lta r-. cer of 
Marsei I le. Final ly, at Et rechy in the Paris reg i on 
(Canadean World Distribution 1981) 
7 
the Communist Party sent 
a letter of protest to the Socialist Mayor, claiming t hat 
the I million francs which the local authority had received 
00 1 for authorising a 13,300 square metre Euromarche project was 
a "derisory sum" in view of the sums paid by Carrefour at 
Etampes (4.. 5 million francs for 3,600 square irietres), ana 
Auchan at Bretigny (4 million francs plus 9 Million 
francs-worth of social facilities for a 6,900 square metre 
project). 
Clearly the political costs have become one of, if riot 
t he, most important cost elements of investment. Halley 
(1984)7 the President of Promod'e'h"s 7 claims 
that the initial 
cost of investment has been increased by between 20 and 
50% 
due to these political costs, and this consequently reduces 
the profitability of projects and restricts 
the growth 
capacity of organisations. 
Naturally., with such large investment costs at stake, 
the developers have responded by becoming much more 
devious 
in their applicationS,, searching out loopholes 
in the 
legislation and exploring other ways of side-stepping 
t he 
CDUCs and CNUC. An APCCI (1982) document suggests several 
loopholes in the legislation which the developers have . oeen 
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quick to exploit. Often applications are made for projects 
with a cisproportionate sales area: gross area ratio so t ýiat I-7 
once the unit nas been duilt7 tl, '*Ie "Pseudo" surface can be 
Slowly t rans fo rmed into sales area. -The a rg u ment t hat 
arises over What is sales anc wtiat is storage space is 
f urt her complicated by certain product ranges such as sports 
goods, camping gear and household equipment7 
for which it 
can be difficult to distinguish sales area from stock- 
holding area. 
Other loopholes in the regulations that the developers 
exploit include the integration of empty small units from 
the galerie marchande into the anchor store7 and the use of 
car parks for "promotional" activities which involve the 
sale of goods from gondalas or modules. All these examples 
are methods employed by developers to illegally increase the 
sales area of a store without recourse to the CDUCs- 
A similar range of irregular tactics have been used by 
developers to obtain authorisations for new stores. One of 
the most common of these is for the applicant to hide behind 
a "front" applicant, as the developer is riot obliged to name 
the intended retailer for the proposal. In Compiegne, as 
Rochard and Peretie (1981) report, a town notable easily 
W 
obtained an authorisation for a hypermarket scheme, only to 
revea 1 later t hat he had created a joint company with 
Carrefour to implement the developme"t. He then proceeded 
to sell his shareholding in this colnparly to his partner for 
10 million francs. Carrefour have shown through the success 
of their joint subsidiary companies formed with regional 
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retailers (Chapter Seven), that riot only does tnis fol., Iyl of 
joint i rivest tylent reduce týie costs of oeveiooment 
invo lvi rig a local reg i aria 1 company, 
Know 1 edge 0fI ocal Conditions 
but 
t hat tias greater 
and oft en w1e -1 ds mo re 
influence in he a rea 7 aPPlicati0ns can be more successful 
than they would have been if the major national retailer had 
been the sale applicant. 
The purchase and exchange of authorisations has also 
been encouraged by the Royer legislation. Once again, 
Rochard and Peretie (1981) provide examples of this 
practice. They cite the story of a butcher in Rambouillet 
who received an authorisation for an out of town hypermarket 
and then sold the site and authorisation to Carrefour for 5 
million franCS7 and in Roche sur Yonne the owner of an 
. . 00 Intermarche store obtained permission for an extension to 
his shop and then sold the store to Carrefour, fifteen days 
later. This practice of buying and selling authorisations 
for sites has7 according to Cohen-Chabaud (1981), encouraged 
the growth of intermediataries and speculators, such as Le 
Corre and Vallee., who act as a developer to obtain an 
authorisation and then sell the site to the highest bidder. 
SimilarlY7 as there are no regulations within the Loi 
Royer to control the change of store use, as long as this 
transfer of activities takes place within two years of the 
store closing, it is increasingly common for DIIY and 
furniture/household goods units to become hypermarkets. One 
of the most noted examples of this occurred in Rennes when 
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two furniture stores due to open on 15th Pori! 1981 became a 
Leclerc store. 
The Leclerc group in particular has earned a reputation 
for its ability to find ways around the reguiations. In one 
instance the gr ou p is reported t0 have - received a 
const ruct i on pe rm it for a 77000 square tyietre un itfor 
11 lylaty1ma 1s" which did -not require a CDUC authorisation, ana 
then opened a hypermarket, claiming that as humans are 
mammals they had not broken the law .! 
Episodes such as 
this have not endeared Leclerc to either the CDUCs or CNUC, 
, "the cavalier methods and, as Cohen-Chabaud (1981) remarks 17 
of the Leclerc group are always disturbing". 
In November 1980 (Rochard 1980)7 the Leclerc group even 
went as far as calling a "Council of War" of 380 Leclerc 
adherents, and voted to proceed with unofficial openings if 
autharisations were not forthcoming. More recently, Leclerc 
has challenged the administration's right to control margins 
and prevent the discount selling of petrol, boaks, arid 
pharmaceuticals, and announced plans to provide free food, 
or at least sell food at well under the cost price7 to the 
poor (Merritt 1984). It is widely believed that Edouard 
Leclerc harbours political aspirations, which may account 
for some of the more outragous publicity stunts performed 
by 
the group. 
Another method of escaping the restrictions placed upon 
development by the Loi Royer7 is through the construction of 
supermarkets which fall just below the size thresholds 
necessary to seek an authorisation from the CDUCs- 
Comment 
'IS4 
nas already Deen made upon t tie 1 ric reas i rig numbers af 
si. tpermarket applications brought before tne 
CIDUCS7 
and many 
crit 1CS7 suen as Marcharic (1979) argue tnat it is trils type 
of smaller development which escapes the CDUCs, rat he rt han 
tne hypermarket, which provides the greatest threat to the 
traditional small retailer. 
Halley (1984) and the APCCI (1982) claim that the law 
has, by default, encouraged the growth of medium sized and 
intermediate sized stores7 as these stores have grown in 
number over the period of the Lol Royer's existence. After 
showing signs of levelling off in the early and mid 1970s, 
both the number and floorspace of new supermarkets opening 
each year has risen noticeably since 1978 (figure 10.4). 
Whilst one could argue that this development of medium sized 
self-service stores is good for the consumers, as it 
increases the number of local shops which operate modern 
distribution techniques, with the associated benefits of 
lower prices. Others (Halley 1984), claim that the growth 
in supermarkets at the expense of hypermarkets is 
detrimental to consumers, because as the size of a self- 
service store falls, so does the range of goocs and services 
offered. 
Sales area alone is a poor measure of a store's 
potential impact. As the APCCI (1982) suggest, a store of 
900 square metres of sales space in a town of 73,5 00 
inhabitants will have less impact Apon the traditional 
retail structure than a store of 300 square metres, opening 
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Figure 10.4A : Number of Supermarkets Opened per Year 1960- 
1982. (Three Year Running Mean) 
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in a town with a population of 17 2100. Simi lar'Y7 a store of 
000 souare metres will riot have the same imoact if it is a 
ciothes or furniture ShQP7 as it would have if it was a food 
o ut let - The loi Royer coes not allow for this differential 
impact, as it does not distinguish or differentiate between 
different type of use. 
However, from the results of impact studies, it seems 
plausable that the growth of supermarkets and smaller self 
service stores will have a more Oirect impact upon 
traditional small outlets as they will compete against one 
another in the same market area. The noted increase in the 
number of supermarket applications made to the CDUCs 
observed in the previous ChapterS7 and the more favourable 
success rates attributed to this form of development7- are 
likely- to pose a greater threat to the traditional small 
trader. The large retail organisations appear to be looking 
more closely at the potential for development of smaller 
self-service units, and it is likely that, as the potential 
for future growth in the hypermarket sector declines with 
rising development costs and store saturation7 their 
attention will focus more closely upon this type of store. 
As the law only distinguishes between small and large 
than sma-1 and large firms., there are at stores, rather I 
present few restrictions to prevent the large retailers from 
investing in smaller stores formats. 
The direct threat to the traditional independent 
retai ler will not 7 however, coate solely 
from the large 
retail groups. As figure 10.5 illustrates, the proportion 
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Figure*10.5 : Number of Supermarkets Opened per Year by 
Type of Organisation 1960-1982. 
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of SLIpermarkets openec each year by incepencent traders is 
rising steadily. These inceperdents týjat open supermarkets 
are likely to belong to affiliated groups SUCýI as LeClerc 
ana I nz e ma rc tie, aýIC ColiseqL(eYltly beylLufit from t-le E) uy 1 ng 
power and organisation of these groups. This allows them to 
provide a highly competitive operation at the local store 
level., and it is likely that the most immediate threat to 
the traditional independents will come from these organised 
affiliated small traders. 
Marchand (1979), and others also argue that by 
prohibiting new developments, the Royer legislation has in 
effect protected those stores that already exist7 
effectively creating a monopoly or preserved environment for 
them to operate in. The increased costs of development 
resulting from the regulations restricts the ability of the 
true independent traders to develop large stores, as Leclerc 
has commented 
"t he law protects the large forms of capital. 
Distribution has become a privilege for'the large. 
(Rochard and Peretie 1981) 
a 'view which is endorsed in the same article by Halley of 
Promod'eis ... 
"t he law creates distortions between enterprises 
which have the ability to obtain an authorisation and 
those which do not. " 
In addition to affording some form of protection to the 
organisations t hat are already established in the 
ýiypermarket sector, tile 1egislation, certainly durinQ t he 
early yea rs 0f its application could be seen 
to be 
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glaintaining spatial monopolies at the local level. Coquery 
(1976) has commented upon the application of -the 
law in 1974 
and 19757 ano a ra ues t hat the legislation nas merely 
reinforced the regional avid urban disparities in commercial 
equipment that previously existed. He supports this claim 
by suggesting that in the fi rst two years of the 
legislat ion, the majority of applications for new 
developments continued to be concentrated upon those areas 
and towns which had already successfully accepted the 
hypermarket concept, and where population densities were 
high. Althoucjh this claim may be less applicable now, as 
retailers are turning towards the secondary market areas, 
they appear to be making this move of their own -accord 
rather than being forced into these areas by the strict 
controls over development in more favourable primary market 
areas., 
10. '5. SUMMARY 
Evaluation of the results of the CDUC and CNUC 
decisions raises several issues which appear to have done 
little to strengthen the position of the traditional 
independent retailer with respect to the large retail 
Organisations. Success rates for projects may be higher 
than a simple analysis of the total number of applications 
suggests, owing to the occurrence of multiple applications 
upon single sites. Hence, the CDUCs and CNUC may only 
delay 
rather than prevent development. Similarly, the 
influence 
of Ministerial control, which would seem to be vulnerable 
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t0 electoral pressures, and the intervent i on 0ft he 
J I. Id icI ary, t1as 1moI ement ed new levels of cont I Wn I Co. 01 
further centralises decisions, ana reduces the infli-tence of 
the local level CDUCs over commercial development. 
The Loi Royer has undoubtedly raised the costs Of 
deve Io pment,, with the consequence that the search for 
loopholes in the legislation has intensified. Developers 
have exploited technicalities within the legislation, made 
use of f ront orcianisations to propose projects, and 
purchased applications from successful applicants. in 
addit'on7 the increased numbe r of supermarket openings., 
largely by affiliated independents, may be partly 
attributed to the restrictions and increased costs of larger 
developments due to the Loi Royer. This growth in 
supermarkets and smaller self-service stores is likely to 
bring organised retailers into a more direct conflict with 
the traditional independents which the law aimed to protect. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEi,, 4 :A CASE STUDY - THE BRITTANY REGION' 
Many of the issues raised by the evaluation Of the 
workings of t he CDUCs arid CNUC7 can be further illustrateo 
by examining hypermarket development in more detail at t he 
regional sca 16. The four d4partements making up t Fie 
Brittany region; C'Otes-du-Nord (22), Finistere (29) 
. Ille- 
et-Vilaine (3 5 arid Morbihan (56) 7 contained a population 
of 2.7 million in 1984, making the area the sixth most 
populated of the 21 economic planning regions in France. 
This population is concentrated 
Ii rk 
the coastal 
. 10 settlements, particularly in the peninsular departertients, 
and the towns of Rennes (Ile-et-Vilaine),, St Brieuc (COtes- 
du-Nord)., B rest and Quimper (Finistere) 7 and Lorient 
. 10 (Morbihan) dominate their respective departements. The 
demographic and socio-econofftic characterisics of the region 
(figure 
. 
11.1) reveal a population with an above average 
proportion of its inhabitants below the age of twenty and 
above sixty-five years of age, reflect'ing the historical 
11 
t rend of migration from the region by t he working 
population. The reg i on, in terms of annual income per 
person was ranked 16th of the 21 regions of France in 1981, 
and with respect to the proportion of households owning 
certain items of household equiPMent7 Brittany falls below 
the national average in all categories, with the exception 
of car and deep freezer ownership. 
Despite these apparent indications of a below average 
standard of living and potential spending power, the total 
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1 ci u re i1 Brittany - Demograptiic and cSocio-F-(: (3nc), y, jc C ha ract eri st i cs. 
1. Ace St 'ructure (1982) 
National Average in Each Category 100 
Brittany -0- 19 Years 104.3 
- 20 - 64 Years 96.7 
- 65 + Years 104.7 
Annual Revenue per Person (1981) 
.I National Average 54 366 Francs 
Brittany 49 213 Francs (ranked lEth) 
3. Ownership of Household Equipment (1982) 
Household Ownership F rance Brittany 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Car 72.1 74.8 
T. V. 91.0 90.2 
Colour T. V. 56.3,50.1 
Ref riq erator 9: 6.1 94.7 
Washing Machine 81.7 7 8. 
Dish Washer 19.7 JI. 8.6 
Deep Freeze 30.7 
Telephone 713.7 79.0 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Le Commerce Moderne, 608,1984. 
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retail turnover of Brittany in 1979 (24, =7 286 F) was t he '2 
eig)*h highest in France (Duvey and Castenet 198()). in line 
with the national averages, 46% of this ti. trnover was 
accounted for by food sales and 54% by non-food sales. 
Furthermore, the region appears to be particularly well 
represented in terms of self-service floorspace with '46 
hypermarkets and 289 supermarkets spread throughout Brittany 
at the begining of 1983. These stores give Brittany one of 
the highest densities of self-service floorspace in France, 
, and a 
11 four de6parteffierts are above the national average 
(figure 11.2). The self-service floorspace density figure 
for Cotes-du-Nord is one of the highest in the country. 
The strong representation of self-service retailing in 
Brittany is undoubtedly linked to the presence in the region 
of two important figures in the development of the 
hypermarket and supermarket concepts in France, Edoljard 
Leclerc, and Jean Cam. The role played by Leclerc in the 
spread of low margin self-service retailing has already been 
mentioned, but Cam and his Rallye group have been equally 
significant, as Rallye has developed into one of the major 
regional hypermarket traders. 
Jean Cam and his friend, Louis Le Gouez, entered 
retailing in 1948 through a small 25 square metre boutique 
in Brest. This store was followed by the openings of a 
further two small shops in Brest, and then in 1957, Cam 
closed these three stores to open a 1,50C. ) square metre store 
in the town trading under the name of "Magasin Jean" (LSA 
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Figure 11. "': Brittany - Self Service Retailing 198: 1. 
PoDulation Self Service Sales Area 
Departement Uono) Sales Area (Sq. M. per 1,0C. )O 
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751 1980). The success of this larger store prompted 
Per" rlg 7 over 
t he 
a decade Iater7 of the fi rst Ra, I lye 
hypermarket at Brest in 1968. 
Other Rallye hype rma rket s in the region were soon 
developed at Quimper and Lanester (near Larient) in 1969 and 
at Lannion in 1973. The group concentrated upon a discount 
policy and p1 aced a strong emphasis on regional brands. 
Ca nseq uent I y, Rallye became firmly associated with the 
Brittany region7 and by the end of 1982,7 of the gro Up7 S 15 
hypermarkets were located in the region. As noted in 
Chapter Eight, Rallye have been one of the primarily 
regional groups that have attempted to move out from their 
regional base into the national market. The group regret 
not having attempted to develop on a national scale at an 
earlier stage in their history, as the Director General in 
1978., Francois Le Gouez remarked... 
"we lost three years through lack of confidence and 
excess of prudence. This was the fastest period Of 
hypermarket expansion, the years of gold. " (LSA 689 
1978) 
The presence of both the Rallye and Leclerc groups in the 
region goes some way towards explaining the strong 
commit-m-ent towards the hypermarket and supermarket in 
Brittany. 
The hypermarkets opened prior to the Loi Royer (map 
11.1) were concentrated on tile major urban centres in 
t he 
region. Brest, St Brieuc., RenneS7 Quimper and Lorient all 
possessed hypermarkets by the end of 1970. At the enc of 
19737 14 hypermarkets had been opened in Brittany, four 
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. Map 11.1 -. Brittany - HyPermarkets OPened 1963-1982 
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were operated by Rallye, two by Leclerc, and the others by a 
variety of regional grOuPs such as Econo, niques ce Rennes 
(Matyimol-L t tl )7 Superouest (Superouest), St6' des hype nytagas iris 
Brcwtons (Escale), Hyperouest (Montreal), and Ets le Strat 
(Concorde). Following initial rapid development whiciri saw 
the opening o. f five units in both 1969 and 1970, the pace of 
development slowed to one or two new stores per year. An 
opening rate that has been maintained since the Loi Royer. 
The stores opened since the introduction of the Royer 
legislation have similarly been concentrated on the larger 
urban centres, but as elsewhere in France during the mid and 
late 1970"s7 infilling of sites has occurred with 
hypermarkets opening in smaller centres such as Foug ere s7 
GuingamP7 Morlaix, Vannes and Pontivy. 
11.1 THE-CDUCs AND CNUC IN BRITTANY 
Following the establishment of the new CDUCs. the 
number of applications for new developments based upon 
hypermarkets remained static at around seven proposals per 
year from the mid 1970s until the early 1980s (figure 11.3), 
and then showed signs of decline in the 1980s. The early 
2) tended applications for hypermarket development (map 11, 
to concentrate upon the major centres such as Rennes, 
Lorient, Brest and Quimper, diffusing to smaller centres 
like St Mal 07 LandernaU7 Plougoumelen (west of Vannes), 
Paimpol (an the north coast) and Guipavas (east of Brest) as 
time Progressed. Development was sought equally between the 
four de"'partements making up the region, with the exception 
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Figure 11.3 : Brittany - Applications for Hypezmarket and 
Supenrarket based Development. 
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man' 11.2 : Brittany - Applications for Hypermarket Development 1974-196.2 
X Accepted * Refused 
(After CNUC decisicn) 
400 
Man 11.2 (Contd) C- 
Aocepted * Refused 
(After CNUC decisicn) 
1980,, 1981.. 1982 (12 Applicatims +2 unlocated) 
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Of Cotes-du-Nord, which received on-Ly three apolications 
between 1974 and 19822. Of the 58 applications mace to the 
CDUCS Det ween 1974 and 19 8for hypermarKet oasea 
development, I O'n'y were authorised by the CDUCs, 
although this figure was raised to 9 (15.5%) following the 
intervention of the Minister (figure 11.4). 
However, as suggested earlier 7 figures based simply 
upon numbers of applications tend to be misleading as this 
does not give a true indication of the real potential for 
hypermarket development in terms of the sites sought. When 
t he nu mber of applications made to the CDUCs are regarded as 
the number of sites or markets for which applications were 
made, the number of potential hypermarket sites is reduced 
to 29. This reassessment has consequences for the success 
rates for these applications which are doubled for both the 
CDUCs and CNUC to 20.7% and 31% respectively. The greatest 
effect of this reassessment of the number of applications 
and their rates of success is seen in the Ille-et-Vilaine 
departement - (35), in which the overall success rate 
is 
raised from 16.7% of the total number of hypermarket 
I 
applications, to 42.9%, y 
if multiple applications upon the 
same site are disregarded. 
A prime example of multiple applications upon one site 
or for one potential catchment area is the battle 
that took 
place for the third hypermarket in Rennes, which 
is 
discussed by Gautier (1979). In 19767 two applications were 
made for a third hypermarket in the town by 
Ste Nouvelle de 
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Figure Ll. 4.,, Brittany - Applicatio-ris ft or ri ypermar,. (ec 
Deve 1o pment 1974- -L 98. - 
-1 -- , 
. La i otal 
Numbers of App! icat i ons 1974-- 982. 
Authorisea oy 
Number of CDUC CNUC 
D'eparteme-rit Applications JN umber% iN umber 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
%J 000 
29 18 16.7 4 
35 18 o03 16.7 
56 19 3 ; 15.8 4 0.5 
Brittany Total 58 6 10.3 9 15.5 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Sites upon which Applications were made 1974-1982. 
Authorised by 
Number of CDUC CNUC 
Deipartement Applications Number Number 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
29 
35 
56 
11 
7 
8 
29 
ý. Lp 
C) 
%. ýp 
C. ) 
27. -,. 7, 
0 
37.5 
36.4 
4.22.9 
Brittany Total 
"1 25. 
0.7 9 31.0 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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Galerie alid Ca r ref aur (t h ro ug ii t he Association cies 
Commercarts de i'liaison Neuvre) , bot- tl 0'r WIICýl were rejected 
by the CDUC and CNUC. A further two proposais '- OY Larrefour 
were rejected by both Colyllylissiovls it, 1977 anci 19787 as were 
projects put forward by Sedeco, ana Auchatl 7 Continent, ana 
Eurotyiarchg in 1978. At this juncture in the proceed 1 ngs., 
the situation was further complicatec by applications f ram 
Leclerc7 Superest and Intermarchleo for a supermarket 
development of between 2,450 and 2,, 490 square metres. 
Another two hypermarket projects were placed before the CDUC 
by Continent in 1979, and rejected, before Euromarch'eo 
finally had their second application of 1979 authorised on 
appeal by the minister. Thus,, in this instance numerous 
applications were generated by the refusal of the CDUC to 
endorse a proposal, rather than because the site or 
catchment area could support all these applications. In 
this case the legislation only managed to celay development, 
and did not prevent it. 
The example of Rennes, along with others such as the 
five applications needed by Euromarchibo between 1974 and 1978 
to obtain an authorisation for development in Lorient (LSA 
807 1981a), and the experience of the Union des Cooperateurs 
Lorientais, who became so frustrated with their efforts to 
obtain an authorisation for a site at Lorient, after five 
refusals from, the CDUC and one refusal from the Minister, 
that they decided in 1978 to side-step the regulations and 
t ransf o rmed a large no n-f 0 od store into a hy pe rma rK e-r 
(Basset 1980)? would seem to reaffirm that a large 
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proportion Of the total applications for hypermarket based 
projects are in fact merely generatec3 by the presence ano 
behaviour of the CDUCs and CNUC. Fu rt he rmo re 7 the eventual 
success of these applicants., p1LLS the continued steady pace 
of view hypermarket openings in Brittany, suggests that the 
CDUCs and CNLJC have only had a celaying effect upon view 
cievelopments. 
The second maj or issue raised by the preceeding 
evaluatiori of the CDUCs and CNUC in the region, is that of 
the im pact of the Minister upon new development. 
Ministerial impact in Brittan y has been most pronounced in 
Ille-et-Villaine7 as before the CNUC stage no projects had 
been authorised in the d'eOpartement. The overturning of CDUC 
decisions by the Minister came to a head in April 1982 
(Hennek 1982)7 when the CNUC authorised a proposal from 
Semaeb for a commercial centre of 11,950 square metres close 
to the Trois Soleils centre in Rennes. The reversal of the 
original decision made by the CDUC (which had firmly 
rejected this application by 15 votes to 6) drew a strong 
reaction from local traders who disrupted the next meeting 
of the CDUC on 6th July 19827 demanding that the PrI6fet 
should protest about the CNUC decision. At this meeting of 
the CDUC7 the trader and craftsmen representatives on the 
commission withdrew from the chamber in protest when a 
proposal for a Somabri DIY outlet made by Semaeb was brought 
before t hem., returning later to cebate two other proposals 
for extensions that were on the agenda. 
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*00 On their return, they found that the Prefet had 
arinouncea that as the CDUC meetina had oeen quorate oefoi-e 
the walk out, a decision to authorise the new Seffiaeb/Somiabri 
project by 5 votes to Z, Made in tPie aosence of the trader 
and craftsmen representatives was valid. The traders 
promptly walked out again and lodged an appeal against týiis 
decision with the Administrative Tribunal which was upheld. 
A repeat application by Semaeb/Somabri at a later CDUC 
meeting was defeated by 12 votes to 5., This case provides 
an example of the disenchantment with the Ministerial right 
to overrule. CDUC decisions that often occurred at the local 
level. 
As elsewhere, the Brittany region has experienced 
increased activity in the supermarket sector. As figure 
11.5 reveals, there has been a rapid rise in the number of 
new supermarkets opening each year since the mid 1970s. 
From approximately 4 new store openings per year in the 
196OS7 
and between 10 and 15 in the early 1970s., the volume 
of store openings has increased to around 20 units per year 
between 1976 and 1980, and to 35-40 since 1980. 
This sharp rise in the number of new supermarket 
openings is primarily due to, an increase in the number of 
smaller units ( with under 1,000 square metres of sales 
space) wh i1 st larger stores (t hose over i, 00C) square 
metres in size) have tended to grow steadily. 
In 197-, 'j',, the 
proportion of existing supermarkets that fell into 
the 600- 
799 square ryietres and 800-999 square metres size categories 
was 15.6% and 1CJ. 3% respectively. By 
1982 these two 
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Figure 11.5 : Brittany - Hypermarkets and Supermarkets 
Opened. 
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0 10 0 r'ý 1S ý`l aC -I- IsentoaY, ci -tre SýJows 
&- II '. G tiese two si-,: *Lm c- asses are tý-e one si r-, wIllicti 
OCCI-111)lec 
a I, a W'C rl 
curing 1, -rie LDiz to 1982, perlob, wr-iiist most o-cner 
si--:, e categories nave experienced a relative decline. This 
a rowt h in suoermarKets that fall below the size thresholds 
necessary for a development to be referred to t he CDUC7 
would seem to support the assertion that developers are 
paying increasing attention to this form of project. 
The number of applications made to the CDUC for 
supermarket development has remained steady (refer to figure 
11.3) with 233 (47.9%) of the 48 proposals mace between 1974 
and 1982 receiving an authorisation after the CDUC and CNUC 
deliberations. i Y1 terms of the average size of proposals 
(figure 11.7), the slight rise in the average area of 
supermarKet applications, from under -,,, 500 square metres in 
the mid 1970s to close to 2,000 square metres in tile early 
198OS7 corresponding with a cecline in the average size of 
applications based upon hypermarkets from 6,000-6,500 square 
metres to 5,000 sqUare metres over the same period, may be 
further tentative evidence of developers turning towards 
larger supermarket or smaller hypermarket developments, as 
the major consumer markets are occupied by hypermarkets. 
This would certainly appear to be true at the regional scale 
where7 as in the case Of Br1ttanY7 all of the major -A r ban 
centres oossess nypermarket developments. 
he fi-nal -Issue raisea by tne evaluation of CDUL ano 
CJ\iUC decisions is the suggestion that by 
I'm't1n97 or at 
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Figure 11.7 : Brittany - Average Size of Hypennarket and 
SuPelanarket Applications. 
(Three Year Running me-an) 
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-least ceiaying, i new projects, the L-01 Royer merely PrIatects 
et-, COI. ('1'4aqE? S loca, i IYI(3rlo(: ) 
- 01-Y Sl-C'-'8tlOýIS fOP eX: LSrlrl(3 s-c ores 
aric C) raarli sat i ons. 11.1 botýl týne case of Rennes ( Ga utie I- 
, 979) anc QuJ. fyi oe, r (Dat-toert iWS), refererice is mace -ý; 0 
consumer organisations welcoming a ý) ý3 -i ic at I Q., j s (3 1, new 
d eve 1o pment., as uney wisned to see tne local monopolies of 
t he exist I rig Rallye and Mamm a tit h (Rennes) and Rallye 
(Qluimper) stores broken. 
in Chapter Seven it was suggested that tile Loi Ro ye r 
had 
'failed 
t C) restrict the growth of tile large retai 1 
o rgain i sat i ons which had continued to dominate the 
hypermarket sector in spite of the new regulations. As 
observed on the national scale, the proportion of 
hypermarkets in the Brittany region that are owned by 
"Grandes Surfaces" organisations has actually increased 
since the introduction of the Loi Royer (figure 11.8). This 
g ý%Owt h in o wne rs hip by the large organisations has been 
achieved by the takeover of most of the stores that had been 
opened before 1973 by local independent firms. This method 
of expansion, which side-steps the CDUCs a-nd CNUC, has been 
pursued by most of the "Grandes Surfaces" groups, as Jean 
Cam has commented ... 
if our group finds it impossible to expand as is 
necessary and our right, we must purchase. " (LSA 751 
1980) 
Such has been the fate of the stores operated by Economiques 
de Rennes,, which have been taken over by Rallye (St Brieuc) 
I anci Sog ramo (Rennes) . Rallye nave a. LSO acq ul reci 
t tie 
Hyperouest store at Rennes/St Gregoire, whilst Promodes toot-ý 
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Brittany - 
0rga -n is at 1 Or**,. 
ype 
urqarl I sac loýl 974 (70 L. 58.2 (7- 
----------------------------------------------- 
"Grances Surfaces" . 28.6 50.0 Mult i pies ii4. ýZ" i -L. 5 Cooperatives 7.7 
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corit ro 1 Of the Hypeiý(ylagasitis BI-LattoýIS at VallylL=S7 alic 
the Ets 'j:. LD "Coýicorce" s't01'e at Loric-«ri«r, (wfllcl-l 
its floorspace to that of a supermarket) was purcýlasecj 
As Eco itl 1979 and reopened as a hypermar"Ket in 
Althouati the strong presence of Leclerc and ! nte rma rcrie 
in the region ensures that the proportion of retail turnover 
that is taken by "large retail organisations" is relatively 
lowli wtletl CC)tyl-: )erec to at fler reg 1 ons in F rance (figure i 1.19) 
tile majority of this share (92.1% in the case of fooo 
turnover) is accounted for by only four organisatiorls 
(Promodýs, Comptairs Modernes, Rallye and Radar) . This 
suggests a high degree or concentration within the large 
organisation sectors in the region. 
11.2. THE DEBATE CONCERNING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
in view of these apparent weaknesses in the legislation 
it is interesting to review the reaction of the government, 
retailers7 and the others involved in the legislative 
process, to t he law7 with particular reference -c o any 
possible solutions to these probo. lems that may have been 
proposea. it should? however, be rioted that many of the 
provisions of the Loi Royer, particularly those aiding the 
consumer, were widely accepted and applauded. The fourth 
annual report, on the law presented to parliament in i 977 
p ro IAC3 y announced the success of articles . 37 to 46 
dea Itwitht he i in prov eryie-rit 0f 
compe, c it ion", 
. 4= the Conditions 01 
'ecljý, L= týle nuY, oe r of i iust rated by aa 
complaints registered on the grounds or discriminatory sales 
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; =icure 11.9: iyarket Sinares of ieaC ItIC3 RiRtai i UDS. 
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Urrover -, a rge Ret aiIe rs 0 13 0 11 e rs 
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Coryipt ai rs 
Turnover Promodes Modernes Rallye Radar 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Retai 1 5.23% 
Food 9.28% 
Non-Food 1.74% 
4.02% 3.84% 0.98% 
6.7-1% 4.98% 1.95% 
1.69% 2.86% 0.98% 
Source: Duvey and Castanet (1980) 
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and prices. 
lKewise, tne special comoensatory aic sc6eme for oicer 
re-c a 11 e rs saw considerable use 7 and ýIas co rit 1 ri i-ted ri 
ex 1 st ence Oeyonc the originally proposec f- ive year perioc. 
in the first five years of operation, 17 2157 0007 0(7. )() francs 
I 
were paid to retailers ana craftsmen - 15*17%ý 32 claims mace by 
retailers, and 197597 by craftsmen for special compensation 
aid were met7 ana a further 6,6,36 claims by retailers and 
10,34: 5 by craftsmen were authorised from the economic and 
social development fund. In allP 437457 retailers benefited 
from these schemes before they were rearganised in the 
Finance Bill of 1982 QLSA 967 1985). 
This 1982 legislation replaced the old payment schemes 
with an "indemnite de dtapart", and the size of the grant7 
which had previously been calculated on tile basis of the 
best three years revenue from the last five years of 
operat '0n7 was to be fixed by a local commission. 
Furthermore7 article 104 of this Act doubled the tax on 
large surface stores to 20 francs per square metre for 
businesses with a turnover of less than 10,000 francs per 
square metre7 and to 40 francs for those with a turnover in 
excess of 207ooo francs per square metre, 
revisions (LSA 835 1982). 
to tuna tnese 
However7 it is apparent from the previous analysis Of 
CDUC and CNUC applicat'onS7 and the Brittany case study, 
that there are many fallings In the legislation as It 
presently stands? particularly with regard, to articles 
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to -%S4 wnicn deal wittl "commercia- equipment A-tic 31 r1c] 
-jere nas : nee*n IYOACý) aeoA-te, -. 
"7'j cerma-lniv since t-ie OC- 
tOOK office in r De as 10 tlow rne regulations C0U, 
ammerlce(3 or revisec to counter most of T, nese sno r-c com i. nas 
in September 1981, Andr'e5 Delelis anno, =d that týie iriinis-tcry 
Of Commerce anc, Crafts was preparing to reform t he L01 
Royer, and that detaiis of the proposed reforms wouid be 
revealed early in 1982. However, as Keeler (1965) 
observes,, Chang i rig economic conditions such as ' an 
accelerating inflation rate, a swelling budget deficit ana a 
deteriorating balance of payments which led firstly to the 
i nt roduct i an of an Austerity paCKage in May aric ttien 
to a devalUat ion of the f ranc and -a temporary freeze on 
prices and ýwages in june 1982, celayed any reforms -ctiat 
Delelis may have had in mind. 
According to Keeler (1985) a few days be-Fore tne 
proposed reforms were due to be approved for submission to 
parliament, they were suspended indefinitely at a meeting of 
the Council of Ministers held on the 1st December 1982. 
-t This action was taken on the basis that the government fe. L 
that it could not implement a series of measures which would 
further restrict commercial modernisatiorl. 7 he fi -ria 1 rial 1 
in the coffin for this particular reform package was t he 
remova! of Dellelis in a cabinet reshl-t-ffle in Marcri 198, S, 
.0 
The successor to Delelis, Mlctiel Crepeau., has also 41 
pleagec himself to reform of týie ý-oi Royer, anc he announceo 
to the general assembly of chambers oF commerce anc industry 
(VICal 
-L, 
98za) that ... 
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"the sYstem estaoilsriec by tne , Ol tloyer is riot coca, 1 Gesil, e tO Change it. " 
- . 00 Crepeau ac-, nowlecoges rna-c cer-ýajn asoec-rs c)f trje ýLeais-4. atlot-l 
are outmociec., if not outdatec, and beiieves triat -tne oo'clons 
for reform are twofoic; ei-cr-ser. retention of tne oasic Iaw 
but wit h modifications 7 or t tie introduction of a 
complementary law. it is wicely expectec that reform wI1 -1 
take the form of modifications to the existing regulations 
and as LSA 906 1983 suggests the ap of the 1966 proach 
elections is likely to ... 
"accelerate reform, in a way favourable to small 
traders and against those who generate commercial 
innovat i on. 
Numerous proposals for reform have been debated in the 
various institutions and organisations in the distributive 
sector. The Chambers of Commerce and Industry (APCCI 1982) 
have called for more extensive (3ossiers to be presented to 
the CDUCs,, which would define and explain the figures quoted 
in the dossiers. The Federation des Associations de 
Commercants (FAM 7 'composed of 
80,000 members of 
independent and specialist retailers, have suggested 
abolishing the CDUCs and size thresholds, if the large 
retail groups opened up their centrales d'achat to all 
traders in the catchment area of a store7 thus enabling 
independents to take advantage of the same ciscounts ana 
buying conditions enjoyed by the large stores (LSA 874 
19813) . 
The major debate has., however,, focused upon three main 
areas of reform; the composition of trie CDUCs and CNUC; trie 
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(2ece*ri*t ra 11 sau 1. Q YI O'r ý', nis-terial al-t-rriarl-cy to -c ý, L. 1, L=Q 1 C) na i 
evel aric, of t, 
II 
the lowering tie sl--:, e thres. nolos app-: ying to 
Yiew Projects. 
..., .L. 
i ne Composit ion of the CDUCs and CNUC 
VariO IAS part icipants in the cistribution sector nave 
debated t he composition of the CDUCs and CNUC. An early 
survey of the CDUCs uncertaKen by L-SA ki-SA 475 197"' anc 5(--)6 
1974) 7 concluded that sma 11 traders and sma 11 communes 
dominated the commissions. According to the law, the six 
independent retailers craftsmen on the CDUCs should 
account for 35% of the membership. Yet LSA revealed that 
for the 91 de5partements surveyed, 39% of the representatives 
were independent traders or craftsmen7 anc no fewer than two 
thirds of the CDUCs contained a greater proportion of 
t rade rs and craftsmen than Royer had legislated for., This 
discrepancy arose because 13% of the locally elected 
rep resent at iv es were themselves either traders or 
craftsmen. This survey also showed that 56% of the locally 
elected representatives came from communes of less than 
5,000 i nhab it ant s7 and only 14% from communes with over 
50,000 inhabitants - thus giving the smaller communes and 
rural communities greater representation on the commissions. 
Further critiesa)s of tile composition of the CDUCs can be 
found in the retail trade publ icat i ons. Chaudet., the 
assistant to the mayor of Rennes, welcomed the extra control 
over retail development which the law provided 
(LSA 526 
1975), but noted that as the members of the commissions 
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representea two distinct i tit e rest a 110 UPSIP t tie elected 
reoresentatives w it ri 0()!. Ltlc: al interests7 ard tnose witri 
economic and social interests,, a natural division between 
these two groups an the CDUCs was ensured7 avid triis was 
11 kely to hivicier thei. 10 Jr impartiality and effectiveness. 
remedy this fa i1i ng, Chaudet siAggested ttlat instead of a 
sing le CDUC, there should be two committees voicing their 
distinct 0P in ' o"S7 and leaving the Pr6fet with the f inal 
decision. This charge of personal interests affecting 
impartiality was also made by Hermand (1975) 7 who a ra ued 
that the traders on the commission were the most influential 
group, as the locally elected representatives7 unlike their 
commercial counterparts,, were rarely a homogeneous groUP7 
I 
as they usually represented different political interests 
and sections of the electorate. 
Many critics have suggested an increase in the number 
of consumer representatives on the CDUCs. For example, the 
FAC have argued for four consumer representatives on the 
CDUC and a reduction in the number of locally elected 
officials to seven. However others (Laresse 1981), argue 
that consumer representation should riot be increased as most 
consumer groups represent some political party... 
"France is the one country in Europe where the 
syndicates are less representative of the active 
population the most creditable consumer 
represent 4! kt-ives are the locally elected officials. 
" 
ihe National Syndicate of Multiple Retailers (Le T 
Commerce Moderne 51,52 1982) has called for a reduction in the 
number of representatives from local traders on the CDUCs as I 
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tney are not always objective. ine Chamoers of Commerce aric 
no ust ry nave s uo a est ed t riat ttle tylayol, 0ý tle Ca ly) tyl U r-I E? 
.. I. 4s a c3j acent 'r, 0 that in which the project ,. proposed S 10 UC 
riave more -ctlan a consultative role on the CDUC., gI veri t ýie 
effect t hat a view cevelopment is -Likely to have IA 00 Y1 t he 
co mme rc iaI structure of his or her commune - pointinq C) 1-k t 
t hat store catchment areas and zones of influ'imce do riot 
respect administrative boundaries. inal iy, 'the employees 
groups have also demanded greater representation for 
themselves, paricularly at the national level. 7he Force 
Ouvrie're argue that as the major employees organisation in 
the food sector7 they should have-a representative on the 
CNUC (LSA 904 1983). 
11.2.2. Tile Decent ral isat ion of Ministerial Authority 
The appeal mechanism involving the CNUC has also been 
criticised as being too centralist. Decisions on commercial 
planning issues have generally been regarded as part of the 
role of the local administration, and it has been suggested 
that the CNUC and Minister only view an appeal from a 
national perspectives, and do not appreciate local factors. 
Much debate has centered upon the notion of creating a 
regional commission (CRUC) to replace either the CDUCs or 
CNUC. Socialist philosophy with its commitment , r, 0 
decentralisation of authority would suggest that the removal 
of Ministerial powers to the regional level, rather than tne 
suovention of local (CDUC) authority by a regional mody, is 
more likely to be an eleme nt of any reforms instigated by a 
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Socialist administration. lo this eric, in all ý-ds outilne 
'o prooosals aria nints CreQEa'-I rJas cc)ýJstaryý. - Iy re -. ý. te rat ea n 15 
cis Pi easlAre w -i tht he present arrana em en -c wr-ýe ieby t tie 
ýyi ini st er in Paris is ultimately responsiole fc)), com mer c1a 
cevelopment in the Alps ... 
" it is for the 1 ocal rep resent at i ves .maya rs, and t hose elected to the Chambers of Commerce anc inci-ts . try 
and Chambers of Trade, ano also eventuaily t he 
consumem, to decide if they wish to autharise a deveiopment or riot. It is they wno are the best 
judges... " (CrLIpeau in Cholet 1. mdated). 
Critics of decentalisation (Vidal 198.3b), point to the 
problems that the creation of a series of CRUCs to replace 
the CNUC may cause. Decentralisation in this way may 1n 
fact have the opposite effect to that desired, in that it 
could increase the influence of local politics at tý-je 
expense of objective commercial decisions., whereas at 'Least 
Ministerial decisions are largely objective, based upon the 
existing or given knowledge of economic avid comffiercial 
affairs in the d6partement concerned. The creation of a 
regional commission also runs the risk of decisions becoming 
more discriminatory, as some commissions are likely to be 
mo re liberal than others, and there will be no Ministerial 
check to balance out decisions and to act as a control 
mechanism. Decentralisation, some critics argue, increases 
the likelihood of reg i ona 1 monopolies developing, as 
disc rim inat ion may also occur between local ana reg i ona 1 
retai lers (who may be favoured) at the expense of nationa! 
o rg avi i sat io ns. 
spite of the arguments over t tie ac I van"cages aric 
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1 sac varvc ages 0t tie C reat i Orl fa req i ona COMM I ss 1 on 
1 
t nere coes appear to be a consensus ove rt tie neec for 
regional commercial planning documents. CrEfpeau nas voicea 
hIS own approval for sucn cossiers which may icne r0 rlyl 
simi lar to that of the town planning "Scrigmas". and ot tie r 
organisations, have suggested similar proposals. T ýie 17 AC 
(LSA 874 i98 230 ) tiave cal led for five yea I, P1 aris for 
commercial development for each region, which should define 
A 
the size tinresnolds, or projects t riat would need CDUC 
aut ho risat i on, # whilst the Chamber of Commerce and indust ry 
d* 
of Riom has suggested that P1 ans, d' Amenagements 
Commerciaux" should be designed at the regional level by all 
sleconomic partners" (LSA 1326 1984b) - These documents would 
provide more. detailed information for decision makers and 
would ensure a coherence of development of commercial 
structures within a region. 
11.2.3. The Lowering of Size Thresholds 
Similar attention has been paid to the issue of 
lowering the size thresholds necessary for a project to 
require authorisation. Attempts to reduce these size 
thresholds have naturally been opposed by the retailers 
(Sordet 1_982). who argue that a lowering of thresholds will 
pose grave problems for the future adaptability of commerce, 
and efforts to increase productivity in tile retail industry. 
Yet despite these appeaIS7 many see this course of action as 
the only way to curb the "game playeC by Leclerc arc 
intermarchie" (Corien-Chabaud 1981). 
Various suggestions-have been made concerning the level 
a9? 
of sizze 'ttiresnolos 
987 fo 
exaryip e 7 jean Royer 
a ro ues for a level (3f ies area. .. -JC) so 1-ta re met res of sa a. ý-, G 
'C tie Consel I Gene ra I of Bas-Rhine for one of b-ou sq ua re 
met res. Ot ne r leveis have been proposed DY the ce rt a in 
Chambers of Commerce ana Industry; that of Clermont-Ferrand 
suaaested a threshold of 40C-) or scuare metres, ciepercing 
upon whether-the application is inside or outside Clermont- 
Ferrand itself7 and that of d'Ambert (Puy-de-Dome (EZ)) nas 
called for levels to be set at 500 square metres for 
settlements with between 3,000 and 157000 inhabitants and 
300 square metres for other communes. 
Hermand (1975) claims that the thresholds issue poses 
problems as developers can easily alter their proposals to 
outmanoenAver any rigid size limits. Hermand argues that it 
is not always the size of a store that is important, but 
rather the mix of goods within the store. Consequently, 
greater emphasis should be placed upon other aspects of 
operation such as price, service, and quality, rather than 
on size alone. Hermand also suggests that size thresholds 
should be more adaptable, as the opening of a 1,000 square 
metre store in a rural area is likely to have just as 
disturbing effect upon established traders as the opening or 
a 3,000 square metre store in a town of 500,000 inhabitants. 
The government has taken some notice of this latter pa 
i tit 
c once rn i rig the effect of smaller self-service stores 
i TI 
n ri rural areas, arid issued a Circular on 5th October 1978 w 
ic' 
pointed to a rise in the average size of stores' opening 1 ri 
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ru ra 1a reas, and requested e rer s5 1*10 Uic oe 
Caul; :Lo us w tien ce part icularly Oro ects i Y-1 t riese 
areas. 
1 ri Feoruary igai . (Co rien-C naoauc ne Senate 
rej ect ed a proposal by jean C! Ltzel., the Senator foi- Allier 
(0ý; ) to lower the siz-e thresholds for applications to 4C_)0 
square metres of sales space in towns of 5, C)(. -)O innabitants, 
and 750 square metres in towns of 5,000 to 507000. These 
calls for mo re flexibility in thresholds, ei t he r for 
settlements of different sizes; between urban and rural 
areas-, or for different forms of development (DIY store ana 
. hypermarKet etc) is an interesting, and increasingly voiced 
conceot. On several occasions the government has hinted at 
a review of the threshold issue., particularly during the 
term of office of Delelis who favoured a lowering of size 
thresholds to 400 square metres., and suggested that 
thresholds should also vary depending upon the type of 
business and size of commune concerned. This idea may also 
find support from the Cre'opeau, who in response to a question 
concerning the Loi Royer reforms (LSA 944 1984) acknowledged 
that a uniform lowering of size thresholds would not solve 
existing problems. 
11.3). SUMMARY 
The example of Brittany wol-Ild appear to confirm many of 
the suggestions made in previous Chapters relating to 
the 
effects of the Royer legislatiotl- Hypermarket growtin ýias 
contir, Lted the region through the iýi«filliylc3 Of sites, anc 
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he dominant position of tne lai, ge retail organisa-clons has 
oeen re 1nfo reec.. Tý)e cor, sl Ce I' a On :D a DO I ca'l- I orls 
s it es ra-ther tunan -rne -totaii numcier o-F , evea Is 
o ner success rates for orooosals i riva V IL ric CY a i, IYI 0. ), K eý 
c3eve io pment st iian may initially seety, tr"ie Case7 a"r ICiS 
again appears to suggest that the CDUCs and CNUC lylav Y 
delay d eve 1o pment as in the case of Rennes. Dnce aga n 
there is evidence of the considerable influence that t rie 
Minister wields over CDUC decisions and success rates. 
FinallY7 t he strategic adapt i OTIS mad e by retailers ta 
outtranoeuver the legislation are supported by the 
acquisition of independent-owned hypermarkets by the larger 
retail organisations, and the rapid growth of supermarkets, 
especially those falling outside the control of the CDUCS- 
The debate concerning the possible amendmients to the 
Loi Royer has focused upon three major issues; the 
composition of the CDU. Cs and CNUC; the cecentralisation of 
Ministerial authority to the regional level; and a change in 
the size thresholds of applications to be reviewed by the 
commissions. Differing views of these issues have been put 
forward by various participants within the retail sector. 
However, changes in any of these features would havet*Qýrx 
likely to have little more than a cosmetic effect upon 
hypermarket developiment- As suggested at the outset of this 
study, the evolution of retail institutions, such as t. ne 
hypermarket, is dependent ., Pon underlying st r uct u ra 
1 
changes int he retail env iro riment Un. L ess legislation 
attempts to influence these structural forces, 
it is 
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un 11 Kely to alleviate any of the perceivea problems of 
1, r, stiti. ttional cevelopment. State intervention in the f0 rlyi 
-amper of the Loi Royer can nope to acnieve little more than -,. 
wit ht he spatial manifestations of more deep rooted 
structural criange. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE- - STRATEGIC 1M. OLICATIO-NiS 
n a0a it 1 on t0 the adaptions mace by c3 . evel-opers t0 
specifically outmanoeuver the restrictions placed upon new 
projects by the CDUCs and CNUC, a number of further trends 
at a more strategic level of operation may be seen to I)e 
related, in part, to the introduction of the Loi Royer. tie 
increased costs and, albeit largely temporary, delay i ri tne 
construction of new stores owing to the activities of the 
CDUCs and CNUC7 has encouraged the large retail groups to 
turn their attention to other aspects of their ope rat -Lng 
policies. Whilst the majority of these strategic features 
of the organisations are related to more deep-rooted 
st ruct u ra 1 change in the retail environment as a whole it 
can not be denied that the implementation of the Royer 
legislation has been a contributing factor to the increased 
emphasis placed upon these strategic issues by retailers and 
developers. Furthermore, these trends have done much tc 
strengthen the dominant position of the large groups in the 
retail sector7 and the Royer legislation provides no form of 
control over these developments7 which may provide a greater 
threat to the independent retailer than hypermarket 
development. 
12.1. CONCENTRATION 
T he t rend towards concentration in the large store 
sector has already been remarked upon earlier i TI relation 
to the increasing numbers of takeovers and acquisitions of 
4? 7 
r3ot n small organisa-clors ancj sing-le stol, es Oy iarge groups, 
i ri orcer t0 jyja i nt ai ri Q rowt h Oy bi rig ti Oypassi tie contro! 
capacities of the CDUCs and CNUC. in adoition to providing 
a means of continuing expansion in face of such potentially 
restrictive legislation as the Loi Royer, takeovers and 
acquisitions have enabled organisations to grow during 
static periods when there have been no new techniques or 
innovations in the sector which would have normally provided 
a means of further expansion (LSA 75. --'j" 1980b). Other 
takeovers may find their motivation in a desire to expand 
geographically from regional into national markets, whilst 
the aim of shortening distribution channels through vertical 
integration explains the acquisitions involving producers 
and wholesalers. All of these developments reinforce the 
general structural shift within the retail environment to 
t he dominance of the sector by the larger retail 
organisations. 
Another factor crucial to concentration through 
acquisition is the opportunity for takeovers to occur. As a 
retail institution matures and competition intensifies, 
certain organisations will grow at different rates to 
others, depending upon the scope of their resources, and the 
efficiency and dynamism of their management. The less 
dynamic organisations become susceptible to acquisition, as 
they may reach a critical stage where their resources have 
been exhausted and a new capital injection is required, or 
whereby in attempting to keep pace with competitors they 
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have fallen into f inaricia! cjif f icuity. 
Certainiy trie case of France7 t he t rad t1o ria 11 y 
strong I-alyll Iy owne rsti ip an Ci I vivo I vement 1 ýl ret ai 
organisations may a'iso increase the Potential for ta-, eovers. 
As a family controilec cOMParly passes trirougn two or tn ree 
g ene rat io ns, t he shareholding blocks get sfyfal ler and 
sma 11 e r, ma ki rig it easier for a competitor to buy into a 
company th ro ug ht he acquisition of these smaller 
shareholding interests. Furthermore 
, 
the strong personal 
level of control often exercised over organisations by 
founding members may mean that as these individuals age yet 
still maintain control over tile company, the f i. rm car lose 
its competitive edge. 
Such motivations and opportunities for acquisition 
which emerge from, these factorS7 has led to increasina 
concentration through acquisition in the retail sector in 
France. The intensity of t. his trend has oeen noted in the 
major trade journals such as i ibre Service Actualites (LSA 
753 1980b and 839 1982) 7 and 
the now defunct Coope6ration 
Distribution Consommation (Rigoureau. 1978). Many of these 
takeovers relating to the hypermarket operators have been 
commented upon in Chapter Seven, and the Loi Royer by 
increasing the costs7 and delaying the development, of new 
stores has often been the catalyst for such developments. 
Marenco (1984) notes that "external growth operations" 
(mergers, absorptions, and takeovers) of both companies and 
individual stores in the food sector multiplied in 
spectacular fashion during the 1973 to 1979 period. 
Two 
ý)q 
t iii rcis of these develoý)ments were aimed at the acquisit lon 
or iarge stores, ana involved the ten leacjimg retail groups 
in the sector. As a result of this activity, si rice 19 
tnirty-three of the fifty largest food chains in France have 
1 ost their independence, and five groups have been 
responsible for the absorption or takeover of twenty-six of 
these. Marenco (1984) suggests that although medium sized 
fi rms are often more efficient than the larger companies, 
their f inancial structure makes them vulnerable 
takeover 
"Firms with t he best performance on the level of 
operation and with the highest return on pror-it or on 
their capital and which are not amongst the biggest, 
also prove to be the most fragile taking into account 
the imbalance of their financial structure. " 
i. 
vo 
The increasingly complex financial and other linkages 
between organisations, through franchises, joint subsidiary 
Companies. J membership of centrales d7 achat, and other forms 
of collaboration7 means that simple measures of 
concentration such as market shares may understate the true 
magnitude of the situation. 
For example, of considerable importance to the large 
retailers in their search for continued growth has been the 
concentration of buying power through joint centrales 
a 7achat. All the organisations which operate hypermarkets 
either control their own centrale or belong to the large 
buying groups like Socadip, Paridoc, and Di-Fra. As the 
recession and price controls imposed by the Socialist 
government has squeezed retail ma rgins, there has 
been a 
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t rend in the early 198os towards wnat the press has referma 
to as "mega-" or "super-" centrales. 
The first of these mega-centrales formed in early 1'384, 
was the Arci-Association (LSA 9.4 20 1964) whicn comoirea t ne 
buying power of Auchan7 Carrefour, Sogara, Casino, Promodes, 
Metro and Comptoirs Modernes. This association invoived 
organisations with a combined retail turnover in the reg', . on 
of 100 miiiiards of francs. This move has inevitaoly 
rei mf o rcec jt he position of these retailers vis a vis 
oroducers. 
In March. 1984 the members of the Socadip and Paridoc 
buying groups responded to the Arci initiative by forming 
Contact (Contribution a ! Organ i sat i on de Nouvelles 
iechniques et pour ITAme' 'lioration de la Collaboration avec 
les Tiers). Within this grouping the individual members of 
both Socadip and Paridoc were to maintain their separate 
autonomy and structure, whilst the association was to have 
three collective objectives (LSA 926 1984a). 
Firstly, Contact would help French industry by virtue 
of the security given to producers through "privileged 
supplier contracts" with the group. Also., Contact's 
knowledge of external markets would help industry exports, 
and Contact would research and encourage productivity 
between the industrial and commercial partners in the fields 
of logistics and management. 
Secondly, communal studies of marketing techniques 
involvi-ng new technologies would be generated by Contact 
which would help the retail members prepare and adapt 
to the 
431 
ru-cure evo L ut i on or rerict, ret a, -, I tic anc: f in aI ly, egro up 
W0 Ui C enc o 1-L r ag eacia! og ue Witot 'ýi erI all ae ret ai1 
o roan i sat 1 ons tnrosAchout Europe to facilitate excrances of 
experience,, Know-hoW7 and techniques. These reported aims 
of the Con-tact group suggest concentration and COD'Oeration 
for more than solely buying purposes. 
Not to be outdone by the formation of these Yega- 
centales, Di-Fra and the Cooperative Movement centrale., 
SGCCII have also announced an association to improve thei, r 
buying position7 and to exchange experiences (LSA 930 
1984a) . 
The most important consequence of the creation of these 
mega-centrales. for the retail sector has been the increased 
buying power of the large retail organisations (figure 
12.1). The three recently formed iytega-centales now account 
for over 70% of retail grocery turnover. This concentration 
buying power is likely to have even more severe 
consequences for smaller retailers than the concentration of 
retai I groups through acquisitions and takeovers as the 
member companies of these mega-centrales will be able to 
obtain mo re favourable conditions from suppliers and 
producers by virtue of their size- Furthermore, the role of 
joint research and development into marketing and management 
techniques through th-ese, groupings is again likely to 
improve t he position of the 
marketplace. 
large ret ai1e rs 1nt he 
Wil i1 st t he Lo i Royer can not be held specifically 
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Figure 12ý. I: Market Share of Grocery t urnover by 
Buying Groups. 
Contact 28.0% 
Arc i -Assoc i at ion 24.0% 
Di-Fra/SGCC 19.0% 
Leclerc 9.0% 
intermarche 5.5% 
Others 14.5% 
Le Commerce Moderne, 603 1984. 
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responsi b le for tne concentratiovi of 0 1-ty I rig power, t rlis 
init iat ive is closely associated with the more general 
trena towards orgarisational. concentration to whicýi the Loi 
Royer would certainly seem to - have been a cont ri but ing 
factor. Marenco (1984) concludes that the ... 
"movement towards concentration appears t, o be closely 
correlated with the development of larce surface sales 
units. " 
and suggests that the Loi Royer has speeded up the rate of 
concent rat i on. By rest ri ct i ng,, or atI. least increasing the 
costs of traditional expansion through the development of 
new units, the legislation is likely to have focused 
attention on concentration as a means of maintaining growth. 
Furthermore, the Loi Royer provides no control over 
concentration within the retail sector, which is ultimately 
likely to be more detrimental to the small retailer segment 
which the legislation was intended to protect. 
12.1. DIVERSIFICATION 
Another method of maintaining growth pursued by 
hypermarket operators has been diversification. Again the 
inconvenience created to hypermarket development by the Loi 
Royer, coupled with the opportunity to expand in other 
growing sectors., has lead most of the leading hypermarket 
chains into other sectors of act ivity. ! nit ial ly, 
diversification concentrated upon retail activities which 
we re closely associated with existing 
hypermarket 
d eve! o pment s, namely DIY stores and restaurants, 
but the 
late 1970s arid early 1980s has seen further expansion 
into 
Al a 
other growing sectors, most notably sports goods, p1 us t he 
textile7 electrical goods, toy and perfume markets. Sectors 
Which have traditionally been dominated by 1 nC3 I epend I ent 
traders. 
The 1975 to 1979 period saw a number of large 
hypermarket retailers involve themselves in the DIY sect o r., 
either through the launch of their own DIY chains, or by ttie 
acquisition of substantial shareholdings in already 
OP established organisations. in 1977 Euromarche launched 
their own Euroloisir chain of home improvement stores7 and 
Carrefour took a 47% shareholding in Castorama in a deal 
which saw the creation of a 50: 50 joint subsidiary, 
Castorama Expansim, to develop DIY outlets opposite 
Carrefour hypermarkets. 
These developments were followed in 1978 by Casino's 
creation of the Somabri chain (which took over SCM (Obi) in 
1980) and by Cofradel establishing Batti Centre Vetter as a 
50: 50 operation with an importer of DIY materials. In 1979 
Auchan entered this sector by signing an agreement with 
Leroy Merlin. Although Cofradel sold off their share in 
Batti Centre Vetter in 1980, other primarily hypermarket 
operators have continued to invest in the DIY market. 
Rallye opened its first Briker store in 1980, and since then 
intermarchle' and Codec have become involved in the sector. 
Whi Ist the DIY market has continued to be dominated by 
t lie large specialist chains such as Catena and Anpf 
("Monsieur Bricolage"), the entry of the hypermarket 
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organisat ions into this sector is sicnif icant, part icularly 
at tine local level 7 as this invoLvement allows tirie larger 
retailers to integrate their own DIY units into ny pe rmal'Ket 
developments, th us creating a more attractive shopping 
ent it yf o-r t he consumer7 aria excluding independent D1Y 
operators from these environments. 
Like DIY7 restaurants and cafeterias are an integral 
feature of most hypermarket developments in France. 
Initially, these facilities were intended to act as 
a complementary function to the hypermarket to provide cheap 
q- Uality food for the clientele. However 7 the financial 
success of restaurant facilities has resulted in some 
hypermarket operators diversifying further into this sector 
with the creation of restaurant /caf eteri a chains as distinct 
entities within their ýorganisations- 
In 19717 Auchan created FlUnCh7 the first self-service 
restaurant chain in France., and more recently has invested 
in the growing fast food market with Pizza Pa (11379) and Pic 
Pain (1980) (LSA 907 1983a). The most sucessful adventure 
into the restaurant sector by a hypermarket operator has 
been that of Casino (LSA 938 1984a). In 19787 Casino with 
17 Epargne, created Stefany to develop traditional 
rest au rant s followed in 1979 by the founCing of France 
Quick (in association with the Belgium group GB-Inno-BM) 
to take advantage of the expanding fast food market. 
Stefany was absorbed by tine group in 19807 and Casino, fully 
aware of the diversity of types of restaurants,, launched 
Cafe Casino as free standing self-service restaurants in 
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1981. 
I tie success of this civerýsificatior riecessitazed a ri 
internal re a rgani sat ian in 198-7, . 9- 7 wit ht he fo rmat i on of 
Casino Restaurantation as a hoidi i Ing- company to control t he 
various types 0f restaurant operated by the group. 
Fo 11 owi rig th is reorganisat 'On7 Casino Rest au rant at ion 
acquired a 35% shareholding in the Paris based Hippopotamus 
chain of service and theme restaurants and merged Stefany 
with this group. Further expansion has involved the 
acquisition of Pizza Top in 1983, a move into the American 
market in the same year, and an agreement with Whitbread to 
jointly develop Quick fast food outlets in the UK. 
The performance of hypermarket operators in t he 
restaurant sector is illustrated by -figure 12.2, which snows 
that in 1983 Casino and Flunch (Auchan) were respectively 
number one and three in terms of turnover in this sector. 
Although the growth of the restaurant 7 and in particular the 
fast food, sector7 plus the opportunities for expansion may 
have provided the M ajor motivation behind these 
diversif icat ions7 the amount of investment made in 
restaurants and cafeterias by hypermarket retailers 
(particularly Casino and Auchan) during the mid and late 
1970s, suggests that these companies have looked towards 
less traditional sectors in response to the problems posed 
in the hypermarket sector by the Loi Royer. 
lar retail ma rKet Tile g rowt h potential of a Part icl-k- 
obviously has considerable influence upon the decision to 
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iQu re 1.4-. 2: Cafeteria/Restaurant Chalris in =rarice i'38Z. 
Est. Turnover Annual NUMOer Of 
(million francs) Change M Stores 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Casino 1 190 + 26 109 
Accor 1 110 N/A 217 
Flurch (Auchan) 1 000 + 10.3 82 
El it7 air Maxims 320 + 16 60 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* excludes share in Hippopotamus 
Le Commerce Moderne, 599,1984. 
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invest in that sector. in the earIy 198OS7 orle of the major 
rowt h sectors nas been tnat of sports QDOCSI? 'fl-Lic'i rias 
experienced an arinf-tal increase in saies of a, -ol. trld io% per 
atirif-ttyl (So rciet 1981 -sector, It ed is suo com'na 
affiliated and unaffiliated incjepencients, has been growing 
by over 40 new stores per year since 1979 (LSA 947 1984)7 
and since the late 1970s/early 1980s has begun to attract 
the large retail organisations. 
Docks de France created Doc Sport (trading as "Go 
Sport") in 1978 on a 51%: 49% shareholding basis with Odier. 
In 1983, Genty Cathiard took a majority shareholding in this 
subsidiary and merged the chain with its own Segmas (" Team 
5") and Ste Alpine de Sports subsidiaries to form a new 
company called So -Sport (LSA 884 1983). The resulting new 
chain of 25 stores was regarded by LSA as the "birth of the 
first large sports goods chain". 
The other major hypermarket retailer to enter the 
sports goods sub sector has been Rallye with a 2C)% snare in 
At h Let i c, At tic. Rallye followed up this investment early in 
1984 with the acquisition of a 67% stake in the company 
which runs the American sports franchise "Athletes Foot" -a 
chain created in 1972, comprising of 500 stores (400 of 
which are franchised) located in the USA, Japan, Australia,, 
New Zealand and the Caribbean (LSA 924 1984b). The eleven 
Athletic Attic shops operated by Rallye took up the Athletes 
Foot loco? and Rallye aims to expand the chain rapidly 
through the use of franchise agreements to around 2-0 company 
owned branches in large towns, plus 50 frarichisec i. Lnits In 
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med 1 um si zed t owns (ý-SA 9ý8 1984). Fit tier riypermarKeC 
retailers i nvo 1 ved in the sports goods sector a re Auchan 
through Decat, ', ilon, Arlaud aria 1 eclerc. 
Ot he r diversifications have seen Auchan entering t, he 
textile sector with Kiabi in 1978, and ttie electrical goods 
market thra ug h the purchase of a 16.7% share in Boulanger 
F re res. Euromarcn6 has developed a number of catalogue 
showrooms called 
X7 PO. L7Allobroge acquired a 50% share in 
Le Ludo (toys) in 1979, and later raised this share to 70% 
with the aim of creating a national toy chain, and in early 
19847 Promod4s revealed plans to develop a chain of 
selective perfume goods store called Shop 8. 
These developments again provide an example of 
retailers which have traditionally expanded in the 
hypermarket sector, diversifying their activities into other 
retail sub-sect a rs and providing a potential threat to 
established small traders in that particular field of 
activity. Whiist it would be an oversimplification to 
attribute all these moves towards diversification 
categorically to the Lai Royer, it is likely that retailers 
have looked more intensly towards civersification as a means 
of expansion, as the Lai Royer has hampered development in 
the hypermarket sector. Once aga'n7 as many of these 
diversifications will involve the creation of stores falling 
below the CDUC thresholds, the Royer legislation by 
distinguishing only between Store7 and not organisational 
size,, poses no restrictions for the entry of 
large retail 
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groups into retai! L sub-sectors SlActl as those of rest au rant s 
and sports goods, Which nave t radit ional ly been 
dominated oy the independent sector. 
12.3. DEVELOPMENT ABROAD 
Whilst the international iýBat ion of retail organisations 
is riot a new phenomenon, Trois Suisses created three 
overseas subsidiaries between 19-32 and 1938 investment 
abroad by French retailers rose markedly in the 1970s. This 
trend is supported by Boutin, Joffre ana Lorin (1982) who 
noted that over the 1973 to 1980 period investment abroad by 
the service sector rose by 20%. The scale of French 
involvement in international retailing has also been 
commented upon by White (1984)7 who in a survey of 
international retail firms taken from the "Stores of the 
World" directory, discovered that 80% of the international 
retailers that he identi. fied came from France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, or fthe U. K., and that over 25% of this total 
originated from France. 
There are a number of factors influencing the rise in 
internationalisation in the retail sector, as Waldman (1978) 
has observed. in general terms, the liberalisation of 
multinational commercial exchanges and the creation of 
supranational economic unions such as the EEC, has broken 
down many barriers which previously restricted entry into 
certain countries. Alongside this, technological progress 
in communications and transport has allowed the integration 
and deveiopment of more geographically dispersed operations. 
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Mo re specifically, econowa c growth in some co unt ri es, 
especially those in Which there is aae tie raI 
Lindercievelopment of modern "etailing tectiniques aric met tiocs7 
has provided Yiew opportunities for expansion by ret ai1e rs. 
Equally important are negative aspects which have restricted 
opport unit ies fo rg rowt hin home markets, such as 
saturation, fierce competition, and legislative constraints 
(like the Loi Royer), avid consequently encouraged retailers 
to consider' expansion on an internatýional scale to take 
advantage of market opportunities overseas as a means of 
maintaining growth. 
Success, however7 is not automatically guaranteed 
despite the size of the new market, as a successful retail 
innovation in one country may be less readily, acceptable in 
anot-her owing to different environmental conditions. The 
operation must be flexible as it is usually necessary to 
adapt various. aspects when entering another country to meet 
the conditions of the local commercial, financial and 
economic environments. Consequently, intensive research 
into the nature of the target market revealing the 
structure of the existing retail sector, consumer habits avid 
trends, and competitors is essential to allow the operation 
to adapt to local conditions. Similarly, operational 
support in te rryis, of both provision and cost must be 
correctly established if the venture is to succeed- 
In many cases it would appear advantageous to enter a 
foreign market in some form of association with a local 
AA ') 
retailer or wholesaler7 as this will aid the adaption of the 
operat'o"7 and help in the formulation of financial and 
property strategies. Several proolemis can arise froty, arl 
over-central isation of trie operation if the company atteiyipts 
to exercise complete control from the hoiyte c0 unt ry. L-oca 
management should be free to make 'decisions. 
Bout 'n7 joffre and Lorin (1982) note that tin ree 
geographical areas in particular seem, to have attracted 
French investment. The majority of intprnational investment 
by French retailers is orientated towards the EEC, although 
this share has declined recently in favour of the USA. Over 
the 1973 to 1980 period, investment in the USA market rose 
by a factor of 8, as companies such as Docks de France., 
which in 1978 took a 35% stake (raised to 66% in 1984) in 
Lil Champs Food Stores, and Casino, which created a Casino 
USA subsidiary in '1975, and took over the Californian cash 
and carry chain Thriftymart in 1980, became involved. Over 
the same period a steady 10% of retail investment has 
occurred in Latin America. 
Retail investment abroad has been largely undertaKen by 
hypermarket groups. The first hypermarket outside France 
involving French investment was opened in Belgium in 1969. 
At the end of 1982, a total of 60 hypermarkets in ten 
different countries were either directly or partially 
controlled by French retailers. This investment abroad was 
. 00, pioneered by Carrefour, who were later joined by Euromarche 
", b 
in 1973, SCOA and Radar in 19757 Promodes in 1976, Cofradel 
I in 19777 and finally Auchan in 1981a 
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As figure iliustrates, the numOer of tiypermarKets 
abroad invoiving ý7rencri companies carew steaoily in tne eariy 
1970s, rising in 1975 and 1976 (due to tne arrival on the 
scene of SCOA, Radar, ana Promodes) to approximately six 
new stores opening each year, and peaked i ri 19777 when 
thirteen hypermarkets were opened overseas as tile result of 
French initiatives. Growth slowed in 1978 and 1979, 
partially cue to the disinvestment of Carrefour from Belgium 
and Germany, and Euromarchg from Brazil, which negated the 
effects of the new stores opened during these years. Since 
198011 growth has recovered with between seven and nine new 
openings per year. 
Geographically, Spain has been the recipient of the 
majority of this investment, with ZU French backed 
hypermarkets at the end of 1982, involving Carrefour, 
Promod1s, Cofradel, Radar and Auchan OLSA 921 1984). The 
Spanish market has presented many opportunities for the 
French hypermarket groups because despite trends towards 
moderrisat ion, the Spanish retail sector of the 1970S was 
still characterised by small independent retailers with 
limited organisation. Modernisation was largely hindered by 
a weak investment capacity (only 14% of 
traders made 
investments in 1979/80) and insufficient state aid. 
The typical Spanish store was small, with 60% of shops 
having less than 40 square metres of sales space, 66% of 
stores were family run, and there was a general 
lack of 
professionalisation, reflected by the 
fact that 75% of 
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Figure 12.3 : Hypennarkets opened Outside France Involving 
French Canpanies. 
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traders nac no -t recP-i ved a secorlcary ec3, _ic: at lot, C-SA aG5 
L-arge numbers of intermeciiaries existed, wit rl tne 
ca nseq 1-kence t r7lat C tianne 1s c) fdi st rii. tt 0 lon were Ong, aric 
costs and prices high. In effect 7 the retail sect 0rin 
Spain could be compared to that of France in the 1960-s7 when 
the hypermarket first appeared. The first Spanish 
hypermarket opened in 1973 an the initiative of Carrefou "7 
and it was not until 1980 that El Corte Inales opened the 
first all-Spanish hypermarket at Seville. 
Similar environmental conditions conducive to 
hypermarket development have attracted considerable French 
investment to Brazi17 which contained 8 French 
hypermarkets, a! 1 belonging to Carrefour, at the end of 
1982. Other countries where hypermarkets built on the basis 
of French investment existed in 1982 were Switzerland7 ,t he 
UK, ) Italy, West Germany, Gabon7 the Ivory CoaSt7 Argentina 
and Saudi Arabia7 whilst investment has occurred in 
Belgium.., Austria, and Andorra at some point over the 1969 
to 1982 period. 
The vast majority of these hypermarkets have been built 
in conjunction With local retailers in the countries 
concerned. Ali of Carrefour7s involvement has been througn 
jointly owned suosidiaries, and Promode's have also operated 
in Spain through Saudisa (a 50: 50 subsidary with Spanish 
retai lers) and in Germany on a 40: 60 basis with the Snaper 
g ro up. Simi larly, in Spain, Cofradel operate through 
SHD 
(Ste Hispanica de Desarollo) in collaboration with Spanish 
retailers and industrialists, wiiiist in Brazil, turomarche 
ýl Ailia", --, 
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investec f C) ra year on a joint basis wit ht he 1 ead 1 rg 
Bra zzi ! ian retai ler, Pea Pao (Grooscrieiser 1977), be-FO re 
disinvestinc in 1978. Euramarche's overseas ventures I ri 
Saudia Arabia co not involve any financial commitment f rom 
the French firm, which merely provides the management and 
know how. The exceptions to these trends are Radar, with a 
100% owned Spanish subsidiary Super Descuento 1,2,13, and 
more recently, Auchan who also operate in Spain through a 
100% subsidiary, Alcampo. 
The disinvestment by French firms which has occurred 
has tended to take pla ce in countries where involvement was 
relatively low. For example, Euromarche withdrew from Spain 
in 1978, where they previously held a 25% share in Iberica 
de Hi perme read as, and f ram Italy in 1977, when they solo 
their 30% share in Eurostanda to their Italian partner, 
Standa. Simi larly, Carrefour disposed of a 30% stake in 
Distrimas (Belgium) in 1978, a 20% share in Inter Kauf park 
Handelgesellschaft (Germany) in 1979, and their 50% holding 
in the- single hypermarket operated by Verb rauchermarkt 
CA ust ri a) in 1980. Most recently in 1983, Carrefour sold 
their 10% stake in their UK subsidiary to their partner 
Wheatsheaf Holdings Ltd.. These disinvestments have allowed 
the companies concerned to concentrate their efforts in 
other countries where their 1 nvest ment and ret u rn on 
investment has been higher. 
Whilst the involvement of French hypermarket operators 
in other countries had commenced prior 
to the Royer 
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legislation, ttie increased activity irl tnis area 1 rivol virc 
mo re companies anb areater i r-, ves -c Y, e r-, i nce t ne 
in-troduction of the Lol rýoyer, suggests tnat ce'layed Q)-owtr, 
a*rIC3 ttle increasec costs of cevelopmen-t in Frarice7 las forCeC 
these com pan I es to look abroad for more favouraole g rowtn 
o ppo rt unit ies. 
1. 
. 7, 
2u 4a OPERATING STI RATEGIES 
Following the reinforcement of the powers of the CDUCs 
and the creation of the CNUC, companies appear to have 
reassessed vario. us aspects of their operating strategies in 
F rance in order to increase turnover and productivity, and 
to maintain competition. Whilst the maj or it y0f this 
competition has been inter-company it has manifest itself on 
the retail sector as a whole, generally improving the 
position of tile larger traders at the expense of the smaller 
retailers which the law was intenced to protect. 
Despite television advertising being illegal for 
distributive firms, figure 12.4 s0ows that the increase in 
spending on publicity and advertising in the distribution 
sector has outstripped (particularly since i973) 
the rise 
in the total spending on advertising, reflectina the 
increased emphasis placec upon this aspect of 
the business 
operation by distributors. 
The breaxdown of types of advert ising/pubi icity usec oy 
dist ri but ors reveals that direct publicity 
is twice as 
i mp o rt ant in this sector than the riat 
i0 na 1 average. 
Simi larly, ex pend it u re, on oublicity through 
the radio atic 
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Figure1 *2-'. 4: Povertising Expenditure in France. 
1. Experialture 
(Million Francs) 1971 1973 1975 1980 198i 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Expenditure 
Index 
Distribution 
Expenditure 
Index 
7340 9000 10500 20300 272200 
23 276 ZI 70 loo 122 14%ý 
283 406 779 2000 3000 
100 144 275 700 1060 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
*2. Type of Advertising 
Type 
% of Expenditure (1981) 
Dist ri but ion National Average 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
P ress 
T. v 
Rad io 
Promotions 
Direct Publicity 
Other 
30.0 33.0 
Prohibited 10.0 
11.0 6.5 
10.0 17.5 
24.5 10.0 
24.5 23.0 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Brochand & Lendrevie (1984) 
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rea i ona press is higher týian the average for ail sect or s 
Brocýlarlcl and Lendrevie (1384) note t'riat in the early years 
of hypermarket development7 Promotions based upon special 
price anniversaries were particularly Popular. Rallye are 
especially fond of promotions (LSA 685 1978a),, having 
decided that tne consumer enjoys promotions ana tne ambiance 
of a "f9te" which they generate. The Rallye calender 
features two major Promotions, a spring f9te, tne theme, of 
which is decided by an executive committee7 and the 
anniversary or birthday of individual stores, during which 
the stores are transformed into "circuses". 
However, since the mid 1970s, Brochand and Lendrevie 
(1984)7 argue that more refined and expensive advertising 
campaigns have evolved. Promotions are still. retained7 but 
they are now integrated with more sophisticated activities 
designed to establish a strong image for the company 
tradename. Many companieS7 especially the national 
o rgan i sat io ns, have two levels of publicity, one at the 
store level, and the other a national campaign organised 
t*hrough the centrale. 
Euromarchg (LSA 685 1978b) employ a two-tier programme 
of this nature. At the shop level, each store has its own 
local advertising budget., usually a percentage of turnover, 
and utilises. such avenues as tilie shop journal wrlicri is 
dist ri but ed f ree to consumers, internal i nf o rmat i on 
leafiets, and store promot i ons. Nat i ona 1 Publicity t0 
complement this can be obtained from the centrale for a 
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Colyllyliss ion. in the case of Euromarcýie 7 tne nature of this 
Is Ceciaec upon -f 
. 0intly so tnat tne programme is 
f'-, ex: Lble and can be adapted to respond to the stores neecs. 
National campaigns are planneo well in aavance -co all f0r 
negotiations with suppliers and are generally seasonal 
events coinciding with holiday periods7 or special events 
such as the "10 Franc Fair". 
This coordinated publicity, especially at the nationa 
level is designed to promote the store's tradenaire and 
associate it with certain elements of the companies Policy. 
The Cora group still place great emphasis upon price avid 
discounts, whilst other organisations t1ave placed increasing 
emphasis upon quality, such as Codec with their slogan 
"proud of our price, proud of our products" (LSA 871 1983), 
which has appeared on over 12,000 posters and recei ved wide 
radio coverage since September 1962. A fine example of the 
move from price to quality in advertisments is the changing 
slogan of Auchan (LSA 939 1984a). In 1972, Auchan proudly 
boasted to be the "tamer of prices". The group* became the 
"breaker of prices - its our trade" in 1976, and then 
the slogan evolved into "freshness - thats our trade". The 
latest slogan from Auchan revolves around the "Auchan life" 
theme which further stresses the quality of their 
hypermarket operation. 
The squeeze on margins, as retailers have attempted 
to 
maintain growth from increasing the productivity in existing 
stores., has encouraged a general trend 
towards the 
introduction of services to attract the consumer. 
As 
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re aliers have recogrised tile need to offer consumers other 
attractions than price C: lScol-tyltS alorle7 many companies have 
deve 1a ped Consuaier Services ceaartments ta faster 
relat i onshi ps Wit il cust ome rs. P in amod 4'ý s created t riel r 
Consumer Services department in 1976 (LSA 845 1984D wit h 
four goals in mind - the (yianagement of consuiyter complaints; 
the development of relationships with consuiner movements; 
the education and provision of information for consumers; 
and to "champion" consumer rights. These efforts have been 
reinforced by the activities of Promodes to improve product 
quality through their Service Qualit'eo department7 which was 
established to test products before they are so. "Ld i ri the 
groups stores. Promodes claim that the standaras 
established by this section are higher than those required 
by law. 
Another area of operation through which hypermarket 
operators have sought to maintain growth is by t he 
introduction and adoption of own brand and generic product 
ranges. This innovation, instigated by Carrefour with the 
launch of their "Produits Libres" range in 11376, has now 
been adopted by most of the major retail chains 
(f igure 
12.5). In the case of Euromarche'07 one of the early adopters 
of this concePt7 their "Produits Orange" range now covers 
400 articles (LSA 864 1982) 7 atid accounts 
for 21.6% or 
text i le7 17.6% of cremery,, and 14.5% of perfume sales. 
Other groups, particularly the smaller regional chajýjs 
like Rallye were slower to adopt the own brana and generic 
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FF Own Brands and Generic Goods. igure 12.5: 
of All Goocs that are Own Draric 
or Generic Goods 
%)I% Monoprix 
29% Casino 
23% Co, o pe rat i ves 
18% Prisunic 
16% Intermarche" 
11% Euromarche" 
Paridoc CDA (Suma) 
10% Paridoc CDA (Mammouth) 
8% Continent 
6% Auchan 
No Policy Leclerc 
Le Commerce Moderne, 6037 1984. 
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good concept. Ral Lye f ina! ty IaLjr-jcýea 'ts Ra" is rl "0 rodu -L L iye 
range in iy.. arcn Llowirlg a jyji 11 ion fo francp ubi 1city 
campai gti (Sylestre iD 8 %Z T i-I is range consisted of C , -7 -) 
so 1 C:, at prices between 0 C- owt hose fo1, and 
b rand name goods of equa-L quality. ey the enc of -98.35, this 
range had been extend6d to 206 products7 and after one year 
of existp-nce Rallye announced that the original- 1.3"C) products 
had accounted for 5.2% of the self-service turnover of the 
groups hypermarkets (LSA 936 1984). 
The most recent development in the generic goods field 
has been the launch in April 1984, of a "GC" (Grande 
Confiance) range by Casino to compliment their successful 
"Guipe" own brand goods. The most interesting feature of 
this development has been that the range of 200 GC goods 
includes thirty household/electrical goods including TVs, 
stereos, cassette recorders and washing machines. These 
durable goods are offered with a three year guarantee and 
promises of rapid after sales service in the event of 
brea-kdowns (LSA 931 1,984). 
The own brand/generic good concept is yet another 
example of the innovations within operating strategies that 
the large retail groups have developed si rice the 
introduction of the Loi Royer. Large retail arganisations 
have also been able to increase their advantage over smaller 
retailers through their greater willingness and capacity to 
adopt such new innovations, especially those associated 
with technological change. 
A correspondence survey of j, ': ý022 consuryters undertaken 
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Vt ne FNCC revealed wicespreao use of crecit carcs by 
cus"comers CLSA 1964). Of the survey pariel, 48.77. ' of 
famiIies possessed ac least one credit carc7 anc, 'Z'27. of carc 
ho iders IASeC ttlis card for clatiles purenases anc 2471 for 
f ood purchases. I-he FNCC survey also sýiowed that althouar, 
t he maj or it y of those cards held by consumers were Oarl, K 
cards, 13.4% of those witri cards also had at least one 
retailer credit card. The retailer credit card is a natural 
extension of the bank credit card, but owing to the cost of 
investment involved, it is only available to the larger 
retail groups. The Duo card7 launched by the Paridoc 
centrale in june 1984 (LSA 938 1984b) is characteristic of 
many retailer cards, as it offers a wide range of 
facilities. For 50 francs per year the card holder receives 
credit facilities, insurance cover, and access to special 
promotion offers or, certain goods including holidays. 
The introduction of such in-house credit cards by tne 
larger retailers is closely associated with the advent of 
new technologies. The next step-from in-store credit cards 
Would seem to be the adoption of EFTIS (Electronic Funds 
Transfer Systems), whereby the consumer pays for goods 
inserting a plastic card into a point of sale terminal. 
This syst em facilitates the transfer of money f rom the 
consumers OanK account to that of the store t hr 0 ug ha 
computer link. 
However7 t he introduction of EFTS in i: rance tlas rloc 
been Without its problems, (The Grocer 28/04/. L384) 7 aric: 
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consioerabie bebate has zaý<en piace over t tie leve- r 
COMM I ss I otl criarged bY OaniAs for tine LLE3e 01- sUc i-I sy sc e yt s. 
BariK cinarges., in 'crie forty, or a cc)jy,, y, jssjc3rj l, arl(2e from oetween 
C). 6 and 1.2% C) ft he t rarisact i or, aric groups Suc rl as 
Ca r ref our Aucharil CasirIO7 and the Parldoc centrale nave 
decided to investigate their own EF7S networks, ciaiming 
-C na-C as they operate on profit margins of around 
charges are too high. 
Other aspects of new technology have, however7 been 
more easily and widely adopted by large retailers. The 
instaliat. ion of information technology systems by retail 
organisations can speed up communication between cifferent 
stores7 the warehouse, and company head-quarters, by virtue 
of the rapid processing of information allowed by these 
systems. If this information arid facility is then used 
correctly, administrative costs can be reduced and the 
efficiency of stock control can be raised. Prodi-Lctivity can 
be raised throughout the whole organisation if these systems 
are utilised efficiently. 
Most major retailers have now harnessed some aspects of 
information technology to improve the efficiency of their 
operation. For example i ri 1984 ("-SA 939 1984býjj the 
Cooperative de Champagne announced the installation of 440 
Mintel terminals in all the stores controlled by the 
Society. in addition to providing potential advantages 
for 
t he operation of the Company, 
consumer services as 
t iie new syst ery, improved 
it provides tile capability for 
increasing tile efficiency (irl terms of speed of delivery, 
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aTIC i nst ant -mowledge of stac., -eve1s) of t ne Society7 
caT, al og ue sa % es to wnicn tne system is clcisely 
is claimec OY t'r')e company that the cata", ogj es o De rat e je sa 
at prices up to 107. cheaper trian tnose of campet itla lyl a il I 
order fi rms, and it is hoped that the itistailatiat-I of tj rl e 
Mi tit e1te rm i na 1swi 11 increase the turrover of trils 
a pe ration, whictl already accounts for 6.8% of the Societies 
sa 1 es. 
12.5. SUMMARY 
Concentration7 diversification, investment abroad7 ano I 
innovations of operating strategy are all ways in which trie 
hypermarket groups have attempted to maintain or increase 
growth. Whilst these initiatives can not be linked directly 
to the Loi Royer, as they are related to more deep-rooted 
structural change within the distribution sector, the Royer 
lecislation has done much to concentrate Marlagelylant 
attention upon these strategic areas in the search for 
improved productivity. 
The actions taken by large retailers in these areas are 
largely beyond the scope of the small retailer, and this 
lack Of access undoubtedly weakens the position of the 
smaller groups in relation to the major retail chains. The 
Loi Royer provides no form of control over any of these 
developmentS7 and methods that have been employed to 
maintain arowth. -he absence of any control proceedures in 
these areas points to further shortcominc-s in tile L-ol Royer. 
The jimited access of the smaller retail organisations to 
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triese innova-clons, whicin have arisen from st, I hancies ructura ci - 
wi-t. rilyi týie retail erivironmeriz, furtner reouces tneir aoil, -, ty 
to compete witti the larger retailers. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN : THE CARREFOUR GROUP -A CASE STUDY OF 
CONTINUED ORGANISATIONAL GR(14TH 
A more explicit indication of t he va 1 ue of t he 
strategic developments discussed in the last Chapter to t he 
larger retail organisations, may be obtained by examining . t1ow 
one firm has exploited openings in these areas to maintain 
the corporate growth of the group. 
Despite the hostility shown by the CDUCs and CNUC 
towards it's applications for development based upon 
hypermarkets, the Carrefour group has maintained its 
position as the leading hypermarket retailer in France. Tile 
sales or the group, as figure 13. i illustrates, have 
constantly increased at a greater rate than national retail 
sales, and th e net income of the group has continued to rise 
over the post Loi Royer period, with the exception of one 
poor year in 1976 (figure 13.2). One major reason for the 
continued success of the group may be found in the 
consistent performance of the company, reflected in the 
stablity of both the gross profit to sales ratio, which has 
remained around 15-16% over the 1974 to 1-982 period, and 
the net income to sales ratio. 
13.1. CARREFFOUR - THE BACKGROUND 
Carrefour was created by Marcel Fournier, a novelty 
shop owner, and Louis Defforey, a 
food wholesaler, wro 
opened a food department in the 
basement of Fournier7s 
store in Annecy. The success of this venture 
encouraged týie 
duo to open a 650 square metre supermarket, 
whicri was 
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Fig la r91 ZIP .1 -0 Carrefour - Retaii Saies 
I Tota- Retail 
Dat e 
Sales 
(Mill. F) 
Annual 
Change M 
Carrefour Group 
Sales Ann I-L a 
(Mill. F) Change 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1,976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
230 765 
4255 857 287 779 
323 610 
382 305 
432 374 
486 438 
539 835 
615 807 
684 826 
773 719 
875 628 
990 912 
+ 10.9 
+ 12.5 
+ 1.4-1.5 
+ 18.1 
+ 13.1 
+ 12.5 
+ 11.0- 
+ 14.0 
+ 11.2 
4- 13.0 
+ 13.2 
+ 13.2 
4 950 
6 535 + 32.0 
7 648 + 16.9 
9 648 + 26.3 
12 467 + 29.2 
14 522 + 16.5 
17 801 22.6 
20 405 + 1-4.6 
24 536 + 20.2 
29 147 + 18.6 
Toussaint (1984)/Carrefour Company Reports/Marenco (198%Z) 
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Figu re . 13.2: Carrefour - Performance indicators. 
Gross , \ýet 
Net income Annua 1Prcfit income/ 
Dat e (Mill. F) Change (%) Sa 1 es M Sales (N) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1974 99 
1975 131 
1976 132 
1977 185 
1978 23 
1979 279 
1980 342 
1981 360 
1.982 397 
15.85 
+ 32.3 16.32 
+ 0.8 14.29 
+ 40.2 15.00 
+ 25.9 16-62 
+ 19.7 16.40 
+ 22.6 4 6.24 
+ 5.3 15.96 
+ 10.3 15.59 
1. -ii 
1.71 
1. -";, p a 
1.48 
1.60 
1.56 
1.67 
1.50 
1.40 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Marerico (1983)/Carrefour Company Reports 
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i ocat ea on tne corner or tne r(Ae CIJ Parmelan anc rue Ancre- 
neu r1 et Annecy. Fr0 (yi t rl 1S51te t racename 
"Carrefour" (crossroads) was oorn. 
in 1962, Marcel Fournier attenced the Cluo MPIM (Methods 
of Modern Merchandising) seminar in Dayton, Ohio, and became 
conv i nced that the retail techniques championed by Be rna rd 
i rUj 3.1 10 at this conference should be adopted by Carrefour. 
Co nseq uent I y, 't tie company which had already acquirec a 
supermarket -site in Paris changed their plans, and on t he 
selected site at St Genevieve des Bois they opened the first 
hypermarket to be seen in France. The store was an instant 
success achieving a turnover of 18.6 million francs in the 
fi rst six months of operation, and 40.1 million francs 
t he ene of the first year (Toussaint 1984). 
In order to rapidly establish a national traderame and 
a reputation that would be associated with this new form of 
retai 1 ing, Carrefour franchised their name and techniques 
for 0.2% of store turnover to groups, such as Docks du Nord- 
Mielle-Cora, the Docks Lyonnais and Docks de Nevers 
pa, rt ne rs hip, Promodes, and. Docks Ardennes. The parent 
company also expanded, maintaining its reputation as the 
pioneer of hypermarkets in France, by opening the 
first 
store with a sales area of over 10,000 square metres at 
Venissieux (nea r Lyan) and the first 20,000 square metre 
hypermarket at Vitrolies. In order to firiance the r aP -L c., 
g rowt h0t he company, 20% or- t he share capital was 
introduced to the Bourse on 16th june 1970. 
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Si nce t tie of tne Loý Royer, Carrefour feel 
tr'lat ney nave oeerl penallsea for tneir ascericancy in , 7, ne 
riyperiytar, ý<et sector, for aithouch ttie Qrai. LE) accourtea for a 
o ua rt er of' trie applications for new developments aasec upon 
hypermarKets made to t he CDUCs by Gr and es Surf aces 
orgarisations, only 21.5% of these projects were authorised 
by the c0 IYIIYI i ss i0 ns. Despite this low success rat e, t he 
group has maintained growth, in terms of the number of new 
st o res o pened . by adopting many of the tactics discussed 
previously, such as the acquisition of competing companies 
and single units, joint development with regional retailers, 
and the purchase of authorised applications. 
Certain t enet s of t he Carrefour philosophy have 
survived intact throughout this period of adaption, and the 
company believes that these aspects have had much to co with 
the firm's continued success. The group reg a ra s itself, 
fi rst and fo rem, o st7 as a specialist in the development of 
large scale self-service stores located on out-of-town 
sites. Peripheral sites are favoured for a number of 
reasons. The company believes that the cost of land for in- 
town sites is often prohibitive, and access to these 
locations can be difficult. More importantlY7 however, out- 
of-town sites allow the development of large car parks, anc 
Carrefour alm to provide one car parking space for every 5 
square metres of sales space, remembering the Tirujillo maxim 
of "no parking, no shopping". 
Central to the operating pýjilosophy of Carrefour is Ithe 
conceat of decent ralised ma na c2 ementA1t ti ouanfi nanc ia 
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cont ro i is tilatily cent ra 1i secl, arl ce pe rfo rjyiarICL=l 07 
I nd ivI Cal ua 1 stores is c-,,. ose'Ly monit o rea. rl lylos-C ot ne r 
aspects of operation ttle COMOaý71Y IS tO7 &,.. iy cecentra- isec. 
Eac n store manager is regarced as a "store cirector", W 17 1 
compiete responsiblity for the performance ara operat-Lon of 
t he store7 which must meet sales objectives escaoij! 5r, ec 
annually by the company. Even the Samod centrale7 c reat ed 
in 1967 for bazar and textile goods, is not a centraie I ti 
the traditional sense 7 but acts purely as a selection agency 
for these types of goodS7 recommending which lines should 
and should not be adooted. The store director is then free 
to decide which goods his store should carry on -'Che basis of 
this advice. 
Af t-t rt her indication of the c3ecentralised nat u re of 
Carrefour is the size of the head office staff, which in 
I Mia ree 1 L973., numbered only twelve, headed by the President7 
Fournier, and two joint Director-Generals, Jacques and Denis 
Defforey. The remaining nine consisted of an accountant 
director; two counsellors, one in charge of internal 
management who established and monitored sales objectives; 
and the other in charge of social and administ rat 
i on 
problems; four supervisors, who each coordinated personnel, 
supply-i and short term management problems 
for five to six 
stores; a-rid two secretaries. 
All ather operating functions 
such as legal counselling, personnel, ana 
marketing, we re 
contracted out to external agencies. 
As with other hypermarket operators, features o-,: ' Ttie 
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Carref our a roar, 1 sa-t 1on nave, i'loweve r changed since tne 
birtri of the group. In parricui . ar greater-emphasis anc more 
res au rces seem ta nave been concent rated 0n ce rt ai ri 
strategic aspects of the graup7 soI Lie -rat IJ 0ns1 -rice 1974. 
whi ist other factors relating to new market opportunities 
and technological charge have encouraged these adaptions in 
s"Crategy, t he constant references made in press releases 
issued by the group to the increased costs of development 
resultina from the Lai Royer suggests that the legislation 
has significantly contributed towards these policy changes. 
In 1960 (LSA 757 1960)7 Carrefour claimed that the 
. LOi Royer had increased the costs of building in France from 
2,577 francs per square metre of sales area in 197: -, to 
37,5500 francs per square met re in 1979. Similarly, Toussaint 
(1984) commenting upon the effect that legislative 
constraints have had upon costs, notes that in 1983 a 
potential annual turnover of --00 miIIion francs was 
necessary to justify the opening of a new store. 
whilst 
-f, 
comments such as these originating from Carrefour it sel 
are likely to contain a certain anti-legislation 
"propoganda" element, they would appear to add weight to 
the 
assertion tile the legislation of 1973 has 
forced hypermarket 
de velopers to look beyond the traditional avenues of 
expansion, towards other aspects of 
the organisation -and its 
development strategy in the search for growth. 
13.2. CONCENTRATION 
pitiloi-jail the Carrefour group has not absorbe, any 
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major regionai. retailers in orcer to mz, i rt aI rl Q rowt -c he 
CQIYIPanY "as, slýlce the advent of 'r-tle týOye)' -'egsla-c--on., oeeri 
1 rivo i ved 1 rl 'c fie ta. Keover0numberof sy, c, -1 -1 1 ri cepenaen 
orgarlsat ions, usually operating single stores. These types 
or acq u1s11 on have beer) cha i-act cz 1- 1 st ic0ft he IQi rit 
subsidiary companies Sogara, Sog rama, and Superest. Fo r 
example, in 1978, Sogara raised its sha re n ol d1 ng 1 rl 
Sochadis, which operated a hypermarket a Arigouleme to 84%, 
avid acquired a Docks de France hypermarket at La Rochelle, 
and the Solodis store at Canors in 1979. Similarly, Sogramo 
gained cont ro 1 of stores at Vivry Noureuil in 198017 and 
Rennes in 1981, and Superest acquired hypermarkets in Champs 
sur Marne and Evreux in 198C) and in all 7 seven of the 
fifteen hypermarkets opened by Carrefour between 1977 and 
1982, were the result of takeovers. Through acquisitions of 
this type, the Carrefour group has contributed to the trend 
towards concentration of ownership observed within the 
hypermarket sector. 
- Carrefour has also tended towards the concentration of 
ownership in relation to its overseas operations (as shall 
be shown later) and in 1984, the croup was one of the 
fa und i ng mem be rs of the Arci Association mega-centrale 
discussed in Chapter iwelve. Afu rt he ri nt e rest i rig 
development in L984. ) with regards 
to concentration, was the 
purchase of the 15% stake previously tie 1dinC ompt oi rs 
Modernes by tile i\ioyauge group. As the Coyiptoirs modernes 
group is Carrefour's partner in Sog ramo (whicri operated 
eig ht hy pe rma rK et s at t he end of 198.4') this i*Yt ovemay only 
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have oeen r, o protect t nei r interests f rom ot her compet It ors. 
1te rnat I vel t May a -L SQ01 ve Some tic I Ca-C i On C) 
Ca r ref our"sf ut u re i nt ent i on tobr1 no ti, -iese un its uno ert he 
direct control of the parent company. 
DIVERýIFICATION 
Carrefour nas. also followed the trend evident amongst 
other hypermarket retailers of diversification into other 
retail sub-sectors. in 1978., Carrefour tooK a 18% stake in 
Metro-Cash which operates cash and carry units in France. 
However, Denis Defforey has dispelled any rumours that 
Carrefour are likely to pursue any degree of vertical 
diversification, claiming that the group has no intention of 
becoming producers or wholesalers, as Carrefour are 
"essentially distributors, for the consumer" (LSA 
1984b) . The most significant civersif icat ions uncertaken by 
the grpup have been into the DIY market, and the adoption of 
the limited range discount store. 
Carrefour entered the DIY sub-sector in April 1977 with 
a 47% share in the leading multiple group, Castorama, which 
involved the creation of a 50: 50 subsidiary company 
(Castoraffia Expansion) to develop DIY stores adjacent to 
Carrefour"s hypermarkets. Castorama was formed in 1969 
from the DIY company created by Christian Dubois in 1950. 
J USIC like Carrefour in t iie fi rst Cast o rama u ri it, a 
5,000 square metre outlet opened in 1969 at 
Englos (L-ille), 
brought a new almerision to a ret a 
il sector p rev 1o usl y 
dominated by small specialist retai-lers. 
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rom -c tiese beg ini nas the ar0U0 ex panded rapidly anC 
a op roacnec La rre rour in ! 977, when triey were seeKing t C) 
raise capiza, ZO runc future expatision (ý_SA 9j. 9 
diversif ication nas had considerable benefits foro0tn 
o rg an i sa ti0ns for as Denis Defforey observed in 1978 (_5A 
666 1978), it is generally tnought triat permission is 'Y' 0 
likely to be obtained from the CDUCS or CNUC for a compiete 
commercial entity, rather than for isolated units. 
in December 1977, Carrefour obtained a 18% share in 
Californie7 a building material retailer operating stores 
in areas of the country where Castorama had yet to penetrate 
(Rhone-Alpes, Midi, South-West and East) 7 and the 
following 
year this group was absorbed by Castoraffla- This developmerft 
reinforced Castorama7s position as the dominant DIY multiple 
group. 
At the end of 1982 (LSA 887 198-%'; 'F )7 there were 7 577 
stores and specialist departments dealing in DIY materials 
in France. of these7 the vast majority (1,924 accounti"c-I 
for 1,095,1588 square met-res of sales space) were operated 
by independents. A further 329 stores with a sales area of 
871,, 12. ZS square metres were owned by DIY and household 
equipment multiples, and 218 units (1227400 square ryietres) 
by companies operating large area lylulti-specialist stores. 
zpartment ýolled by c6 The remairlinc- 106 outlets were cont' 
store, variety store and food multiple groupso 
Castorama was the leading operator jr, the DTY/riouseho. Lc 
eq ui pment multiple category, with 72 stores comparec to the 
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- -I. 
of its rlea rest riv al 7 Leroy Merlin wýio are assoclatec, 
wl, crl Aucriarl. Similarly, in týje 2e area La r( Pec 1a 
store category, Carrefour tied wit*ýj Aj_tctjarj at the neac r 
trils C. Lassiricatior, Oro, _, (j witý, Doth Companies cont IoI rig 
stores, closely followed Dy t:. uromarchg (-, )2) and Cora (. 50). 
However7 by virtue of the larger stores triat týrjey operated, 
Carrefour controlled a far greater sales area 0f000 j7 
square metres to Auchan" s 187 40C-) sq ua re met res. These 
f igures give some indication of the leadership that the 
Cast o rama-Ca r ref our partnership has established in the part 
of the DIY market controlled by large retailers, and 
illustrates the success of Carrefour's diversification into 
this field. 
Carrefour have also diversified by developing the 
"discount de proximit6" (local discount store) fa rtytu Ia. 
This retailing concept is founded upon small stores carrying 
a limited assortment of low priced goods, located in the 
heart of urban areas. Margins are held down by low staff 
numbers and reduced advertising costs. Costs are also 
constrained by the reduced capital investment needed to 
establish this type of store and low supply costs, as the 
shallow range of goods sold only requires a limited number 
of suppliers. 
The growth of this retail institution has been 
attributed to a combination of socio-economic trends and 
legislative conditions within the retail environment (Gallo 
1982). It is suggested that increased transport costs and 
the impact of the recession has made consumers more price 
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co rsti o us 
7 and consequently discount formulas have become 
mo re attractive. in addition7 these types of stores fail 
below the size thresholds which require authorisation far 
developyient from the CDUCs and CNUC7 so they provide an 
opportunity for large unit retailers to develop in-town 
st o res. Fu rt he nyto re, in December 1981, a debate in the 
National Assembly gave support to this type of store, as it 
was felt t hat it represented growth in the small shop 
sector, and contributed to lower price levels. 
Carrefour became involved with this retail concept 
through the acquisition of a 450/. stake in Erteco in 
September 1978. The formula which Carrefolur adopted was 
launched in 1975 by Simon Bertaud, a former employee of 
both Radar and Cora (Bataille 1"978). Bertaud developed the 
1a cal discount store an the basis of small shops (betweer 
200 and 350 square metres in size) requiring around 250- 
300 
7 
000 francs of investment capital, and which were 
essentially "depots" for the sale of goods. Only groceries, 
beverages., drugs and perfumes were sold in these outlets, 
direct from suppliers cartons, and at low margins, which 
averaged 12.5% throughout the store. The small scale of the 
operation required a staff of between 5 or 6 employees, thus 
keeping staff costs down to around . 3.5% of turnover. 
In order to expand this formula which traded uncer the 
name of "Archi-Bas", Bertaud formed Erteco in 1975 on a 
50: 50 shareholding basis with Radar. in September 1978 
Carrefour acquired an i tit e rest in this company whictl 
470 
resu it et in a new shareholoing structure ieaving Radar and 
Ca r ref our eac). -, w it Ill 457. of ne colylparly w ti A. i st Be rta t-tc 
retained 10%. of týie caaita-ý.. ihe intervention oi= Carrefour 
ai S0 saw the creation of a new executive committe composea 
of Etienne Thie]. from Carrefour and iY1. Arnold f rom Radar; 
t ýIe introduction of Carrefour and Radar generic goods into 
t he stores; and a change of tradename to "Ed (Epicerie 
Discount) . 
Since 1978 the growth of Erteco has been rapid. From 
10 shops in 1978, the chain expanded to 26 stores at the end 
of 198011 and to 76 by the end of 198.2,, all of which were 
located in Paris and the suburbs, anc supplied from a 8,00C) 
square metre depot at Rurgis (LSA 886 However 7 the 
speed of this expansion caused some financial difficulties, 
largely due to the costs of operating the Rungis depot. in 
Z ion francs an a 1982, t he company made a loss of ',:: '0 mill- 
turnover of 650 million francs. in an attempt to improve 
t he performance of the chain, Carrefour assumed t he 
management of the company in July 1983 and appointed a new 
di rect a r, Marc Rousset7 to run the operation (LSA '307 
1983b). Despite these problems, Carrefour believe that 
limited ass o rt ment stores of this type are viable, and 
regard this formula as one way of combatting the aggresive 
discounting oo1icies of Leclerc and intermarche. 
Carref our" s faith in the po t ent ia1 of 
Erteco was 
shown in OcIC o be r 19 8 13, when 
the croup announced the 
acquisition of Radar's shareholding 
in the company. The 
new-look, Carrefour-operatec Erteco, (3ecided 
that following 
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ne rapic arowtýi of the chain curitir, the early 196(--)Is t tie 7 
emcmas is Sri Q IJ Ic me sw-itchec to management asPects rat ne r 
tnar, rurttier expansion. -Ln particý(Iar, Carrefol-tr are alming 
to improve supply and stock contro! triroughout týie chain; to 
estaol. ish Ed Products as 0 raric riames; ta raise -C he 
average size of stores from "S4,0 t0 between 450 and 50(--) 
square metres of sales area; and to increase the range of 
goods carried in tile stores from 428 to 450/60 lines (LSA 
949 
. 
1984). The announcement of these plans suggest that 
Carrefour view their diversification into this store formula 
as part of the Iong term strategy of the group. 
13.4. DEVELOPMENT ABROAD 
Carrefour re i nf a rced its image as the pioneer of 
hypermarket retailing in France, when it became the first 
French retailer to develop hypermarkets in countries outside 
France in the late 1960"s. The initial involvement abroad 
by the group was concentrated upon those countries which 
already possessed modern retailing systems. In 19697 
Carrefour created Distrimas in conjunction with Delhai-.;.. e 
Freres et cie "Le Lion" in Belgium; took a 28% stake in 
Hypermarchle" de Participations, formed with the Swiss 
retailer Mercure (who held the majority share of 42%); and a 
10% share in the UK group Hypermarket Holdings, in which 
Wheatsheaf Distribution held the remaining 90% of the 
Capital. The collaboration wit-h Del"thaize Freres ", -e L-ion" 
in Belgium resulted in both partners entering the West 
German market during 1977, alorigsice Kaufpark (48%) ana 
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St russgen ( 12%) Tt ýl ro Ug h the formation c)f inter Aaur-pal, K 
rianceicesel sciýiaft n ch t tie rencýi aricj Be 19 i I-Ilyl 
companies retainec a . 20% stake. 
The early 1970s witnessed a change in the overseas 
strategy of Carrefour as the group oecame involved 1n 
count ries where t he retail syst em was largely 
und e rd eve Io ped In 19712, Carrefour acquired a cjo% share in 
an italian company, italmare, and in 1973, formed a joint 
subsidiary company, Almar, with the leading Spanish 
retailer7 Si mag o. These developments were followed in 
September 1974 by the creation of T revo Co mire rc io et 
i nd ustria in Brazil, an organisation in wnich Carrefour 
retained a 8.3% stake. Also around this time, CarrefoiAr also 
recognised the potential for the hypermarket concept in the 
USA, as Denis Defforey remarked ... 
"Nobody in the US is doing what we are doing. We 
have devised something new here, and we can teach 
it to America. " (Business Week 15/12/197.., ) 
Following negotiations a deal was apparently signed with an 
American retailer in September 1973, but this proposed 
partnership fell through in April 1974. 
The int roduct ion of the Lai Royer, appears to have 
focused retailers' attentions even more firmly upon the 
market potential of some of these overseas markets, and 
Fournier has commented that the Royer law I ed tat he 
exportation Of the best of French distribution (LSA 62E 
1977). The response of Carrefour to the appearance of t he 
Loi Royer seems, t0 have been to disinvest from those 
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operations where the group cfic -riot iIj ity stake 7 rl 01Ca lytaj 0r1 
a, ric to concen-cra-ce new inves-cmenc 1-1 q0 rl trie less ceve. 100ea 
markets, where the POCentlal for future growtri was grea-cest. 
1 rl 1978, t he arou ýD solb its r1o 10 1 nC3 In Distrilylas 
to Delhaize --rqe*m4res "Le Lion" (LSA EEE i978 )7 as dominant 
ý10ffie COMOetitors, sat'Aration and legislation introducea 
1975 restricted t he f ut u re growth pot ent iaIoft tie 
hypermarket in Belgi, utyt. 1n 19797 Carrefour disinvestec from 
its German interests, and the following year sold its IJO% 5 
share in the Austrian Company Verorauchermarkt, Which 
operated a 16,950 square metre store in Vienna. More 
recently, in 19837 Ca r ref our so 1d their i0% stake 1 YI 
Hypermarket Holdings to its UK partner Wheatsheaf7 and in 
1984 the group sold its share in Euromercato to Stanca (LSA 
922 1984). Euromercato, which controlled four hypermarkets 
(t h ree inMi1 an and ano t he rin Nap 1 es) had been created in 
1980 from the merger of Standa7 s two hypermarkets with those 
controlled by Carrefour's original Italian subsidiary, 
Italmare. 
The capital raised by these disinvestment moves has 
been reinvested in those countries where the potential for 
f ut u re hypermarket growth has been perceived as a reat est7 
and w he re Carrefour holds a majority interest, and most 
importantly, controls the management Of the suosidiary 
organisation. The vast majority of the i nvest ment made 
abroao by Carrefour since 197-3 has been co ncent rat ed 
in 
Spain and Latin America7 particularly 
Brazil, although in 
1913A'- 7t 
he g ro up o periec its first store in 
Ara ent 1 na. 
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Larrerour7 s Smatjjsýj aC: Vet-, tj_jre inas taKen ol ace triroucri a 
number of subsiciary companies. Tne oartnersýillp (:, e-a-- witri 
Si lylag a1 rl AI ty'a r has since been repeatea in p" OY,, O t C, 1, a C, e 
Hi pe rme rcad os (Carrefour 50%; Simago 50: 1. ) formed in 19 7 57 
and by t he purchase in 1978 of the 44% share hel a' 
Euromarche in Iberica be Hi pe rme rcad o s. 1n add it 1 on I 
Carrefour"s 10 i tit subsidiary company with Guyenne et 
Gascogne, Sogara, formed a 50: 50 subsidiary called Grandes 
Superficies in 1975 with the Banco Condai and Rovira7 and 
Promotora de Hipermercados has since acquired the Spanish 
interest in this organisation. The Carrefour gral. -, p envisage 
considerable potential for hypermarket development in Spain, 
refering to the fact that in 1962 the 37 million population 
was served by only 30 hypermarkets (LSA 839 1982a). 
Consequently, the group has devoted consideradle effort to 
actapting and integrating its hypermarket operations to take 
advantage of this market potential, and have set tnemselves 
a target of two or three new store openings per year. (LSA 
933 1984). 
As in France, the managers of Carrefour's Spanish 
stores have complete control over their own stores, Whilst 
the company establishes general policies and determines 
profit targets for the outlets. Promotional activities are 
less frequent than in France, and the Spanisn stores carry 
n0 own label- or generic lines, concentrating instead Lt q0n 
Spanish national brands. Ali deliveries are made direct to 
the store, . although there is a selection centrale called 
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Socomo fo r oa. zar ano te>('C 1 le goods, wtilen performs trie same 
role as Samoo in France. 
M 0r-i CB'C 't tie acap-c 1 ons ro posec : )y Ca rref ourto 
in-cegrate tne nypermar'Ket into the Spanis In retaii sector I rias 
been t tie reg 1 aria sa'C i orl 0 r- D 'A y 1'rl Q 't; a cater in a 'i, e 
ef f icient ly fart he d Ist inct reg i onal tastes which ex ist in 
Spa In . ana t ne adoption of a Spanlsýi tradename (L-SA 8%39 
1982a) The group"s hypermarkets originally traced under a 
variety of logos, Ca r ref aurP ryca and "Hi pe r (t he 
old Euromarchoeo name), owing to the historical development 
of the stores through a number of different subsidiary 
companies, but it was decided to adopt the Spanish 
t radename, "Pryca" (Precio Calidad - Price and Quality), 
throughout the whole group to encourage integration. 
Carrefour have also decided to renovate many of the existing 
stores and to add galeries marchande to same unitS7 to 
compliment the hypermarket operations 
in Brazil, Carrefour have experienced similar growth to 
that achieved ivi SPain7 with the Trevo Commerciae industria 
subsidiary (now renamed Carrefour Commercio 
Industria) 
opening approximately one store per year. However7 
hi C3 h 
rates of inflation have hindered the 
financial per fa rmarice. 
Of this subsidiarY7 and for certain stores, problems of 
packaging and stoc k life in temperatures 
in excess Of '70'C 
have occurred. Supply of goods has also been 
far from easy 
in some cases., with the third 
Carrefour hypermarket 7 opered 
Lia in ! 977 receivinc- 80% of its stocK 
f rom Sao in Brazi L7 
(Grobscheiser i977b) Pau 10 
7 so me j, %7rC)C) 
kiIa met res away .; p I 
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ýIe Bra zi 11 an developments have also provokea I. A nrL. SC 
a I-fl 0 -ri QS ot rie rBI, aziaistriouto, rs Wh Q resenz Z 'Ie 
f avau riti sm Lneil-toing credit facilities to purcmase si'ýes) 
allegedly shown towards Carrefour oy the public auttiorities. 
Ihere are also signs of increased competition from the major 
Brazi, liari retailers, julyiO07 and Peg-Pag, as they have oegun 
to react to the arrival of Carrefour. However, despite 
these difficulties, Carrefour has made consiceraole 
investment in the Brazilian market, and the opening of the 
gro Up7 S first Argentinian hypermarket in Buenos Aires during 
19827 would seem to confirm t'he group's commitment to 
expansion in this part of the World. 
Essentially, since the introduction of the Loi Royer, 
Carrefour has consolidated and increased its investment 
abroad7 particularly in countries where t he retail 
st ruct u re remains largely unde rdeve 1o pea 1nt nese 
count rieS7 the environmental corditons for the madernisation 
"hose existina in France of the retail sector resemble 
the early 1960s when the self-service and hypermarket 
fo rmu ! as were rapidly adopted. The imPo rt ance of thiS 
overseas investment to Carrefour is reflected in the share 
of total group turtiover which is accounted for by overseas 
Subsidiaries. This proportion has risen from 14% in 1978 to 
15% in 1980., and to just below 18% in 1982'. 
13.5. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS 
Carrefour tiave also reviewed several elements of tneir 
operating sti-ategy since 1974, with a view to increasing trie 
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turnover and profitability Of L=xisting stores. 1978, 
a ro IAO appearea to accept trie Liffii7aT, i CrIS PI acea IA 0 Ofl ri ew 
investment in France, anc decicea that future i m. ro i, ave iyi e ri ts 
V1 tirie g roUP 7s per fo rmarice Sri a 1-110 be acriievea Oy -1 t tie 
development of store operation anc management (LSA EE8 
1976). To realise these improvementsl Carrefour reorganiseci 
their senior management st r uct u re . creating a two-tier 
hierarchy composed of a group directorate anc an executive 
directorate. 
At the lower level 7 the group cirectorate, Consist 1nC3 
of Marcel Fournier and Denis Defforey, assisted by a finance 
director, a general affairs director,, ana a marketiric 
director7 were to involve themselves with short and medium 
term issues (LSA 666 1978). Above the group directorate, 
the 14 member executive directorate headed by Jacques 
Defforey and Bernard Fournier, and composed of seven 
regional directors7 three merchandise directors, an 
ad mini st rat i ve / manag ement ai rect o r, and a social 
affairs/personnel director, would formulate the long term 
strategy of the grouP7 arid instigate the ciffusion of these 
strategies tO the shoo level (Points de Vente 177a 1976). 
The executive directorate was expected to meet once 
every 15 daYS7 and the role of the regional directors a YI 
this committee was regarded or vital 1mpo rt ance t0 
operational development 7 as these representatives were 
the 
ones mos"t involved at týie store "Level. For certain issues, 
such as the opening of a new store, decisions were 
to be 
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made Joint -, y by botn týje exec, _ttIve at-, a c)_cjl _E? ct 0 I_at s. 
As Ca r re fo ur -Irl tenCe (j T, **I eIP 
develop as ndepen(jer-It subsicilaries W --, 'C rl 
manacemen t st i,, ciecisions invoi. ving rie, --- e 0.: ) e 11 a,, -, 10 SSI 
were made independently from eitner of t he C 1'ect C) Jýa- as, 
With the exception of italy wýjich fell U'rlcei- the auspices O-F 
the executive directorate. Group investment in Spain was to 
be overseen by Bernard Fourniei-7 and that in Bra. ,, i1 
Jacques Defforey. The intention of this internal 
rearganisation was to spread responsibility througnout 
different levels of the group and to allow concentration on 
specitic activi ties. 
The decent ralisat ion of alAtharity within the Carrefour 
organisation is intended to provide great scope far 
flexibility, allowing store managers to respond to local 
factors and environmental conctitions. The arolAp coes not 
pursue a national price policy, allowIng individual stores 
to take advantage of any additional c3iscounts that ttiey can 
obtain from local suppliers. Similarly, each store may 
decide upon its own policy with regards to after sales 
service as, according to Bataille (1978), Jacques Defforey 
believes that the puolic should regard the grouo's stores 
primarily as autonomous units, and only secondly as part of 
the Carrefour organisation. 
. A. The group has been quici< to respond to charg, no 
consumer cemands., particularly the i nc reasi tic emoriasis 
p1 aced upon fresh food, and has adjusted the assortiyteri`t: 
TiIto T- t rie carriec by its stores accorci rig I Y- he res 1-t -L 
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care f 1-t I (yto r-I I r, o I- I -r-10 0f store assor-ý, Yient, a. sf 101.1 Ile 
Snows'! rias been a sreacy rise ýcne proportion of tne g ro LIPS 
sa., es accountec fc),, -- oy fres-i procil-tce (iarge. -,. y at -crie exoe-rise 
of grocery salesi, since 1574. imp rovement sin st oci-ý 
i-laric Ii nQ and COn-ul-01 tlave also contribuce to the ci rous =Cl 
conTinued success. Distribution costs are constantly under 
rev i ew at t he faly"Y Of7 aria in some i rist ances at t he 
i nd iVia Lia 17 goods leveli As a result of this Cont inuing 
review, t he average length Of StOCK rotation nas oeen 
reduced from 21.6 days in 1974 7 to 19.1 days in 177, and 
14.5 days in 41,38 1 (Ma renco 1984) 
According to Toussaint (1984), 60% of totaý I operating 
costs are personnel costs. in response t0t r"S7 
considerable effort has been channelled into controlling 
this e1 ement of expenditure7 wnicri nas remained rairly 
constant at around 8% of turnover during the 1976 to 1982 
period. Carrefour pride themselves upon their staff 
relat i oris and introduced a two-yearly convention for 
eitployeeS7 and an annual review of working conditions and 
contracts. The personnel policy appears to have been 
successfu! 7 as 
the group reports low absenteeism througnout 
its stores. 
The careful attention paid by Carrefour to Crilang I ng 
market cond it i ons and o pe rat i ng strategies is fu rt he r 
reflected in the new hypermarket openec at Etampes in August 
19 8 "'S (The Grocer 26/li/. L983). 7h is st o re has oeen 
del i berately adapted to suit "e economic recession of -c tie 
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Figure 13.3 : Carrefour - Sales by Type of GOcd- 
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tyl 9- a C) se i ne s-tore cesiaPI tlas Cleetl iýe'Oz silyP' 
false ceilinos or automatic energy control insta_ý _a*clorll arld 
f ew cecorative elements. Operating costs riave oeen t-< e,:: r 
d own by simple and f unct 10 na i fixtures aric 4a Oas Ic 
p resent at ion of mercnaricise witýi no special c:, Isolays- T ri e 
only exception to this low cost approach has been the f respi 
f ood department, in view of the iricreasec i lyl qQ rt a rice of 
this department to store sales. 
Although Carrefour themselves admittea in 1976 (L-SA 666 
1978) that the group was unlikely to be amongst the pioneers 
of EPOS systems, as at the time they regarded the technology 
as too expensive, they have monitored the developments in 
this field carefully, and have been quick to adopt other 
aspects of new technology. In 19817 an in-store credit 
card, the "Carte Pass" was introduced in a six store P'lot7 
and by the end of 1982 this card accounted for between 6 and 
7% of sales (LSA 930 1984b). However., ajongsice many otýier 
retailers., the group has reservations concerning the 
i nt rod uct i on of EFTPOS systems 7 sharing 
the generai belief 
amongst large retailers in France that bank charges are too 
high. 
Carrefour have been most 
concerneo with aovertising and 
LSA (942 1984a and 947 1984b) 
acteci as the major iocomotive for 
receptive to new tecnnologies 
promotional activities. As 
have reported, the caroup has 
mintel experiment, in tne 
N terminals ýiave oeen Compiegne region. Four thousand Mint-pe'l, 
installea throughout the region, anc Carrefour tlave taKen IJO 
80 of the 300 pages on the information system 
to a. vertise 
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1. cI nel r store at Comoieane. 'he Infol-tylatio-r-I On tne Systely, is 
up aazecC (R I 
Y, aric orovides or1 ces, e, C 01 
cu r ren t. and f ut u re p Vo, yc)t otis iano ri eie"o -F 
trie commerclai centre7 arid details of tne services of f erec 
by t he Carrefour store. -Iýie cost of this system to t tie 
cons ume r -is t1 he p r: L ce or a ptione c al 7asas pec 1 al 
telephone number provides access. Following the success of 
t his pilot scneme, Carrefo[A rare planning to equip nei I, 
remaining stores with this facility as quickly as t ýie 
expansion of Mintel allows. 
Carrefour again proved t0 be one 0ft tie leading 
innovators in French retailing in 19767 witn ttle launcn C) f 
their "Produits Libre" generic range. This development, the 
fi rst of its kina by a hypermarket o0erator in iý; *rance, 
proved to be an important publicity and marketing coup for 
-er t tian t tie Q ro up, and the goods themselves have sold bett 
expected. The initial impact of the 50 goods in tne 
original range was spectacular (L-SA 56C-) 1976), ano in the 
first ter days of sales they accounted for 12% of the 
turnover achieved by all the goocs in their specific ranges, 
and 3.5% of total store turnover. By the end of the firsit. 
year, (LSA 626- i977), the generic range accouritec for 47. of 
total turnover, and 40% of all sales in their respective 
ranges. 
From this successful start encompassing grocery, C r- ug , 
ana Perfume lines, the range was ex-cencec to probucts by 
Apri, 1978 ttirougýi the inclusion of fresh textile, 
'rooCS7 
483 
9000S. ! -, or a new good to me accea to range iz 
was -SSE c-A Q 10 --Iavc- es-7a. 3.14. rce s &. '- es 
vo1 ume7 so 71 ti a"C suppi lers WO U1 a 02 interestec. In 
add it iani _C was "n ecessarymain 4u- a _"ý ri rIC, 0,11 Q 1_1 S Ua 1JCY 
controi over these products 7 aria tne goocs chosen needed to 
be those for wnich a satisfactory comc)romise oetween price 
and qua-lity could be found. The success of the " Produi-ts 
L. 1bre" rarige nas prompted most of Carrefour"s competitors to 
develop their own generic arid own label lines7 a situation 
which pleases Denis Defforey... 
"it is always good to be "Y"tateC7 oecause when one 
of your competitors 1m1t at es Y0 1-( 7nea oes n 0"C 
innovate. " (LSA 666 1978) 
4 The image as the leading innovarbor I Y) French retaili-r-IQ 
is one of which Carrefour are understandably proud, and the 
group intends to preserve tnis reputation. To enriance ttie, 
groups reputation, Carrefour have been very imaginative with 
regaras to their promotiona! activities. One e1 ement af 
this is the monthly "Carrefour Journal" produced for each of 
its stores. , 
This eight page newsneet, which accounts for 
about 20% of the groups total advertising expenditure, is 
delivered free to approximately 560,000 households. 
Carrefour7 like other retaii groups, have made efforts 
to red uce rhe role of promotions i ri their advert is i ng 
st rat eg y. The croup believes (LSA 685 1978c), that the 
riy pe rma rK et was in canger of being swamped 
by p romot i ons, 
claims to have lead tile "return to calm" movement, with 
rewer promotions to disturb the c3aily routine of 
the stores, 
and with retailers developing more sophisticated publicity 
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strategies designed to entice specific customer segments. 
Pa rt 0ft ri 1S evolving advertising strategy has involved 
greater emphasis upon the building of a Carrefour i mag e 
Which stresses the qualitative aspects of the organisation 
(Clauteaux 1981). To achieve 
th'S7 the group employed the 
I tylpac-c advertising agency int he early 1980s to iielp 
construct the desired image. 
Despite the increasing emphasis placed upon quality by 
Carrefour and other hypermarket operators, price still 
remains central to the groups operating philosophy, and it 
is in relation to this aspect that Carrefour's advertising 
has been at its most innovative. In 1979, Carrefour first 
tangled with the thorny issue of comparative advertising, 
when the group launched an "economic indicator" (LSA 701 
1979). The intention of this initiative, instigated by 
Jacques Defforey, was to reinforce the ciscount element of 
tiie Carrefour operation. 
this index, which operated for six months, comprised of 
the price of a shopping basket of 200 brand name products, 
chosen each month by the Ifop-Elmar agency (wittlout prior 
consultation with Carrefour), from 430 
food ahd non-food 
goods featured in the Insee consumer price 
index. 7 he cost 
of this shopping basket in the 
Carrefour store was tirleýl 
compaired with the cost of the same goods 
in the stores of 
the group7 s four 1, nain competitors 
in the region in quest-on7 
and týle results were publisned 
locaIlY. 
The supporting publicity ca, Yi: -: )a1Q_n 
for týiis irit1 at ve, 
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o roan i sed by the agency behirld tý-= iaý, ýjcrj of tne 1,0 C t-ý s 
Lib res " (Roux 7 
Seq 1-te 1aI Cayac at'r-, GC)Iif- ý4. - Iric- iACL=C a 
Pub! ic re I at lotis Calyloa, I 19r, 
i"VOIVi*rIg public debates in --Ie 
University towns Of Angers, Borceaux, to re not1e7 ly iarSel LE 
Lyon, and Paris, on the theme of competition anc its role -n 
containing i rif 1 at i on. T, hese debate S7 L jacc ues 
Def fo rey and 1' 1fop rep resent at i ves, plus loca. 1. acadety, i cs, 
t rade and consumer orgarlisations, were intencec -botti to 
f ocus attention upon the Carrefour CaMPa'gn7 wriiisi. at ltirie 
same t ime diffusing some of the debate concerning the 
legality of comparative advertising campaigns of this 
'nat u re. 
he issue of comparative advertising was again to 
involve Carrefour in late 198.3. On 21st November 1981Z, t he 
Carrefour hypermarket at Chartres published a double page 
advert 4L n Republican" comparing the store"s prices 
over 150 product Li ties with those of its four lyla. j ar 
competitors in the area, a Rallye hypermarket at Luce; 
Leclerc at Luisant; and intermarchleo' stores at Mainvilliers 
and Co ud ray-C ha rt res (LSA 912 198%. 74). This advert was 
supported by a special edition of the store's "Car ref our 
Journal" and adverts carried upon buses in the town. 
This coup prompted furious reaction from competitors. 
The two L tit e rma rche stores responded by sending some of 
their employees around to the Carrefour store to purchase 
the goods featured in the acverts, which were 
tnen resolc at 
t he same prices in the Intermarch'eO stores 1 nt e rin a rCrl'e,, 
the 
a! oric witn Rallye also pi. iblishea statements In -oca- 
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01'ess Cetiouricinc-i trie one-si 1ý I i-= C, ece!: ) r) lCec Cý-fallacter_ a rl 
oI-tI his operat ..: L 0 tl 7 
1 s't o T, their own. 
an ye ,z roo ucec. & all -ve orice 
i tie campaign came as a complete suprise to ret a 11 
sector, as Ca r re four t1ad oeen moving towaras as0f 
iyia rk et i ng approach, wilCh ttie emphasis i-toon qual itY7 701' 
some time. Once again, Carrefour hac ped off a 
publicity coup to the chagrin of their rivals. Otne rCro 1-tio s 
began to follow the Carrefour lead and proauce trieir own 
versions Of the campaign, and a major pub'licity batt-le 
ensued between Carrefour with the slocan "Carrefol-ir invents 
comparative pricing", and Leclerc who responded wit h 
"Edouard Leclerc does better". and denounced "the crossroads 
of illusion" (Betts 198: 3). 
Ta ihe comparative advertising campaign encroached -tpon 
grey area of the law, and a series of law suits were brouctit 
against Carrefour and other promoters who adopted a Simi lar 
programme. in all, tile campaign is thought to have cost 
Carrefour 4 million francs in legal fees, as Arlaud (at 
Bourges), Auchan, Mammouth (at MOntess0n), and Leclerc took 
Carrefour to the courts (Hager 1984). Njost of these lega, 
caseswere brought against two aspects of the campaign. 
Some opponents argued that the campaign was potentially 
misleading arid, thereforej contravened article 44 of the ý-oi 
Royer which forbade ... 
"advertising of any form which makes faise statements, 
or which is likely to induce an error. " 
of the Penal Coce Whilst others refered to article 42' 
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AS debate a rew as tt tle 0' comoarative 
ad ve rt is i ng. 7 various representative groups mace -,,, neir views 
i-M 0w Iti. tie APCC 1 1984) anc t tie (Le, Commerce ly'acerrie 59-2 
Bureau de Ve'rification ce la Publici-Ice (LSA 929 1984a) 70 (3U ý' 
q uest io ned the true motive behind campaigns o"F this nacure, 
and pointed to the shortcomings in the methods used to d raw 
up the comparative lists. Foremost amongst their complaints 
were -chat the selectivity of articles meant t tiat price 
comparison was only f rag trent a ry, and. t tia*C P I, J. Ce levels 
needed to be ma i nt ai ned for a whole year t0 be z 11 I. I. L Y 
credibtP- -- These groups also stressed tnat price was only 
one element of retailing, and comparisons of this type 
ignored both quality and service considerations. 
The public authorities themselves were rat he r 
noncommittal in their response. The government acknowledged 
the general state of confusion generated by price 
comparisons, but in respone to deman0s for legislative 
reform,, bot h Crepeau (LSA 925-17 1984), and Catherine 
Lalumiere7 the Secretary of State -For Consumers, (LSA 9%. 04 
1984b) argued that price comparisons 9,11OUIC not be treated 
-t wit-i as a special case, anc should, therefore, only be cea-1 
in a general reform of the regulations concerned wlttl 
commercial comoetition. Co ns eq uent 1 y, 
the governmerir, ias 
left the regulation of these advertising calyPalgrls 
to t he 
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'r Una. L aria appeal co 1-t rt Sa1t 'tic ug ti I IY; ay 984 Le 
o mme rce 15 ers iyt o de rne 600 /* 9 C-) 
7 ýIe L OUnC Ii07 
stressec t 1-1 eI IYI 00 I"U aIrI Ce0L, -i e obectjvjý-, y ofior: Y1 a10 ýI 
7 cisplayec in acvertismen"cs. 
n the waKe of the successful publiclli; y COLIP ac ýi i eved 
by tne comparative advertising campaign, Larrefour launched 
a comparative quality campaign early in 1984 (LSA 924 j. 964a 
ant 925 1984). Týiis development can be seen as part of the 
overall long term strategy of the group to emphas i se 
quality. This new programme revealed t he results of 
laboratory tests carried out by the ATS (Assistance 
Technique Scient if ique) in Marseille on own brand wasnina 
powders and washing up liquids produced by the maj or 
retailers. Future plans involve simillar tests for shampoos, 
coffee, oils,, chocolate, and fres In produce. 
The sticcess of most of these adaptions and innovations 
J into the operating strategy of Carrefour since nt rad uced 
19747 can be iliustrated by the increase in productivity, 
measured by average sales per square metre of sales space, 
achieved by the group over the period (figure 1-Z1.4). in the 
case of Carrefour7 the improvements achieved in the fields 
of stock rotation and other aspects of the operation, 
alongside such i nn o vat i ye steps as tile int roduct i on of 
generic products and the originality and impact Of Publicity 
campaigns, has done MIACh to improve the performance of t he 
company, and maintain its position as the leading pioneer o,,: 
' 
hypermarket retailing. i he Royer legislation, by 
rest r1 ct i no or c3eiayiylg (jeveiopmevit at ttle local evel or 
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Figure 13.4 : Carrefour - Sales per Square Metre of 
Floorspace. 
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increasing the costs of new stares has merely succeecea 
In enco u raq i no groups such as Carrefou', -- to rev *-- ew z ne ir 
strategies, and ma ke adaptions t0 -C - tie Chang i -rig reta iI 
eviv iro timent wrlicn has reinforced their dominance in tne 
retail sector at the expenime of other retail organisations. 
13-6. SUMMARY 
The continued growth of the Carrefour group in spite of 
t he Loi Royer, provides a specific example of t he 
limitations of the legislation. By attempting primarily to 
control only one manifestation of the structural change 
taking place in the. retail environment, namely hypermarket 
location, the legislation has failed to influence other 
elements which have been equally important to the growth and 
development of large retail organisations. 
Carrefour has improved its position in the retail 
sector through adapting to the general trends towards 
concentration, by the acquisition of individual stores, 
collaboration in joint-subsidiary companies, and most 
recently through the formation of mega-centrales, and 
diversification into other retail sub-sectors. Similar-'Y7 
as far as the group"S overseas operations are concerned7 the 
group has disinvested from the more "modern" retail markets 
concertrate in the less deveiGped ones in which it is 
felt t hat t he retail environment provides the greatest 
potential for future hypermarket development. 
At a more micro-level the acaptions made to t tie 
company's operating strategy again reveals a keen perception 
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cilatlaes within the retall evivironment,. Store design arýd 
-: 3 roc 11 ct ranges illave oeen rev i sec a (ý e 
current trerios7 w i-ii 1 s7c titie rearrangeo MatlageMerl--, St r ucT U re 
and cont inued co mm i rn, ent ta oecent ra Ii sea mariagety, ent 
theoretically allows for qreater flexibiilty to meet oca 
conditions. in addition,, the adopt-Lori of new tecrinclogy in 
relation to Mintel terminals and i ri-st o re credit ca rc, s 
111 ust rates the gro up7 S awareness of technological Cnarice 
and deve 1o pment. Final ly, the innovative moves made Dy 
Carrefour with regards to their- promotional activities aric 
particuýlarly tile pioneering or own-la . oel anc generic brarcs., 
have done mucn to keep Carrefour at the foref ront of Frerciri 
retailing. 
It is such developments and adaptions as these, basec 
upon the ability and willingness to react t C) st r LLct u ra 1 
changes within the retail ervironment7 that have maintained 
the growth of the Carrefour group and the otiler leading 
large retail organisations in France. The Loi Royer has 
provided few limitations to developments and adaptions such 
as these which have provided the greatest threat to the 
independent small trader. 
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iN C. SN 
fl -c ne Co nc 1 las 10 11 aft hie 1r 157 ý, wo 1-K Bocce'yn nc 
"allarcer noted rl at 
"Public policy can thus on -I -LY Siow cown or postpone trie evo-lution of retailinq. 11 
T I his study of the effects of the Loi Royer upon nypermarket 
development in France would appear to suppo rt this. 
ase rt ion. Whilst tne reliance upon seconcary data for the 
information concerned with new store openings and 
applications to the CDUCs and CNUC may question the validity 
of some of the conclusions arawn from the analysis, it is 
f el t that by obtaining and comparing triis information from 
a range of sources such charges can be refuted successfully. 
Such an approach also provides a check upon the accuracy of 
the data. Fu rt he rm o re, the impressions gained from the 
study have received support during unstructured interviews 
undertaken with developers, retailers, academics7 retail 
consultants, and Ministry of Commerce staff as part of the 
study. 
10 evaluate the success of any public policy measure 
one must refer to the specific aims of the legislation. the 
t iming of the 1 nt rod uct i on of the Loi Royer following 
per i ods of militant act-ivity on the part of small retailer 
pressure groups, and prior to Natiorlai Assembly elections 
firmly Suggests that the legislation was in part cesigned to 
pacify these interest groups. in t-, iis aity, the 'Lol 
Royer 
must be regarded as a success. iýie threat of 
CID-UNATI ýias 
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been removed as both membership anc support for tne grol-to 
ýias aeclinec. 
Associateci wit h th-is aim is what is regarced as t tie 
f und ament. al caoal of the law,, namely to protect t tie styla i j. 
shopkeeper sector f rom the perceived threat of t he 
hypermarket and other large stores. 1n this aim the 
legislation must be said to have failed. Development of 
nypermarkets, has continued in France and the "Grandes 
Surfaces" groups and other large organised retailers have 
reinforced their share of both hypermarket numbers and 
floorspace at the national and local level. Furthermore, 
any gains that the independent sector may have appeared to 
have made, have largely accrued to the organised or 
affiliated independents,, s-uch as Leclerc and Intermarchoeo, 
rather than the traditional small independent trader that 
the law sought to protect. 
Although tile developers appear to have made adaptions 
their application st-rategy in face of the legislation, 
most of these developments may find explanation in other 
forces. The decline in the number of new hypermarkets 
opening each year, and in the average size of these stores 
can be seen to have been underway before the legislation 
could have hoped to have had any effect. Similarly, 
escalating costs, regional infilling, plus the saturation of 
stores in large towns and the ensuing movement towards the 
middle markets may provide equally plausible explanations 
for these trends, other than the effects of the legislation. 
The legislation ratner than instigating change, appears to 
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riave oniY served to reinforce existing tj-erjc:, s. 
Finally, a tnird possibie aim of trie legisiation, -C tie 
cecerit rai isat ion 0ft ne at-it no r ity t0o et e rm i ne ret ai 
P rov isionta the local leve'. *L, must also be regarced tias 
hav 1 TIO fai1 ed Whilst it can not be deriled tiat the CDUCs 
have influenced local oevelopment in the Stio Y-t 
-kI e-r (Y' 
7 by 
thel r ability to delay (if not prevent) project 
S7 t tie 
ultimate decision with regards to proposals remains with týie 
cent ra I adm ini st rat i on. The large number of appeals . nas 
ensu red t hat in many instances the minister has still 
determined the structure of retailing at the local level. 
Th is authority reduces the role of the CDUC at the local 
level, and appears to be highly susceptible to electoral 
mot i vat io ns. In addition, the intervention of the judiciary 
1nso me CaSeS7 has introduced af Urt he r., urienvisageC 7 
level of control which further reduces the ability of tile 
CDUCs to in f -1 I-tence retail development in their own 
40 departements. 
Given that the law has failed to prevent hypermarket 
growth, and has done little to improve the position of the 
slyla 11 independent traders in relation t0 large store 
retai lers, one must search for explanations 
for tills 
failing. One aspect which should riot be discounted is 
misguidence. To many, the volume of applications rejected 
anci t lie low success rat es 
for hypermarke-t deve Io pmeri-c 
i rid i cat et hat t iie legislation ilas 
been SUCcessf ul anc 
trierefore7 there is little need for change. However, closer 
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ariaiysis of CDUC and C"\iLjC: becisions sýjows trla-r, lylost of= 
success is iliusory. in the case of app. Lica-t; jorls oasec; ijpoýr-, 
nypermar IKea eve Io pment t ne re has 1-tric o 1-1. ot ec. L y beer-, arl 
oversiAoscript ion 0 proposals at t ety, pt oy tie 
developers to counter low success rat es. Fu rt he rino re., atl 
i ryip o rt ant dist inCt ion shaI. k 1d be made bet ween t tie "C ot a -1 
number ýof applications, and the number of applications mace 
for a single site. Often success rates f0r particular 
target catchment a reas a re hioner than is 1 mmec- l- at e1y 
apparent, and high numbers of rejections merely represent 
delay in development ratrier than prevention. 
The most obvious reason for the lack of success of the 
Loi Royer in curtailing hypermarket c3rowtri must lie witti the 
loopholes within the legislation. Restrictive measures of 
this type invariably do not provide for all contingencies, 
and developers are quick to exploit any shortcomings that 
can be f0 und. Technicalities within definitions, t he 
"fronting" of applications, and the purchase of 
authorisations are all methods by which operators have 
circumvented the restrictions of tile legislation. 
Other adaptions made by developers to bypass the 
legislation include a greater use of extensions to existing 
bu i1di ngs, particularly those that Woulb upgrace a 
supermarket to hypermarket status, and 
the acquisition of 
eit tier individual stores or companies. 
This latter trenc 
has far greater IlylpIlcatiorls. for the retail sect 
or as 
wno 
le7 
and for the sMall independent sector 
it, pal-ticular, 
as it reinforces the general trend 
towards concentration and 
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"crie dominance of týie sectoiý by fewer, -a rcie-i- c) rg a ri: sa 
U I- eq 1-ta sic-Irlificarice r-jas oeeý-, tne Q reat er emon as is 
p. L aced up0 -rI supermarkets by cevelopers. ier success 
rates for applICatiOns for t. -C he r1is form or b eve opme t1t 7 
general trend towards smaller uYlits, and t he g rowt h0f 
o ra an i sed independents have all encouraged trus trend. ri 
parallel with this development has been a c3rowina riumber of 
supermarket openings each year7 and a growth iri týie numcer 
of smal 1 self-service stores falling below the size 
thresholds necessary for a project to be referred to the 
CDUCs. -these developments have the effect of introducing 
organised retai lers, whether indepencents or other forms, 
into a more direct confrontation with the small shop sector. 
At t he crux of the matter, however, lies what is 
probably the most impo rt ant sho rtcom i ng of t he Royer 
legislation, its failure to influence the underlying 
structural trends and changes within the retail env iro nment 
which encourages the development of new retail institutions 
like the hypermarket. The Loi Royer effectively only seeks 
to control the spatial location of the hypermarket, the 
mainifestation or result of more deep-rooted and influen"Cial 
structural processes. 
At a general level, concent rat i on re i rif o rc ing t he 
buying power arid cominance of the large firms has continuec 
týjrougjj acquisition and collaboration, arid the strucitural 
t rend towaras di vers 1f icat i on has 1 rit ro d uced t he large 
retail organisations into sectors traditionally cominared by 
497 
smal 1inae peric en-t s. 1n adoition the t rend -flowarcs the 
c3eve. L o pment Of 'y"-klt'vlatlOtla. ' "etal-L Compariies nas ý=_eer ri e 
investment Of CaPital outsice trie COLtYlt'ry arici tne rewarcs of 
ttiese investments nave mainta3. -r-tec tne POsitlOy's Of tne larc3e 
retai 1 companies,. Final ly, t th e aC3 a Ot 10 n af operatiric 
strategies as the large retailers I-espond to changes in the 
retail env i ronment encouraging the aeveloPment of own- 
brand and generic products; the acoption of new tecrinology; 
a switch from price to quality consciousness; adjustments in 
store design and product ranges offered; and more 
sophisticated advertising or promotional practices, all of 
which have aaain served to strengthen the position of the 
dominant J reatilers. 
Whilst the Lai Royer can not be specifically blamed for 
these developments which relate to deep-rooted structural 
chance within the retail environiytent7 it can be argued that 
the legislation by increasing the costs, and celaying the 
development of new storeS7 has focused management attention 
upon these issues and indirectly encouraged their adoption. 
These developments which the inaependent retailer is 
generally unable or unwilling to respond to, and adapt tQ7 
are likely to provide the greatest threat to this 
organisational sector, yet the Lai Royer pro vides little 
form of control over any of these developments. 
The Lai Royer7 somewhat 1rO"iCaI'Y7 may even have 
encouraceb certain developments ý_j hiCh will 
fu rt he r 
disadvantage the small retailer groups wý"Ch it was intencec 
to orotect. 7 he 11 G ratic es Surfaces" a rgam sat 
ions are 
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developing Smaller rtypermal-Kets aric supermarkers', rf 0co ubt 
ericouraQed Oy ttle nigner success , 'atVs for tnese -types 0; 
deve 1a pme"t 7 arld this treric is liKely to bring tiriese groups 
into more direct conflict witn trie indepencent trader a-r, -, ne 
local i eve 1. Simi lar-2, y, t tie 9 rowt haf organised or 
affi. L ' iated independent retailing tias created a new source C) 
conflict within the organisational sector 7 oet ween 
o rgan i sed or affiliated incepencents, and the traditionai 
'Anafiliated trader. Final 'Y7 trends towards diversification 
have introduced large retail organisations into sectors 
which have traditionally been dominated by the indepencents. 
Consequent I y, the Royer-legislat-Jon which was designed to 
reduce conflict, may paradoxically have created other forms 
of conflict. 
in all the models relating to institutional change in 
the retail sector7 the influence of the retail env iro nmen't 7 
and the changes within 
't7 
is crucial to the appearance, 
evolut'on7 and survival of innovations. Consequent ly, if 
any legislation is to be successful in influencing the 
development of the retail sector it must address itself to 
these issues. Furthermore, the retail environment is in a 
constant state of change, and legislation pertaining to it 
I'A ust likewise be, flexible and adaptable in order to respond 
to these changes. As retail techniques and i nst it ut 10 ris 
evolve, so should public policy measures. 
Control of the forces of chance within the environment 
is far from easy. The influence of legislation outsic: e the 
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ret a ii sect ordi rected pr1 lyla ri L 
y 
ot ne r soc 1 (a 
ec ono iY, ic issues may weii nave ;ý , Die to -C 01Q, . Lay jr, IYI a rl 1 
aricl ai rect 1 rig Cnarige It' the Consumer at1c; 0 rc a rlisac la 71 a 
c0 IYI P0 rient s0ft tie ret a 11 env i), onlylent. Pub i ic 00-ICY 
tyieasu res, within t he retail sector are likely to r-, avea 
areater chance 0f success if they are positive aric 
developmental 
7 rather than of trhe rieg. ati I ive and contro"I type. 
It would seem to be a better course of act i or-, to 
recognise and monitor charge within the retail secto 17 aric 
to channel resources i tit 0 programmes which help t he 
"disadvantaged" sectors of the retail community such as t he 
independent trader, to adapt and respond to these trends. 
The provision of educational facilities,, the encouragement 
of collaboration, and even direct financial incentives., 
which encourage the "organised" development of small 
retailers may all prove to be useful. The success of 
privately-engineered organised independent retailing, 
epitamised by Leclerc and Intermarche, would seem to point 
to the advantages of "organised" development of this nature. 
However, one major barrier to constructive approaches 
and policies is the cost. Generally, developmental measures 
cost more to implement than control-type policies. The 
unwillingness of governments to free financial resources for 
the retail sector7 as is the case in other economic 
sectors, is a common feature in most countries of western 
Europe. Given the growing importance of retailing in trie 
economy, both as an producer of wealth and as an employer, 
governments may have to review this attitude. 7he ot 
her 
C; oo 
ba rr iert0d eve 1o pment a1 policies aI med at t, ýI e sly, Ot I 
-o be the reactlon anC attiti-tce of ret aiIer is li-ýeiy 
ndepenben traders t hemse 1 ves towards S 1-1 C1 schemes. 
I Tie rt ia aric conservatism doo(tinate in this orgarl-1sa-Cionai 
sector7 and attempts will have to be mace to alter t hese 
views. 
Unless public policy in the retail sector seeks to 
i nf 1 uence t he st r uct Lira 1c hang es o cc urri ng wit ýI int he 
environment, and is adaptable to these changeS7 one can only 
agree with the conclusions reached by Hollander (197-Ij 
that ... 
11 ret ai 1-o rient at ed PI. Lb 1ic policy tends t0 be atl 
in fI tience upon, but has not normally been the f ina. 1 
determinant of retail structure and practice. " 
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code 
d6p. 
I 
D6partement 
Ain 
Aisne ...... Allier 
... ... Alpes-Maritimes 
Ard&che . .... ... Ardennes .... ... Aube 
... ... ... ... Aude 
Bouches-du-Rh6ne 
Calvados 
.... ... .... ... Cantal 
.... Charente 
... Charente-Maritime 
.... Cher 
... ..... . ........ .... Corr6ze 
Corse ........ .. C6te d'Or 
C6tes-du-Nord 
P rdogne P. 
ubs 
Dr6me 
Eure 
.... Eure-et-Loir 
... Finis, bre 
Gard 
Garonne (Haute) 
Geýs 
.... Gironde 
Hdrault 
Ille-et-Vilaine 
Indre 
Indre-el-Loire ..... ...... Isere ...... Jura ..... ....... .. Landes ... ......... Loir-et-Cher ...... Loire 
Loire (Haute) ................. Loire-Atl antique ................ Loiret .ý.... I .............. Lct-et-Garonne ... ............ Maine-et-Loire 
Manche ...... .... Marne .. ý.. ý............... Marne (Haute) ........ Mayenne 
Meurthe-et-Mosellie 
Meuse ........... Morbihan 
Moselle 
Ni6vre 
Nord 
Oise 
Orne 
Pas-de-Calais 
Puy-de-Ci6me 
Pyr6nees-Atlantiques 
Pyrenees (Hautes) 
Pyren6es-Or ien tales 
Rhin (Bas) 
Rhin (Haut) 
Rhone 
Sa6ne (Haute) 
Sa6ne-et-Loire 
Sartrie 
Savoie 
Savoie (Haute) 
Paris 
Seine-Maritime 
Seine-et-Marne 
Yvelines 
S&vres (Deux) 
Somme 
Tarn 
Tarn-et-Garonne 
Var 
Vaucluse 
Vendee 
Vienne 
Vienne (Haute) 
Vosges 
Yonne 
Belfort (Territoire de) 
Essonne 
Hauts-de-Seine 
Seine-Saint-Denis 
Val-de-Marne 
Val-d'Oise 
Iný 
Appendix : The DeparteMents of 
France. 
SEE 
INSET 
11 APPENDIX 2: Hypermarket Characteristics. 
Dawson J. A.,, Burt S. L.,, and Sparks L. (1983) 
Definition 
Various agencies have attempted to provide short definitions of a hyperTnarket. 
None of these definitions, often because of brevity, is wholly successful. The 
following is an attempt to distill the essence of hyperTnarket retailing in temis 
of its operational characteristics. Whilst riot all the following characteristic,, 
are present in all hypermarkets the- mix of features commonly present include: - 
A retail establishment usually operated by a horizontally integrated 
cýain organisation. (corporate, co-operative or contractual) - 
2 2. A sales area of at least 2 500 m In the U. K. stores with a sales 
a of 2. rr? -59 000 are often called superstores with the 
term hypermarket liffdted to units over 5,000 md sales area. In 
addition to the sales area them is a substantial non-sales area 
given over to storage. - 
3. The merchandise mix usually results in at least 35 per cent of sales 
area in non-food goods. 
4. The Rroduct ranae usually involves a wide assortment and shallow 
range of goods with relatively few brands of any one product. 
5. The rTerrhandisiM 221icy is one-of mass, scrambled merchandising 
with low margins and high sales volumes. 
6. The store sales techniqLw is one of complete custwer self-service 
with the customer checking out all purchases at a single front-end 
station. 
7. Stores generally have extended 222ning hours in the evenings and at 
weekerxis. 
Associated operations integral to the main retail store, typically 
ar, e cafeteria, petrol sales, tyre bay ana garaen cen-cre wirn, in s5crw 
cases, other associated operations such as timber sales. 
Tt%c level of automation in store operation is high with frequently 
scanning systems and heavy use of pallets including manufacturer 
packed caged palletsG' 
10. The supply channels for the store involve a high proportion of goods 
obtai-nieia. -q. -Inh large lots,, directly f): xn the manufacturer. 
-11. Associated car P usually on the store stte provides 
space for 
often over 1,, ýW cars with parking ratios fmquently over 
15 places '05 
per hundxed nF es spaces. 
12 Development of the hypennarket site and property is usually 
initiated 
by the retail operator. A 
13. Early schemes favoured locations in out-of-town or edge-of-town 
positions but more recently hypermarkets have 
been operated in all 
types of location including inner cities, within shopping centres 
and in small towns. The major locational criterion would appear 
to 
be a catchment population generally in excess of 
30,000 people. 
14. Hypermarket desio stresses f\=tion with stores hcwing 
few 
architectural frills and seeking energy conservation. 
15. nt structure tends to be decentralized with store management 
-- -- -- -2 %- 414 4- ,ý F'M Tý 
4- V% ga rn! M An Tý 
-777; OT- eXeCU-ClVe re5PQnb-IL-U--L-lLIy v-'-" 
nn - r, )A 
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Has the 
Lol Royer 
had any 
effect ? 
Steve Burt 
Department of Business Studies, 
University of Stirling 
The independent shopkeeper in France 
his always played a very Important 
role, stud historically they have been 
supported - if only In theory - by 
government intervention. Hyper- 
markets began to develop in France in 
the early 1960s and it was not long 
before their Increasing share of total 
retail trade begin to alarm the smaller 
operators. In 1973 the W Royer, which 
attempted to restrict hypermarket 
expansion beyond certain limits, was 
Introduced. Has it had any effect? Or 
has the slowing down (n hypermarkets 
in France his been due to a number of 
other causes? 
Steve Burt suggests that the law may 
not have had the restrictive effect that 
was expected. Any decline in the 
number of large units opened may be 
attributable to changing economic con- 
ditions and organisational trends. 
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IN JUNE 1963 the first hypermarket 
in France was opened at St Genevieve 
des Bois by the Carrefour company. 
The arrival of this innovation and the 
associated techniques of self-service, 
discounting, and mass scrambled 
merchandising through large area 
units, was to have a profound impact 
on the retail sector in France. French 
retailing, dominated by small, family- 
owned businesses operating high 
margin/high price policies, was sud- 
denly introduced to modern retailing 
techniques, and the ensuing loss of 
market share and closure of marginal 
outlets that this clash of techniques 
entailed (Messerlin 1982). The threat- 
ened small shopkeepers took to the 
street under the leadership of a militant 
cafe owner, Gerard Nicoud, and suc- 
ceeded in provoking the government 
into providing some form of legislative 
I 
protection against the hypermarket 
developers in the shape of the Loi 
Royer of December 1973. 
Part of this legislaticm altered the 
composition of the advisory Com- 
missions EMpartementale dUrbanisme 
Commercial (CDUC) established in 
1969, and gave them far greater powers 
for controlling reWl developments. All 
planning applications for new retail 
units with a sales area in excess of 1,500 
sq metres (or 1,000 sq metres in com- 
munes of less than 40,000 inhabitants), 
extensions of over 200 sq metrcs to 
existing units, and changes to retail use 
of buildings in these size categories 
were required to obtain the approval of 
these new control bodies from May 
1974. (Dawson 1976, Fries 1978). 
In view of the potentially restrictive 
powers granted to the revised CDUCs, 
one would expect to observe a marked 
Figure 1 Hypermarket openings 
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Hypermarkets in France 
slowing down in hYpermarket growth 
in France since the law was introduced. 
However, detailed analysis of the 
number, ownership, and other charact- 
eristics of hypermarkets in France - 
based on annual listings published by 
LSA, Points de Mente, and company 
reports - suggests that the Royer 
legislation may not have had as great 
an impact on the hypermarket sector 
as initially expected. 
Trends In development 
The number of hypermarkets opened 
each year shows a drop in units opened 
in 1974 and 1975, the years immed- 
iateiy following the legislation, from a 
peak of 62 units in 1972. Subsequently 
the number of new units has fluctuated 
around a figure of about 30 units per 
year. Initial reaction to this decline may 
suggest that this trend is primarily due 
to the Loi Rcyer. However, general 
economic trends - affecting company investment and expansion - should 
not be ignored. The decline in 1971 (see 
figure 1) cannot be attributed to the 
legislation, and owing to the construc- 
tion delay between planning a new unit 
and opening it, the sharp drop of 1974 
and 1975 may be more plausibly 
explained by economic factors relating 
to the oil crisis of 1973, as the first units 
to pass through the CDUCs would be 
unlikely to open before 1976. Despite 
the Loi Royer, there has in fact been 
steady hypermarket growth, which has 
shown little sign of tailing off - as figure 2 illustrates - with only a slight 
change in the growth gradient since 
1975. 
Although there has been a decline in 
the average size of the new units open- 
ing-, from around 5,500-6,000 sq metres, 
of sales area in 1972, to 4,000-4,500 sq 
metres in 1982, this trend was evident 
before 1975, so the effect of the legis- 
lation on store size may be merely to 
reinforce general trends already under- 
way. Once again, the trend in size may 
be explained by other factors, as 
economic trends and competition for 
sites will have increased the costs of 
land and construction, encouraging a 
move towards smaller stores. This trend 
was reinforced as the larger agglomera- 
tions and markets developed, forcing 
companies into smaller towns and 
middle markets whose reduced catch- 
ment populations justify smaller units. 
This drift towards smaller stores is 
reflected in the growing proportion of 
new units opening which are between 
2,500 and 4,999 sq metres in size. In 
1972,38.7107a of new units fell into this 
size category, rising to 59.5076 in 1976, 
and 75.807o in 1982. 
Ownership trends 
For categorisation purposes five differ- 
ent organisational types are commonly 
distinguished in the French ret" sector. 
The Grandes Surfaces organisations 
(eg Carrefour, EuromarcM, Auchan) 
who trade primar-ily through hyper- 
markets and operate few other types of 
outlet; the department /variety store 
chains (Au Printemps, Galeries 
Lafayette) who have moved into the 
hypermarket sector as the department 
17 
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Table 1: Proportion of total hypermarket ftoorspace and total number of units controlled by different organisational types. 
1972 
ORGANISATIONAL % 
TYPE F/S (No. ) 
Grandes Surfaces 
Organisations 36.9 (26.5) 
Branch Multiple 
Organisations 31.3 (32.8) 
Co-operative Societies 3.7 6.3) 
Department/Variety 
Store Chains 11.2 (10.8) 
Affiliated Independents 5.9 9.3) 
Unaffiliated Indep. and 
others 10.9 (14.2) 
and variety stores have lost market 
penetration; the branch multiples 
(Radar, Comptoirs Modernes, and the 
companies associated with the Paridoc 
buying group and trading under the 
Mammouth banner) who opemte a 
much wider spectrum of store types; as 
do the Co-operative Societies and the 
Independents. The share and influence 
of these rive organisation types in the 
hypermarket sector has varied over 
time, as table I shows. 
The Grandes Surface organisations 
- the group which the legislation was 
intended to restrict - have continued 
to increase their share of both numbers 
and floorspace. The Co-operative 
societies, and affiliated independents 
- those belonging to groups like 
Ltclerc, Codec and Intermarche - 
have also increased their share of the 
Sector. 
These gains have been at the expense 
of the depart men t/variety store groups 
-. vho have seen their share decline 
rapidly owing to the financial problems 
faced by these orWisations in general, 
and the tendency to opemte in the 
hypermarket sector indirectly. 11YPical 
in this respect is Au Printemps, who 
sold their hypermarkets, to EuromarcM 
in 1976, in return for a 24.3% share- 
holding in that company. The decline 
of the unaffiliated independent sector 
is associated with the growth of the 
affiliated sector. The growth of the 
latter sector may only reflect a growth 
in affiliations, as much independents 
entering the hypermarket sector are 
1977 1982 
F/S (Noj F/S (No. ) 
49.1 (37.3) 52.6 (41.0) 
27.8 (28.9) 24.8 (25.9) 
6.5 ( 8.9) 6.7 ( 8.8) 
31(2.9) 2.8 ( 3-0) 
9.1 (14.5) 10.9 (17.7) 
4.4 ( 6.7) 2.1 ( 3.4) 
now affiliated to integrated groups. 
Finally. the multiple sector has declined 
slowly over the same period due to the 
varying fortunes of the large number 
of companies in this classification 
category. 
Continued growth - some 
explanations 
The initial spread and, despite restrict- 
ive legislation, the apparent continued 
growth of the hypermarket in France 
may be explained by a variety of fac- 
tors. The c; dstence of several favourable 
circumstances for hypermarket growth 
- related to the characteristics of the 
population, migration, urban pattern, 
standard of living, and adoption of 
new innovations - in France have been 
well documented elsewhere (Smith 1973 
and others), and have undoubtedly 
contributed to hypermarket growth. 
The passive support of the govern- 
ment for the modernisation of the 
distributive trades prior to 1973, and 
the late development of self service 
techniques in France have also aided 
development. The supermarket only 
came to France in the late 1960s, and 
was consequently adopted at the same 
time or immediately preceding the 
hypermarket. As a result the hyper- 
market arrived as part of the more 
general self service innovation, and did 
not have to face the resistance of a well 
established self service sector. 
The strongly regionalised nature of 
the French retail system, with the 
majority of firms concentrating their 
18 RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1984 
operations in specific areas of the 
country, has certainly helped the 
extensive acceptance of the hyper- 
market. Over half the d6partements of 
France have a density of hypermarket 
floorspace of over 46 sq metres per 
1,000 inhabitants in 1982. This wide- 
spread high density of floorspacc has 
been generated by the increased influ- 
ence of the neighbourhood process of 
spatial diffusion, as companies have 
expanded by the infilling of middle 
markets in their own regions, rather 
than by developing in the national 
market. 
Finally, further reasons for con- 
tinued growth may be found in the 
changing expansion policies pursued by 
retail organisations. The acquisition of 
either individual units or retail com- 
panies, allowing the concentration of 
resources and continued growth of 
certain organisations, has become a 
I 
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French hypers, like the British, meet the need for personalised service 
common feature of the hypermarket, 
and indeed the retail, sector since 1976. 
Docks de France acquired La Ruche 
Picarde in 1990, and a 505i holding in 
Cofradel in 1979. Simflafly, Cedis took 
over Econorniques M-oyens in 1977, and 
the GEM hypermarkets -of the Goulet 
TUrpin group became Euromarche 
outlets in 1978. 
Not all merger and acquisition activ- 
ity has been successful; for example, 
Carrefour failed in its attempt to 
absorb its subsidiary companies and 
acquire the Cora group's hypermarkcts 
in 1973, and Au Printemps made an 
unsuccessful bid for Radar in 1979. 
This trend towards concentration has 
also been maintained by Carrefour 
developing many of its hypermarkets 
since 1972 through subsidiary com- 
panies - Sogara, Sogramo, and GSD 
- controlled on a 50: 50 basis with 
regional multiples such as Guyenne et 
= C) Cll 
Gascogne, Comptoirs Modernes and 
I'Allobrogc. 
The Grandes Surfaces organisations 
have been the major beneficiaries of 
these takeovers, whilst unaffiliated 
independents appear to have been the 
major Mrgets. This process of growth 
through acquisition has allowed com- 
panies to develop and expand whilst 
avoiding the CDUCs- There has been 
a slowing down in the number of take- 
overs in the last few years, which may 
be attributed to the general financial 
climate, and the fact that the most 
susceptible units and companies have 
now changed hands. 
Organisations have also continued to 
expand floorspace by the extension of 
existing units. There has been an 
increasing proportion of new units 
opened each year accounted for by 
stores which have been enlarged from 
supermarkets - reflecting in part the 
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entry of affiliated independents into 
the hypermarket sector. Similarly, 
extensions to existing units since 1968 
had added over 32,000 sq metres of 
sales area. Allowing for the 115,000 sq 
metres lost in rationalisation pro- 
grammes carried out on hypermarkets, 
a net gain of over 200,000 sq metres has 
been made to existing hypermarket 
floorspaceý The vast majority of this 
additional floorspace (8507o) has been 
added since 1974. The multiple organ- 
isations in particular have concentrated 
on the rationalisation and development 
of existing units, a policy which may 
reflect the approach of site saturation 
in their regional markets. 
Conclusion 
Analysis of hypermarket development 
in France suggests that the Loi Royer 
may not have had the restrictive effect 
on growth that was expected. The share 
of retail sales taken by hypermarkets 
has continued to rise to around 12qo 
(compared with 6074 in 1972) as the 
total number and total floorspace has 
continued to grow. Any noted decline 
in the number of units and average size 
. of units opening each year may be equally explained in terms of changing 
economic conditions, the regional 
nature of the retail trade in France, and 
organisational trends. Similarly, the use 
of different methods of expansion such 
as acquisitions and extension of exist- 
ing floorspace has helped to maintain 
growth - particularly of the Grandes 
Surfaces organisations, the very group 
which the legislation was intended to 
restrict m 
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